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Abstract
Intelligent Design (ID) is a contemporary attempt to defend the idea that the order of nature
bears marks of its Creator. The movement began in the U.S.A. during the 1980´s and 1990´s,
and its claims about the relationship of theology and science, and its critique of evolutionary
theory have caused much controversy. This study is a theological and philosophical analysis
of ID’s design argument and its presuppositions. ID is contrasted with naturalistic
evolutionism and theistic evolutionism, and related to the broader discussion of natural
theology. The study attempts to provide a more balanced and nuanced view of both the
strengths and weaknesses of ID’s argumentation than much of the previous discussion. The
study’s main focus is on increasing understanding of the ID movement’s argumentation, but
some evaluation of the arguments of the discussion is also included and criticisms are
developed.
ID’s design arguments are quite minimalistic, not aspiring to prove the existence of
God, but merely of an unidentified intelligent designer of cosmic and biological teleology. It
also emphasizes the scientific nature of its design argument. Consequently, much discussion
has focused on the question of whether ID is better understood as part of the natural
sciences, or as philosophical-theological idea. Though this study also considers this
philosophical question, it also emphasis that it is not the central question of the debate, since
good arguments are not restricted to science. So, it is more interesting to ask why people
believe or do not believe in the designedness of the cosmos and how good the arguments for
each view are. The definition of natural science is a side-issue in the discussion of these
questions.
The study argues that ID’s design argument is best understood as an inference to the
best explanation that is supported by the analogy between nature’s teleological order and the
teleological capabilities of minds. The credibility of this design argument depends not only
on our philosophical and theological background beliefs, but also on the empirical evidence.
Theological and philosophical a priori -considerations arguments are not sufficient to settle
the debate on ID apart from empirical study of what the world is like. Nevertheless, the
theistic and naturalistic worldviews that have been defended in the discussion are not based
merely on scientific data, but also on philosophical, metaphysical and theological
considerations.
While emphasizing its scientific nature, the ID movement also seeks to build bridges
between science and religion. Rather than conflicting with each other, ID argues that science
and theology support each other, when they are rightly understood. Though this study
supports the basic premise that there can be mutually beneficial dialogue between science
and theology, it also warns against emphasizing the importance of scientific arguments to
such an extent that the broader metaphysical, philosophical and theological nature of the
doctrine of creation and the value of non-scientific arguments is forgotten. The study also
argues that contrary to some of ID’s argumentation, one can believe both in divine design
and Darwinian evolution at the same time. This compatibility thesis can surprisingly be
argued not only on the basis of broader theological and philosophical arguments, but also on
the basis of the ID movement’s own ideas.

Tiivistelmä
Älykkään suunnittelun liikkeen (Intelligent Design, ID) pyrkimyksenä on puolustaa ajatusta,
että luonnonjärjestys sisältää merkkejä jonkinlaisen luojan toiminnasta. Liike on saanut
alkunsa Yhdysvalloissa 1980- ja 1990-luvuilla, ja sen väitteet luonnontieteen ja teologian
yhtymäkohdista sekä sen esittämä evoluutioteorian kritiikki ovat herättäneet runsaasti
kiistaa. Tämä tutkimus analysoi liikkeen käyttämiä keskeisiä argumentteja ja niiden
taustaoletuksia. Tutkimuksessa älykkään suunnittelun liikkeen ajatukset asetetaan osaksi
laajempaa keskustelua teologian ja luonnontieteen suhteesta. ID:n ajattelua myös verrataan
vaihtoehtoisiin näkemyksiin, erityisesti naturalismiin ja teistiseen evolutionismiin.
Tavoitteena on näin analysoida älykkään suunnittelun argumenttien vahvuuksia ja
heikkouksia aiempaa keskustelua tasapainoisemmalla ja tarkemmalla tavalla.  Tutkimuksen
pääasiallinen tavoite on älykkään suunnittelun liikkeen argumentaation ymmärtäminen,
mutta se sisältää myös keskustelussa käytettyjen argumenttien arviointia ja kritiikkiä.
Älykkään suunnittelun liike painottaa argumenttiensa tieteellistä luonnetta, ja katsoo
argumenttiensa pystyvän lähinnä jonkin tuntemattoman suunnittelijan olemassaolon
todistamiseen. Aiempi keskustelu on usein keskittynyt kysymykseen siitä, tulisiko ID
ymmärtää osaksi luonnontiedettä vai teologis-filosofiseksi ajatukseksi. Tämä tutkimus
sivuaa myös tätä filosofista kysymystä, mutta painottaa, ettei luonnontieteen määritelmän
tulisi olla keskustelun keskeisin kysymys, sillä hyvät perusteet eivät rajoitu vain
luonnontieteen sisälle. Sen sijaan on olennaisempaa kysyä, miksi ihmiset uskovat tai eivät
usko luonnon suunnitelmallisuuteen, ja kuinka hyviä kunkin näkemyksen puolesta esitetyt
perusteet ovat. Tutkimuksessa tuodaan esille, että kaikki keskustelun osapuolet hyödyntävät
merkittävässä määrin myös filosofisia ja teologisia argumentteja ja oletuksia. Juuri näihin
asioihin liittyvien kysymysten analysointi on nostettu tutkimuksessa keskeiseen asemaan.
Tutkimuksen mukaan ID-liikkeen suunnitteluargumentti on järkevintä ymmärtää
parhaaseen selitykseen tähtääväksi päätelmäksi, jota tuetaan analogialla luonnon
päämääräsuuntautuneen järjestyksen ja mielen kykyjen välillä. Suunnitteluargumentin
uskottavuus riippuu filosofisista ja teologisista taustaoletuksistamme sekä käsityksestämme
luonnontieteellisestä todistusaineistosta. Keskustelussa esitetyt maailmankuvat eivät siis
perustu vain luonnontieteen tuloksiin, vaan myös filosofiseen, metafyysiseen ja teologiseen
pohdiskeluun.
Vaikka älykkään suunnittelun liike korostaa tieteellistä luonnettaan, se pyrkii myös
rakentamaan siltoja luonnontieteen ja uskonnon välille. Teologia ja luonnontiede eivät
liikkeen mukaan ole vihollisia, vaan tukevat toisiaan, kunhan ne vain ymmärretään oikein.
Tämä tutkimus tukee sitä perusoletusta, että luonnontieteen ja teologian välillä voi olla
molempia hyödyttävää vuorovaikutusta. Samaan aikaan tutkimus kuitenkin varoittaa
painottamasta luonnontieteen merkitystä teologialle niin paljon, että luomisopin laajempi
metafyysinen, filosofinen ja teologinen luonne ja ei-tieteellisten perusteiden arvo unohtuu.
Tutkimus osoittaa myös, että jopa älykkään suunnittelun liikkeen ajattelun sisältä voidaan
löytää mahdollisia perusteita harmonisoida näkemys luonnonjärjestyksen jumalallisesta
suunnittelusta ja darwinilaisen evoluutioteorian hyväksyminen.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Questions, Method and Structure
The Purpose and Methodology of this Study
Already in the classical era, many people felt that the useful arrangements, rational ordering
and beauty of the cosmos testify to the existence of some sort of Creator, and this intuition
remains widespread today.2 This study is about the debate on Intelligent Design (ID), a
contemporary attempt to argue that nature indeed contains evidence of design by an
intelligent mind. ID formulates this idea as a design argument in the light of the natural
sciences. However, ID is not the only way to defend the rationality of belief in the Creator,
and many claim that its approach is misguided. Many even argue that the progress of the
natural sciences reveals only a godless universe of chance and necessity without purpose.
This disagreement invites the question: What is the scientific, philosophical and theological
basis of these different interpretations of nature?
The purpose of this study is to systematically analyse the Intelligent Design
movement’s design argument and its theology as it relates to this argument. Though the
movement itself emphasizes its claimed scientific nature, the focus of this study is primarily
theological and philosophical rather than scientific. Because of ID´s controversial nature, the
movement’s thought will be contrasted with theistic evolutionism and atheistic naturalism.
The discussion on design and the relationship of science and religion has a long history, and
my analysis will situate ID in this context. Results of this analysis are relevant for the
discussion on Intelligent Design as well as for the more general discussion about the
relationship between the natural sciences and Christian theology.
The primary goal of this study is to form a general understanding of the structure of
Intelligent Design thought and its relationship to central competing views. More precisely,
the main questions of this study are the following:
1. What is the structure of the Intelligent Design movement’s design argument and
what are its central concepts and presuppositions?
2. How does Intelligent Design relate to theistic evolutionism and naturalistic
evolutionism on the question of design?
My method for answering these questions is systematic analysis, meaning the analysis of the
concepts, arguments and presuppositions of Intelligent Design. Though I will evaluate and
2 Perhaps interpreting nature in this way is simply natural for our sorts of intellects. See chapter 4.1 and
McCauley 2012 for further discussion.
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criticize arguments in the process of mapping the theological and philosophical landscape of
the ID movement´s thought, I must nevertheless emphasize that this study is not an
evaluation of ID’s claimed research programme. That would require a different type of
study, with much greater emphasis on interpreting the results of the natural sciences.
Furthermore, since the issues in the debate are highly controversial, I do not expect readers
to agree with me on every point. I will feel that I have succeeded if readers from several
different perspectives can feel that I have at least identified the core issues of the debate and
mapped out its cognitive landscape in an insightful manner.
Structure of this Study
This study has ten chapters. The first chapter introduces the controversy over Intelligent
Design and my methodology. It is followed by a background chapter introducing some
closely related views, such as creationism, theistic evolutionism and naturalistic
evolutionism. The relationship of theology and the natural sciences is a complex and
controversial issue, which will keep coming up throughout this study. Because of this, the
chapter introduces many basic concepts used in the theology and science -discussion, and
shows how my own approach to the study of the Intelligent Design debate builds on these.
Chapters three and four analyse the basic ideas and logic of design arguments, as well
as setting the stage for further analysis. Chapters five and six analyse the empirical debate
about  the  design  argument,  which  I  divide  broadly  into  cosmic  and  the  biological  design
arguments. Chapters seven explores the philosophical and theological questions raised by
the previous chapters further, with particular focus on analysing critiques of “designer of the
gaps” and “naturalism of the gaps” -arguments. Chapter eight focuses further on the
tensions between ID and theistic evolutionism. Chapter nine analyses the discussion
surrounding the problem of natural evil and design arguments. I then summarize the results
of my research and the answers to my research questions in chapter ten.
Taken together, these chapters cover a broad amount of ground. An alternative
approach would have been to just focus on the theme of one chapter, such as the
philosophical basis of the fine-tuning argument (chapter 5) or the problem of natural evil
(chapter 9). However, my purpose is not to provide the deepest analysis of fine-tuning or the
problem of natural evil to date, but rather to provide an analysis of the Intelligent Design
movement´s particular design arguments and the structure of thought which underlies them.
For this purpose, it is necessary to examine this design argument from a variety of angles.
This makes it possible to see new connections and tensions that have not been clear in
previous research. Furthermore, since the issues are linked, advancing the discussion
requires understanding all of the central issues surrounding design arguments.
The breadth of this study is also necessary to demonstrate how philosophical and
theological ideas influence the discussion on ID, and what their role is in relation to the
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empirical arguments. Based on my analysis of the arguments used in the discussion, I have
reached the overarching conclusion that there is no philosophical or theological “silver
bullet” that could by itself settle the discussion either for or against ID’s design arguments 3
Though philosophical and theological reasons can and do influence our beliefs regarding the
history of life, evolution and design, such considerations cannot allow us to wholly bypass
discussion of the empirical evidence. Opinions about the designedness (and undesignedness)
of the cosmos are in practice formed in a complex interplay of many influences, including
empirical, philosophical, theological and psychological factors, among others.4
1.2. Introducing the Controversy over Intelligent Design
What is the Intelligent Design Movement?
Several different narratives of the history of Intelligent Design have been proposed. Many
have connected Intelligent Design with the creationist movement of the 20th century, noting
similarities between the arguments used against Darwinian evolutionary biology.5 The ID
movement’s rise to publicity happened after the 1987 Arkansas trial on the teaching of
Scientific Creationism in public schools in the U.S.A. However, the movement’s proponents
themselves see deeper roots for their ideas in the tradition of design arguments stretching
back to ancient Greek philosophy. There is a good deal of justification for this, although the
Greek arguments also differ substantially from ID.6 The first versions of the contemporary ID
movement’s arguments appeared already before the Arkansas Creationism trials, in the 1984
book The Mystery of Life’s Origin by Charles Thaxton, Walter Bradley and Roger Olsen. But
the formation of an actual movement of thinkers called the Intelligent Design movement is
connected to the Berkeley law professor Phillip E. Johnsonand his criticisms of naturalism
3 This is comparable to what Gregory Dawes (2009) has argued for theistic explanations and what Robert Larmer
(2014) has argued in respect to miracles. Del Ratzsch (2001), Jeffrey Koperski (2008) and Bradley Monton (2009)
have argued similarly in the discussion on ID.
To  clarify,  I  do  not  mean  that  I  think  anyone  in  the  debate  on  design  and  evolution  really  wants  to  wholly
bypass the discussion of the empirical evidence. However, both naturalistic and theistic philosophical and
theological arguments are in practice often referred to in the debate as though they could be used to rule out a
particular view of the history of life (such as ID or theistic evolutionism) even apart from the consideration of the
empirical evidence. In contrast,  it  seems to me that a theology of creation can in principle be constructed to fit
either ID or theistic evolutionism, depending on where the evidence seems to lead. Similarly, Robin Collins (2009,
243) argues that there is no a priori reason whereby we could have predicted that God must choose Darwinian
evolution  as  his  way  of  creation.  So,  Collins’  belief  in  evolution  is  based  on  the  scientific  evidence,  and  the
theological interpretation of evolution comes after this. These issues will become clearer in the coming chapters as
I delve deeper into the arguments.
4 Social and political factors also enter into the equation, but these are not in the focus of my dissertation. I come
closest to an analysis of psychological factors in chapter 4.1 and political factors in chapter 2.2.
5 E.g. Forrest & Gross 2004, Shanks 2003; see also Woodward 2003 and Woodward 2006 for the ID movement´s
perspective.
6 Sedley 2007.
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and Darwinism in the 1990’s. Johnson was soon joined by philosopher Stephen Meyer,
mathematician-philosopher-theologian William Dembski, and biochemist Michael Behe,
among others. The movement also gained some support from influential Christian
philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig.7
Though different narratives about the origins and nature of the Intelligent Design
movement abound, both critics and defenders agree that the Center for Science and Culture
(CSC) of the Seattle-based “think tank” Discovery Institute is the most important gathering
point for the ID theorists. CSC provides the following definition for Intelligent Design:
Intelligent  design  refers  to  a  scientific  research  programme  as  well  as  a  community  of
scientists, philosophers and other scholars who seek evidence of design in nature. The
theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things
are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural
selection. Through the study and analysis of a system’s components, a design theorist is
able  to  determine whether  various natural  structures  are  the product  of  chance,  natural
law, intelligent design, or some combination thereof. Such research is conducted by
observing the types of information produced when intelligent agents act. Scientists then
seek to  find objects  which have those same types of  informational  properties  which we
commonly know come from intelligence. Intelligent design has applied these scientific
methods  to  detect  design  in  irreducibly  complex  biological  structures,  the  complex  and
specified information content in DNA, the life-sustaining physical architecture of the
universe, and the geologically rapid origin of biological diversity in the fossil record
during the Cambrian explosion approximately 530 million years ago.8
The Discovery Institute’s definition emphasises the Intelligent Design movement’s claimed
intellectual and scientific nature.  According to this definition, Intelligent Design is three
things: (1) a scientific research programme attempting to find evidence of design in nature,
7 For different perspectives on the history of Intelligent Design, see Giberson & Yerxa 2002, Woodward 2003 &
2006, as well as Forrest & Gross 2004. On the support for ID from Christian philosophers, see Plantinga 1991,
Moreland (ed) 1994 and Craig 2007.
8 Discovery Institute 2011. Campbell (2004, 33) provides a similar definition. Bradley Monton (2009, 15-29)  has
provided a  critique  of  the  first  part  of  this  definition: “certain features of the universe and of living things are best
explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.” Monton argues that the definition
is problematic, because: (1) Everyone believes that at least some features of the universe and living things are
designed,  and  thus  the  definition  is  not  specific  enough.  For  example,  human  artifacts  are  also  a  part  of  the
universe, and are designed. (2) Typically ID proponents mean to refer to the detection of non-human intelligent
causes, though this is not mentioned in the definition. Thus seeing an automobile as designed does not suffice to
make one a member of the ID movement. (3) ID proponents typically believe that the intelligence thus discovered
is  not  itself  produced  by  natural  processes.  The  definition  I  have  quoted  avoids  the  first  two  dangers  by
referencing more specific places where the ID movement claims to detect design, such as “irreducibly complex
biological structures” and “the life-sustaining physical architecture of the universe.” It is clear that not just any
believer in human design also sees design in these places.  The question of whether ID’s designer is necessarily
supernatural will be discussed in chapter three. In any case, Monton´s remarks make it clear that this is not an
exhaustive definition of ID.
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(2) a community (or movement) of scholars who participate in this research programme9,
and (3) a theory which holds that there is indeed evidence for intelligent design in nature.
This theory is said to be based on the study and analysis of natural systems. Advocates of
Intelligent Design emphasize that their design argument rests on new scientific discoveries
which provide evidence for design and against Darwinism. They point to developments in
(for example) physics, cosmology, molecular biology, genetics, information theory,
mathematics and the philosophy of mind as providing the basis for their design argument.
The definition’s distinction between the idea of evidence for design and the community
known as the Intelligent Design movement is useful. The idea that there is evidence for the
operation of an intelligent mind in nature is far older and more popular than the ID
movement itself. It is more popularly known as the design argument or  the teleological
argument, and it has been formulated in many ways over the centuries. According to
philosopher Del Ratzsch’s definition, “teleological arguments focus upon finding and identifying
various traces of the operation of a mind in nature’s temporal and physical structures, behaviors and
paths.”10 As a community, the main thinkers of the ID movement are mostly located in the
United States of America, but the movement does also have global influence.11
The design argument of the ID movement is controversial partly because the ID
theorists generally believe that a critique of Darwinism is essential for the defence of the
design argument. According to ID supporter Thomas Woodward’s analysis, the movement’s
story is about “respected professors at prestigious secular universities  – – rising up and arguing
that (1) Darwinism is woefully lacking factual support and is rather based on philosophical
assumptions, and (2) empirical evidence, especially in molecular biology, now points compellingly to
some sort of creative intelligence behind life.”12 Woodward emphasises the intellectual nature of
the ID movement, just as the previously quoted Discovery Institute’s definition also does.
The ID movement sees its critique of Darwinism as a scientific dissent from a doctrine of
evolution which does not fit the facts. Dissent from this doctrine is seen as the courageous
and intellectually honest thing to do.13 The movement’s critique of Darwinism sets its design
argument apart from views which seek to harmonize evolutionary biology and belief in
creation and/or design.
In addition to its defence of the design argument, Intelligent Design’s critique of
methodological naturalism is also a distinctive mark of the movement’s argumentation.14
9 The terminology of the first two definitions comes from the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos’ (1977) analysis
of  scientific  research  programs.  For  a  classic  analysis  of  Lakatos  in  the  theology  and  science  discussion,  see
Murphy 1993.
10 Ratzsch 2010.
11 The works of Cardinal Christoph Schöenborn (2007) and Matti Leisola (2013) are just a few examples of support
for ID in Europe. Many others could also be cited; see Numbers 2006, chapter 18 for further discussion. My
dissertation focuses on the work of ID´s main theorists, who are all U.S. citizens.
12 Woodward 2003, 195.
13 For examples of this understanding in the own words of the ID movement’s thinkers, see Dembski’s collections
Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Dissent From Darwinism (2004), and Darwin’s Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the
Intelligent Design movement. (2006)
14 As noted by Beckwith (2003).
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Methodological naturalism is understood in the movement as the idea that only “natural”,
mechanistic and non-purposeful explanations are allowed in the natural sciences. ID´s
critique of methodological naturalism stems partly from a desire to challenge materialistic
interpretations of natural science, and build a new kind of natural science more consonant
with theology. So, the definition of science is thought to have not only scientific, but also
cultural importance. The issue is also important to critics of ID. Theistic evolutionists
typically argue that methodological naturalism does not imply that we cannot rationally
discuss theological questions (such as the purposiveness of nature) outside of natural
science.  The issue is politically charged, since the status of ID as science or non-science will
determine whether it can be taught in public schools U.S. Consequently, much has been
written on whether ID is natural science or not.15 In this study, I will consider this question of
definitions primarily as it related to ID’s primary idea: the design argument.
The Importance of Theological and Philosophical Analysis of ID
The Discovery Institute’s definition quoted above places an emphasis on the scientific nature
of Intelligent Design. While the empirical arguments of ID will not be ignored in this study,
my focus is on the philosophical and theological side of Intelligent Design. I believe that this
approach is important for six reasons.
First (1), as will become apparent in the coming chapters, the discussion on ID often
impinges on fundamental theological and philosophical questions regarding the relationship
of science and religion, the ultimate character of reality and how beliefs are justified.
Second (2), there are many interesting philosophical issues to analyse in design
arguments, and the argument’s logical structure needs to be clarified. The evaluation of the
current state of natural science is not necessary for this kind of philosophical work.
Third (3), philosophical and theological differences strongly influence the different
views about the rationality of design arguments, and not acknowledging their important role
on all sides would lead to a misleading representation of the debate.
Fourth (4), the design argument is traditionally part of the theological and
philosophical programme of natural theology, and situating ID’s design argument in this
discussion is necessary for understanding its strengths and weaknesses when compared to
other approaches.
Fifth (5), because I am a theologian and this is a study done at a theological faculty, it is
better to concentrate on the aspects where my competence is strongest, rather than
attempting an analysis of Intelligent Design in the light of the natural sciences.
Sixth (6), the theological and philosophical side of Intelligent Design is also very
important for the movement itself, even though this side of the movement is not mentioned
in the CSC’s definition. It is possible that the omission is made for the strategic reason that
15 E.g. Ruse 1996, Ratzsch 2001. For further discussion, see chapters 3.5. and 3.6.
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emphasizing the theological side of ID’s project could make it more difficult to get a hearing
for ID’s empirical arguments in the secular media and public schools.
Other definitions of Intelligent Design by members of the ID movement reveal the
importance of theology clearly. In ID theorist William Dembski’s definition, “Intelligent
Design is three things: a scientific research programme that investigates the effects of intelligent
causes; an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of
understanding divine action.”16 Here “a way of understanding divine action” reveals the
importance of the theological side of ID. Thomas Woodward similarly emphasizes the
scientific motivations of Intelligent Design, but admits that its goal is also to open up both
science and society for the “serious consideration of the theistic perspective.”17 Angus Menuge
likewise argues that “defenders of ID see themselves as revolutionaries who can build bridges
between science and theology.”18
Though ID theorists emphasize the scientific side of their motivations, many critics of
the movement think the religious side is more important. For example, Barbara Forrest
writes that “in actuality, this ‘scientific’ movement which seeks to permeate the American academic
and cultural mainstream is religious to its core.”19 For Forrest, Intelligent Design is not a
scientific research programme (because it does not fulfil the criteria required of such
programmes) but a religious movement that is trying gain power in American cultural and
academic life. In her opinion, ID’s so-called scientific arguments are just a smokescreen.
Their arguments are not of any value scientifically, but represent reiterations of creationist
arguments long since discredited by mainstream scientists.20 Robert Pennock also argues that
“the creation/evolution debate is only superficially about science. At its base, it is about religion and it
is about philosophy.”21 I would not go quite as far as this – I think that there are real
disagreements about the state of natural science in the debate, and the empirical evidence is
important for all sides of the debate. The empirical side of the discussion includes things like
debates about the viability of various hypotheses of the origin of life, the possibility of
evolving “irreducibly complex” biochemical structures, what kind of values the constants of
nature need in order to make life possible, is biological order machine-like and so on.
Having read material from ID proponents and based on my interaction with some of the
members of the movement, it is my feeling that they honestly believe in the strenght of their
empirical arguments. However, Pennock is right that the debate is definitely also about
religion and philosophy.
Many secular critics of ID feel that ID’s religious overtones are dangerous, and believe
that stopping ID is important for the preservation of Enlightenment values and a free secular
society. They worry that ID’s bid to include intelligent design as a possible explanation
16 Dembski 1999, 13.
17 Woodward 2003, 205.
18 Menuge 2004a, 48-49.
19 Forrest 2001, 30.
20 Forrest 2001, 31-32. More on the definition of creationism below.
21 Pennock 2009, 309.
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within the natural sciences would lead to the cessation of natural science in favour of
vacuous “God did it” -explanations when encountering mysterious phenomena.22 These
secular critics of ID argue that the fact of evolution is so clearly established by the scientific
evidence that any contrary opinions must be explained by non-rational factors such as a fear
of the religious and moral implications of evolutionary theory.23
So, it is clear that the debate on ID has its political side. While the Discovery Institute’s
Center for Science and Culture has  focused  much  of  its  funding  on  ID  research,  it  has  also
argued for the permissibility of criticizing Darwinism and defending the freedom of teachers
to teach ID’s arguments as part of public science education in the United States.24 Forrest’s
most important evidence is the Discovery Institute’s Wedge document:  a  plan  sent  to
supporters which laid out a long-term plan for using Intelligent Design as a means of
affecting culture and opening up discussion on moral and religious values. The document
was subsequently leaked and later also made available to the public by the Discovery
Institute. In the document, ID’s scientific programme serves the cultural goal of preserving
the cultural authority of Judeo-Christian values such as the value of human life.25 While
Forrest presents the Wedge document with the air of investigators uncovering a secret
conspiracy, Menuge correctly points out that these cultural aims were already openly
proclaimed by ID supports such as Johnson long before the publication of the Wedge
document.26
These examples highlight the importance of the religious side of ID, and thus also the
importance of its philosophical and theological study. They also reveal the contentious
nature of the debate. Theological and philosophical analysis can bring light to openly
revealed and hidden presumptions on both sides of the debate. The need for clarity and a
22 See e.g. Forrest & Gross 2004, Shanks 2004, 244, who believe that ID is ultimately attempting to replace secular
democracy with a theocracy. The basis for this claim is that the Discovery Institute has received an important part
of its funding from Howard Ahmanson, who Forrest identifies as a follower of the Christian reconstructionism of
R. J. Rushdoony (1973) and Dominion theology. Ahmanson also has a place on the Discovery Institute’s board of
directors. However, as Numbers (2006, 382) has noted, the Discovery Institute has never advocated theocracy.
The Discovery Institute’s argues that in practice its fellows have defended democracy, human rights and the
American separation of church and state on many forums. (Discovery Institute 2005). Gregory Dawes (2007)
provides many more examples of polemical characterizations of ID.
23 Freeman & Herron (2007, 105) also argue against ID in this way in their textbook of evolutionary biology.
24 Forrest & Gross (2004) chronicle many battles over science education. Here too the truth about Intelligent
Design is contentious. The Discovery Institute argues that it has merely tried to defend the academic freedom of
teachers  to  question  Darwinism,  and  has  not  attempted  to  force  anyone  to  teach  Intelligent  Design  through
politics (DeWolf, West, Luskin & Witt 2006).
One battle over school education which received much publicity occurred in Dover, Pennsylvania in 2005. ID
was  not  taught  in  the  classroom,  but  the  school  district  decided  that  a  short  statement  about  the  “gaps”  of
Darwinian evolutionary theory and the existence of ID was read prior to biology lessons. The matter eventually
became a court case, which even included an investigation of whether Intelligent Design qualifies as science. The
judge accepted the arguments against ID and ruled against the school district. (Jones 2005, for critique see
DeWolf, West, Luskin & Witt 2006)
25 The Discovery Institute 2003, Johnson 2000. For critiques of the “wedge”, see Shanks (2004, 244) and Forrest &
Gross (2004, chapter 2).
26 Menuge 2004, 36.
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balanced analysis has been stressed (for example) by philosophers Jeffrey Koperski and Del
Ratzsch, who have called on scholars to analyse ID calmly to identify both the strengths and
weaknesses of ID thought.27 In Finnish systematic theology, the method of systematic
analysis is typically used precisely to better understand a system of thought, rather than to
criticize it. So the method chosen for this study is suited for producing the sort of balanced
analysis Koperski and Ratzsch call for. Of course, understanding a system of thought can
also help one see its flaws more clearly. However, my personal hope is that this analysis will
not just result in pointing out flaws in the various viewpoints, but also build bridges between
them to help the continuation of the dialogue.
The contentiousness of the discussion is also revealed in the varied nature of the
criticisms directed against Intelligent Design. For example, the ID movement’s design
argument has been criticized both by arguing that the hypothesis of a designer is
unfalsifiable and by arguing that ID’s design argument has been falsified.28 In theological
critiques of ID, ID’s susceptibility to falsification by future scientific discoveries is often seen
as one of its greatest flaws.29 Some critics of Intelligent Design argue that design is excluded
from science on philosophical grounds30, while others argue that naturalistic science is open
even to supernatural explanations if there is evidence.31 Some argue against Intelligent
Design from atheist premises, regarding the design argument as the best sort of evidence for
God.32 Others argue against Intelligent Design from theistic premises, believing Intelligent
Design to be a theologically mistaken “God of the gaps” -doctrine.33 Some of ID’s critics reject
the possibility of all design arguments,34 while others defend broader cosmic design
arguments themselves.35 Some critics even agree with the ID theorists that there are major
problems in mainstream Darwinian evolutionary theory, but do not agree that intelligent
design is any better as an explanation for life’s development.36 Intelligent Design is a
controversial minority position, and the majority of the scientific community has rejected it.
However, the literature responding to ID is far from unanimous. The reasons for the rejection
of the ID movement’s ideas vary, and many critics agree with ID on at least some point. The
philosophical and theological issues of the Intelligent Design discussion have thus not been
27 Koperski 2008, Ratzsch 2001.
28 For example, see the collection edited by Pennock 2001 and Del Ratzsch’s review (2001).
29 See chapter 7.2. of this study.
30 Pennock 1999.
31 Young & Edis 2006, Kitcher 2007.
32 Dawkins 2006a.
33 Haught 2003, Cunningham 2010.
34 Dawkins 2006a, Pennock 1999.
35 Miller 2002, Swinburne 2004c.
36 For example, Lynn Margulis, known for her endosymbiosis theory, agrees with Michael Behe’s critique of the
Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and mutation, but disputes ID theory as an alternative. For Margulis’
views on evolution see Margulis 1999, for her views on the ID movement see her interview in Discover Magazine
(Teresi 2011.) See also Fodor & Piattello-Palmarini 2009, for their view that the mechanism of natural selection
lacks creative power, and Cobb 2008 as well as Pigliucci & Müller 2010 for the complexity and richness of modern
evolutionary theory.
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settled. Because of the variety of viewpoints and the extent of the disagreement on central
philosophical  issues,  there is  room for a balanced theological  and philosophical  analysis  of
the movement’s ideas.
1.3. Sources and Literature
The Intelligent Design Theorists
The primary source material of this study consists of the central Intelligent Design theorists’
writings and collections where they engage their naturalistic and theistic critics. The most
central thinkers of the Intelligent Design movement, according to both defenders and critics
of the movement, are Phillip Johnson, Michael Behe, William Dembski and Stephen Meyer.37
Their works constitute the main sources of this study. Works by other ID theorists are also
used to fill in gaps and to help identify central arguments. I will now briefly describe these
thinkers and some of my source material.
Phillip Johnson, professor emeritus of law at the University of Berkeley, California, is
universally acknowledged to be the movement’s most important early leader and the one
most responsible for creating the movement’s vision in the 1990’s. This study uses Johnson’s
books Darwin on Trial (1991), Reason in the Balance (1995), Defeating Darwinism by Opening
Minds (1997), and The Wedge of Truth (1999), as well as several articles. However, many of
Johnson’s ideas have been defended in more depth and substantially altered by the other
thinkers of the ID movement, and thus Johnson is not often in the spotlight in this study.
Michael Behe, professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, is responsible for the movement’s most popular anti-Darwinian argument, the
argument from irreducible complexity. Behe’s main importance for the movement comes
from his scientific arguments, but he has also written on the philosophy of the design
argument, and has commented on its religious implications. This study utilises Behe’s works
37 Dawes (2007, 70) similarly considers Behe, Dembski and Meyer to be the central ID theorists. Meyer has become
even more important since Dawes’ article, because of the publication of Meyer 2009 and Meyer 2013. Jonathan
Wells  and Paul  Nelson  are  also  important  figures  for  the  ID movement,  and were  present  in  the  Pajaro  Dunes
meeting which the ID movement considers pivotal. (Illustra Media 2003) Robert Pennock (1991) thus
characterizes  Nelson  as  one  of  the  “four  horsemen”  of  ID  together  with  Johnson,  Behe,  and  Dembski.  The
Discovery Institute’s Wedge Document (2003) likewise highlights Nelson’s research as important for ID. However,
Nelson’s and Wells’  publications have not been as central or as referenced as those of Johnson, Behe, Dembski
and Meyer. Nelson’s monograph On Common Descent, already promised in the Wedge Document, is still under
work  and  cannot  be  used  as  a  source.  In  any  case,  Wells  and  Nelson  focus  on  critiquing  the  arguments  for
common descent,  and this  debate  will  not  be  in  the  focus  of  this  study,  since  it  is  not  essential  to  ID´s  design
arguments. (I will demonstrate this in chapter 6.)
In  recent  years,  Casey  Luskin  has  been  one  of  the  most  important  popularizers  of  ID through the  Discovery
Institute blog Evolution News and Views. However, his arguments are dependent on the work done by the main ID
theorists, so he himself will not be in the focus of this study.
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Darwin’s Black Box (1996) and The Edge of Evolution (2007), as well as many articles and Behe’s
dialogues with his critics on the Internet.
William A. Dembski is a mathematician and theologian. Dembski is currently affiliated
with the Discovery Institute, but has previously been employed at Baylor University (where
he briefly led his own controversial centre of research) and Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary (Forth Worth, Texas). He is known for his development of the concept of specified
complexity and his eliminative design inference as well as his many books integrating ID
with Christian theology. Dembski is a profilic and influential writer. This study references
his works The Design Inference (1998), Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and
Theology (1999), No Free Lunch (2002), The Design Revolution (2004), The End of Christianity
(2009), as well as many articles and co-authored or edited books, such as The Design of Life
(2007, together with Jonathan Wells) and How to be an Intellectually Fulfilled Atheist (Or Not)
(2008, together with Jonathan Wells).
Stephen C. Meyer is a philosopher of science and the director of the Discovery
Institute’s Center for Science and Culture in Seattle. Meyer´s recent works Signature in the Cell
(2009) and Darwin’s Doubt (2013) have substantially expanded and elaborated the ID
movement’s defence of design arguments. However, Meyer has been important for ID’s
development from the beginning behind the scenes, and I also reference many of his articles
that predate the books. Meyer is also the author of the ID textbook Explore Evolution: The
Arguments for and Against Neo-Darwinism (2007) together with Scott Minnich, Jonathan
Moneymaker, Paul A. Nelson, and Ralph Seelke.
Other Sources and Literature
The Intelligent Design movement includes a great variety of thinkers and design arguments.
This study does not analyse all of the arguments used in the sources, as that would require
far too much space. Instead, this study includes analysis only of those arguments that have
emerged as central for the design argument of the ID movement. The breadth of sources is
used to analyse ID’s arguments on these crucial points as well as possible. I have identified
the centrality of the analysed arguments by their repetition among the main ID theorists and
the rest of the ID literature, as well as their centrality in the structure of Intelligent Design
theory as shown by systematic analysis. This sort of analysis is possible, because the ID
theorists’ design arguments and theological views as they relate to the design argument are
very similar despite their varied denominational backgrounds.
As sources on the critique of Intelligent Design from the standpoint of naturalism and
theistic evolutionism, I have utilized numerous books and articles defending these points of
view. There is a great amount of such articles, so I have selected to focus mainly on thinkers
who interact with the Intelligent Design movement. I also reference scientific, philosophical
and theological literature on the each topic analysed.
This study is focused on Intelligent Design, and is not a study of naturalism or theistic
evolutionism as such. I have two main reasons for nevertheless including these points of
comparison. First, as already mentioned, the Intelligent Design movement’s argumentation
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is controversial. An analysis of the movement’s argumentation can only be convincing as it
takes into account the existence of alternative interpretations. Second, the ID theorists
themselves argue their views largely in relation to these alternative views. To understand
Intelligent Design, one must thus also understand their views about naturalism and theistic
evolutionism.38 I will now proceed to introduce the players in the debate in more detail.
38 This  is  also  one  reason  why  I  do  not  consider  other  alternatives  to  Intelligent  Design  such  as  Young-Earth
creationism in more detail. The interaction of the ID theorists with the Young-Earth view is simply very limited.  I
feel my analysis in chapter 2.1. is sufficient for clarifying the relationship of ID and creationism. Pantheistic and
panentheistic views, panpsychism and polytheistic views of evolution are also largely bypassed because of this
reason.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Creationism and Theistic Evolutionism
Controversy over the Background of Intelligent Design
Even the history of Intelligent Design is contentious, and narratives of it can be part of the
political struggle for or against the movement.39 Nathaniel C. Comfort correctly notes that
“one point on which anti-Darwinists and anticreationists agree is that this is a pitched battle between
dogmatic religious fanatics on the one hand, and rigorous, fair-minded scientists on the other.
However, which side is which depends on who you read.”40 In critiques of Intelligent Design, it is
often considered a repackaged version of creationism. It is argued that after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1987 decision to outlaw the teaching of “scientific creationism”, some
creationists sought to avoid the legal implications by adopting a new name, “Intelligent
Design”, for their position.41 The ID theorists have tried to present a more complex picture of
the movements’ origins, and have emphasized the differences between Intelligent Design
and the creationism whose teaching was outlawed in 1987. They also note that the movement
includes thinkers from non-creationist backgrounds as well.42
The relationship of ID and creationism is indeed more complex than the simple
caricatures allow. While some early ID works use the term creationism, they use it in a far
more general sense than the “scientific creationism” which was the subject of the 1987 trial.43
Furthermore, the influentials ID-books Mystery of the Origin of Life (1984)44 and Evolution: A
Theory in Crisis (1986)45 had already been published before the 1987 trial. Karl Giberson and
Donald Yerxa link ID with creationism in a more plausible, neutral way: the early ID
theorists in the 1980’s were dissatisfied with creationism already before the 1987 trial, and
sought a way to break out of creationism’s intellectual ghetto.46 It seems credible to argue
39 For different narratives, see Woodward 2003 and Forrest & Gross 2004. For attempts at a neutral view, see
Giberson & Yerxa 2002 as well as Numbers 2006.
40 Comfort 2007, 3.
41 Forrest & Gross 2004.
42 E.g. Behe 2000a, Dembski 1999a. In addition, ID theorists refer to earlier secular uses by the term ”intelligent
design”, such as by Fred Hoyle (Witt 2007), on the development of ID Dembski 1998; Witt 2005; Woodward 2003,
33-45.  Both ID and creationism also draw strength from debates within the community of evolutionary biologists.
For example, Phillip Johnson (1993, 154) references the debate between punctuated equilibrium and gradualism
to argue against the existence of good fossil evidence in support of common descent. This was rhetorically
effective, though both sides of the debate believed in the existence of fossils demonstrating evolutionary
transitions. (Similarly Denton 1987, chapter 7. Note also that Denton affirms belief in common descent in his later
works, e.g. Denton 1998). See further Woodward 2003, chapter 2.
43 E.g.  Johnson 1993;  Dembski  1999a,  247-251.  The  same seems to  be  true  of  the  textbook evidence  analysed  by
Forrest & Gross (2004).
44 Thaxton, Bradley & Olsen 1992.
45 Denton 1986.
46 Giberson & Yerxa 2002.
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that the movement indeed gained more influence after the 1987 creationism trial gave
additional reason for creationists to move away from the old approaches, but ID's basic idea
of presenting better and more minimalistic arguments in favour of belief in biological design
was already present before the trial.47
Giberson and Yerxa are correct to note the influence of creationists in the ID
movement, but it is also true that not all major ID theorists have such a background. Michael
Behe moved to Intelligent Design from a theistic evolutionistic viewpoint rather than any
variety of literalistic creationism. Some agnostics, such as Michael Denton and David
Berlinski, have also been influential in the movement.48 The  account  of  Forrest  and  Gross
gives too little attention to these thinkers, but their inclusion in the analysis does complexify
the picture of the ID movement.49 However, it is correct that ID has much support in the
same social circles that also support the “scientific creationism” which was on trial in 1987.
There is a difference here between the movement’s intellectual leaders and its lay supports.50
Broad Definitions of Creationism
History alone does not settle the question of the relationship of ID and creationism. Rather,
the answer also depends on the definition of creationism. Broadly understood, creationism
refers simply to the belief that some sort of creative intelligence was involved in the creation
of the cosmos and life. For example, Niall Shanks argues that the design argument forms the
core of creationism. On this broad definition, Intelligent Design can clearly be classified as
creationism. However, this definition also includes many theistic critics of ID (such as the
Darwinian biologist Kenneth Miller) among the creationists. Consistent with his definition,
Shanks does indeed call Miller a “cosmological creationist”.51 David Sedley similarly
classifies the thought of Socrates and Plato as creationism is his important work Creationism
and its Critics in Antiquity (2007). Sedley defines creationism as “the thesis that the world’s
structure can be adequately explained only by postulating at least one intelligent designer, a creator
god.”52 For Sedley, this is also the central issue that “separates modern ‘creationists’ from their
Darwinian critics.”53 Again, theistic evolutinists are also creationists under this definition.
According to Robert Newman, creationism means simply belief in the doctrine of
creation, according to which the world and everything in it has gotten its being from God.
Newman divides possible alternatives to creationism into four options: (1) atheism, which
asserts that the world exists without gods, (2) pantheism, which asserts that the world is
47 Ratzsch (1996, 84-85) similarly identifies early ID theorists as “upper tier” creationists trying to create more
informed and scientific arguments for the creationist belief in the designedness of the order of nature.
48 Berlinski 2009.
49 Woodward 2003.
50 This is evidenced by the school education battles chronicled by Forrest & Gross (2004).
51 Shanks 2004, 6. For Shanks’ definition of Kenneth Miller as a “cosmological creationist”, see Shanks 2004, 234.
52 Sedley 2007, xvii.
53 Sedley 2007, xvii.
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God,  (3)  panentheism  which  asserts  that  the  world  is  God’s  body,  and  (4)  dualism,  which
says that matter is self-existent, but God has molded it.54 While most ID theorists are
creationists according to this definition, they would emphasize that their theory of design is
at least theoretically also compatible with Newman’s other options: atheism, pantheism,
panentheism and dualism. This is because their design argument does not yet identify the
designer, so someone could in principle interpret the designer as an extraterrestrial alien or
Plato's demiurge, for example. On this definition, Intelligent Design is not identical to
creationism. Rather, it is a much more minimalistic argument that does not alone determine
the broader worldview of the proponent.55
Varieties of Creationism
The definition of creationism can be further defined by specifying what is meant by creation.
Does creation refer to God's maintaining the world in existence at every moment, the giving
of existence sometime in the past, or both? Is there a notion of creatio continua,  as  well  as
creatio ex nihilo?56 In the contemporary discussion, varieties of creationism emerge particulary
in relation to scientific investigations of origins. Three typical forms of creationism (as
broadly understood) are literalistic (Young-Earth) creationism, progressive (Old-Earth)
creationism and theistic evolutionism. Many ID theorists use the term “creationism” to refer
only to literalistic creationism, and have labored to distance ID from creationism as thus
understood. For them, Intelligent Design refers only to the belief that the actions of an
intelligent designer can in some way be recognized in the pattern of nature, while
creationism makes much more specific claims.57 Under the above broad definition, theistic
evolutionism is also a form of creationism. However, theistic evolution is also often
separated from creationism, because creationism is understood to imply an opposition to
mainstream evolutionary theory. Ratzsch argues that in creationism, it is believed that
“whether or not God could have built evolutionary potentials into the creation, or could have brought
about  life  and  all  its  diversity  by  evolutionary  means,  he  did  not  in  fact  do  so.  There  are  thus
discontinuities in nature – e.g., non-life/life, reptile/mammal, animal/human – which cannot be
crossed by purely natural means, each such discontinuity requiring separate supernatural creative
action.”58 The use of the word “creationism” therefore varies greatly and we must take care to
define what we mean by the term.59
54 Newman 2001, 115.
55 On the separation between the designer and God, see e.g. Behe 2001a, 699-700; 2007, 277-288; Dembski 2002b,
195.
56 Peters & Hewlett 2006.
57 According  to  Koperski  (2003,  568),  the  use  of  the  term  “creationist”  has  indeed  become  pejorative  in  the
criticisms of Intelligent Design such as those presented by Pennock (1999).
58 Ratzsch 1996, 12.
59 Because of the many uses of the word, the use of the term “creationism” in early Intelligent Design literature as
demonstrated by Forrest & Gross (2004, 273-283) and Bell (2010) does not seem sufficient to demonstrate that the
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Literalistic creationism is the view that the Earth and all species of animals were
miraculously created only six to ten thousand years old. This view is based on a literal,
historical interpretetation of the biblical scriptures, which are understood as God´s word
about history, and an interpretation of the scientific evidence which seeks to harmonize
science with this literalistic view. Thus science is argued to support belief in a young Earth,
the reality of a global flood in Noah’s time, the possibility of starlight to travel to the Earth
from distant stars during the creation week, and so on. These theories require extensive
modifications of mainstream scientific physics, astronomy, geology, biology and history.
These ideas have not gained much ground in the scientific community, since the creationists´
view about the literal understanding of the Bible as the guiding framework of the natural
sciences is not widely shared.60
The Intelligent Design movement has some literalistic creationists, and the arguments
of literalistic creationists have been important influences for many others within the ID
camp. For example, the biologist Paul Nelson is a literalistic Young Earth -creationist. Nelson
reports that creationists of his sort are a minority among the movement’s leading theorists.61
Dembski and Denton have reported that their scepticism of evolution was influenced by the
arguments of literalistic creationists, though Dembski and Denton themselves accept
mainstream estimates for the age of the cosmos and life on Earth.62 There are indeed
substantial similarities in the way these creationists and the ID movement criticize
Darwinism both scientifically and morally.63 However, while the ID theorists generally avoid
bringing the Bible into the discussion on origins, and regard evidence of design as the central
point, many in the camp of the literalistic creationism consider the authority of biblical
scripture to be the central issue.64
Progressive creationism (or Old Earth -creationism) accepts the old history of the Earth and
the universe. The “days” of the Genesis account of creation in ways which accommodates the
long ages of natural history, and God’s creating work is believed to have occurred
progressively over this time through numerous supernatural creative acts. Views on where
such acts were required vary. Some progressive creationists believe that God acted to create
the major kinds of animals, while others believe God intervened only in the origins of life
and the origin of the human soul, for example. Progressive creationists can criticise the
ideas  of  the  movement  are  not  different  from  those  of  some  variety  of  creationism.  Rather,  there  is  both
substantial continuity and substantial discontinuity between ID and many varieties of creationism.
60 Numbers  2006  is  the  most  comprehensive  discussion  of  creationism  and  its  problems  available.  For  a  good
balanced discussion of the controversy on creationism, see also Ratzsch 1996.
61 Nelson 2002. The Finnish biotechnologist Matti Leisola, who is the editor of the ID journal Bio-Complexity, is
another influential ID proponent who is skeptical of the old age of the Earth. (Leisola 2013, chapter 8.1.)
62 Dembski 2005c, Denton 2004.
63 Forrest & Gross 2004. For ID’s moral critique of Darwinism, see Wiker 2002 & West 2007 and chapter 8.2. of the
present study.
64 Ronald  Numbers’  (2006)  authoritative  study on  creationists  thus  only  includes  a  few mentions  of  the  design
argument outside the Intelligent Design movement, concentrating more on the creationists’ Flood Geology, which
is  absent  in  ID.  Young  Earth  -creationists  have  also  criticised  the  ID  movement  for  concentrating  on  design
arguments rather than defending the authority of biblical scripture on the matters of origins (e.g. Wieland 2002).
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sufficiency of the Darwinian account of origins like literalistic creationists. ID theorist Phillip
Johnson can be classified as a progressive creationist, as can many others in the movement.65
Theistic Evolutionism
Theistic evolutionism or evolutionary creationism means the belief that God has used an
evolutionary natural process to create the living species. Mainline Catholic and Protestant
theology accepts the compatibility of evolutionary theory and the doctrine of creation.
Theistic evolutionists want to take mainstream science seriously when considering how we
should understand the doctrine of creation.66 Under the broad definitions of creationism,
theistic evolutionism is also creationism since it includes belief in a Creator. However, if we
adopt a narrower definition where creationism requires belief in the miraculous activity of
God within natural history and critique of evolutionary theory, then most varieties of theistic
evolutionism are not creationism.
Ian Barbour classifies theistic evolutionism broadly into three forms. On the first view
(1), God controls events that appear to be random.  On  this  view,  the  process  of  evolution  is
understood to be under God’s control, though his supervision is not included in scientific
theories of our origins. On the second view (2), God designed a system of law and chance. God
set up the universe at the beginning in a way that makes evolution possible. On the third
view (3), God influences the events of evolutionary history without controlling them. On this view,
God  is  understood  to  give  the  world  much  freedom  to  evolve.  God  influences  evolution
through  his  love,  but  does  not  control  it.67 All of these theories are nuanced and complex
proposals, which have results for our theories of divine action and our understanding of the
problem of evil, among other things.
These three versions of theistic evolutionism are all united by their acceptance of
mainstream Darwinian evolutionary theory. What is excluded is the possibility that a theistic
evolutionist might accept parts of evolutionary theory (such as the idea of common descent)
while rejecting others (such as the idea of natural selection as the mechanism driving
evolutionary change). This type of theistic evolutionism is clearly not the same as literalistic
creationism or progressive creationism, though it does not fit into Barbour’s definition.
However, it has also been historically quite common. Following the Darwinian revolution,
the scientific community did not immediately reach a consensus that random mutation and
natural selection were indeed the primary force driving evolution.68 Many contemporary
65 Pennock 1999. See also chapter 6.2 of the present study for further analysis of what the ID theorists think about
evolution.
66 There is precedent for this within the Christian tradition. St. Augustine (354-430) argued in his On the Literal
Understanding of Genesis that  the  Bible  did  not  require  a  Flat  Earth  -view incompatible  with  philosophy,  but  is
compatible with the philosophers’ spherical view. Augustine, De Genesi Ad Litteram (I, 19).
67 Barbour, 1997; similarly Giberson & Yerxa 2002, 172. Peters & Hewlett 2003 is a more throughout presentation
of the different varieties of theistic evolutionism.
68 Ruse 2003, Bowler 2009, 202-207.
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evolutionary biologists are again questioning the centrality of random mutation and
selection for evolution.69
Within the ID movement, there is some acceptance of a fourth type (4) of theistic
evolutionism, which I define as follows: God controls the direction of evolution in a way that gives
us evidence of his action and non-teleological explanations are not sufficient even on the level of
biology. On this view, naturalistic non-purposeful mechanisms do not wholly explain
evolution. Michael Behe is a theistic evolutionist in this sense. In his intellectual
development, Behe moved from being a theistic evolutionist in the mainstream sense to this
fourth category. 70 Behe accepts the doctrine of common descent as probably true, but does
not believe that the Darwinian mechanism of mutation and selection can account for all of
life’s evolution. Rather, he thinks that an intelligent designer has guided the evolution of life
beyond the laws of nature. This type of theistic evolutionism includes critiques of
evolutionary biology, and so comes closer to narrower definitions of creationism.
Nevertheless, it is worlds apart from literalistic creationism.71
So, there are ID proponents who fit in each of the different major camps of creationism:
literalistic creationism, progressive creationism and theistic evolutionism. If a broad
definition of creationism as simply belief in some kind of Creator is used, ID qualifies as
creationism. ID also qualifies as creationism under the more narrow definition where
creationism requires belief in a Creator and the rejection of the sufficiency of evolutionary
explanations on the level of natural science. However, the variety of creationist views
embraced by ID proponents shows that there is no necessary conceptual link between ID and
any more specific creationist view, such as progressive creationism. ID's conception of
creation is quite minimalistic, and can be assimilated under a variety of broader frameworks.
2.2. Naturalistic Evolutionism and ID
Intelligent Design’s Struggle Against Naturalism
In addition to the four forms of creationism outlined above, the ideas of Intelligent Design
have also been formed at least partly as a reaction against the perceived use of science as a
weapon for atheism. ID’s vision is to unite all opponents of naturalistic evolutionism in
69 Pigliucci & Müller 2010. I will discuss the new developments and the structure of evolutionary theory further in
chapter 6.2.
70 See  e.g.  the  arguments  of  Behe  2007a  and  Behe’s  autobiographical  essay  Behe  2006b.  The  relation  of  ID  to
different parts of evolutionary theory will be further discussed in chapter five.
71 Pennock 1991, chapter 1, Scott 1999, Scott 2004 and Ross 2005 all represent different attempts to map out the
relationships between the varieties of creationism analysed in this chapter. Pennock and Scott present a model
where the different views form a continuum based on how literalistically the Bible is read, whereas Ross argues
that the relationships should be mapped out using more factors than used by Scott and Pennock, and that when
this is done, the relationships of the views are far more complex than a simple continuum. For example, Old Earth
-creationists and theistic evolutionists can also read the Bible literally. Furthermore, there is substantial variety
within each of the viewpoints.
Background
31
defence of a minimalistic idea of design. Those living inside ID’s “big tent” may disagree
about particulars, but at least agree on the design argument and about opposing atheistic
interpretations of science.72
It seems that the Dawkinsian interpretation of Darwinian evolution is actually one of
the major influences behind the emergence of ID theory.73 Richard Dawkins’ book “The Blind
Watchmaker: How the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without a Designer” (1986), in
which Dawkins argues that the Darwinian theory of evolution supports atheism, is quoted
prominently in many major ID works.74 Phillip Johnson, the early leading visionary of ID, is
reported to have begun formulating his new views on evolution after reading Dawkins’ Blind
Watchmaker and Michael Denton’s Evolution together. After reading these works, Johnson
was convinced that the creation-evolution debate had enormous implications for our
worldviews and broader culture. He was also convinced that Dawkins’ naturalistic view was
scientifically, philosophically and theologically problematic.75 So, opposing the atheistic
interpretation of evolution was part of the initial motivation of ID.
However,  Dawkins’  prominence  in  the  ID  theorists’  works  also  reflects  the  public
prominence of Dawkins’ argumentation. Dawkins’ Blind Watchmaker remains one of the most
in-depth defences of the capability of evolution to explain the origin of complex biological
adaptations like the human eye, and his arguments on this point are referenced even in some
current textbooks of evolutionary biology.76 The ID theorists are therefore not unreasonable
to refer to Dawkins’ highly influential arguments on the central issue of the capability of the
Darwinian mechanism to explain all of life’s complexity without design. However, as I will
argue in more detail in chapter 6, there are also many other approaches to evolutionary
biology besides Dawkins’ views.
It is also important to note that Dawkins’ anti-religious interpretation of evolutionary
theory and his understanding of the mechanisms of evolution are not shared by all. Thus
theologian Conor Cunningham argues in his book Darwin’s Pious Idea (2006) that the
Dawkinsian new atheism and Intelligent Design both misunderstand evolution in just the
same ways and fail to appreciate the true depth and complexity of evolutionary theory,
which is congenial to a theistic interpretation.
Defining Naturalism
The meaning of the term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in modern philosophy –
there are many varieties of naturalists. However, the central meaning of the term derives
72 Nelson 2002, Giberson & Yerxa 2002, Numbers 2006, Johnson 2000, Dembski 2005c, Woodward 2003.
73 As Jonathan Loesberger (2007, 107-108) has also argued.
74 E.g. Johnson 1991, Behe 2006a, Dembski 2001, Meyer 2010.
75 Woodward 2003. William Dembski has also admitted that Dawkins was a central influence in his formulation of
the concept of “specified complexity.” See the interview in Barham 2012.
76 E.g. Freeman & Herron (2007, 98-99).
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from the work of self-proclaimed naturalistic philosophers such as John Dewey, Ernest
Nagel,  Sidney  Hook  and  Roy  Wood  Sellars.  The  broad  idea  of  naturalism  is  to  align
philosophy closely with science. The most important method for understanding the natural
world is thought to be science, and it is believed that there is nothing outside of nature. It is
further argued that the function of philosophy is not to construct grand metaphysical
theories without science, but to support science in doing its job.77
What then is a naturalistic view of evolution? Charley Hardwick gives the following
five-point definition of naturalism:
(1) Outside of nature, which includes humans and their cultural creations, there is
nothing.
(2) It follows from (1) that nature is self-originating.
(3) Since there is nothing beyond nature, there can be no overarching purpose or goal
that would give any lasting meaning to the universe.
(4) There is no such thing as the “soul”, and no reasonable prospect of conscious
human survival beyond death.
(5) The emergence of life and mind in evolution was accidental and unintended.78
John Haught argues that scientific naturalism additionally includes the following two
points:
(6) Every natural event is itself a product of other natural events. Since there is no
divine cause, all causes are purely natural causes, in principle accessible to scientific
comprehension.
(7) All the various features of living beings, including humans, can be explained
ultimately in evolutionary, specifically Darwinian, terms. This belief may be called
“evolutionary naturalism”.79
In the above definitions, “nature” is not defined except by its negation: what is not
considered natural. Naturalism is understood to centrally include the denial of the existence
of God and divine purposes in nature. However, beyond this point, naturalism includes
quite a broad variety of conceptions of what is “natural”. A naturalistic definition of what
exists might be that everything that exists is composed of the “stuff described by chemists in the
periodic table of the elements”, though even more elementary levels can of course be studied.80
However, this is still quite a vague description of what nature contains, especially as many
naturalists allow for emergence of properties whose best description seems to more than just
chemistry, such as consciousness.81
77 Papineau 2009; see also Ritchie 2008 for an overview of varieties of naturalism.
78 Hardwick 1996, 5-6; quoted in Haught 2009, 247.
79 Haught 2009, 247.
80 Drees 2006.
81 Though naturalism is often linked with physicalism, the belief that physical stuff is all that exists is not shared
by all naturalists. Many also believe that non-physical properties can emerge through physical processes, but
ultimately these non-physical properties are of course still dependent on physics. (See Ritschie 2008, chapter 6).
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An important rough division can be made within naturalism into soft naturalism and
hard, eliminative naturalism. A soft naturalist can accept the reality of mind and purpose,
and allow for the emergence of strata of reality which are not reducible to physics and
chemistry. A soft naturalist need not think that reductive evolutionary explanations for all of
human life can be found. Hard, eliminative naturalists argue that our common beliefs about
consciousness are merely “folk psychology” that will in time be replaced with a naturalistic
understanding, in which terms such as intention and consciousness are not mentioned.82
Goetz and Taliaferro have argued that what the central unifying factor of the varieties of
naturalism is actually atheism: what is natural is defined in opposition to belief in God.83 This
is perhaps simplistic, because naturalism would seem to (as Haught defines it) also include
the denial of the soul and immortality after death. However, the denial of God or any
supernatural reality is indeed a central factor in naturalism.
Based on this understanding, naturalistic evolution means simply evolution which can
be understood without God. In theory, it is thus possible for a naturalist to believe that
evolution was intelligently designed, as long as the designer was not God. For example, one
could argue that the first living life form was designed by aliens, or even that the laws of
nature we study were engineered by a race of extra-dimensional space aliens. These views
would allow a naturalist to support a form of ID. Presumably, this would still be naturalism,
as long as these intelligent beings would themselves have evolved from simpler, non-
conscious precursors. However, the naturalists in the debate on ID prefer less fanciful
explanations of the order of nature in terms of non-purposeful mechanisms. In any case,
within naturalism, intelligence and purpose only emerge into the universe only after a long
evolution – if their existence even in humans is admitted as real.84
Naturalistic evolution can also mean the view that evolutionary biology is positively in
conflict with religious beliefs. Even if evolutionary biology is logically compatible with the
existence of a Creator, it can be argued that it makes some religious doctrines less credible.
The following are examples of proposed conflicts: (1) Contradictions between evolutionary
biology and the literalistic, historical reading of Genesis. For example, according to standard
Darwinian theory there was always a larger population of early humans, whereas in Genesis
human beings can be traced back to one pair of humans. The ID theorists mostly avoid
   The definition of nature is problematic. Human conceptions of what nature is have shifted through history, with
different notions of nature being socially constructed. (McGrath 2001) A modern naturalist might say that nature
is composed of matter and energy, but the boundaries of these concepts have shifted through their history.
Cunningham (2010, chapter 6) argues that if even a human mind can be just a clump of matter and energy, this
stretches the concepts of matter and energy to the breaking point. Furthermore, if nature means all of reality as
well as the foundations of reality, then that could in principle also include God, souls and angels. One could even
argue that on the theistic understanding, God´s existence is natural, and the world’s existence is supernatural.
82 A naturalist can thus accept that reality can be studied on many different levels, each with its own appropriate
methodology  and  concepts.  For  example,  biology  need  not  be  reduced  to  physics  or  psychology  to  biology.
Rather, a naturalist can accept a stratified conception of reality (Bhaskar 1979). For an analysis of the many
varieties of naturalism, see Ritchie 2008. For a defence of eliminative naturalism, see Churchland 2007.
83 Goetz & Taliaferro 2008.
84 Goetz & Taliaferro 2008.
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getting into this discussion.85 (2) Conflicts between Christian doctrine and the evolutionary
account of human history. For example, it has been argued that Darwinian evolutionary
biology  may  require  changes  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.86 (3) Conflicts between
evolutionary explanations of religious belief and religious explanations of religious belief. If
the cognitive faculties which produce religious beliefs are produced by evolution for some
benefit other than creating true beliefs, does this mean we have no reason to trust in our
faculties?87 (4) Conflicts between traditional Christian morality and attempts to infer ethical
principles from Darwinism, such as social Darwinism. Many in the ID community consider
this to be a significant conflict.88 (5) Conflicts between the Darwinian worldview and
Christian doctrine. Michael Ruse argues that if we already accept naturalism in the case of
evolutionary history, we should also be inclined to seek naturalistic (non-miraculous)
explanations for things like the disciples’ experiences of the risen Jesus.89 These are questions
about the most credible philosophical interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary biology. (6)
The conflict between Darwinian explanations of biological complexity and the theological
idea that God has purposefully designed the cosmos and life the universe as designed.90
Darwinism is though to reveal a universe without purpose, ruled over by uncaring chance
and necessity rather than loving divine providence. This final proposed conflict is the most
central in the debate on Intelligent Design, and the one that the present work spends the
most time analysing. However, the moral significance of the issues is also in the background
of ID’s argumentation.
Intelligent Design’s Moral and Cultural Critique of Naturalism
The importance of religious, cultural and political motivations for ID’s design argument is a
contentious issue. Both critics and defenders of ID accept that the ID theorists do have moral
and cultural motivations. Critics of ID tend to argue that these motivations distort the ID
theorists’ capability to evaluate scientific facts in a trustworthy manner.91 In contrast,
85 On the conflicts between creationism and evolutionism, see Numbers 2006 and Ratzsch 1996.
86 Ruse 2003.
87 For critique of this idea, see Visala 2011 and Leech & Visala 2011.
88 For example, the point is argued in the books Moral Darwinism (Wiker 2002) and Darwin Day in America (West
2007). I will analyse this discussion in some more detail in chapter 8.3.
89 Ruse 2003.
90 E.g. Dawkins 1991.
91 The point of the critics such as Forrest and Gross (2004) is not that morality in itself is a bad thing for a scientist
to  have.  Some morality  is  essential  to  science.  For  example,  scientists  should  value  the  scientific  project,  value
truth, co-operate with other humans and be able to admit their mistakes (Stenmark 2004, chapter 3; see also
chapters  8  and  9  for  discussion  of  ideological  science).  Saying  that  a  scientist  has  moral  motivations  does  not
therefore  imply  that  this  scientist  is  not  a  good  scientist.  The  argument  of  the  critics  is  rather  that  the  ID
movement’s specific moral and religious motivations are not congenial to science, because these moral and
religious motivations are thought to direct the ID theorists away from the truth. Preserving a baseless religious
viewpoint about the world and advancing its influence politically are thought to be more important motivations
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defenders of ID argue that seeking the truth is their primary moral motivation. The religious
and cultural importance of the issues merely gives the ID proponents additional moral
energy to spend time studying and debating the issues.92 Thus Johnson argues that ID wants
to free “science from the thought control of a materialist ideology that forbids scientists to follow the
evidence”.93 The reconciliation of faith and reason is also acknowledged to be an important
cultural purpose of Intelligent Design. Thus Stephen C. Meyer argues that “the theory of
intelligent design generates both excitement and loathing because, in additin to providing a
compelling explanation of scientific facts, it holds out the promise of help in integrating two things of
supreme importance – science and faith – that have long been seen as at odds.”94 Both of these
purposes are broadly shared also by defenders of theistic natural theology and researchers in
the science and religion community, but the means used are very different.95
There is also a theistic argument, the moral argument, which claims that the existence
of God has great moral importance at the level of moral ontology. If there is no God, it is
claimed, then good and evil are not objective realities, but rather simply the subjective
opinions  and  feelings  of  individuals  and  societies.  If  there  is  no  good  Creator  who  has
designed our universe purposefully, then there is no objective purpose to our lives which has
been set from the outside. Rather, we must create our own purposes.96 Before the ID
movement, literalistic and progressive creationists have already emphasized the moral
importance of the creation-evolution debate for decades.97
Though most of the ID literature emphasizes the importance of science and philosophy,
the importance of morality and religious reasons is also prominently present in several
of ID than the search for the truth. It may be that this critique assumes the falsity of the ID theorists’ religion. If
their religion were true, then presumably commitment to it would not lead them away from the truth.
92 E.g. Menuge 2003.
93 Johnson 2006, 317. According to Johnson, it is the naturalists who are bound by their metaphysics, since
materialistic scientism requires a wholly naturalistic story of creation. In contrast, the theism of the ID theorists
allows them to consider the evidence more openly. I will come back to this theme in chapters 3.4 and 3.5.
94 Meyer 2013, 513.
95 Meyer (2013, 513) approvingly quotes Whitehead's statement: “When we consider what religion is for mankind and
what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends oupon the decision of this generation as
to the relations between them.” (Whitehead 1926, 260).
96 There are several ways of answering this problem. First (1), the atheist could change his position and become a
theist.  If  an atheist believes both in the existence of objective morality and that objective morality requires God,
then  this  logically  leads  to  theism.  On this  view,  if  one  does  not  want  to  give  up objective  morality,  one  must
become a theist. Second (2), the atheist could argue that objective morality does not require the existence of God,
but that it can be grounded in something else – Platonic universals, perhaps. Third (3), the atheist could recognize
the subjective nature of morality, but argue that this makes no practical difference. All sides of the debate
typically agree that atheists can behave morally even if they do not believe in God; the main issue is the logical
consistency of atheists rather than their morality. The morality of the atheists is actually presupposed by the
argument  –  the  atheist  is  assumed to  seek  “good”  and evaluate  behavior  in  the  light  of  what  he  believes  to  be
good. Fourth (4), the atheist could admit that we indeed cannot have morality without God and that this is indeed
problematic for our behavior, but that the desirability of the existence of God does not make it true.  Fifth (5), the
atheist  could  admit  that  we  cannot  have  morality  without  God  and  celebrate  this  as  a  liberating  license  to  do
whatever one wishes. So, a multitude of different attitudes and philosophical responses is possible. See further
King & Garcia (ed) 2009.
97 For some examples, see Numbers  2006, chapters 4 and 5.
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works. Phillip Johnsons’s works Reason in the Balance (1995) and The  Wedge  of  Truth (2001)
begin and end by emphasizing the religious and moral significance of the debate on
evolution. For Johnson, our culture’s creation myths determine the standard reasoning
which our culture applies to “all questions of importance.”98 The theistic creation story grounds
belief in the purposiveness of our existence and the objectivity of morality, while naturalistic
Darwinism undermines both.99 In Johnson’s strategy for changing culture, Intelligent Design
functions as a “wedge of truth” which shows the baselessness of materialistic scientism and
thus  makes  room for  broader  conceptions  of  rationality.  This  in  turn  will  make  it  possible
(Johnson hopes) for Western culture to return to belief in objective morality and to approach
believing again in the objective truth of the Biblical revelation.100 For Johnson, Darwinism is
thus a worldview and a way of thought, not just a scientific theory. He argues that Dennett
and Dawkins give the correct interpretation of evolution, where Darwinian evolution is seen
as the universal acid which eats through traditional beliefs, and (if true) as the logical
starting point of understanding all of life and culture.101 Johnson’s views are highly
significant for the ID movement as a whole, since Johnson is universally regarded as the
central visionary and leader of the ID movement in the 1990’s.102
In his book Moral Darwinism: How We Became Hedonists (2002) ID proponent Benjamin
Wiker constructs a contrast between two different moral viewpoints which he believes have
been fighting throughout history. The first of these is theistic morality, which Wiker links
with Intelligent Design. The second is “Moral Darwinism”, which Wiker traces to the
philophy of Epicurus (340-270 B.C.) and links to evolutionary biology. Wiker’s argument is
one of the most detailed moral arguments in the ID literature, and it is significant that the
back cover carries endorsements from Johnson, Behe and Dembski. In his introduction to
Wiker´s book, William Dembski calls Intelligent Design “the ground zero of the culture wars”.
For Dembski, the crucial question behind different ethical systems is, again, the nature of
reality: “ultimately, the problem is whether reality at its base is purposive and intelligent or mindless
and material.”103
The Discovery Institute’s Wedge Document (1999) was originally created for the
purposes of presenting ID’s vision and cultural importance to financial supporters. The
document begins with the idea that human beings are created in the image of God, and
reports that this idea has positively influenced the birth of representative democracy, human
rights, free enterprise and the progress of science and the arts (in short, all kinds of central
achievements of Western culture). The document goes on to say that belief in humans as the
image of God is now under attack by the philosophy of scientific materialism, which denies
the objective existence of good and evil and devalues human life. Darwinian evolution is
98 Johnson 2001, 159.
99 Johnson 1995, 7.
100 Johnson 2001.
101 Johnson & Reynolds 2010.
102 Dembski (ed.) 2006; Woodward 2003, chapter 4; Forrest & Gross 2004, 16-23.
103 Wiker 2002, 11.
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understood to provide a central part of the foundation for this philosophy of materialism.
Because of this, the challenge of Intelligent Design to Darwinism and to the philosophy of
materialism is argued to be culturally important.104
John G. West’s “Darwin Day in America: How Our Politics and Culture Have Been
Dehumanized in the Name of Science” (2007) is also important for understanding the ID
movement’s moral vision, since West is the director of the Discovery Institute. West argues
that Darwinian scientific materialism has played a crucial part in generating five negative
moral phenomena: technocracy, utopianism, devaluing of human life, moral relativism and
the stifling of free speech. West does not argue that these consequences follow necessarily
from a Darwinian worldview: “Few actions are the necessary result of any particular set of ideas.
People often act inconsistently with their own beliefs. – – People also interpret and apply their beliefs
in different ways. – – Again, these consequences may not have been necessitated by scientific
materialism, but they were certainly natural and logical conclusions of the materialist worldview.”105
West sees Intelligent Design as a good antidote to this worldview of scientific materialism.
All of these documents repeat and expand on Johnson’s basic idea: a culture's creation
myths play a large part in determining the culture's morality, because they strongly
influence views of human nature. The mainstream of the ID movement sees the debate on
Darwinism and ID as a conflict of worldviews with different standards of rationality and
different morality. ID defends the purposiveness of reality, while Darwinism is about
reducing reality to mindless material causes. ID is argued to be consonant with objective
morality and belief in human value while Darwinism is though to be more consonant with
moral relativism and the devaluing of human life.
So, the ID movement clearly opposes Darwinism as a whole worldview, not just as a
scientific theory. The ID theorists believe that this worldview is morally and culturally
dangerous, and want to oppose it for these reasons. But they argue that this does not exclude
the possibility of other motivations (such as truth-seeking), nor does it follow from this that
there could not be something to ID's arguments. In the course of this study, I will repeatedly
show that the ID theorists put great emphasis on the importance of the empirical evidence
and sound argumentation in the formation of their ideas about design and evolution. The
same is also emphasized in their personal historical narratives as told by the ID movement.106
In the history of science, theories and arguments have indeed been proposed for a
great variety of reasons. People, even scientists, are motivated by a multitude of factors, and
moral and religious motivations are not necessarily in conflict with the motivation to search
for the truth. Rather, moral and religious motivations can also often lead one to have a high
regard for truth and to spend much time in ascertaining the truth about some matter. As I
will argue in more detail in chapter 2.3, Mikael Stenmark has proposed that we should
analyse the relationship of science and religion multi-dimensionally. In the social and
104 Discovery Institute 2003, 2005; Forrest & Gross 2004, chapter 1; Menuge 2004a.
105 West 2007, 370-371.
106 See e.g. Woodward 2003 and 2006; Meyer 2006.
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teleological dimension, there can be plenty of interaction between science and religion
without jeopardizing the evaluation of the justification of scientific theories. The evaluation
of arguments is a separate matter from the motivation of those arguments.107
It is difficult to accept that different people could honestly and rationally come to a
completely different conclusion about some matter. Studies have shown that humans
generally have a tendency to explain the opinions of those we disagree with by reference to
non-rational reasons, whereas our own opinions are explained by rational factors. So,
creationists will tend to explain evolutionary beliefs by reference to the sinful nature of
humans, while evolutionists tend to explain skepticism of evolution in basically the same
way.108
The distinction between the objective and subjective rationality is helpful at this point.
Some view can be objectively false, and therefore any arguments in its favour are misleading
from the objective perspective of truth. However, this does not mean that arguments for such
a view could not nevertheless seem convincing from a finite subjective perspective. For
example, belief in a geocentric universe was certainly rational for Medieval Europeans,
though it was later overthrown by the heliocentric cosmology, which was again overthrown
later.109 Following this line of thought, even if we ourselves reject some view such as ID or
Darwinian evolutionary biology as objectively false, it should be possible for us to believe
that accepting these views may be subjectively rational for those who believe it. Furthermore,
in a democratic culture, it is important to attempt to understand the reasons others have for
their beliefs, and attempt to engage in rational dialogue.110 We should strive to use
arguments that cannot also be used against ourselves in the same way. In fact, in the debate
on Intelligent Design, all parties are partly motivated also by moral and theological
motivations. As noted earlier, many critics, too, see the debate on ID as a battle between
good and evil. I will note many theological background assumptions on all sides in the
course of this study.
In this study, I will attempt to read both critics and defenders of ID charitably and
engage in this dialogue with different views. Based on my own reading of the ID material
and interaction with some ID proponents, I have gotten a strong impression that the ID
theorists do value truth. So, I will not side with the conspiracy theorists. While the full
analysis of ID’s moral vision is beyond this study, I do want to offer a few remarks that are
relevant for the discussion of ID’s design arguments.
First, the designer identified in ID’s moral argumentation is clearly theistic, not just an
unidentified intelligent designer. Wiker argues that there is an “intelligent designer who has
107 Stenmark 2004.
108 See Harman 2004.
109 See e.g. Hannam 2011, chapter 18.
110 On this point, see the upcoming work of the Finnish Center of Excellence on Reason and Religious Recognition
led by Risto Saarinen.
Background
39
created a moral order intrinsic to human nature (and therefore, human beings must act in accordance
to the designer’s natural moral order).”111
A question  arises:  why should  we  act  in  accordance  with  the  designer’s  wishes?  As  I
will show in chapter 3.1, the ID movement emphasizes the logical limitations of the design
argument and the difficulty of identifying the designer based on just the designer argument.
The designer could in principle even be a space-alien. However, if we change Wiker’s
sentence to read that “space-aliens have created us to have certain moral instincts, and therefore we
must act in accordance to their design”, the argument no longer seems at all persuasive.
Couldn’t the space-aliens as finite beings have evil purposes? What if we ourselves gained
the capability to design new intelligent forms of life – would these new beings truly be
morally obligated to act in the way that we designed them to act, even if we had designed
them to be slaves? It seems not. However, if the designer is by definition the supreme moral
authority of the universe, and the supreme good, namely God, then it seems more reasonable
that we should act according to his moral order. This would then be in line with theistic
moral arguments for the existence of God.112 Wiker's argument only makes sense on this
more robust concept of the designer, but not on the minimalistic conception used in ID’s
design arguments. As I will also argue in later chapters, in their argumentation the ID
proponents sometimes move like this between a minimal and a theistic conception of the
designer.
Second, the presentation of alternative moral worldviews in ID’s moral arguments is
far too dualistic. Theistic belief in Intelligent Design and materialistic belief in Darwinian
evolution are presented as the central competing alternatives, but this bypasses the
possibility of theistic evolutionism. Couldn’t belief in the purposiveness of reality and
traditional morality be combined with belief in Darwinian evolution? The answer of the
source material referenced in this subchapter is that theistic evolutionism is a difficult and
problematic view, which is perhaps “barely possible”, but not as consistent as believing in
either theistic intelligent design or Darwinian materialism. The dualistic framing of
alternatives also does not take into account that only a minority of naturalists choose to
understand naturalism or evolutionary biology as the starting point of moral reasoning.113
I will analyse Intelligent Design’s views on theistic evolutionism and defend theistic
evolution in detail in chapter 8. I will argue in that chapter that ID's critique of theistic
111 Wiker 2002, 22.
112 King & Garcia (ed) 2009. Wiker (2002) himself admits that he is defending the morality of traditional Christian
theism. Wiker’s contrast is between a theistic system of morality, where God ensures the objectivity of morality,
and relativism, where humans must “construct their own value systems”, on a hedonistic or utilitarian basis.
113 Dawkins (1986, 1) has written that because of Darwinism, we have the basis to argue that there is at bottom no
purpose to the universe, and no good or evil. However, elsewhere Dawkins (2006b, chapter 1) has also argued
that we humans nevertheless have the capability and duty to act morally. Belief in the importance of goodness is
actually one of the foundations of Dawkins’ moral critique of religion. It may be that the existence of moral truths
does not fit well into Dawkins´understanding of reality, but this needs to be argued further. Mikael Stenmark
(2001) has critiqued moral interpretations of science as scientism. A naturalist who rejects scientism could also
reject such moral interpretations, and attempt to find other grounds for morality.
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evolutionism drives the movement's argumentation toward contradictions. Inadequate
grappling with in-depth defences of theistic evolutionism is a large weakness in ID’s
argumentation.
2.3. Science and Theology
Defining Science and Religion
Understanding the relationship of science and religion is important for understanding the
debate on Intelligent Design. A central difficulty comes from the fact that there is no
universal definition of either science or religion. The word “science” itself is used in many
different ways. For example, in the English-speaking world, the word “science” customarily
refers only to the natural sciences, while the German word “wissenschaft” also includes the
humanities.114 Even within the natural sciences, there are multiple methodologies, and the
content of theories and scientific assumptions have varied widely over time.115 Del Ratzsch,
conscious of the difficulties, defines natural science broadly as “a deeply empirical project aimed
most fundamentally at understanding and explaining the natural realm, typically in natural
terms.”116 Science should also be understood as a “stratified phenomenon”, encompassing
multiple levels of reality. Science can be studied on several levels, including psychological,
sociological and theoretical dimensions.117 The nature of science is quite controversial in the
discussion over Intelligent Design, and I will discuss it further in chapter three. Ratzsch’s
definition assumes that science only “typically” explains nature in natural terms, whereas
many argue that there are no exceptions to the rule of methodological naturalism.
Defining “religion” is equally difficult. For example, a fairly typical Western definition
of  religion  (used  by  Ratzsch)  is “belief in a transcendent supernatural being(s), plus (typically)
closely associated moral codes, ritual practices, personal/group commitments, convictions concerning
meaning, purpose, value, and post-death conscious existence, all integrated into an encompassing
world-view.”118 The most obvious problem with this definition is the exclusion of religions
where belief in “transcendent supernatural beings” is not traditionally central, such as
Buddhism. But there are also other problems. For example, defining the Christian God as a
“supernatural being” has sometimes been contested by Christian theologians, because these
are not terms used in the Christian tradition itself, and many would rather speak of God as
the “ground of being” or “existence itself” than as a supernatural being.119
114 McGrath 2001, introduction.
115 Brooke 1991.
116 Ratzsch 2009a, 55.
117 McGrath 2002.
118 Ratzsch 2009a, 55.
119 See e.g. Feser 2008, Cunningham 2009, Turner 2002 for critical discussion of seeing God as a “supernatural
being”.
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Philosopher William Alston has provided a more multifaceted definition of religion.
Alston argues that we should not think of religion in terms of a single unifying characteristic,
but rather a web of characteristics, many of which may be absent from a particular religion.
These are (1) belief in supernatural beings, (2) a distinction between sacred and profane
objects, (3) ritual acts focused on sacred objects, (4) a moral code believed to be sanctioned by
the gods, (5) characteristic religious feelings such as awe, (6) prayer, (7) a worldview, (8) a
total organization of one’s life based on the worldview, and (9) a social group that more or
less follows these tenets. While “religion” refers to the conjunction of a sufficient number of
such characteristics, “theology” typically refers to the doctrine and way of thought
associated with this religion.120
The question of defining science and religion has political importance for many in the
debate over Intelligent Design. If Intelligent Design can be defined as “religion” then it can
be argued that it should remain outside public schools. However, if it is “science” then it can
be taught, it is argued.121 On the side of ID, Calvert argues that naturalism is clearly a
religion, since it includes a fairly comprehensive worldview about human origins and our
place in the world.122 In response, it seems to me that naturalism has only a few of the
religion-making characteristics described in Alston’s definition, whereas traditional religions
have many. However, the minimalistic idea of ID also has only few religion-making
characteristics, though its proponents typically follow some religion. In any case, the legal
debate is outside the scope of this study. The take-home lesson from this discussion is simply
that when we discuss the relationship of “science” and “religion” or “science” and
“theology” we should try to keep the existence of different forms of each in mind.
Models on the Relationship of Science and Theology
According to Ian G. Barbour’s famous typology, the relationship of science and religion (as
well as science and theology) can be viewed in four ways. According to the conflict view (1)
science and theology occupy the same cognitive territory and are locked in mortal conflict. A
typical example of the conflict view is the positivist idea that history proceeds from theology
to metaphysics to science. Science is on the march, and is constantly pushing back the forces
of religious superstition. According to the independence view (2) science and theology occupy
separate domains and do not interact. A typical example of this view is S.J. Gould’s division,
which places science in the realm of facts and theology in the realm of values and emotion.123
This division is also supported by philosophers and theologians who argue that science and
religion are radically different forms of life which do not speak the same language, and
whose interaction is thus difficult at best. Between these extremes stand the dialogue view (3)
120 Alston 1967, summary from Kelly James Clark (2014, chapter 2).
121 See e.g. Calvert 2009; Forrest & Gross 2004, chapter 8.
122 Calvert 2009.
123 Gould 2002.
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which holds that science and theology have at least some common ground, on which
interaction and dialogue can take place. For example, since the Judeo-Christian doctrine of
creation states that God has created the empirical realm, so perhaps we can find traces of his
creative work there. The results of science may at least serve to heighten our appreciation of
the Creator’s greatness. Or perhaps results from psychology and cognitive science can be in
dialogue with the theological picture of man. The fourth view is the integration view (4) which
aims to integrate the viewpoints of science and theology into a comprehensive worldview,
usually  with  the  help  of  philosophy.  Though science  and theology  are  still  seen  as  having
differences, combining and integrating them is seen as the best way to form our picture of
God and reality.124
The conflict view is possibly the most common view of the relationship between
science and theology on the popular level. Historical study of the relationship of science and
theology has shown the truth to be more complex, however. Although isolated cases of real
conflict exist, religious beliefs have also helped the growth of science. For example, most of
the early modern scientists were motivated by Christian beliefs in the rationality of the
natural world which God created. In recent historical study, the relationship of science and
religion is is argued to be complex, and simpler theories of warfare and total harmony have
been set aside.125 Even the difficulty of defining science and religion shows the need for a
more complex approach: both science and religion are complex and diverse phenomena, and
it thus stands to reason that their relationship is complex as well.
Mikael Stenmark’s multidimensional model of the relationship of science and religion
seeks to do justice to this complexity. Stenmark identifies four different levels of science and
religion, on which they can be related. The first (1) is the social dimension. Science and
religion are both social practices within a particular historical and cultural setting. Barbour’s
typology focuses on the relationship of scientific theories and religious doctrines. But
Stenmark emphasis that science and religion are also social, human phenomena. The second
(2) is the teleological dimension. Scientific and religious practices have their own values and
goals. The goal of science is understood to be the understanding of reality; the goal of
religion can be the same, but is also related to a search for happiness. The third is the (3)
epistemological or methodological dimension: the means developed and used to achieve the
goals of science and religion, as well as definitions of rationality. Stenmark argues that the
differences in goals lead to different standards of what counts as rational. However, there are
also similarities here. The epistemic practices of scientists are human. Though scientists
strive to minimize error, it is arguable that their knowledge cannot be wholly independent of
authorities, intuitions and personal experiences.126 The fourth (4) dimension is the theoretical
dimension. This means the beliefs, stories, theories, and the like that the practice of science
and religion generates.127
124 Barbour 1997, 77-105.
125 For more on this, see e.g. Brooke 1991, Ferngren 2002.
126 Ratzsch 2010.
127 Stenmark 2004, 268.
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Theoretical discourse on the relationship of science and theology typically focuses on
the epistemological and theoretical levels. In this study on Intelligent Design, the epistemic
and theoretical levels of the interaction of science and religion are also the ones in the
spotlight. On the epistemic level, the discussion focuses on the rational justification of belief
in an intelligent designer. The discussion on whether theology and worldviews can influence
science is also a question on the epistemic level.128 On the theoretical level, we can ask
whether there is some kind of resonance between the doctrine of creation and the scientific
understanding of the world. Proponents of ID argue that nature has much order which is
best explained by reference to some intelligent designer. The naturalists of the debate, on the
other hand, argue that the success of the natural sciences should lead us to be sceptical of all
such explanations.
The Possibility of Dialogue
One possible way of dismissing dialogue between theology and science unimportant is to
show that science and theology are too different to interact in any meaningful way. There are
many ways to defend such an independence view. For example, it can be argued that theology
and science are two entirely different language games, and that religion is not really
concerned with the realm of empirically accessible facts, as science is. This position is known
as Wittgensteinian fideism.129 Some also argue that the theistic metaphysics underlying much
of natural theology (to be introduced in chapter 2.4) is in error. Theistic metaphysics requires
a realistic notion of religious language, but some argue that religious language is more like
poetry and music, merely expressing emotions but not trying to say anything about God.130
This type of philosophical criticism of the dialogue between science and theology is
often put forward as a neutral description of religion, merely correcting misunderstandings
about the grammar of faith. In these accounts, theology and science are thought to be so
different that there is no common ground and no connections. One problem arises from the
vagueness of the concept of religion. It seems clear that there are many forms of religion, and
some of these may indeed be antirealist and totally separated from all forms of science.
However, other forms of religion presuppose metaphysical realism and allow for interaction
with natural science.131
Reading histories of the relationship of Christianity and natural science, it seems
evident that some forms of science and religion have interacted in many ways historically.132
128 Stenmark 2004.
129 E.g. Phillips 1994.
130 Phillips 1994.
131 For good examples of theological realism and antirealism, see McGrath 2001 & 2002. It is important to keep in
mind that theological realism can be accepted independently of accepting natural theology. A fideist can also be a
theological realist who believes in the mind-independent existence of God.
132 Wykstra 2001.
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For example, the metaphysical beliefs underlying modern science, such as belief in the
world’s orderliness, arguably have a Christian foundation.133 Peter Harrison argues that the
idea of the fall also played a role in the rise of modern science, because the recognition of
man’s sinfulness (and thus capability to err) was used to argue for the necessity of peer
review.134 The idea of a historical flood caused many scientists to look for evidence of the
flood in geological sediments. Thus research which in time overturned the literalistic
interpretation of Genesis had religious beginnings.135 These are just a few examples of a
positive interaction between science and religion. These, and the existence of natural
theology itself shows that not all forms of religion are antirealist, and that there have
historically been connections between some forms of religion and science.
While the idea that there is a complete separation between science and theology can
sound like a neutral description of the issue, it actually means judging many apparently
religious ways of thought to be outside the realm of true religion. The independence view is
thus not just descriptive, but requires a normative element as well. It seems that if we want
to really describe the complex relationship between different forms of religion and different
forms of science, we will need to compare our philosophical ideas about religion and science
with the actual historical and current interaction of different forms of religion and science. In
this material one can find many differences between religion and science, but also many
commonalities and common ground where meaningful dialogue has occurred. The reality of
dialogue between science and theology in the past makes me open to dialogue in the present,
as well.136
I have argued that science and theology are not so independent that they have no
common ground at all. However, proponents of independence views have made some valid
points in trying to explain differences between science and theology. Science and theology
are certainly different, and we should not make them mean the same thing. Michael J.
Murray has helpfully compared the relationship between theology and science to a marriage
partnership. In a functional marriage, both partners must respect each other and each other’s
differences. The relationship of science and theology should not be a “doormat relationship”
in which one party holds dominion over each other. The strongest expression of the
dominion of science over theology is in scientism, the belief that science is the only or at least
our overwhelmingly best way of gaining knowledge about anything. The strongest
expression of the dominance of theology over science is in literalistic Young Earth -
creationism, in which the interpretation of scientific research is completely subordinate to the
133 Burtt 2003.
134 Harrison 2009. Of course, this does not mean that the human capacity for error was only discovered because of
Christianity. Harrison simply argues that historically, the doctrine of the Fall was a central argument and
motivating factor for the necessity of scientific communities and peer review.
135 Browne 2003.
136 In this I am not being particularly brave or original, because belief in the possibility of mutually beneficial
interaction is part of a broad consensus of religion and science studies which has emerged in the last decades.
Typical  articles  in  any  handbook or  encyclopaedia  on  the  issue  present  many examples  of  positive  interaction.
(See e.g. Clayton & Simpson 2006).
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Young Earth -reading of the Bible. In my view, Murray is correct in rejecting both of these
methods in favour of dialogue.137
But how does the interaction between science and theology work in practice? Possibly
the most in-depth model of this interaction is Robert John Russell’s model of creative mutual
interaction (CMI).  Russell  is  a  critic  of  Intelligent Design,  but relating ID to Russell’s  model
nevertheless helps understand the nature of ID’s project. In Russell’s model, theology and
science are separate enterprises which often work on different types of questions. However,
both are concerned with truth, and there can be much benefit to their interaction. Theories
from science can act as data which can be interpreted and explained within theology, but
also as constraints which rule out some theological ideas about the world. For example, the
theistic arguments of natural theology provide a theological explanation or interpretation of
some scientific discoveries, such as the fine-tuning of the laws of nature or the origin of the
cosmos in the Big Bang. Furthermore, there are cases where science has reached its limits,
and points beyond itself to the possibility of theological discourse. The results of science and
also favor some theological perspective over others, such as the scientific evidence against
the claims of literalistic creationism. Often, scientific discoveries have to be interpreted
through some philosophical framework before theological implications can be gleamed,
however.138
But in Russell’s understanding, the influence can also run in the other direction, from
theology  to  natural  science.  Theology  has  historically  grounded  the  philosophical
assumptions that have provided the foundations for natural science, such as the orderliness
and comprehensibility of the world and the necessity of empirical research. But theology’s
influence can even extend to motivating new scientific projects, and evaluating a priori
which research programme seems most likely to succeed. An interesting example of this,
which Russell often uses, is Fred Hoyle’s defence of steady state cosmology, which was
initially motivated by Hoyle’s strong dislike of the apparently theistic implications of Big
Bang cosmology. In this case, Hoyle began with a theological (atheistic) motivation, and
went on to develop a full-fledged scientific theory which would be more consonant with his
atheism.139
As  I  will  argue  in  more  detail  in  the  following  chapters,  the  influence  runs  in  both
directions – from science to theology and from theology to science – also in Intelligent Design
thought. ID is thought to provide scientific evidence that resonates with the theological belief
in a Creator, though the evidence of design is not alone sufficient to prove the existence of
this Creator. ID also sees influences from theology into science. As noted in chapter 2.2, ID’s
project of finding evidence of design in the universe is motivated by theistic philosophy and
theistic moral concerns in addition to purely scientific motivations (such as the search for
scientific truth). However, these motivations are thought to be unnecessary for
137 Murray 2009a; see also Stenmark 2004, chapters 8-9.
138 Russell 2008, 303.
139 Russell 2008, 305. For further discussion of Russell’s model, see also Peters & Hallanger 2006.
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understanding ID’s scientific argument. The ID theorists also make the point that belief in
the designedness of the cosmos and life has historically been quite beneficial for natural
science. They also see the same kind of interaction between science and (atheistic) theology
in Darwinian evolutionary biology. Darwinian evolutionary biology is thought to be
influenced by materialistic philosophical biases. Also, the theory of Darwinian evolution is
thought to provide a significant challenge to theistic belief, when coupled the philosophical
framework of scientism. ID is seen as the best way to answer this challenge.
In Russell’s model, such extrascientific motivations and the interpretation of scientific
results through philosophical frameworks are to be expected. So, in a way, Russell´s model
also helps understand the structure of ID´s argumentation. Nevertheless, though this use of
the model clarifies the way ID thinkers themselves think of their project, ID’s claim to be
science has been questioned. For example, Russell himself does not accept either ID as an
example of creative mutual interaction. This is because Russell regards design as a
theological, not a scientific explanation. So, ID seems to be inserting a theological explanation
within science, rather than respecting the integrity and autonomy of science and theology, as
Russell’s model of creative mutual interaction does.140 According  to  Russell,  theistic  and
atheistic interpretations of evolution should be presented as theological and philosophical
arguments, rather than as part of science.141 I  will  return to these arguments in the coming
chapters.
Some Problems of Scientism
“Scientism” is a word that has already come up several times, so some further clarification of
its meaning is in order. What I have in mind is what Mikael Stenmark has termed “epistemic
scientism”: “The view that the only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has
access to.”142 Furthermore, in this view science – and typically natural science is meant here –
is believed to be the only or at least the most reliable way of gaining knowledge about
reality. Sometimes an even stronger scientistic view which Stenmark terms rationalistic
scientism is advocated in connection to epistemic scientism. This is the view that “we are
rationally entitled to believe only what can be scientifically justified or what is scientifically
knowable.”143 If  we  accept  this  strong  form  of  scientism,  rationality  of  belief  in  God,  for
example, would require evidence at least comparable to the evidences used in science.
However, scientism is very problematic. Since the issue will come up many times over the
course of this study, I will now present four lines of critique against scientism.
First (1), scientism appears to be self-refuting. Epistemic and rationalistic scientism are
not themselves results of scientific enquiry, but philosophical viewpoints. So if we are
140 Russell 2008, 214-215.
141 Russell 2008, 6.
142 Stenmark 2001, 4.
143 Stenmark 2001, 6.
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justified in believing in scientism or if scientism counts as reliable knowledge, then it seems
that we can have knowledge and rational beliefs outside of science anyway, and scientism is
refuted.144
Second (2), the practice of natural science itself requires a broader conception of
rationality. In order to perform experiments as part of a community of natural scientists, one
must have some trust in experience, the veracity of our beliefs about other minds, our ability
to plan intentionally, the ability of experiments to shed light on hypotheses and so on. It is
difficult to see how natural science could be more reliable than the beliefs that its practice is
based upon. Therefore, it seems that if natural science is reliable, reliable knowledge and
rational beliefs must also be possible outside natural science.145
Third (3), most of our everyday beliefs would be irrational, if we were to accept
rationalistic scientism. The methods of science require strict conditions and typically aim at
solving highly specialized problems. We cannot present scientific evidence even for such
simple beliefs as “my wife loves me” or “I love my wife” (unless we adopt a very broad
definition of “science”). However, even scientists cannot help but have such beliefs.
Fourth (4), in practice it seems that many presentations of “the scientific worldview”
are not actually based merely on natural science, but are more like philosophical
interpretations of natural science. It has proven exceedingly difficult to construct a whole
worldview based on natural science.146
Instead of scientism, I posit that we should be open to the interaction of science,
philosophy and theology without devaluing any of these or trying to make them into
something they are not. We should not reduce theology into science nor science into
theology, even if we find common ground and even some commonalities in rationality.
However, having some sort of reasons in support of belief in God need not mean that
theology is thereby reduced to scientific reasoning. This would only be true if science were
the only way to provide rational reasons for belief.147 The  problems  of  scientism  do  not
automatically prove that religious beliefs are true, but they do open the way for constructive
and critical dialogue between natural science and theology.
If we want to see positive interaction between theology and the natural sciences, we
need to accept two premises in addition to the rejection of scientism. First, we need to
suppose that theology and the natural sciences have some common ground which makes
144 Stenmark 2001, 32-33.
145 As Del Ratzsch (2010) argues, some such commonalities in rationality seem inevitable, because both science
and religion are human enterprises. Popular beliefs to the contrary, studies of actual scientific and religious
practices show that there are surprising amounts of similarities. Science is also influenced by intuitions, authority
and traditions, and religious belief is also influenced by evidence (such as personal experiences or philosophical
arguments). Nancey Murphy (1993) has similarly compared theological rationality to that of scientific research
programs.
146 An  amusing  example  of  this  is  produced  by  Denis  Noble  (2008,  13).  Noble  analyses  Dawkins’  concept  of
“selfish genes” and shows how this interpretation went beyond the biological data, and how current research is
correcting this conception. (Noble 2013 goes further in this direction). See Stenmark 2001, chapter 2 for some
further examples.
147 Stenmark (2001) presents a more thorough critique of scientism.
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dialogue possible. Second, we need to suppose that evidence and explanations are also
somehow relevant in theology. A theological anti-realist who does not believe that religions
make truth-claims will typically have little interest in the dialogue between science and
theology.148 For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  I  will  accept  these  assumptions,  which  are  also
important for the ID movement.
2.4. Natural Theology
Understanding Natural Theology
The Intelligent Design movement generally emphasizes that ID is a scientific, not a
theological idea. However, ID is also conceived of as revealing a connection between
theology and science. Scientific evidence for the existence of some designer behind nature is
seen as evidence consonant with the Christian doctrine of creation. In the Christian tradition,
such connections between Christian doctrines and publicly available evidence have
traditionally been explored under the name of natural theology. It will therefore be important
to connect my analysis of the ID movement’s thought to the concept of natural theology.
According to John Hedley Brooke, “natural theology is a type of theological discourse in
which the existence and attributes of the deity are discussed in terms of what can be known through
natural reason, in contradistinction (though not necessarily in opposition) to knowledge derived from
special revelation.”149 However, as Brooke goes on to point out, the definitions of “natural
reason” and “revelation” have been understood differently in differently cultures and
different times.150 Broadly speaking natural theology speaks of knowledge of God available
through human observation, memory and rational intuitions, as well as arguments based on
them.151 There are other definitions of natural theology, and the relation of natural theology
to theologies of nature is much discussed. I will return to this issue at the end of chapter 2.4.
The Historical Importance of Natural Theology
Natural theology has a long history. The idea of natural knowledge of the divine can already
be found in the Greek philosophies of nature as well as in the Bible and in the writings of
many Church Fathers. The standard biblical proof text for natural theology has long been
Romans 1:20: “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and
divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are
148 For a good defence of realism in Christian theology, see McGrath 2002.
149 Brooke 2002, 163-164.
150 Brooke 2002, 164.  A more thorough discussion of the change of the concept of ”reason” and the influence of
this change on theology can be found in Turner 2002.
151 Plantinga 2011, 48.
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without excuse.” Acts 14:17 states that God “has not left himself without testimony: He has shown
kindness by giving you rain from heaven and crops in their seasons; he provides you with plenty of
food and fills your hearts with joy.” These and other passages like them do not present
arguments for the existence of God, but some idea of the common availability of knowledge
of God nevertheless seems to be present.152
Although some early Christians took a negative attitude to philosophy, many early
Church fathers nevertheless took a positive attitude to natural theology and tried to find
connections between Christianity and Greek philosophy.153 For  example,  Augustine  writes
that “though the voices of the prophets were silent, the world itself, by its well-ordered changes and
movements, and by the fair appearance of all visible things, bears a testimony of its own, both that it
has been created, and also that it could not have been created save by God, whose greatness and beauty
are unutterable and invisible.”154 Here Augustine says that the order of the world is evidently
created by God, and that this could be known even without the prophets. In many places the
Church Fathers also support their views with philosophical arguments. 155  However, in their
writings, faith and reason are arguably conceived as a holistic unity rather than making a
sharp distinction between the deliverances of reason and the deliverances of faith.156 In the
Middle Ages, natural theology was developed further by theologians such as Anselm (1033-
1109), Bonaventure (1221-1274) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).157
The closest parallels to the design arguments of the ID movement come from the
arguments of early modern scientists rather than from classical or medieval though,
however. Sir Isaac Newton’s (1642-1727) design arguments were based both on the
harmonious order of the natural laws and the solar system as well as the order in biology.
The apex of this pre-Darwinian natural theology is typically thought to be the design
arguments of William Paley (1743-1805) in his Natural Theology: Or, Evidences of the Existence
and Attributes of the Deity (1802). While Paley focused on the biological evidences for design,
thinkers like James Hutton (1726-1797) and Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) focused attention on
the system of nature as a whole, Hutton on the geological processes which maintain the
Earth’s fertile soil and Priestley on the role of vegetation in maintaining the quality of air.
The laws of nature were viewed as the supreme designer’s harmonious design.158 In  this
British fusion of natural science and natural theology, it was believed that the natural
sciences provided powerful support for belief in God.159
152 For analyses on Biblical natural theology, see Barr 1993 and Rowland 2013.
153 Ferguson 1999.
154 De civitate dei, XI, 4.
155 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, II: 1-9; Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and Resurrection, chapter 1; Augustine, On Free
Will, 2.12.33. I have found these examples through Swinburne (2004b, 536).
156 McGrath 2001, chapter 6; Kirjavainen 1984. On the evolution of the concept of reason see Turner 2002.
157 See further Hall 2013 and Feser 2008.
158 Brooke 2002, 170. Natural theology also provided a way of defending the legitimacy empirical science in
theological terms: God had created a rational world and had meant for humans to study and understand it.
Natural theology united Christians of several different persuasions (Brooke 1991, 2002).
159 Brooke 1991, see also McGrath 2009b.
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Philosophical and Scientific Critiques of Natural Theology
Modern times also brought new challenges to natural theology. In traditional Christian
natural theology knowledge of God found through reason was not thought to be in any way
better than that received through the Church and through faith. However, the religious
conflicts following the Reformation made many long for some universal criterion for
adjudicating between competing religious truth claims. The success of the natural sciences
gave hope of the possibilities of human reason to work as such a universal arbiter. Natural
theology was also sometimes separated from the broader web of Christian beliefs. Deism, a
religion of reason rejecting revelation and the authority of the Church as sources of
knowledge, was born. Most of the Enlightenment philosophers who were critical of religion
(such as Voltaire, 1694-1778, and Thomas Paine, 1737-1809) were deists who practiced
natural theology and believed in the existence of a Creator God. The number of deists was
smaller than has often been later stated, but they have exercised great intellectual influence.
The relationship of faith and reason has been problematized far more often after the
Enlightenment.160
In later discussions the critiques of natural theology made in the 18th and 19th centuries
has often been seen as devastating, though it has never caused natural theology to disappear.
There have been three main lines of critique against natural theology: philosophical critique,
scientific critique and theological critique. In this chapter I will only give some broad
outlines of this critique. Since many of the philosophical and scientific critiques of natural
theology are repeated in the discussion on Intelligent Design, they will be analysed more in
the course of the coming chapters. However, the relevance of theological critiques of natural
theology to Intelligent Design has not been discussed as much. I will thus discuss natural
theology and the general relation of faith and reason in chapter 2.5.
The most influential philosophical critiques of natural theology and the design
arguments have been presented by the Scottish sceptical philosopher David Hume (1711-
1776) and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion Hume analyses the arguments of natural theology and comes to the
conclusion that they do not prove anything very certain about the original cause of the
cosmos. At most it might be said that the cause of the cosmos bears some distant similarity to
a human mind. For Kant, reading Hume’s arguments was like waking up from a “dogmatic
dream.” His Critique of Pure Reason is sustained critique of natural theology. Kant comes to
the conclusion that one cannot say anything about a transcendent Creator based on the
phenomena included in human experience. The design argument can at most show the
existence of some sort of “architect” of the universe, a conclusion insufficient for religion. In
his later works Kant grounds belief in God as necessity for the operation of “practical
reason” rather than the arguments of natural theology.161
160 Barnett 2004, Harrison 2002, Livingston 2007.
161 Chignell 2009.
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Scientific critiques of natural theology have been made particularly on the basis of
Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) evolutionary theory. Prior to Darwin’s theory, the dominant
explanation for the complex adaptations of species was divine design. Thus Isaac Newton
believed that the structure of the eye was obviously made by a designer well versed in the
principles of optics. But Darwin’s theory offered a way of explaining the adaptations of
species on the basis of his theory of natural selection, without reference to design. Darwin’s
theory was silent about the origin of life and the laws of nature, however, and the wider
teleology of the laws of nature became the new focus of natural theology. Many saw
biological  evolution  as  simply  God’s  way  of  creating  the  species.162 Nevertheless, atheistic
interpretations of Darwinism were also presented, and they continue to be common. As
noted, Dawkins’ argument that evolutionary theory makes it possible to be an “intellectually
satisfied atheist” is quoted prominently in ID literature.163
Philosophical ideas often associated with natural science have also played a part in the
waning of natural theology. Within the natural sciences, mechanistic explanations in terms of
laws and natural factors have been highly valued from the beginning. Already one of the
important fathers of modern natural science, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), argued that the
Aristotelian explanations in terms of purposes are not very helpful for science. Rather,
science seeks understanding which is useful for achieving technological mastery over
nature.164 For Bacon the mechanistic universe studied by science was indeed the purposeful
creation of God, and testified of the greatness of God. However, over time, it became
possible to argue that mechanistic nature indeed is all that exists, and talk of divine purposes
is also meaningless outside natural science.165
As I will show in chapter 8, the ID theorists often argue that restricting natural science
to a search for merely natural explanations will over time indeed tend to lead to a naturalistic
worldview. That is, methodological naturalism will tend to lead to metaphysical naturalism.
However, in practice many methodological naturalists are indeed simultaneously believers
in divine purposes and natural theology. Already before Darwin, many theologians and
religious believers believed that the Creator’s glory is apparent in the way he works in the
universe through natural laws.166
162 McGrath 2009, chapter 7.
163 Dawkins 1991, 6; Loesberg 2007, 107-108. The title (How to be an Intellectually Fulfilled Atheist (Or Not)) of
Dembski  &  Wells  2008  even  uses  Dawkins’  words  directly.  The  work  counters  Dawkins’  atheism  by  arguing
against evolutionary theory.
Scholars have differed on the relative importance of the Darwinian and Humean critiques of the design
argument. Sander Gliboff (2000) argues that the Humean critique together with pre-Darwinian speculations about
evolution  is  enough to  dismiss  the  design  argument,  and Dawkins  thus  wouldn’t  have  to  give  up his  atheism
even if he were living before Darwin.
164 Novum Organon,  Book II.  It  can be argued that Bacon misunderstands the Aristotelian system of four causes.
However, it remains true that this understanding of science is common in modernity (Feser 2008, 174-180).
165 Brooke 1991, chapter 4.
166 See Numbers 2003 for one account of the complex historical development of methodological naturalism. On
the complexity of the interaction between Darwinism and teleological ideas, see Ruse 2003 and Bowler 2009.
These works also discuss the important social and cultural background of the development.
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Rather than methodological naturalism as such, the combination of methodological
naturalism and scientism can form the basis for rejecting all natural theology. Suppose that
natural science is our only (or overwhelmingly best) way of gaining reliable knowledge or
justified beliefs, and natural science can never speak of metaphysical and supernatural
things. This implies that the traditional arguments of natural theology are meaningless, since
they are by definition outside naturalistic science and arguments outside science are not
reliable.167 This type of scientism is influential in the contemporary discussion, and I have
critiqued it chapter 2.3.
Theological critiques of natural theology were made already prior to Darwin. For
example, Neo-Protestant theology following in Kant’s wake rejected natural theology on
philosophical grounds, and attempted to find another way to ground theological claims. But
the critique of natural theology presented by the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) has
possible exerted even greater influence. Barth worried that all natural theology inevitably
subordinates theology under some outside criterion, and so theology becomes a servant of
fallen human reason. The God of the philosophers is inevitably different from the Trinitarian
God of Christianity, and so natural theology ends up corrupting Christianity. According to
Barth, theology must stand on its own foundation, the revelation of God. Barth’s critique of
natural theology was not based on just academic concerns, but also on a fear of the practical
consequences of accepting natural theology. Nazi-friendly theology had the same problem of
subordinating theology to human reason and ideological concerns.168
The Renaissance of Natural Theology
Despite the critiques, natural theology has never disappeared. Barthian theological critiques
of natural theology have not had much traction in the Catholic Church, for example.169 Since
the renaissance of analytic philosophical theology starting from the 1960’s, natural theology
has also been making a comeback. The arguments of natural theology have many modern
defenders and the traditional critiques are no longer necessarily seen as conclusive.170
University presses are publishing large tomes on natural theology like the Blackwell
Companion to Natural Theology (2011) and the Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology (2013).
Though there are many forms of modern natural theology, the one closest to Intelligent
Design is related to philosophical theism, theism meaning belief in the existence of the
167 One  influential  way  of  defending  this  sort  of  scientism  has  been  logical  positivism,  dominant  in  Anglo-
American  philosophy  in  the  1930s  to  1960s  but  now  considered  refuted.  The  logical  positivists  argued  that  all
metaphysical philosophy and theology was meaningless since it did not satisfy the verification criterion of
meaning, according to which all meaningful statements which are not a priori truths must be verifiable
empirically. See Wolterstorff 2009.
168 See Brunner & Barth 2002 [1934], White 2010, and Holder 2012 for more on this discussion.
169 See Turner 2004.
170 Prominent  defenders  and critics  of  natural  theology  agree  on  this  point.  For  example,  see  the  evaluations  of
Humean and Kantian arguments by Swinburne (2004a, 2011) and Philipse (2012).
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Creator of all things who is personal, immaterial, eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent,
omniscient,  and  perfectly  good.171 The relationship of the Intelligent Design movement’s
design argument to theism is a complex issue, which will be explored in the coming
chapters. However, traditionally the design argument is one of several theistic arguments for
the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent deity who created the universe
and whose providence watches over it.172 The cosmological argument, for example, portrays
God as the necessary ground of our contingent being. It is based on the classic question “why
is there something rather than nothing”?173 Many of the theistic arguments are metaphysical
and not dependent on the empirical findings of natural science in the way the ID
movement’s design arguments are.
Whereas many critiques of natural theology assume that the project fails if there is any
way to deny the conclusions of the theistic arguments, modern natural theologians typically
see even modest conclusions as significant. Perhaps it is too stringent to demand that any
useful natural theology must provide certain and deductive proofs of God’s existence
whereby all who hear the proofs will be throughoutly convinced. Very few things in natural
science, philosophy or everyday life can be known with such certainty. An argument may
provide good evidence for the existence of God even if it doesn’t meet this stringent
standard.174 Thus Richard Swinburne, perhaps the best-known contemporary natural
theologian, argues in his work The Existence of God only to the conclusion that the probability
of theism being true is over 50 percent after considering several cumulative arguments which
each raise the probability by some amount. The arguments from religious experience then
finally raise the probability above 50 percent.175
Another strategy for defending natural theology from critique has also been to redefine
it. The typical division is between natural theologies and theologies of nature.176 Whereas
natural theology seeks to speak of God based on human reason and experience and start
outside religious traditions, theologies of nature start from within a religious tradition such
as Christianity and then seek to form a theological interpretation of nature in dialogue with
the natural sciences. Theologies of nature do not seek to establish the existence of God
through any supposed neutral starting point, but can find resonance and correlations with
Christianity and human culture. However, the precise border between these different
approaches can be difficult to determine. Theologian Alister McGrath is a theologian of
nature by these definitions, but he himself calls his enterprise natural theology. McGrath’s
basis for this is his desire to join into the Christian tradition of natural theology and not be
constricted by definitions of natural theology made in the time of Enlightenment.177 Both
171 Swinburne 2004a, 7.
172 Plantinga 1990 [1967], chapter 4.
173 For an interesting defence of the reasonability of this question, see Turner 2004.
174 Plantinga 1990 [1967], ix-x.
175 Swinburne 2004a. Swinburne’s probabilities are based on his extensive use of Bayes’ theorem to quantify as far
as possible the signifance of the different lines of evidence for theism.
176 The distinction comes from Ian G. Barbour (1997, 100).
177 McGrath 2008, Padgett 2004.
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theologians of nature and natural theologians can also refer to the same evidence, such as
cosmic fine-tuning, as supporting religious belief.178
2.5. Theological Critiques and Defences of Natural Theology
Two theological critiques of natural theology also relevant for the ID movement are the
fideistic critique of natural theology and the critique of idolatry. The fideistic critique concerns
the place of natural theology in the Christian faith, and the critique of idolatry concerns the
relationship between the Trinitarian God of Christianity and the “God of the philosophers”
of natural theology. Both are also relevant for the discussion on Intelligent Design. First, if
evidence has no place in Christian religious belief, then approaches like natural theology and
ID are religiously irrelevant, perhaps even harmful. Second, if natural theology’s argument
for the existence of theistic God cannot help but construct an idol, then surely ID’s design
arguments aiming to show the existence of an unspecified “intelligent designer” will also do
so. I will begin with the fideistic critique.
The Fideistic Critique of Natural Theology
Broadly understood, fideism is the idea that religious faith is independent of philosophical
arguments for theism or even opposed to such evidential reasoning. In my view, this
viewpoint is correct in arguing that religious rationality should not be reduced to that of the
natural sciences, and we should avoid excessive rationalization of theological language.  The
generation of religious beliefs is a complex process involving many different types of
reasons, many of which are not as important in science.179
The fideistic critique of natural theology emphasizes the differences of religious belief
and scientific theories. For example, D. Z. Phillips argues that seeing God as a hypothesis to
explain the world is contrary to the actual nature of religious belief. Hypotheses are always
uncertain, but for many believers God is their fundamental ground of being, an absolute
certainty and not a hypothesis.180 Though  he  does  not  classify  himself  as  a  fideist,  Alvin
Plantinga similarly argues that Christian belief does not originate in looking for
explanations, but in the self-revelation of God: “Believers in God do not ordinarily postulate that
there is such a person, just as believers in other persons or material objects do not ordinarily postulate
178 Compare Swinburne’s (2004a) and McGrath’s (2009b) uses of the fine-tuning evidence, for example.
179 Olli-Pekka Vainio (2010) provides a good classification of different types of fideism. Fideism is commonly
defined as faith completely disconnected from rational reasons. However, I have used a broader definition,
because Vainio argues persuasively that such extreme fideism is historically rather rare.
180 Phillips 1976; see also Koistinen 2000 for similar arguments against Swinburne’s evidentialist theism and
Moore 2007, 398-399.
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that there are such things.”181 According to Plantinga, hypotheses are necessary for scientific
theories, but Christians do not postulate God as an explanation, but receive knowledge of
God through the action of the Holy Spirit on their sensus divinitatis.182
A central difference between natural theology and theologies of nature is in how much
knowledge of the divine can be gained based on reason (broadly understood, including
observation, memory, rational intuition, arguments and so on) without reliance on divine
revelation mediated through a religion like Christianity. In theologies of nature, interpreting
nature properly as God’s creation requires a pre-existing religious view. For example, Alister
McGrath argues that no concept of “reason” or “nature” is truly universal and objective.
Rather, these concepts themselves are cultural constructs, and an atheist’s conception of
reasonability can be quite different from a Christian’s. Thus the same order of nature can be
full of evidence of divine wisdom for the Christian, even while the atheist sees only the work
of blind and uncaring chance and necessity. McGrath argues that nature is open to many
interpretations, and though something of the transcendent can be glimpsed even starting
outside any religious tradition, only the mind enlightened by Christ can perceive that nature
testifies of God. However, McGrath simultaneously also argues that a Trinitarian Christian
view also explains properties of nature like its comprehensibility and fine-tuning better than
competing views. A theology of nature seeks to make such resonance between Christian
views and natural science visible, but does not seek to conclusively prove the truth of
Christian belief in creation.183
By contrast, the arguments of natural theology are based on the idea that there are
sufficient commonalities in different views about reason and nature to make convincing
arguments about God possible even without assuming Christianity as a starting point.
Natural theology can still be based on quite a broad understanding of “rational belief” and
religious belief does not need to be understood merely as a scientific hypothesis. For
example,  one of  Swinburne’s principles is  that  we should have a prima facie trust in human
experience and the beliefs produced by our cognitive mechanisms. If I find myself with the
belief that there is a book in front of me, then I am justified in believing that there is a book in
front of me unless I am also in possession of some strong counterargument to this belief.
Swinburne is willing to grant that belief in God can also often be a “basic belief” like this.
Thus if someone believes that they are experiencing the presence of God, they are prima facie
justified in believing that God is present. Trust in other’s testimony about the existence of
God or trust in religious authorities can also function as a source of justified religious belief.
This means that medieval villagers, for example, were rational and justified in their belief in
God. However, Swinburne argues that in modern times this sort of basic belief in God faces
many challenges which make the arguments of natural theology necessary. In addition to
181 Plantinga 2000, 370.
182 Plantinga 2000.
183 McGrath 2008.
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religious authorities and basic beliefs, there are also atheistic authorities, atheistic basic
beliefs and atheistic arguments.184
Responding to the Fideistic Critique
I think the fideistic critique captures something essential about religious beliefs. The origins
of religious beliefs are complex and different for different religious people, but for the
historical Christian community belief in the Creator God has certainly not been conceived of
as a hypothesis. However, as McGrath has argued, this does not mean that the doctrine of
God could not possess explanatory potential. McGrath argues that Christian doctrine also
has an important explanatory dimension. For example, the Christian tradition contains
explanations for the religious experiences of Christians and the development of Christian
beliefs such as the resurrection of Jesus. Furthermore, the doctrine of creation can help us
understand why the world has a rational order.185
Stenmark has provided an interesting metaphor for why a religious believer might
consider it useful to engage in a theoretical discussion about evidence for the existence of
God, even if belief in God is not primarily a hypothesis for the believer. Consider my belief
that my wife loves me and is a wise and loving woman. These beliefs are grounded in my
entire life-experience with my wife, and my belief in them is not a hypothesis. Nevertheless,
suppose that someone else does not believe that my wife loves me, or has doubts about her
virtuous character. I could in principle discuss some evidences of this love, even though it
will be difficult to convey the full grounds of my own beliefs. Similarly, Stenmark argues
that a religious believer may discuss the evidence for God’s existence, though the grounds
for religious belief are broader.186 So,  if  the  reasons  for  belief  discussed  by  Swinburne  and
other theistic philosophers (or the Intelligent Design movement) are at all relevant or
interesting from the believer’s standpoint, then their evidential value can be discussed
fruitfully, even if religious belief itself is based on broader grounds.187 Indeed, Olli-Pekka
Vainio has demonstrated that historically even most of those who classified as fideists have
wanted to find some sort of connections between Christianity and the broader culture.188
As I argued in chapter 2.3 normative statements about the relationship of theology and
science can be difficult to argue in a way that will convince everyone, since there are many
184 Swinburne 2004b.
185 McGrath 2003, chapter 14.
186 Stenmark 1995, 325-327.
187 Stenmark’s parable succeeds in describing how natural theology might be possible without presupposing that
religious faith in God is merely a hypothesis.  It  also depicts well  the desire for dialogue and apologetics that is
important  for  natural  theology.  However,  the  parable  is  incomplete  because  natural  theology  is  not  just
theoretical dialogue to convince others of the truth of some proposition. Rather, it is also the theoretical
exploration  and systematisation  of  intuitions  about  the  world  and meditation  before  the  mysteries  of  creation.
McGrath (2008, chapter 11), for example, emphasizes natural theology’s links to the theology of beauty and awe.
188 Vainio 2010.
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different religions and sciences. If one adopts a non-realistic view of religious language, then
the arguments of natural theology will appear to be completely uninteresting. However, if
one adopts the theological realism of theologians like McGrath, then the prospects for
dialogue begin to look more promising.189 Historically religions have themselves been
formulated in dialogue with other traditions, and communicating religious truths has
historically been seen as a valuable objective. So, for many forms of religious belief, finding
commonalities in rationality and ideas between different traditions can be seen as valuable.190
The Critique of Idolatry
The second theological critique of natural theology relevant to the ID discussion is the
critique of idolatry. There is often argued to be a large difference between the “God of the
philosophers” and the God of Christianity. For example, the mathematician Blaise Pascal
(1623-1662) described his mystical experience in 1654 as follows: “From about half past ten in
the evening until half past midnight. FIRE. God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of
philosophers and scholars. Certainty, certainty, heartfelt, joy, peace.” For Pascal this did not mean
the rejection of philosophical apologetics, but he did think that the arguments of natural
theology are insufficient for real religious belief.191 However, others have used this difference
to argue that all images of God constructed on the basis of human reasoning are idols.
Though the main current of Christian belief has always accepted dialogue with philosophy,
critique of philosophical ideas has also been commonplace in theology.
The critique of idolatry springs from two very different sources. The first is Barth’s
argument that Christian theology and belief should be based on revelation, rather than fallen
human reasoning, which will inevitably end up constructing an idol. Only the revelation of
God can bring knowledge of God. Barth’s famous ”Nein!” (1934) to natural theology was
written in response to his friend Emil Brunner’s (1889-1969) moderate defence of natural
theology. Brunner had argued that some sort of human capacity for the reception of
revelation and remnant of the image of God is required by Christian doctrine and
tradition.192
The second source for this critique of natural theology as idolatry is quite different:
Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) philosophical critique of “onto-theology”.193 The critique of
onto-theology is that using God as an explanation inevitably makes God into just another
creature among creatures, part of the system of the world. In order to say that “God exists”,
189 E.g. McGrath 2001.
190 Vainio 2010, McGrath 2003, 110-117.
191 Adamson 1995, chapter 7.
192 McGrath 2008, chapter 7; 2001, chapter 6; Barr 1993; White 2010; Holder 2012. The critique of natural theologies
based on fallen human reason is also important in Luther’s critique of the “theologians of glory” who construct an
image of God in which the cross of Christ has no place (Kopperi 1997, 138n53).
193 McCord Adams 2014.
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for example, one has to assume some sort of common concept of existence shared by both
God and created being. Theologian Conor Cunningham has applied this critique to ID by
arguing that speaking of God as a designer makes God into a watchmaker comparable with a
human being. Cunningham thus argues that ID’s designer is actually closer to a devil than
the true Creator, because the designer is just like a human being, only more powerful and
more intelligent.194 Though the concept of onto-theology was popularized by Heidegger, the
idea that God is very different from any creature is nevertheless a staple of classical Christian
theology. In the theology of Aquinas, for example, God is not just a normal being among
beings, but “being itself.” Any application of terms to God is analogical, not direct.195
Responding to the Critique of Idolatry
In my view, though the danger of creating a false image of God is always present in
theology, the critique of idolatry is not a good argument against all natural theology. The
Barthian critique of natural theology has an inner tension, because the Bible and Christian
theology themselves seem to contain grounds for natural theology. In this situation, the
Barthian reliance on the Bible should lead to the acceptance of some sort of natural
revelation.196 McGrath’s theology of nature accepts the basic Barthian suspicion of human
reason, though McGrath argues that Barth states the matter too extremely. Theologies of
nature solve the tension by allowing for resonance between Christian doctrine and human
reason, but arguing that nature must always be interpreted from the Christian viewpoint
before it can be seen to reveal the divine Logos. Rather than neglecting Christ, creation is
understood to happen through the same divine Logos who then becomes incarnate to redeem
mankind. The Christian tradition itself is seen as warranting this kind of resonance between
general knowledge and revelation, thus negating the Barthian objection.197
But will a natural theology of the Swinburnean type, starting from commonly shared
premises,  necessarily  end  up  constructing  a  God  of  the  philosophers  with  nothing  in
common with the Trinitarian God? It is important to note that the question of fitting together
different images of God is not just a problem for natural theology, but all of Christian
theology. The God of the Old Testament is not openly Trinitarian, though the Old Testament
can be interpreted from the viewpoint of Trinitarian theology. Within Christian theology the
Prophets of the Old Testament are thought to speak of the same God as the New
Testament.198 So, could not philosophical natural theology also speak of the same God, even
194 Cunningham 2010, 275-280.
195 See also Turner 2004. Turner also defend’s the possibility of natural theology based on his understanding of
Aquinas.
196 E.g. McGrath 2008; Barr 1993.
197 McGrath 2001, chapter 6. McGrath himself terms his though a “natural theology”, but as Runehov (2010)
argues, its content is closer to what is usually meant by a theology of nature.
198 On the historical importance of the Old Testament for Christianity, see Pelikan 1971, 13-27.
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if it does not speak always in the same terms? The two understandings of God are not
wholly different: Proof texts for most of the attributes of the theistic God (such as
omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, moral perfection and so on) can also be found in
the Bible.199 Thomas Aquinas described the relationship of the God of the philosophers
through an interesting metaphor. If we see someone from far away, we may be able to tell
that it is a human person, and only later recognize that it is Peter. When seeing the person far
away, we were seeing Peter, even while we did not recognize him. Similarly, the God of the
philosophers can be interpreted to be, on closer inspection, the God of Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob who is known more fully through faith.200
The question of ontotheology requires thinking about the nature of theological
language. In what sense can human concepts be applied to God at all? The question is not
just about concepts like “being” or “design” but also applies to concepts like the love of God
and the properties of God discussed in various Biblical passages. Because we are human
beings, we must necessarily use human concepts when talking about God. Theologian Denys
Turner has defended natural theology against the critique of onto-theology in his book Faith,
Reason and the Existence of God (2004). Turner argues that we must simultaneously recognize
both God’s unknowability and his knowability. Theological language balances between
affirmation and negations, and forgetting either leads to problems. Claiming that God is
wholly other and that human concepts cannot be applied to him would make God irrelevant
to humans and dismiss the central Christian doctrines of God’s revelation and incarnation.
However, believing that we can wholly comprehend God would lead to creating a false
image of God to fit into our philosophies. This would indeed lead to constructing an idol as
feared by the ontotheologians, because Christian doctrine also requires admitting the
transcendence and mysteriousness of God’s nature.
Turner argues that natural theology can be formulated in in a way that avoids the
ontotheological error. The key is that in proving the existence of God (or at least providing
evidence supporting this belief) natural theology is proving the existence of a mystery that
reason cannot fully grasp. Paradoxically, just as natural theology leads us to understand that
God exists and that God has certain attributes, it also leads us to understand God’s
transcendence and mysteriousness.201 The same point is  poetically expressed by Augustine,
as quoted previously: “though the voices of the prophets were silent, the world itself, by its well-
ordered changes and movements, and by the fair appearance of all visible things, bears a testimony of
199 For example, see the articles in Flint & Rea 2009, which discuss the attributes of God and often quote biblical
passages alongside philosophical reflection.
200 Turner 2004, 18-19.
201 This is the central argument of Turner 2004. Turner is a representative of the tradition of negative theology,
and all proponents of natural theology do not accept as strong a sense of the mysteriousness of God. As William
Alston has pointed out in his article “Two Cheers for Mystery” (2005), modern Anglo-American philosophical
theologians generally trust in the capacity of the human reason to understand quite a lot of the properties and
intents of God, though no-one believes that they fully comprehend God. For two different perspectives of how we
can talk of God’s “properties”, see also Holmes 2007 and Wainwright 2009. Dawes (2009, 46-48) argues that the
analogical nature of theological language harms the explanatory power of the arguments of natural theology.
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its own, both that it has been created, and also that it could not have been created save by God, whose
greatness and beauty are unutterable and invisible.”202
Edward Feser’s statement of the theological problems of speaking of God as a designer
is more positive to ID than Cunningham. Feser separates between five different gradations in
our conceptions of God. On the first level (1), God is understood as a wizard-like bearded
man who lives in a place called Heaven. On the second level (2), God is understood as an
omnipotent and omniscient bodiless being who is nevertheless comparable to a human
being. On the third level (3), God is understood as pure being or existence itself, as in the
tradition of philosophical theology. The fourth level (4) is based on mystical experience of
God, and is the highest achievable in this life. The fifth level (5) is the beatific vision of God.
In Feser’s view, ID is on the second level of understanding of God, and thus presents an
anthropomorphic conception of God. Feser criticizes ID’s idea of God as a designer, arguing
that we should move towards a deeper understanding of God. However, an interesting part
of his analysis is that he does not condemn any of the levels as somehow evil. On all levels,
theological language does manage to speak about God. Children may even need to begin
with the first level of understanding before proceeding further. Each level is an improvement
over the previous one, and closer to the truth than atheism. According to this understanding,
then, ID thus also manages to communicate something about God.203
The  ID  theorists  do  recognize  that  God  is  more  than  a  designer.  As  I  will  argue  in
chapter 3.1, the Intelligent Design movement by and large insists that the design argument
does not prove the existence of God. However, if God is not more than a designer, then
establishing the existence of a designer would already be sufficient to establish the existence
of God. Therefore, the ID theorists’ must be claiming that God is more than a designer. Often
this implied conclusion is also stated directly.204 This is in line with Turner’s description of
theological language: our language fails not because it says too much of God, but because it
says too little. In the Thomistic account, God can be talked about analogically. Thus God can
be said to be personal, loving and wise like humans, but in a different way than humans.
Analogy always includes both a denial and and affirmation. Similarly, it seems that God
could be said to be a designer, but in a different way than humans.205
There is some disagreement about whether we can specify exactly in what way the
terms used of God differ from terms used about human persons. In univocal accounts of
202 De civitate dei, XI, 4.
203 Feser 2008, 87-88.
204 E.g. Behe 2000h.
205 Turner 2004, chapters 7 and 8. There is some disagreement about whether we can specify exactly in what way
the terms used of God differ from terms used about human persons. In univocal accounts of theological language,
it  is  argued that we can identify the core similarities and differences in the use of language, so that we can say
precisely what we mean when we say that God is a person, for example. God is a person, but without a body and
without the limitations of humans. It  may be that this univocal account of theological language fits better with
Intelligent Design’s theories about the attributes of the designer. The univocal account of theological language
also  always  includes  both  negation  and  affirmation,  just  as  the  analogical  language.  Both  accounts  are  quite
possible for Christians.
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theological language, it is argued that we can identify the core similarities and differences in
the use of language, so that we can say precisely what we mean when we say that God is a
person,  for  example.  God  is  a  person,  but  without  a  body  and  without  the  limitations  of
humans. It may be that this univocal account of theological language fits better with ID´s
ideas about the attributes of the designer. Using univocal language, God could be
understood as a designer in the sense that he too has intentions and is able to give matter
rational form that fulfills some purpose. The univocal account of theological language also
always includes both negation and affirmation, just as the analogical language. In both
accounts, denials must be based on some affirmations that are also made. In order to have a
basis for claiming that our theological language cannot exhaustively describe God, we must
first have some positive understanding of what God is like.206
Intelligent Design and the Doctrine of Creation
As Cunningham argues in response to Intelligent Design, the doctrine of creation is about
much more than the idea that God is the designer of the empirically studied order of nature.
It is, according to Cunningham, primarily a metaphysical doctrine explaining why there is
something rather than nothing, explaining the fundamental dependency of all things of their
Creator.207 I think that Cunningham’s point is important. ID does not speak of this aspect of
the doctrine of creation, and thus provides at best an incomplete defence of belief in the
doctrine. I will be returning to this critique in chapter eight.
However, it seems to me that ID does correctly call attention to another part of the
doctrine of creation: God as the Creator of the order of the nature. In studies of the historical
development of the doctrine of creation, it is often even argued that the idea of God as the
conqueror of the forces of chaos and the creator of order in the cosmos preceded the doctrine
of creatio ex nihilo and metaphysical developments of the doctrine. McGrath thus argues that
“the theme of ordering is of major importance to Old Testament conceptions of creation.”208 The fact
of existence is not the only thing explained by the doctrine of creation; it also seeks to explain
the rationality and beauty of the world God has created. It is with this part of the doctrine of
creation that ID’s “designer” who purposefully creates order can find consonance.209
206 For one in-depth defence of univocal theological language, see Alston 1989. For further reflection on the matter,
see also Williams 2005 and McCord Adams 2014.
207 Cunningham 2010.
208 McGrath 2001, 155. See also Copan & Craig 2004 for a defence of the view that the biblical text itself expresses
the idea of creatio ex nihilo.
209 This is not to say that all  versions of the doctrine of creation will  be compatible with Intelligent Design. For
example, from the standpoint of process theology, a creator ordering nature could be seen as coercion and
contrary to love. Thomas Jay Oord (2010) indeed criticizes Intelligent Design on this basis. However, the creation
of form could also be seen as a gift (Hart 2003).
Chris Doran (2010, 231-233) also argues that ID´s designer cannot be the Christian God. This is because (1) in
the ID literature, designers also act in an undetectable way, which ID thinkers sometimes call deceptive, (2)
constrained optimization (one of ÍD´s responses to the problem of evil) should not apply to an omnipotent God,
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The ID theorists are not the only ones who have argued that finding signs of design in
the cosmos resonates in some way with the Christian doctrine of creation. This is also
assumed by the design arguments of mainstream natural theology. Above, I argued that
responses to the charge of idolatry and ontotheology are available both within theologies of
nature and natural theologies. All of these responses are also available for the ID movement.
The compatibility of the vague “intelligent designer” and the God of the Bible can be
defended using the same logic as the identification of the “God of philosophers” with the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in natural theology. Intelligent Design also does not need
to argue that knowledge of God needs to be gained from some sort of neutral standpoint.
Evidence of design in the cosmos could simply be way of finding resonance with a pre-
existing Christian belief.210 So, evading these theological critiques seems possible for ID.
This does not mean that no other theological critiques of ID can be made; I will
consider several critiques in the coming chapters. Furthermore, the critiques of natural
theology remain practically useful, because they can help natural theologians and ID
theorists formulate their enterprise in a way that avoids theological dangers.
In this background chapter, I have introduced several themes important for my
analysis of Intelligent Design. I began by exploring the relationship of Intelligent Design and
different forms of creationism as well as theistic and naturalistic evolutionism. I then I
introduced the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences, as well as the tradition
of  natural  theology.  I  then  briefly  argued  for  some  positions,  such  as  the  rejection  of
scientism and the possibility of some sort of moderate natural theology or theology of
nature. My openness to the science-religion dialogue and natural theology together with my
wish to avoid the dangers pointed out in the above discussion also leads me to a critical
openness towards design arguments. I have moved “beyond fideism” to a broader
conception of religious rationality.211
Another factor contributing to my interest in the ID debate is my own subjective
experience of the feeling of wonder and amazement at the order of nature which underlies
design arguments. As I will over the next two chapters, both critics and defenders of design
and (3) harmonising ID with theism requires further theological reasoning, which ID argues is unnecessary for
the  design  argument.  In  my  view,  all  of  these  poitns  are  misunderstandings  of  ID.  The  first  point,  the
undetectability of at least some divine action, is in any case part of the traditional Christian picture. Regarding the
second point,  I  will  argue in chapter 9.2 that this is more properly related to the critique of the possibility of a
world that is the best in all conceivable respects. Regarding the third point, I will show in chapters 3 and 9 that
the ID theorists actually do allow for using additional theological arguments when analysing issues like the
character of the designer and the problem of natural evil.
210 Sometimes talk of God as a designer does seem to become a primary way of understanding who God is within
ID literature. In a popular defence of the Christian faith, Dembski uses the word “designer” instead of the word
“God”, speaking of the Designer’s transcendence and goodness and his visit to Earth in Jesus of Nazareth.
(Licona & Dembski 2010, 12) Here Cunningham’s critique is perhaps an appropriate reminder of the limitedness
of the analogy of God as a designer. However, Dembski does elsewhere use more classical concepts, such as
describing  Christ  as  the  Logos  of  God,  in  describing  the  relationship  of  the  design  argument  to  Christian
theology. (Dembski 1999a)
211 Vainio 2010.
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arguments share an intuitive feeling that the order of nature bears the appearance of design,
and that this must somehow be explained. But is this intuition reliable, and can it be rational
to believe that nature indeed testifies of the existence, power and wisdom of its Creator?
What is the structure of the design argument, and can it avoid the standard philosophical
critiques of natural theology? Are the natural sciences somehow relevant to answering this
question, or can it be answered even without considering scientific results and methods? I
will consider ID’s relationship to natural theology and the natural sciences in more detail in
chapter 3.
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3. DESIGN, NATURAL THEOLOGY AND
SCIENCE
How should we situate Intelligent Design in the theology and science discussion? Intelligent
Design has both commonalities and differences with the tradition of natural theology. Both
emphasize the relevance of evidence for religious belief and argue that a personal being is
the explanation for some features of nature. The design argument is also used in natural
theology, though it takes a somewhat different form in the ID movement’s argumentation.
But whereas natural theology is a part of the philosophy of religion, Intelligent Design makes
a claim to being a scientific research programme rather than a philosophical argument. In
this chapter, I explore the relation of ID to natural theology and the natural sciences. In the
process,  I  also  lay  some  groundwork  for  my  analysis  of  ID’s  design  argument  in  the
following chapters. Chapters 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. explore ID’s overall vision and its relationship
to natural theology; chapters 3.4 and 3.5. explore ID’s relationship to science.
3.1. The Separation between the Designer and God
Traditional Understandings of the Design Argument
Design arguments “focus upon finding and identifying various traces of the operation of a mind in
nature’s temporal and physical structures, behaviors and paths.”212 The argument is also called the
teleological argument, because it is based on apparently goal-directed (teleological) order in
nature. Design arguments are a posteriori arguments based on the empirically discovered
properties of nature, rather than a priori arguments based just on reasoning from first
premises. Design arguments have historically been among the most popular and most
widely believed of natural theology’s arguments in support of belief in the existence of God.
Even Immanuel Kant, critical of all proofs of the existence of God, wrote that the teleological
argument
always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most
accordant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it
itself  derives  its  existence  and  gains  ever  new  vigor  from  that  source.  –  –  Reason,
constantly  upheld  by  this  ever-increasing  evidence  which,  though  empirical,  is  yet  so
powerful, cannot be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse
speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection,
as from a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the universe –
ascending from height to height up to the all-highest.213
212 Ratzsch 2010.
213 Kant 1953, 520; quoted in Plantinga 1990 [1967], 95.
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Kant did also criticize the design argument. He argued that the argument can provide
evidence only for the existence of some kind of designer, not the existence of God. The
crucial problem is the finiteness of the universe, which can be explained by supposing the
existence of a very wise and very powerful being, without the need for an infinite Creator.214
Kant further argued that using speculative reason to establish the existence of God is an
error, because God is not spatio-temporal and cannot be the object of experience.215
Modern natural theology and Intelligent Design diverge significantly in their responses
to these critiques. Modern natural theologians have disagreed with Kant’s epistemological
ideas and his conclusion. According to Swinburne, an infinite Creator is a simpler hypothesis
than a finite Creator, and the cumulative theistic argument can give us good reasons to
believe in an infinite God, even if they do not prove his existence absolutely. Whereas Kant
assumed that our conclusions cannot exceed that which is required by the evidence, even
theories within natural science go beyond this requirement. For example, on the basis of
observation of a small part of the cosmos, we make theories about physics which concern the
whole universe.216  The ID movement agrees that the designer can be identified as God using
additional theological and philosophical argument. However, the movement also
emphasizes, with Kant, that design arguments alone can at most prove the existence of an
unidentified designer.217
Intelligent Design’s Minimalistic Design Argument
The  ID  theorists  explicitly  refer  to  the  philosophical  discussion  on  design  arguments  as
motivation for their limitation of the design argument. Michael Behe admits that God is
culturally the obvious candidate for the role of the designer, but nevertheless “the leap [from
a designer] to God with a capital G short-circuits scholarly arguments that have been going on for
millennia across many cultures.”218 In the context of this quote, Behe supports this idea with the
possibility that the order of nature could in principle be the product of some highly
advanced technology, rather than the creation of God. The design argument by itself is not
214 Kant 1953, 520.
215 Rossi 2014.
216 Swinburne 2011b. See also Tapio Luoma’s analysis of Thomas F. Torrance on this point (Luoma 2002, chapter
5).
217 Sometimes the movement´s thinkers emphasize this so much that some critics even interpret them as agnostics.
(E.g. Nieminen, Mustonen & Ryökäs 2014, 277: "These ID proponents [Behe as the prime example] seem to have
mostly  agnostic  worldviews.")  This  is  a  misunderstanding  that  is  corrected  by  a  broader  reading  of  the  ID
literature, as I will show in the main text.
218 Behe 2007, 277-288. See also Behe 2001a, 699-700. Even in some defenses of natural theology, the selection of
theism  over  other  designer-alternatives  can  also  be  based  on  subjective  personal  and  cultural  reasons.  For
example, James F. Sennett (2005) argues that because of our cultural context and our background beliefs, then
evidence for the existence of some mind which has ordered the cosmos is for most Western people quite
reasonably also evidence for the Christian God rather than Hume’s spider-god or a polytheistic pantheon of gods.
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enough to adjudicate between this idea and the doctrine of creation. Thus the design
argument itself does not prove God. Willaim Dembski similarly argues that while ID is
compatible with theism and creationism, it is also compatible with deistic views and
Platonism, for example. Thus it does not “prejudge such questions as who is the designer”.219
In some early ID works, the separation between the designer and God is not made this
sharply. Phillip Johnson argues in his early book Darwin on Trial that believing in God as the
designer of life is a reasonable alternative to Darwinism. Johnson's critique of
methodological naturalism is based on the idea that supernatural explanations should be
allowed within natural science.220 However, later Johnson has also defined the limits of the
ID movement’s argument more minimalistically: “My  personal  view  is  that  I  identify  the
designer of life with the God of the Bible, although intelligent design theory as such does not entail
that.”221 Similarly, in an early article Stephen Meyer argues that intelligent design is part of
the “return of the God hypothesis”. Citing the arguments of natural theology favorably, Meyer
argues that many lines of evidence provide epistemic support for belief in God, though they
do not prove his existence.222 However, in his later writings Meyer has also emphasized the
distinction between the intelligent designer and God: “neither the evidence from biology nor the
theory of intelligent design”223 can prove the identity of the designer as God. Nevertheless, he
continues to hold that “theism makes more sense of the totality of human experience than does any
other worldview.”224
All of the major ID theorists make a connection between the designer and the Christian
God, and regard making this connection as a very reasonable thing to do. For example,
Dembski argues that Intelligent Design forms a “bridge between science and theology”225 and
that “ultimately, the problem is whether reality at its base is purposive and intelligent or mindless
and material.”226 According to Johnson, materialists reasonably fear that “even the most
minimalist version of a deity will tend to become understood as something like the God of the Bible,
who communicates with humans and cares about how we behave.”227 He thus sees Intelligent
Design as a “wedge” which will open up an open discussion about the nature of the ultimate
reality and make it easier to trust in the God of the Bible.228 According to Behe, evidence for
design has the effect of strengthening a believer’s faith in God229, and philosophical,
historical and religious arguments exist which support seeing the designer as the God of
219 Dembski 1999a, 252.
220 Johnson 1993.
221 Johnson 2007.
222 Meyer 1999c.
223 Meyer 2010, 439.
224 Meyer 2010, 440.
225 Dembski  1999.  The  traditionality  of  Dembski’s  belief  in  God  can  also  be  seen  from  his  critique  of  process
theology in the introduction to Dembski, W. Downes, J. and Frederick, W. (ed) 2008. On process theology, see
further McDaniel & Bowman 2006, Cobb & Griffin 1976, Nash 1987.
226 Wiker 2002, 11.
227 Johnson 2007.
228 Johnson 2000.
229 Behe 1998a.
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Christianity. Behe even makes the same argument that Russell and Sober made after him: an
infinite series of designers is implausible, and so God is the most plausible designer.230 Meyer
and Dembski have argued together that evidence of an intelligent designer constitutes
evidence for Christian theism when compared to atheism, even if design is also compatible
with other non-naturalistic views.231 So, the beliefs of the ID theorists and the natural
theologians on the identification of the designer and God are quite close, though the practical
rhetorical strategies are very different.
Given these views, it seems perplexing that the ID theorists so often emphasize the distinction
between the designer and God, rather than the connection between the designer and God, which they
clearly also make. Some critics of the ID movement have argued that the separation between
the intelligent designer and God is merely a strategic ploy for the ID movement. By saying
that ID does not reveal the identity of the designer, the design argument keeps the
appearance of non-religiousity and can be taught in public schools in the U.S.232 Elliott Sober
(representing naturalism) and Robert Russell (representing theistic evolutionism) have
argued separately that not identifying ID's designer as God is very difficult. Identifying the
designer as space aliens, for example, leads to the additional question: where did these space
aliens come from? If evolution is not a viable answer, then these space aliens must
themselves have also been designed. If we do not want to end up with an infinite series of
designers, then at some point the chain must stop with God. So, the designer is most credibly
God.233
As persuasive as this line of thought can be, Russell and Sober don't represent these
arguments as absolutely unassailable. The arguments from Kant and Hume for a distinction
between the designer and God are still accepted by many philosophers and theologians. It
could be that the ID theorists simply agree with Kant and Hume on this issue. Their
language in the above quotations supports this possibility. It is argued that the mere idea
that there is an intelligent designer of life is compatible with several ideas of what the
designer is like, and it akes further argument to rule out space aliens. Given the strong
traditions behind the separation of the designer and God, it seems plausible that the ID
theorists seriously believe that it takes an extra step of reasoning to move from “there is a
designer” to “this designer is God.” Even if they themselves think that taking this extra step
is very reasonable, they can without contradiction think that this additional step does exist.
Once again, I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle of ID´s position and the
critics´ argument. The ID theorists´ formulation of the logic of the design argument, which I
will analyse in more detail in chapter 4, does support the possibility of a separation between
the minimalistic hypothesis of design and God. So, the ID theorists have grounds to honestly
believe in this distinction. However, the best explanation for the ID theorists' emphasis on
this distinction is created by the unique cultural situation of the ID movement and its desire
230 Behe 2001.
231 Dembski & Meyer 1998.
232 Shanks 2004, Forrest 2001. For a critique of Shanks, see Del Ratzsch (2005).
233 Russell 2005, Sober 2007.
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to break out of the intellectual ghetto of creationism, and to gain a foothold in science
education. So, the emphasis is made for strategic reasons, even if the distinction is honestly
believed.
It is easy to imagine that the ID theorists' emphasis would be quite different, if the
cultural circumstances were different. In the debate on ID, defenders of the design argument
emphasize the difference between the designer and God, while critics emphasize the
supernatural nature of the designer. This is a complete reversion of the debate between
Hume and Paley. Suppose that there was no pressure to get ID qualified as a part of natural
science, and the central cultural issue was instead the credibility of theism. Wth this change,
theistic defenders of Intelligent Design would likely emphasize the connection they see
between the designer and God, while the atheistic critics of the movement would once again
argue that the design argument can establish only the existence of some designer, but not
God.234 Indeed, I will argue later that though the minimalistic conception of the designer
does make some sense based on the logic of ID's design argument, ID's broader cultural
agenda requires a more robust concept of the designer. In many cases, the ID theorists move
between a minimalistic and theistic conception of the designer as it suits their purposes.
3.2. Understanding Teleology
In design arguments, certain properties of the order of nature are thought to be best
explained by reference to the intentional operation of a mind: an intelligent designer. One
common feature of nature which has been seen as designed is teleology, goal-oriented order.
Members of the Intelligent Design movement see explaining this type of purposive order by
reference to the purposes of a designer as a very reasonable thing to do. However, others
deny that there is any essential link between teleology and intelligent design, arguing that
teleology (or at least the appearance of teleology) can also exist without purposeful design. I
will now introduce the foundational concept of teleology.
The Shifting Fortunes of Teleology
Teleological conceptions of nature go back to the early Greek philosophers, most
prominently to Plato and Aristotle. Plato argued that the random movement of matter itself
is not sufficient to generate the orderliness of the world. Rather, the teleological order of the
234 William  Lane  Craig  (2008)  indeed  uses  the  ID  movement’s  design  argument  as  part  of  an  apologetic  for
Christian theism, arguing that the existence of an “intelligent designer” fits better with theism than atheism.
According  to  Craig,  it  would  be  strange  for  a  naturalist  to  argue  that  they  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  very
powerful, wise creator of life and the cosmos, but that they do not believe in God. The existence of Zeus would
indeed already be a problem for many forms of naturalism, though perhaps not for all - such gods could perhaps
be explained as products of naturalistic evolution as well.
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material world was created by a demiurge acting as a mediator between the material world
and the eternal world of ideas. Plato’s conception of teleology can be characterized as
extrinsic: purposeful order is imposed on the world from the outside.235 In contrast,
Aristotle’s conception of teleology is immanent. Aristotle rejected Plato’s world of ideas and
thought that teleology resides in the order of nature and individual creatures themselves.
The four fundamental causes were the material cause (what a thing is made of), the efficient
cause (what creates the thing), the formal cause (the form which the matter takes), and the
teleological cause (what a thing is directed towards or what it exists for). For Aristotelians,
teleology is present everywhere in nature, not just in biological organisms. For example, the
Moon is directed towards moving around the Earth. It is not that the Moon is a conscious
creature: for Aristotelians, teleology does not have to be conscious. 236
Aquinas' teleological argument is a synthesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts
of teleology: teleology is immanent to the order of nature, but has an extrinsic origin.
Aquinas argues that the unconscious natural teleology of the world requires the
intentionality of an intelligent being who directed all things to their natural ends. As an
arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, so what lacks intelligence in
nature achieves its goals because of the direction God gives it. Teleology resides in each
individual creature, but it is planted there by God.237
These Platonic, Aristotelian and Aquinian conceptions of teleology are all forms of
teleological realism. Teleology is understood to be an objectively real part of the world,
indispensable for our understanding of reality. The beginning of teleological nonrealism can
be found in the scientific revolution and the removal of teleological explanations from
physics. Early modern scientists such as Francis Bacon and Descartes preferred a scientific
picture that did not refer to teleology, but explained things by reference to matter in motion.
Teleology was not completely abolished, however, but retained a place outside scientific
discourse. Descartes situated teleology in the conscious life of the subject, while other
mechanistic philosophers argued that matter in motion requires a divine designer to order it
into the harmonious cosmos we observe.238
While teleological language fell from favour in physics, it nevertheless remained
indispensable in biology. Even though organisms are natural entities, it has proven difficult
to understand these self-organising, self-nourishing entities without reference to teleology
(or at least something very much like teleology). The purpose of the heart seems to be to
pump blood, the purpose of lungs seems to be to breath air, and so on. All of the organs
function together to keep the animal alive.239 Many see teleology as the wrong term for this
functional complexity and instead wish to talk about adaptations, functional complexity or
teleonomy, but these are arguably merely new names for teleology. Aristotle himself did not
235 Ariew 2002, 8. Sedley 2007, Cornford 1977, 32.
236 Ariew 2002, 8. Sedley 2007, Cornford 1977, 32.
237 Feser 2008.
238 Ariew 2007.
239 Walsh 2008.
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argue that teleology has to be purposeful or conscious, so the desire to avoid talk of
conscious purposiveness does not require abandoning the term.240 As I will show in chapter
6, the ID theorists themselves also write of things like biological functions, machinery and
information, and then interpret these as products of purposeful design.
The question of how biological teleology should be understood within a naturalistic
understanding of reality has perplexed philosophers, and many solutions have been
attempted. Two possible solutions are teleological eliminativism and teleological
reductionism. In teleological eliminativism, teleology is understood to be merely a human
concept, not an objective property of nature. Biology is understood to be in the business of
ultimately providing non-teleological descriptions of organisms. In teleological
reductionism, the reality of teleology in nature is affirmed, but it is believed to emerge from
ultimately non-teleological processes.241 There is a broad spectrum of naturalistic views,
ranging from reductionistic views, rejecting the reality of teleology even in the context of
human actions, to more robust views affirming the reality of natural teleology and human
consciousness.242
One strategy the ID movement could adopt in defending belief in a Creator would be
to argue that teleology in nature is real and that naturalism is conceptually unable to account
for  it.  This  strategy  is  taken  up by  thinkers  like  Michael  C.  Rea  in  his  book World Without
Design (2005) and Edward Feser in his The Last Superstition (2008). Conor Cunningham also
argues that the most consistent form of materialism is eliminative materialism, which denies
the reality of everything that is difficult to account for in terms used in physics, such as the
reality of consciousness and teleology. However, this eliminative materialism is self-refuting
and unlivable, and so is a very poor alternative to theism.243 A naturalist who agrees that
eliminative materialism is absurd will typically often rather become an softer type of
naturalist than convert to theism, however.244
Such philosophical arguments are not typically used in the Intelligent Design
movement’s critique of naturalism. Though the ID theorists refer to the classical discussions
on teleology, they do not really engage with it in their literature or use classical concepts in
arguing their case. They argue based on the appearance of purposefulness, rather than
assuming the reality of purposiveness at the outset. They then claim that the best explanation
for this appearance is that the order is designed, rather than being just a figment of human
imagination.  Their  conception  of  purposeful  order  in  biology  does  approach  Aquinas’
understanding, where teleology is seen as immanent to the organisms, but having an
extrinsic source.245 However, while they are clearly teleological realists, they state their case
240 E.g. Walsh 2008, Melander 1997, Ariew 2002.
241 Walsh 2008.
242 Feser 2010. Melander (1997) presents four different models for understanding the justification of teleological
descriptions in biology and argues for the possibility of teleological descriptions without supposing a designer.
243 Cunningham 2010.
244 See e.g. Walsh 2008.
245 Thus Ariew 2002, 8.
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very differently from classical philosophers and Aquinas.246 Whereas St. Thomas’ argument
was metaphysical and deductive, the Intelligent Design movement’s argument is better
described as inference to the best explanation using empirical data and comparing the
efficacy of naturalistic and design-based explanations.247
Explaining Teleology
Explanation by reference to the operation of an intelligent designer is not the only option that
has been proposed as an explanation for teleology, or what Ratzsch terms mind correlativity:
the correspondence of patterns in nature with the rationality of the human mind. The three
most common options have been that (1) something mindlike, but not personal, has created
nature in an orderly way, (2) nature has been deliberately designed to be rational by a
personal Creator, or (3) our cognition sees nature as rational, but it is really not: there is
nothing mindlike behind nature.248
Whereas the first two explanations are forms of teleological realism, the last one
exemplifies teleological anti-realism. An influential formulation of the problem was given by
Kant, who argued that “our intellect does not draw its laws from nature – – but imposes them on
nature.”249 Teleology is seen by human minds, so what guarantees that teleology is real and
not just a figment of the human imagination? The ID theorists argue that these rational
patterns in nature are not created by this human act of interpretation, but are rather only
discovered by humans. This is stated succinctly by Dembski: “Intelligent Design is one
intelligence determining what another intelligence has done.”250 Again, this underscores the idea of
a link between the sort of order seen in nature and intelligence. There is a rationality in
nature which is comprehensible to the human mind. According to this idea, we can discover
246 Feser 2010.
247 There has been some controversy over how Intelligent Design is related to the classic Thomistic understanding
of  teleology.  In  their  descriptions  of  biological  nature,  ID  theorists  sometimes  seem  to  be  moving  within  the
modern mechanistic understanding of nature that is so popular within natural science, rather than understanding
reality from the starting point of Thomistic philosophy. Philosopher Edward Feser, in particular, has pressed the
point against ID (Feser 2008). Even J.T. Bridges, a Thomist very sympathetic to Intelligent Design, sees some
tension here. However, Bridges argues that ID can be reconciled with Thomism, provided that ID is seen as a
limited explanation on the scientific level, while Thomism is seen as a metaphysical worldview which can well
accommodate  mechanistic  explanations  within  its  framework.  (Bridges  2012,  216).  My  own  view  is  that  ID's
teleological realism is a significant point of contact with Thomism, but the Thomistic understanding of teleology
is far broader than ID's. ID theorists base their design argument only on a part of nature's order (to be detailed in
chapters 5 and 6), while Thomists see teleology everywhere.
248 I have adapted the list from Del Ratzsch (2001, 23). I have compressed his last three options into one, since they
are all  different explanations for why our minds would see nature as rational,  even though it  is  really not.  The
explanation  could  be  based  on  Darwinian  evolution,  the  flexibility  of  our  minds  to  find  patterns  anywhere,  or
perhaps our ability to impose the order of our minds on the outside world.
249 Popper 1964, 191.
250 Dembski 1998c, 19.
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real patterns in nature and the rationality of nature is not just a human invention, but rather
something merely discovered.251
If we understand realism and anti-realism as different explanations for the appearance
of “mind correlativity” or teleology in nature, then it becomes possible to use the evidence to
speak in favour of the realistic interpretation of teleology. This explanatory comparison has
been used in the same way to help show why we should prefer a critical realism in the
natural sciences: it explains the success of the natural sciences better than the anti-realistic
interpretation.252 This  was  also  Popper’s  response  to  Kant.  Our  reason  cannot  impose  any
sort of laws on nature, at least if we suppose that nature really exists. In this case, a false
understanding of the laws of nature will tend to be contradicted by actual events.253 Larry
Wright has argued that teleological descriptions can be similarly tested and improved upon.
For example, our understanding of how an automobile’s engine works can be falsified and
improved with additional knowledge. The same is generally understood to be true in
biology.254 It would be difficult to argue that the human heart acts as though it has the
function of pumping blood even though it actually does not have this function in the context
of the living organism. As Wright notes, this would amount to saying that the order of living
beings is purely accidental.255 Wright’s rejection of chance as an explanation is quite similar
to the arguments of the ID movement that as the complexity and specificity of a pattern
increase, its explanation by reference to chance becomes ever less credible. Seeing a vague
face of Elvis in peanut butter would not qualify as a real pattern, but would more likely be
seen as accidental. But the words “I love you” formed by ink blots on the paper would be
seen as a real pattern. Similarly, the complex patterns of functional biological order are
clearly real.256
Rhe possibility that some teleological descriptions are reliable does not mean that all
teleological descriptions are equally useful or reliable. This also does not demonstrate that
the way the ID movement understands teleology in biology is necessarily correct. In
philosophy of biology, there seems to be a broad consensus that teleological-sounding
descriptions are necessary for biology, though some prefer to use terms like “functional
descriptions” or “teleonomy” to describe this. However, the nature of these teleological
descriptions and their implications are not agreed upon.257
Teleological reductionism accepts the reality of teleology (or at least something like it)
in nature, but argues that it is reducible to non-teleological causes such as process of
evolution. Indeed, as Michael Ruse has argued, Darwinian evolutionary theory agrees with
251 Menuge 2004b, Wiker & Witt 2006, Ratzsch 2001.
252 McGrath 2002.
253 Pihlström 1997, 19.
254 Wright 1976, 149-150
255 Wright 1976.
256 This is related to Dembski’s concept of specified complexity, to be analysed in chapter 4.5. I note for clarity that
Wright is not making a design argument. Rather, he allows for the explanation of teleology from both a design-
perspective and a naturalistic evolutionary perspective.
257 Walsh 2008.
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the tradition of natural theology that the functional complexity of biological organisms is a
real thing to be explained. Otherwise there would have been no need for postulating the
Darwinian mechanism of natural selection to explain such adaptations.258 The ID theorists
have often referenced Dawkins’ definition of biology as “the study of complicated things that
give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”259 On  this  point  ID  and  Darwinian
evolutionary biology can be seen as allies. The difference is that rather than explaining this
order by reference to the actions of a personal intelligent designer, evolutionary biology
explains it as the product of natural evolutionary mechanisms. The idea is that teleology can
ultimately be explained by non-teleological factors. 260
3.3. Personal Explanation in Natural Theology and Intelligent Design
I have argued that ID attempts to explain the presence of teleological features of nature in
terms of the operation of a mind. Precisely what sort of features is meant will become clear in
chapters five and six. For now, there are even more fundamental questions to discuss: how
do explanations by reference to the intentional activity of an agent work? Or do they have
explanatory  value  at  all?  There  is  a  vast  history  to  this  discussion.261 This chapter will
introduce the discussion on the validity of design arguments which will be continued in the
following chapters. I will also note some commonalities and differences between ID and
theistic natural theology.
Personal Explanation
In the contemporary discussion, the concept of personal explanation has received particular
attention in relation to theistic natural theology. Because of the success of natural science,
mechanistic explanations involving reference to law-like regularities are often considered to
be the paradigm case of good explanations.262 But there is another type of explanation that all
humans are familiar with: personal explanation by reference to the purposes and capabilities
of agents. The possibility that such explanations can have explanatory power is assumed in
normal human life whenever we explain the activities of some human person by reference to
their intentions. For  example,  we  might  say  that  our  friend  went  to  the  shop  because  she
wanted to buy milk, or we might say that an automobile has the order it has because it has
258 Ruse 2003. Thus also Dennett (2006b, 38) argues that design in nature is real and ingenious, but is explained by
a process which acts without intelligence.
259 Dawkins 1991, 1. See chapters 2.2 and 4.1 of the present study for further discussion on ID´s use of Dawkins.
260 Ruse 2003.
261 Knuuttila & Sihvola 2014 for in-depth discussion.
262 See Salmon 1990 for discussion.
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been intentionally designed by humans. Similarly, theistic natural theologians argue that
nature has certain features because its order has been intentionally designed by God.263
The ID movement does not always specify very exactly what is meant by design as an
explanation, but the basic idea of personal explanation is clearly visible.264 Dembski makes
the distinction between “design” which refers to just the pattern or structure which is
observed and “intelligent design”, the activity of an intelligent agent which can create such a
pattern. Dembski argues that the process of intelligent design typically proceeds in three
steps. First, the designer has a purpose which he wants to execute. Second, the designer
forms  a  plan  to  fullfill  his  purpose.  Third,  the  designer  arranges  things  according  to  his
purpose. 265 Other ID theorists argue that to create certain types of structures, the capability
of an intelligent designer to arrange parts with foresight is required.266 Principally, the
designer is capable of “directed contingency”, in other words “choice”.267 The designer thus has
a will, the ability to plan, and the ability to influence the material world. The definition is
based on human experience of design, just as the natural theologian’s defence of divine
personal explanation is based on the efficacy of human personal explanation. The argument
of the ID movement is that designers can create rational patterns in nature. Human designers
can do this, and similar (but greater) capabilities are seen as the best explanation for nature’s
order.268
Many objections to the use of personal explanations in natural theology and Intelligent
Design thought have been made. At the most basic level, the coherence of the concept of God
could be questioned. If the concept of God was somehow contradictory or incomprehensible,
then explanations based on the activity of this divine person would not be explanations at
all. Thus atheist Kai Nielsen, for example, has argued that the concept of God is so
incomprehensible that it would not be reasonable to believe in God even if the stars were
arranged before our eyes into the text “GOD EXISTS”, because this would have no more
meaning that if the text said “PROCRASTINATION DRINKS MELANCHOLY.”269 ID is not
committed to seeing the Creator as divine. However, if the concept of an unembodied
intelligence is incoherent, this would be a problem for any form of Intelligent Design which
implies that the designer is unembodied. In chapter 3.1, I argued that this is indeed how the
ID theorists in practice understand the designer, so these arguments are also important for
them.
In defending the coherence of theistic explanations, natural theology requires the help
of philosophical theology. The discussion started by Swinburne’s “The Coherence of Theism”
263 E.g. Swinburne 2004.
264 Menuge 2004b.
265 Dembski 2002, xvi.
266 Behe 2006a, 193.
267 Dembski 2002, see also Dembski & Witt 2010. Dembski expands on his definition by writing that “[t]he principle
characteristic of intelligent agency is directed contingency, or what we call choice.” (2002, 62)
268 I will be analyzing the logical structure of the argument in more detail in chapter 4.
269 Nielsen 2004, 279.
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(1977) has convinced many of the coherence of theism and theistic explanation.270 A popular
way of arguing for the coherence of theistic personal explanation is by reference to human
personal explanations. According to Charles Taliaferro, if we regard explanations in terms of
human intentions (such as “I wish to see my beloved”) as explanatory of human behaviour
and logically coherent, then we will also have to concede that theistic personal explanation is
also coherent and explanatory.271 However, others continue to argue that the coherence of
theism has not been demonstrated. The divine person is also often thought to be difficult to
describe using the same concepts as human persons.272
Another simple way of rejecting theistic arguments would be to also reject the
coherence and reliability of intentional explanations even in the case of humans. Eliminative
naturalists, who believe that mind and intention are not real explanations even in the human
context, will naturally also reject biological and cosmic design arguments. Within eliminative
naturalism, references to intentionality in the case of humans are seen as “folk psychology”
which should be replaced with correct scientific neurophysiological explanations for human
behaviour.273 However, eliminative naturalism is a highly problematic view, which many
theistic thinkers even regard as the reductio ad absurdum of naturalism, if it really is the most
consistent naturalistic view of the world.274 In the discussion on ID, naturalists have typically
not embraced eliminativism, but have accepted the validity of design-based explanations in
the human context. Thus references to design and purpose are typically accepted to have
explanatory power in the human context, but applying the inferences to the order of nature
is criticized. This is a much more promising strategy than eliminative naturalism. However,
it also allows that if design-based explanations used in biology are sufficiently similar to the
explanations used in the case of human agents, then they could succeed.
Evaluating Design Arguments
The precise ways of criticizing ID’s design inference will become clear in the coming
chapters, but a preliminary list of criteria – testability, the amount of details, relation to
background knowledge and past explanatory success – will be helpful at this point to elucidate
differences between personal explanations and mechanistic explanations. In the discussion
surrounding ID, design-based explanations are typically evaluated using criteria developed
in the philosophy of science to evaluate different scientific hypotheses. Science is held as the
gold standard to which other explanations are compared.275 This strategy is not wholly
misguided, since the ID theorists themselves present their design arguments as part of the
270 Swinburne 1993.
271 Taliaferro 2012, 8-16; Taliaferro 1994.
272 Dawes 2009, 48-51.
273 E.g. Churchland 2007.
274 E.g. Feser 2008, Goetz & Taliaferro 2008, Cunningham 2010, Menuge 2004b.
275 My list is based on criteria discussed by Ratzsch (2001, parts III and IV) and Dawes (2009, chapter 7).
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natural sciences. Furthermore, there is surely much common ground between the  evaluation
of design as an explanation  includes reference to criteria that are used in the natural
sciences. Nevertheless, ID as a personal explanation also differs substantially from
explanations that are typically used in the natural sciences.
The first commonly referred criterion of good explanations is the criterion of testability.
In the natural sciences, the possibility to test different ideas against empirical results is highly
valued,  since  otherwise  we  would  be  left  with  no  way  to  find  out  if  our  theory  is  false.
Theories can be tested by reference to their ability to explain current scientific knowledge,
but also by their ability to predict future results. In some cases, predictions can be fairly
easily inferred from the postulates of the theory. For example, knowing the laws of
thermodynamics, we can predict that the amount of usable energy in a closed system will
decrease over time. But often auxiliary hypotheses have to be added to the theory before we
can derive predictions from it.276
Following the ideal of testability, it can be argued that personal explanations are also
testable. For example, let's hypothesize that a person is going to the shop to buy milk. We
can look at what the person does, and notice if the result actually occurs.277 Intentional
explanations can also help be tested by comparison to other explanations, like the null
hypothesis (random chance). Supposing that humans act for reasons provides a more
plausible overall picture of human activity than the hypothesis that they act for no reason at
all. Supposing that there exists a being with the appropriate intention and causal power to
create some result, it can be argued that this hypothesis predicts the data better than the null
hypothesis.278
However, typically, our theories about agents are not formed in this manner, by first
hypothesizing about specific motives and then observing human behaviour. As Ratzsch
notes, “design theories are, ultimately, theories involving agency. And, with respect to agents,
theories and explanations often must trail data. We are often in positions of utter inability to predict
specific human actions, but such actions once observed may be readily and quite legitimately
explainable.”279 This is the case even in the case of humans. For example, we may be unable to
predict why a person is going to the shop. Is it to buy milk, or to buy sugar? Or perhaps to
flirt with the pretty clerk? We are often unable to tell beforehand. Often we even need
information from the person in question before we can make the choice. Reasons for
behaviour are often easier to identify after the fact, rather than beforehand.
In the case of ID, the motive of the designer is not thought to be part of the explanation.
Rather, the capabilities of the designer to produce goal-directed order are the important
explaining feature. The ID movement has also attempted to derive other predictions from the
design hypothesis, as we will see in chapters 5 and 6. I will argue that this is moving between
a minimalistic and a more robust design hypothesis. In principle it is indeed possible to add
276 Ratzsch 2001, chapter 7.
277 Dawes 2009, appendix.
278 Dawes 2009, 125.
279 Ratzsch 2001, 117.
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auxiliary hypotheses to a minimalistic design argument to make the hypothesis more robust
and generate more predictions. If the initial design argument is successful in identifying that
there indeed exists an intelligent designer, it does not seem unreasonable to try to make
additional hypotheses about any patterns that can be discerned in the designer’s activity, just
as extended observation of a human agent can lead us to create a more detailed theory about
how that agent tends to act.280 So, as it keeps trailing the data, a design hypothesis can
perhaps become more robust and thus also more testable, even if it is initially quite vague.281
In chapter 4.4, I will be returning to the question of whether design hypotheses need to
be predictive in order to be testable. In the influential hypothetico-deductive model of
scientific explanation developed by Carl Hempel, explanation and prediction were
synonymous. It was thought that each proper scientific explanation was also a prediction,
because based on the relevant natural laws and conditions, one could predict the result. But
in contemporary philosophy of science, the hypothetico-deductive model's strong link
between predictive and explanatory  capacity has been denied. Scientific explanation is more
concerned with understanding the causal structure of the universe and explanatory
unification, rather than just prediction. For example, quantum physics can explain even
highly improbable quantum fluctuations, but may not ever be able to predict them.282
The amount of details provided about the designer is also relevant for analysing how
good  design  is  as  an  explanation.  The  goodness  of  God  is  a  central  explanatory  factor  in
many theistic arguments. If we are able to comprehend God's goodness at least in some way,
then it becomes possible to argue that a good God would have the motive to create a certain
kind world. Thus Swinburne argues that God explains the order of the universe, because it is
plausible to believe that his goodness would lead him to create bodily creatures capable of
interacting with each other.283 Robin Collins argues that if we assume that the existence of
complex, intelligent life is a good thing, then it becomes plausible to assume that a good God
would create a cosmos which makes this existence possible.284 However, for many skeptics,
the problem of evil makes ascribing such comprehensible goodness to God difficult.285 By
contrast, the ID movement’s designer is left unidentified and his motives are thus
280 Dawes 2009, 266.
281 William Lane Craig (2007) has argued that although one cannot falsify the existence of a designer, particular
forms of the design hypothesis can nevertheless be falsified and tested in this manner. It seems to me that this is
correct. For example, one could falsify the hypothesis that the designer has created biological machines that are
not evolvable through a gradual Darwinian process. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 6.3, many argue that
natural science has indeed falsified this form of the design argument.
282 See Salmon 1990, 117-122 and Woodward J. 2011 for the history of this discussion, as well as Woodward J. 2003
for  discussion  of  the  concept  of  causality.  Cleland  (2011,  568-569)  argues  that  this  can  be  seen  even  in  the
historical natural sciences. For example, the hypothesis that an asteroid impacted the Earth 65 million years ago
arguably was not able to predict the precise geological discoveries that we have made, but is nevertheless
regarded as the best explanation.
283 Swinburne 2004a, 346-349; 2004c.
284 Collins 2012, 254-256.
285 Narveson 2003. Similarly, Dawes (2009, 44-46) argues that a hypothesis about the motivations of the deity is
extremely important for the explanatory value of theism.
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mysterious. As I will argue in the coming chapters, the ID movement argues that certain
types of patterns are better explained by an intelligent cause, even if the motives of this
intelligent designer are unknown.286
Evaluations based on the amount of details provided by an explanation are also related
to the concept of scientific tractability. Scientific explanations are highly detailed, with
references to laws, mechanisms and the minutest details of the systems being investigated.
Science also does not provide explanations for everything – for example, it is difficult to
specify a mechanism explaining why gravity works the way it does. However, in general, an
attempt is made for investigating natural phenomena in detail. By contrast, explanations by
reference to intentionality do not include this level of mechanical detail. Theistic intentional
explanations typically do not involve any specification about the mechanism by which God
creates the laws of nature, for example. Indeed no such mechanism needs to be given, since
according to the hypothesis God can bring about any result he chooses without any need for
intermediate second causes. In the case of the intelligent design hypothesis, an intermediate
cause does exist if the designer of life was a space-alien, as has been suggested. However,
nothing like this has been specified by the Intelligent Design movement, and no evidence of
laboratories or similar has been found on Earth.
Both theistic natural theology and Intelligent Design require that intentional activity as
a cause itself possesses some explanatory power, even without specification of any particular
mechanistic process the designer worked through. In intentional explanations as used in the
human context, this does seem to be the case. In all explanations, there comes a point where
we reach the level of basic causal powers, and are unable to specify further intermediate
mechanisms.287 Furthermore, while intentional explanations seem to work on a different level
than mechanistic explanations, this does not mean that they have no explanatory power.288
Like the natural theologians, ID theorist Meyer also references the example of human design
as one basis or this claim. In the case of humans, we cannot yet specify how our
consciousness and will influence the molecules of our bodies, but we nevertheless believe
that our consciousness has an effect in the world, and that references to human design can be
286 This is a crucial difference between ID's design argument and the intentional explanations described by Dawes
(2009, appendix). Within ID, the capabilities of the designer are thought to have explanatory power even apart
from knowing the precise motives of the designer.
287 There is reason to think that the demand for intermediate mechanisms should not be absolute. Dawes (2009,
51-53) argues that the demand of an intermediate mechanism leads to an infinite regress. Suppose that we cannot
say that A causes B without specifying an additional intermediate mechanism C. How can we then say that A
causes C to cause B without specifying yet further causal mechanisms for how A causes C, leading to an infinite
regress? Dawes thinks that divine action is a mysterious concept far removed from our everyday understanding,
but the requirement for a mechanism is no reason to reject theistic explanations.  At most it  can be a reason for
preferring naturalistic explanations when such are available.
288 Dawes 2009, appendix. These features lead Collins (2006) to suggest that Intelligent Design should be viewed
as a ”metascientific” idea: it has empirical content, yet operates on a different level than normal scientific theories.
I will return to the question whether Intelligent Design is science in chapters 3.4 and 3.5.
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explanatory. In addition, we can typically detect that something is designed by humans
without being able to specify how these humans do so. 289
This does show that design can be explanatory even without precise knowledge of
mechanisms. However, in the case of human designers, we do typically have at least some
idea of how the designed objects were produced (or how they could have been produced) in
practice. The possibility to investigate such details further is a good thing for the hypothesis,
though it is not unconceivable that a hypothesis could not have explanatory power even if
further details about the cause cannot yet be investigated. 290 If personal explanation is
indeed explanatory, it is not necessarily a fatal flaw for it that personal explanations are
different from mechanistic explanations. Even a vague hypothesis could in principle be the
most plausible one, and could provide us with valuable knowledge. Following Aristotle, it
could be argued that there may be great value in even a glimpse off “celestial things”: “half
glimpse of persons we love is more delightful than an accurate view of other things.”291 But  such
glimpses are quite different from scientific theories.
Relation to background knowledge is another important criterion for evaluating
explanations. How credible is the explanation beforehand and how well does it fit into our
overall framework of beliefs? How likely is a given theistic hypothesis? I have already
argued that our understanding of the philosophy of mind will greatly influence the
plausibility of personal explanations. Dawes, for example, argues that because our only
experience is of bodily agents, the concept of theistic explanation is quite strange and should
be given a low background probability.292 The conception of human persons adopted by
Swinburne and members of the Intelligent Design movement is generally nonmaterialistic,
and in such an ontology the possibility of theism does not seem as far-fetched as in a
naturalistic ontology.293
Background knowledge is also important for guarding against frivolous intentional
explanations, as I will argue in chapter 4. Here the cumulative nature of theistic natural
theology is an important difference between ID and natural theology. Natural theologians
such as Swinburne and Collins as well as theologians of nature such as McGrath consider the
evidence of design as part of a much broader argument. It is part of a web of supportive
theistic arguments and does not stand alone. Pre-existing reasons to believe in theism are
289 Meyer 2013, 392-398.
290 McCullough (2013) argues that explanations based on divine design need not shut down scientific enquiry: ”In
that sense, divine-agent explanations do bottom out for the scientist, but that is not quite the same thing as saying that they
shut down scientific inquiry. To invoke Apollo is to give an explanation that does not admit of further explanation, but it
does not forestall alternate explanations. The sun can be said to rise because Apollo mounts his chariot, and there may be no
getting behind his decision to some further cause of the morning; still, we can inquire whether there actually is a chariot, or a
decision, or an Apollo.
We can still inquire whether other explanations, implying an Apollo or not, make better sense of the data. The question is
still open, in that sense; scientific inquiry is still possible. To posit a God in the gaps simply disallows an infinite chain of
explanation.”
291 Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 644b32-35. Quoted in Zagzebski 2012, chapter 9.
292 Dawes 2009, chapter 7.
293 Menuge 2004b; Dembski 2007; Larmer 2014, chapter 7.
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even a formal premise in Collins’ formulation of the design argument.294 As mentioned in
chapter 3.1, the ID theorists too see a use for further religious and philosophical
considerations in identifying the “intelligent designer” as the God of Christian theism. I will
argue that they also recognize the influence of background beliefs on assessments of how
strong the evidence for design is in nature. However, as I will also argue in the course of this
study, the ID theorists believe the evidence of design can be so strong that belief in the
existence of an unknown designer can be justified even if we have little or no evidence to
think that he exists beforehand.
The past explanatory success of the explanation is the final criterion I will be considering
in this chapter. Belief in the designedness of the cosmos has been an important historical
background supposition of modern natural science. The importance of teleological concepts
for the development of natural science is acknowledged by both critics and defenders of
Intelligent Design, and as I will argue in chapter 6, teleological concepts continue to be used
in biology.295 So, it is arguable that as a “metascientific idea”, a philosophical idea that builds
on empirical discoveries and guides scientific practice, design has indeed been scientifically
fruitful.296 However, the historical importance of design does not demonstrate that design
should continue to be a part of present-day science. Furthermore, fruitfulness as a
philosophical background assumption does not necessarily equate to fruitfulness as an
explanation within the natural sciences, acting on the same level as other theories.297
By contrast, in critiques of natural theology and ID, it is common to emphasize the
historical success of the naturalistic research programme. The success of the natural science
sin explaining natural phenomena is taken to imply that in time, every mystery can be solved
without reference to Gods or intelligent designers.298 In contrast, supporters of ID argue that
the progress of science has also deepened the difficulty of some mysteries. Thinkers in the
theology and science community usually similarly argue that the natural sciences have
historically been fruiful in explaining certain kinds of phenomena, but other matters are
more properly the domain of other disciplines. The use of the criteria of fruitfulness depends
on our beliefs about the evidence: have the natural sciences indeed been able to solve all
mysteries, and which ones does it seem likely to solve?
Types of Design Arguments
So, the Intelligent Design movement argues that nature’s empirically detected order is best
explained by the existence of an intelligent designer. According to Behe, design is the
294 Collins 2012, 207. I am also including considerations of the simplicty of the hypothesis (e.g. Swinburne 2011a)
as part of the criteria of background knowledge.
295 E.g. Ratzsch 2001, chapter 11; Shanks 2004, chapter 1.
296 Collins 2006.
297 Shanks 2004, chapter 1; Kitcher 2007.
298 E.g. Kitcher 2007; Dennett 2006a, Dawes 2007. I will present more references in chapter 7.
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“purposeful arrangement of parts”.299 It is interesting that for Behe, this same definition
functions as a description for both “design”, the pattern of nature which is explained, and
the process of intelligent design, which explains the rationality of this order. This indicates
that Behe sees a fairly tight logical connection between design as a pattern and intelligent
design as its explanation. The same idea can also be found in the other ID theorists’ writings.
According to Dembski and Wells, design is an “inherently teleological” process, thus it is able
to explain teleological patterns.300 According to Meyer, the creation of information is
something that is typical to designers, and thus the information of DNA is best explained by
reference to design. Meyer argues that creating such programmes requires “forward-looking”
thinking, present in the activity of intelligent designers, but not possessed by mindless
natural processes.301 Thus, the order of nature is thought to be goal-oriented, purposeful or
functional, and best explained by a goal-oriented process of intelligent design.
These examples reveal an important background assumption in the Intelligent Design
movement’s design arguments. They require some kind of connection between design and
intelligent design as a process. Some connection is already implied by the words the ID
theorists use to describe nature: nature is full of “apparent design”, something that at face
value looks like something that we would intuitively explain by the process of intelligent
design. Speaking of “apparent design” makes it more plausible to argue that perhaps the
design is not only apparent, but there also actually is an intelligent designer who has created
this order. Behind all this is the principle that an explanation must fit that which is
explained; the explanation must possess features relevant for understanding the existence of
that which is explained.
However, design arguments are also supposed to be based on a description of nature
that is in some way neutral or empirical. Thus the description of the order of nature must not
already presuppose the conclusion of design. The validity of describing the order of nature
as “apparently designed” must be based on some other grounds than the knowledge that it
is in fact designed. The division of the design argument into two steps is commonly used to
clarify this discussion. In the first step, the argument to design, it is argued that nature is
ordered in some special way. In the second step, the argument from design, it is argued that
these patterns are best explained by intelligent design. Certain features of nature are thought
to exhibit the appearance of design, which is argued to be best explained by the existence of a
real designer, as I showed in chapter 3.2.302
Design arguments can be broadly divided into two categories based on the type of
empirical evidence used. First (1), there are cosmic design arguments appealing to properties of
natural laws that are present everywhere in the cosmos, such their fine-tuning for life and
their rationality. Cosmic design arguments are very popular even outside of the ID
movement, and have been developed rigorously by philosophers such as John Leslie, Robin
299 Behe 2006a, 193.
300 Dembski & Wells 2007, glossary.
301 Meyer 2009, 2004.
302 E.g. Ruse 2007.
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Collins and Richard Swinburne.303 Second (2), there are biological design arguments, based on
the apparently purposeful complexity of biological organisms. Both types of arguments have
been used by the ID movement, though the majority of the ID literature focuses on the
biological design argument, and this is where ID’s most original contributions to the debate
have been made.304
Sometimes the ID theorists have expressed their focus on biology explicitly. Behe
writes that “by ‘intelligent design’ I mean to imply design beyond the laws of nature. That is, taking
the laws of nature as given, are there other reasons for concluding that life and its component systems
have been intentionally arranged?”305 Johnson admits that naturalistic evolution leaves room for
a Creator who set up naturalistic processes to do the “work of creation”. However, for him this
is not enough: “If God stayed in that realm beyond the reach of scientific investigation, and allowed
an apparently blind materialistic evolutionary process to do all the work of creation, then it would
have to be said that God furnished us with a world of excuses for unbelief and idolatry.”306 The
implication would seem to be that fine-tuning does not provide enough evidence of a theistic
God who has been active in natural history, as opposed to the God of deism, who merely set
things up at the beginning. The ID theorists want to see if there is evidence of design beyond
the laws and basic properties of nature.
However, cosmic design arguments are also important for the ID movement. Johnson
sometimes gives very broad formulations of the design argument, such as the following:
“reality is simply too rational and beautiful ever to be forced into the narrow categories that
materialism can comprehend.”307 The fine-tuning argument is also present in the ID literature
from the beginning. The early collections of ID articles, “Mere Creation” (1998) and “The
Creation Hypothesis” (1994) included chapters on fine-tuning and the cosmic design
argument. The later ID books “The Privileged Planet” (2004) and “A Meaningful World”
(2006) even focus on cosmic design arguments. Many ID theorists reference the discussion on
cosmic design arguments and use it as background for their own biological arguments.308
303 See chapter 5.
304 See chapter 6. Similar classifications are given by Sober (2003) and Narveson (2003). Narveson divides design
arguments into local design arguments, concerned with local properties of nature such as biological organisms,
and global design arguments based on the properties of nature which are present everywhere, such as the laws of
nature. Local design arguments also include arguments based on the properties of the solar system, for example,
not just biological design arguments. For example, Gonzales & Richards (2004) do also argue based on the
properties of the solar system (which is an example of a local argument), and Behe (2007) references this
argument as part of the background of the biological design argument.
305 Behe  2001,  696.  Behe  has  not  been  totally  consistent  in  this  definition.  At  other  times  he  writes  as  though
believing in cosmic design is enough to make someone a believer in “intelligent design”. Commenting on John
Haught’s view, which combines belief in cosmic design and Darwinism, Behe (1999) argues that “despite chastising
design theorists in his book, John Haught believes in intelligent design as much as does William Dembski.” This indicates
the importance Behe nevertheless places on cosmic design arguments.
306 Johnson 2001, 443.
307 Johnson 2000, 152. Quotations on the importance of fine-tuning for the ID movement could be multiplied. For
example, Dembski and Witt (2010, 30) consider the fine-tuning of the laws of nature and the problem of the origin
of life as the two best arguments for intelligent design.
308 Moreland (ed) 1994, Dembski (ed) 1998, Gonzales & Richards 2004, Wiker & Witt 2006.
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Behe explains the importance of the fine-tuning argument for ID in two ways. First,
Behe argues that because the cosmic and biological design arguments are based on different
sets of data, but reach the same conclusion, they exhibit the epistemically valuable
phenomenon of consilience. A worldview that is supported by multiple independent lines of
evidence may be stronger than one based on just one line of evidence.309 But Behe also argues
that the cosmic design argument can function as background knowledge that gives increased
plausibility for the biological design argument. Given evidence of cosmic fine-tuning, it does
not feel out of place to also find evidence of biological fine-tuning, or that the existence of
this biological fine-tuning requires the activity of the designer beyond the laws of nature and
into the events of natural history: “if  we  admit  the  possibility  of  an  agent  who  can  choose  and
implement the laws of physics for the universe, then there is no principled reason to think that
implementing much greater fine-tuning would be beyond it.”310 Behe thinks that it as inconsistent
to allow for design at the cosmic level but not inside the cosmos in the events of cosmic and
natural history. Rather, it is possible to affirm that the fine-tuning extends from the natural
laws and the properties of nature into the events of natural history and many details of
biology.311
Behe's argument is similar to those used for the possibility of miracles in the tradition
of natural theology. Swinburne's argument for the plausibility of Jesus' resurrection has the
arguments of natural theology as a background assumption. The plausibility of the existence
of the sort of God who could act in history makes it possible to argue that some actual event,
like the various historical data about Jesus, are best explained if we suppose that a
miraculous act of God has occurred.312 Similarly, Craig Keener argues that our prior beliefs
about the existence or non-existence of God cannot help but influence our evaluations of the
evidence for miracles. Someone who rules out the existence of God a priori may not consider
any evidence for miracles as sufficient. However, someone who thinks the existence of God
is at least possible or even plausible can, according to Keener, be more open to the possibility
of miracles.313
As I will show in chapter 7, there are also theological understandings of divine action
where a sharp difference can be made between divine action in creating the world, and
divine action within the world. Behe’s comments raise the question of the natures of the
design arguments in the ID movement’s argumentation and modern natural theology. Do
cosmic design arguments help make biological design arguments possible, or is there some
great difference between the arguments which makes this difficult? What are the
commonalities and differences between these design arguments? According to Swinburne’s
309 Behe 2007, 204-220.
310 Behe 2007, 216.
311 For other examples, Meyer (1999b, 56-66) uses fine-tuning as a lead-in to his biological design argument,
referencing philosophers Swinburne, Collins and others. Woodward (2003) also emphasizes the importance of
fine-tuning and other cosmological discoveries in making ID a viable position.
312 Swinburne 2003.
313 Keener 2011, 129 writes that "no one who believes in historic monetheistic understanding of God would deny the
possibility of God influencing the system of nature; such a denial must be predicated on a prior denial of this sort of God."
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analysis, for example, modern natural theology seeks to deal with facts which are “too
strange” or “too big” for natural science.314 This type of natural theology works on a different
level from natural science, and does not typically come into conflict with it.315 By contrast, the
biological design arguments of Intelligent Design seem to be intruding on the territory of
natural science. The design argument is argued to be scientific, not philosophical.316 For the
ID theorists, design and Darwinian evolution are alternative explanations for the same
phenomena. This causes much controversy, and the charge that ID is a “God of the gaps” -
argument has been frequently made.317 The  same  “God  of  the  Gaps”  -objection  is  also
sometimes used against the arguments of the modern natural theologians, however.318 Is
there some reason why the objection works better against some design arguments but not
others? Answering this question in detail will have to wait until a closer examination of the
logic  of  design  arguments  in  the  following  chapters.  I  will  analyse  the  God  of  the  gaps-
critique in more detail in chapter 7.
3.4. Naturalistic Science?
Methodological Naturalism
In the discussion on Intelligent Design, much energy has been used to discuss whether
Intelligent Design qualifies as part of natural science or not. The prominence of this theme is
inherited from the discussion on whether it is permissible to teach creationism in public
schools. The legal strategy for combating the teaching of creationism has been based on a
strong methodological naturalism, in which all discussion of supernatural entities in the
natural sciences is considered forbidden by definition. It was not enough to insist merely that
creationism was bad science, it also had to be non-science. In the 1981 Arkansas Creationism
trial, Judge William Overton defined science first as what is accepted by the scientific
community or whatever scientists do. He then listed five narrower criteria: (1) Science is
guided by natural law, (2) it explains by reference to natural law, (3) it is testable against the
empirical world, (4) its conclusions are tentative, and (5) it is falsifiable.319 In defining science
as restricted to non-supernatural factors, Overton was following the testimony of
philosopher of science Michael Ruse, who had argued in his testimony that “any reliance on a
supernatural force, a Creator intervening in a natural world by supernatural process, is necessarily
314 Swinburne 2004a, chapter 4.
315 Stoeger 2010, 186.
316 Dembski (2004a, 49) and Behe (2006a, 210-212) both argue that the design arguments of traditional natural
theology  were  often  poorly  formulated  and  just  statements  of  an  intuition,  whereas  ID  makes  the  argument
rigorous, scientific and convincing.
317 E.g. Miller 2002, Kitcher 2007, Shanks 2004, Haught 2003, Cunningham 2010.
318 E.g. Stenger 2004, 182. See more in chapter 7.
319 Overton 2009 [1981].
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not science.”320 After the trial, much critical discussion has ensued about these criteria,
because they are not philosophically rigorous. Philosopher of science Larry Laudan in
particular argued that though the outcome of the trial was good, the criteria used to judge
science and their application to creationism were problematic. Laudan argued that scientific
creationism contains much that is testable – and which has been tested and found false.321
As seen in chapters 2.2 and 2.3, methodological naturalism of some sort is typically
seen as an important feature of modern natural science. Natural science guided by
methodological naturalism always looks for natural explanation for phenomena, rather than
religious explanations. As Ronald Numbers argues, even Christian natural philosophy and
natural science have always been guided by a “preference for natural explanations over divine
mysteries” when dealing with natural phenomena.322 It was thought that God had created a
rational world, whose structure was open to human investigation. Explaining things by
reference to God’s mysterious will was not the default position of the natural philosophers;
rather, they wanted to understand the natural processes which God had created. Similarly,
many contemporary theists also restrict natural science to the study of natural causes, and
adopt methodological naturalism.323
As I will argue in more detail in chapter 8.4, ID's emphasis on the scientific natural of
design arguments is partly based on its desire for cultural influence and public impact. The
movement recognizes the immense cultural authority of “science” and wants to reclaim it
from naturalists. In challenging the sufficiency of the scientific theory of evolution and
naturalistic philosophy in the public arena, they want to say that their critique and their
alternative are also scientific. But ID's critics are also affected by political motivations and the
desire to find simple arguments by which to thwart the prospect of ID being taught it public
schools. In a collection edited by Michael Ruse on the creationism trials, philosopher Philip
Quinn even argues that while there are good arguments against creationism, these may be
too complex, and so“there may well be circumstances in which only the bad effective argument will
work  against  them  in  the  political  or  legal  arenas.  If  there  are,  then  I  think,  though  I  come  to  this
conclusion reluctantly, it is morally permissible for us to use the bad effective argument.”324 I think
this strategy is unfortunate. We should seek for the truth and reject bad arguments, even if
they are expedient. My purpose here is to get beyond the politics and look instead at the
philosophical and theological foundations of various views.325
320 Ruse 2009 [1981], 272.
321 For some of the discussion, see the collection edited by Robert Pennock and Michael Ruse (2009).
322 Numbers 2003, 266.
323 Numbers 2003.
324 Quinn 2008, 398.
325 Similarly Monton 2009b. Monton also presents other examples of the same tendency.
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Intelligent Design’s Critique of Methodological Naturalism
The critique of this naturalistic restriction of science has been part of the Intelligent Design
movement’s argumentation since its beginnings. Johnson commented on Judge Overton’s
decision already in his Darwin on Trial.  Johnson argued that the naturalistic ground rules of
science have led to a far too positive view of the powers of Darwinian evolution. According
to Johnson, defenders of naturalism “enforce rules of procedure that preclude opposing points of
view.”326 For Johnson, evolution is just applied naturalistic philosophy: if naturalism is
assumed to be true at the start of our inquiry into origins, then living organisms must have
evolved through naturalistic processes, no matter what the evidence seems to say. Following
Johnson’s argument, all the major thinkers of the ID movement believe that belief in
Darwinian evolutionary theory and the veracity of a naturalistic origin of life owes more to
philosophy than to science. In the ID literature, evolutionary ideas are traced back to the
materialistic philosophy of Epicurus (341-274 B.C.), who already argued, prior to any of the
discoveries of modern science, that the random movement of atoms eventually brings about
more stable forms and even life.327
That philosophical ideas influenced the formation and popularity of evolutionary
theory is fairly uncontroversial: what is controversial is the ID theorists’ understanding that
these factors are more important than the empirical results.328 The  ID  theorists  thus  argue
that methodological naturalism can lead to a “naturalism of the gaps”: a philosophical or
even faith-based position which assumes that naturalistic explanations exist for all
phenomena and cannot allow the consideration of real scientific problems with naturalism.329
Ratzsch has argued that much of the discussion on demarcation criteria and
methodological naturalism has missed the central point the ID theorists have been trying to
make. In methodologically naturalistic science as it is typically understood, scientific study of
natural history works only on purely naturalistic theories. However, suppose that there
really is a being “whose purposes, decisions and actions are involved in the existence, governance or
structure of physical reality.”330 Suppose further that the actions of this being are responsible
for the origin of life and much of its development, and that there are real “gaps” in the
capabilities of natural processes nature.331 In this case, reliance purely on the results of
methodologically naturalistic science would produce a false picture of the history of life,
326 Johnson 1993, 118.
327 Wiker 2002. Wiker’s analysis is lauded in the book by all of the major ID theorists. Similarly Lennox 2007, 96-
99.
328 See  e.g.  Sedley  2007  for  the  ancient  background  and  Ruse  2003  as  well  as  Bowler  2009  on  the  historical
development of evolutionary biology.
329 Dembski 2003b, Behe 2003b & 2005a.
330 Ratzsch 2002.
331 I discuss the question of the God of the gaps further in chapter 7.
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because it could not even in principle recognize this being’s role and the really existing limits
of naturalistic processes.332
I agree that this is the central point of the ID theorists' critique of methodological
naturalism, and do not want to bypass it in this discussion. So, I will consider three different
strategies for defending the exclusion of design from the natural sciences.
First,  (1)  one  can  argue  that  there  is  good  reason  to  think  that  ID  is  false.  A
metaphysical naturalist can argue that it is very implausible that God exists and that he has
influenced history. Similarly, a theologian could argue that we can only expect God to act in
human history, rather than natural history. However, these responses to ID are not self-
evidently correct. The non-existence of a God who acts in history cannot be simply assumed,
but must be argued. And part of this process should also involve the detailed examination of
arguments for design, such as those presented in natural theology and ID. Furthermore, it is
problematic that here natural science becomes ideological, since methodological naturalism
is here based on a worldview that is not universally shared even by scientists.333
Second (2), it can be argued that the restriction of science to the study of natural causes
is not based on any bias against theology or design arguments, but is simply a humble
admission of the limits of the scientific method. Perhaps design-based explanations simply
don't fulfill the criteria of natural science, like testability. In this case, there is a very good
justification for excluding such explanations from natural science. In chapter 3.3, I argued
that ID is in some respects similar, but in other ways different from ideas that are typically
considered to be part of the natural sciences. However, as I will argue below, defending ID's
exclusion based on these criteria is not a simple matter.
The third (3) possible defence of methodological naturalism is much more promising. It
can be argued that methodological naturalism as a research programme does not need to be
pursued dogmatically. So, if it appears that the evidence supports something like ID, then at
that point we will have reached the end of methodologically naturalistic science, and the
beginning of something new - perhaps theology or some new kind of design-based science.
But until that point, we can keep pursuing methodologically naturalistic science, because it
has proven to be a historically fruitful approach. This critique might even allow ID in science
in theory, but simply deny it in practice. This critique, too, has the benefit that it requires
interaction with the evidence. ID's unviability as part of science must be demonstrated in
practice, rather than assumed a priori.
332 Much discussion of methodological naturalism and ID’s status as natural science can be found in all major ID
works, such as Behe 2006a, Johnson 1993, Dembski 2002a and Meyer 2009.
333 See  the  discussion  in  chapter  3.5.  and  Stenmark  2004,  chapter  9  for  critiques  of  ideological  science.  Hans
Halvorson 2014 correctly points out that methodological naturalism is indeed sometimes defined as the idea that
natural science should be done as though naturalism were true. Halvorson goes on to argue this cannot be how
methodological naturalism was originally understood, since it was initially formulated in a theistic framework.
(Similarly Numbers 2003, Bishop 2013) Rather, we must find grounds for methodological naturalism in the
chosen limitations of the proper domain of the sciences.
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Strong and Weak Methodological Naturalism
In the critical responses to the Intelligent Design movement, two different forms of
methodological naturalism can be discerned. The first is strong (or hard) methodological
naturalism, following Ruse’s claim that “any reliance on a supernatural force, a Creator
intervening in a natural world by supernatural process, is necessarily not science.”334 Typically this
form of naturalism is defended on the basis that the methods and theories of science are not
suited to examining such questions. Thus the exclusion of the supernatural is not thought to
be arbitrary, but based on the requirements of empirical science such as empirical
testability.335 This  type  of  idea  of  scientific  methodological  naturalism  has  also  been
important in the legal struggle against the teaching of Intelligent Design in public schools in
the U.S.A.336 It is also one of the arguments used in the 2005 Dover decision to exclude the
teaching of Intelligent Design from public schools.337
However, strong methodological naturalism is vulnerable to the previously discussed
central criticism made by the Intelligent Design movement. It gives the Intelligent Design
movement the opening to make a rhetorically powerful argument against their critics: if
critics of Intelligent Design have defined design arguments as by definition unscientific and
outside the possibility of rational consideration, then it becomes unsurprising that these
critics do not see any evidence for design in nature, and their testimony against ID loses
much of its force. Sometimes critics of ID who adopt strong methodological naturalism
indeed do go so far as stating that “even if  all  the  data point  to  an intelligent designer,  such an
hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic. Of course the scientist, as an
individual, is free to embrace a reality that transcends naturalism.”338
As indicated by the quote, methodological naturalism can also be a way of making
peace between  faith and reason by keeping them separate. Indeed, it actually has Christian
origins. Again, as Numbers points out, “scientific naturalism was largely made in Christendom by
pious Christians. Although it possessed the potential to corrode religious beliefs – and sometimes did
so – it flourished among Christian scientists who believe that God customarily achieved his ends
through natural causes.”339 According to Numbers, though the principle dates back perhaps to
334 Ruse 2009 [1981], 272.
335 See Pennock & Ruse 2011 for many arguments in this vein.
336 Pennock & Ruse 2009; Jones 2005; Dewolf, West, Luskin & Witt, Jonathan (ed) 2006.
337 Jones 2005. For analysis and commentary, see Nagasawa 2011, 95-101. Nagasawa argues that the premise that
ID is unscientific is unnecessary for the purpose of combating the teaching of ID in schools. It is sufficient to say
that ID has not been established as a viable alternative in the scientific community. I would argue that adopting
strong methodological naturalism as part of the legal definition of science would, if successful, give a stronger
legal basis for excluding creationism from schools, since on this understanding ID would by definition be outside
science. In Nagasawa’s definition, it is only excluded from science teaching as a practical matter to concentrate on
theories that are deemed more viable by the scientific community. On the practical level, the debate about
teaching ID then becomes a debate about pedagogy rather than a legal question.
338 Todd 1999.
339 Numbers 2003, 284.
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medieval times, the term “methodological naturalism” itself goes back to Paul deVries and
was coined to combat creationism.340
One modern defence of naturalistic science in these lines is provided by theologian
John Haught. Haught argues that theologies of nature can incorporate the findings of natural
science, but it is mistaken to use design as an explanation on the same level as natural science
functions. According to Haught, theological accounts of nature are rather concerned with the
ultimate character of reality, rather than operating on the level of scientific theories. “Thus,
theology would have the role of ultimate explanation in an extended hierarchy of explanations that
includes, and does not in any way compete with, scientific accounts.”341 This  type  of  hierarchical
understanding of the relationship of different disciplines in very common in the theology
and science community: each discipline is understood to have its own territory, to which its
methods are best suited. While there can be overlap and dialogue between the disciplines,
investigating questions of natural science with the methods of the humanities or theology is
not likely to be fruitful.342
But to return to ID's central critique of methodological naturalism: suppose that a true
fact about the world is that God created life through a miracle and that the origin of life
would have been impossible otherwise. Suppose further that we can construct a good
argument showing that design is the most credible explanation for the origin of life. Would it
then be problematic to exclude design from science and instead say that some objectively
very unlikely naturalistic hypothesis is the best scientific explanation for the origin of life?
Can science have different criteria for selecting an explanation than the general criteria for
what is a good explanation? Would it even be desirable to exclude some potentially true
explanation from science? ID theorists argue that science should be a search for truth that
does not exclude any possibility a priori, even evidence for intelligent design in the history of
life. It could well be that the created reality does not respect the boundaries of scientific
disciplines as they are understood in the hierarchical model.343
340 deVries 1986.
341 Haught 2008, 35.
342 Russell 2008, introduction.
343 Monton (2013, 46) puts this point eloquently: “If science really is committed to methodological naturalism, then it
automatically follows that the aim of science is not generating true theories. Instead, the aim of science would be something
like: generating the best theories that can be formulated subject to the restriction that those theories are naturalistic. More
and more evidence could come in suggesting that a supernatural being exists, but scientific theories wouldn’t be allowed to
acknowledge that possibility. Imagine what might happen if the evidence becomes overwhelming – scientists might privately
come to believe in the supernatural being, but scientific theories wouldn’t be allowed to acknowledge that possibility. Long
after overwhelming evidence has convinced everyone that the supernatural being exists, scientists would still be searching for
naturalistic causes.
In this scenario, science would rightfully find itself a marginalized intellectual discipline. What would be the point of
spending all the resources scientists have investigating natural causes, when it is evident that the causes are supernatural?
I’m not saying that society would want to completely stop investigating the possibility of naturalistic causes, but by failing
to countenance the possibility of supernatural hypotheses, scientists would be missing out on a revolution in our
understanding of the world.
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There is a way to respond to this critique and defend a non-dogmatic strong
methodological naturalism. Defenders of the hierarchical model argue that the natural
sciences do indeed exclude some good explanations, because these explanations are by
definition part of another discipline, such as psychology or theology. So, if the best
explanation for the origin of life was intelligent design, then the origin of life would on the
hierarchical model no longer be a part of the natural sciences. Rather, it would be part of
some new kind of design-based science, or even a part of theology, if we think the designer
can reliably be identified as God. Strong methodological naturalism does not need to be held
dogmatically, and it does not need to be a problem for strong methodological naturalists if
some phenomenon is explained better by theological or design-based explanation. Rather,
methodologically naturalistic science can be admitted to have limits.344
As long as one believes that natural science is not even meant to describe all of reality,
it is possible to argue that some questiosn are not part of the realm that methodologically
naturalistic science studies. But how does one in practice determine which questions are
properly studied by the methodologically naturalistic natural sciences, and which questions
are best explained theologically or psychologically? As I will argue in more detail in chapter
7, there is much disagreement here. For example, some believe that explaining the fine-
tuning of the laws of nature is part of the domain of the natural sciences, while others think
that theological explanations are called for at this point. The explanation of consciousness is a
similar issue: some claim that consciousness will ultimate be reducible to physical
explanations (and so is part of the realm of methodologically naturalistic science), while
others hold that this will never happen. Similar questions also arise in the study of history:
for example, should we explain the experiences of Jesus' disciples after the crucifixion by the
methods of methodologically naturalistic history, or are theological explanations possible?
It is very difficult to determine the limits of the methodologically naturalistic science a
priori. Rather, it seems to me that the limits have be determined based on the scientific,
philosophical and theological arguments that can be made in each case. Does a particular
problem (like the origin of consciousness, the origin of fine-tuning or the origin of life) seem
like the kind of problem that the methodologically naturalistic sciences have a history of
successfully solving? Do we have good reason to think that this particular problem  can be
solved by methodologically naturalistic science, or good reason to think that it will not? The
discussion comes down to how good the arguments for various views are, and in the end
cannot be settled simply by reference to the traditional boundaries of disciplines (as valuable
as these are). If we think that biological problems are properly a realm where strong
methodological naturalism applies, we have to present arguments for why we think this is
so.  These  arguments  will  have  to  show  why  it  is  likely  that  we  will  find  naturalistic
Thus, if evidence comes in against naturalism, investigation of the world that assumes naturalism has the potential to
become otiose. Given the commitment to methodological naturalism, the success of science hinges of the contingent fact that
naturalism is true.” (Similarly Monton 2009a)
344 This comes close to the solution proposed by Halvorson (2014) based on a different argument.
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explanations for all biological problems, and why things like ID's critiques fail to overturn
these naturalistic explanations.
It seems to me that there is much merit to the hierarchical model of the relationship of
the different sciences and theology. As I will argue in more detail in chapter 7.1, there are
clearly question that are outside the bounds of the natural sciences, such the question of
“why something exists rather than nothing.”345 However, perhaps science could in principle
have bearing on some more limited question related to the supernatural, such as whether
there are natural explanations available for some claimed miraculous healing. The ID
theorists' claim that life has the kinds of marks of design by which we recognize design
elsewhere also appears like a question that the natural sciences have a bearing on, even
design arguments themselves are traditionally outside the natural sciences, and are typically
considered to be the territory of philosophy and theology. The natural sciences are also
clearly needed to investigate the credibility of biological design arguments based  on the
origin of life, because such arguments often have as one premise the improbability of the
origin of life based on purely natural mechanisms. Such claims can only be justified based on
scientific arguments. So, one can quite plausibly argue that science has at least some
importance for design arguments even under strong methodological naturalism.
In contrast with strong methodological naturalism, weak (or soft) methodological
naturalism argues merely that natural science contains a preference for naturalistic
explanations, because such explanations are what the scientific method is most suited to
examining, and because focusing on natural causes has been a fruitful approach historically.
However, weak methodological naturalism also allows in principle for the failure of all
naturalistic explanations and even appeals to supernatural factors if this is where the
evidence leads. If there is a reason for saying that ID is not part of current science then this is
based on ID’s lack of success as a research programme, rather than the philosophical
definition of science. Some critics have recently been moving away from the strong
methodological naturalism advocated by Ruse and earlier critics of creationism.346 Thus
Phillip Kitcher argues that Intelligent Design does qualify as science, and that even
methodologically naturalistic science can be open to evidence of design. However, he goes
on to argue that Intelligent Design is bad 18th century science superceded and refuted by the
developments of science after that.347 Niall Shanks similarly argues that “the methodological
naturalist will not simply rule hypotheses about supernatural causes out of court”.348
Methodological naturalists of this type can maintain a critical openness to design
arguments within science, while nevertheless favouring natural explanations.349 This type of
345 Turner 2004, chapters 11 and 12; Hart 2013.
346 Robert Pennock (2011) is one of those who continue to defend strong methodological naturalism in the current
discussion. For critique of Pennock, see Monton 2013.
347 Kitcher 2007.
348 Shanks 2004, 141-142. Similarly, Sarkar (2011) also favours criticizing Intelligent Design based on its lack of
scientific content, rather than demarcation criteria.
349 Kitcher  (2007)  similarly  argues  that  design  was  once  a  part  of  science,  but  was  abandoned  because  of  the
success of naturalistic science. For commentary, see Koperski 2008.
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methodological naturalism avoids the central point of the ID theorists’ critique, because it
does not rule out the question of design based purely on demarcation criteria between
science and non-science on theological or philosophical grounds, before considering the
evidence and the quality of the arguments.350 Any problems in strong methodological
naturalism do not imply that weak methodological naturalism could not still be a plausible
position. In light of the difficulty of the demarcation problem, this position is quite attractive.
As philosopher Yujin Nagasawa has also noted: “it is much more difficult to show that intelligent
design is not science as to show that it has not been established as a good viable scientific theory.”351
As Nagasawa notes, it is difficult to find a non-circular criterion which could be used to
definitely rule out design-based explanation from biology. For example, suppose that only
observable entities can be referenced in scientific theories. Because the intelligent designer of
the cosmos and life has not been observed, he or she could not then be a part of science. But
this is problematic, because the natural sciences typically allow for indirect observation and
theories, which allows scientific status for the big bang theory, belief in electrons and so on.
Or consider falsifiability as a criterion of science. One problem is that the core of theories can
seldom be falsified directly: theories can often be amended to explain anomalies, and tests
require the addition of auxiliary hypotheses to the theory. Ratzsch argues that even a
hypothesis of supernatural design can have such testable parts, though the designer’s
existence cannot be falsified directly.352
Following the arguments of Laudan and others, the ID theorists question strict
demarcation criteria. However, they claim that if we compare the types of arguments used in
ID to scientific arguments, we find sufficient similarities to ground ID's claim to science. It is
argued that references to intelligent design are already made in many sciences, such as the
engineering sciences, the forensic sciences, psychology, archeology and history. It is then
argued that we can identify design in biology on very similar grounds to those we use in
these other sciences. It should be possible to investigate design as a possible cause within
natural history, just as it can be recognized as a real cause within human history. In making
this argument, the ID theorists typically also argue intelligent design can be testable,
falsifiable, predictive and so on.353
In contrast to the ID movement, some adopt weak methodological naturalism for the
purpose of arguing against theological claims with the authority of science. If theological
350 This also seems like the only way of avoiding the charge that methodological naturalism is question-begging
(see Larmer 2003).
351 Nagasawa 2011, 97-101. Similarly, Petri Ylikoski (2001, 51) argues that “it is unclear why we should raise the issue
of demarcation at all. An appeal to virtus dormitiva is a bad explanation outside science as well. We should be analyzing
what makes explanations good in general. There are good explanations that are not scientific, and there are bad scientific
explanations. It would be inconceivable, at least to me, if scientific and everyday explanations did not share some basic ideas
about good and bad explanations. After all, science has its origin in common sense cognition. There should be some kind of
continuity. Of course, it now includes much that is apparently incompatible with common sense, but I seriously doubt that
this incompatibility also extends to the general principles of explanatoriness.”
352 Ratzsch 2001, chapters 7-11. See also Koperski 2008.
353 E.g. Johnson 1993, chapter 9; Meyer 1999a.
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claims were a part of science, then scientists could claim expertise in evaluating them. Thus
ID critics Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke and Johan Braeckman argue that there are many
ideas about the supernatural that scientific results could in principle corroborate or
contradict: "not only in the life sciences, but also in other domains of inquiry, paranormal researchers
and skeptics have investigated extraordinary claims which, if corroborated, would substantiate the
existence of immaterial and supernatural entities" such as ghosts and extra-sensory perception.354
Even evolutionary biology itself has been historically formed in competition against the
design argument, and so impinges on the truthfulness of at least some ideas about design,
such as literalistic and progressive creationism. According to Boudry, Blancke and
Braeckman, skeptics who restrict science from evaluating supernatural explanations give up
their most powerful weapon in the fight against superstition and nonsense. It is important to
be able to say that we can scientifically test and falsify at some such claims. However, this
also means admitting that science could in principle also corroborate them.355
Sometimes it is difficult to classify positions as either weak or strong methodological
naturalism.356 This is because even a thinker who in principle allows for design arguments
within science can simultaneously believe in criteria of rationality that make any design
arguments impossible in practice. For example, Dawkins begins his book the Blind
Watchmaker by affirming that intelligent design is an intuitively very plausible explanation
for biological complexity.357 In  his  later  book The God Delusion,  Dawkins  even  calls  God  a
“scientific hypothesis”, one that the progress of science has made unnecessary by providing
better explanations.358 It initially seems that Dawkins is a weak methodological naturalist.
His purpose in adopting this argumentative strategy is similar to that of Boudry, Blancke
and Braeckman: if God is a scientific hypothesis, then he can argue that God has been driven
out by better scientific theories.
However, on closer examination, it is clear that for Dawkins, the rules of rationality
themselves mitigate against the design argument and belief in God. At the end of the Blind
Watchmaker Dawkins  considers  the  question  of  how the  origin  of  life  should  be  explained,
and argues on philosophical grounds that even random chance is a better explanation for the
origin of life than supernatural design. This is because, for Dawkins, the purpose of
explanation is to understand the complex by referring to something less complex. The God
hypothesis, according to Dawkins, postulates a very complex Creator to explain the
354 Boudry, Blancke & Braeckman 2012, 1159.
355 Boudry, Blancke & Braeckman 2012, 1159; Nagel 2008, 201; Nelson 1996.
356 Note that the terms strong and weak methodological naturalism are sometimes used in a different way. For
example, Alvin Plantinga (2011, 175) defines weak methodological naturalism to mean natural science which does
not assume either God’s existence or his nonexistence, while strong methodological naturalism assumes the
nonexistence of God as the basis of its method. However, both methodological naturalisms described by
Plantinga are strong methodological naturalism in my sense, because according to Plantinga’s definition they
cannot even consider evidence for the existence of God or a supernatural designer.
357 Dawkins 1999, chapter 1.
358 Dawkins 2006, chapter 1.
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complexity of the biological world and the order of the universe. Thus the God hypothesis
doesn’t really explain complexity, but only introduces more complexity.359
In his books, Dawkins emphasizes the existence of extremely convincing scientific
evidence for evolution. However, it is clear that he also has strong metaphysical and
philosophical reasons for his position. For Dawkins, naturalistic evolution is in fact the only
theory that is even in principle capable of explaining the complexity of the biological world.
This is because only it can reduce the complex to ultimately simpler beginnings. Thus even if
there were no evidence for evolution, Dawkins argues, it would still be a better explanation
for the origin of species than design. In the case of the origin of life, Dawkins regards blind
chance is a better explanation than design, though he earlier rejected blind chance as an
explanation in the case of biological evolution.360 Many critics have thus remarked that given
Dawkins’ philosophy of what scientific, rational explanations are, something like Darwinian
evolution would have to be the most rational explanation even on purely a priori grounds.361
It seems to me that the discussion on methodological naturalism has shown the
difficulty of formulating a strict principle to exclude theistic and design-based explanations
from science. However, this difficulty does not show that we cannot say anything about
what makes the quality of a scientific theory good or bad. Speaking of the virtues scientific
explanations or the values of science instead of absolute criteria seems a more promising
approach. Testability (including predictive power), coherence with existing scientific theory,
fruitfulness in opening up further avenues of research, simplicity and other criteria allow us
to judge the scientific quality of competing theories and research programmes.362 Using
scientific virtues as criteria of judging the best explanation, one could (for example) argue
that naturalistic theories of natural history are scientifically more virtuous than the
competing research programme of Intelligent Design, which explains properties of nature by
reference to an unknown intelligent designer.363 It is further possible to argue that though
there are problems with naturalistic understandings of the world, ID represents a larger
359 Dawkins 1991, chapter 6. This argument is a condensed version of what would later become Dawkins’ “main
argument” in the God Delusion: the improbability of God argument (Dawkins 2006, chapter 4). Dawkins argues
that  all  complex  things  are  improbable,  and  that  God  would  be  very  complex  and  thus  his  existence  is  very
improbable
360 Dawkins 1991, chapter 6.
361 E.g. Orr 2007; Plantinga 2007. Dawkins’ criticism of the design argument here is dubious for a number of other
reasons, as well. First, (1) the design argument arguably does not attempt to explain “complexity”or adaptation in
general, but rather a specific instance of complexity. Second, (2) we seem to regard reference to human design as
explanatory, even though humans are arguably much more complex than the artifacts they create. Third, (3)
Dawkins’ argument that God is complex is strange and ignores centuries of discussion on what God is like. (Feser
2008, Lennox 2007).
362 The criteria for the best scientific explanation are controversial, and are of course linked to the question of what
is the best explanation in general. I will have a little bit more to say about the latter question in chapter 7.4. See
also Niiniluoto (2002, chapter 6.1) who differentiates between institutional and pragmatic criteria for measuring
the success of science.
363 Here I am adopting Imre Lakatos’ (1977) terminology of scientific research programs.
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revision of science than these anomalies require.364 Thus, even if design were admitted as a
possible part of science, one could continue to argue against it.
“In Principle” and “In Practice” -Reasons for Critiquing ID
Related to the discussion on methodological naturalism, Gregory Dawes has made a useful
distinction between “in principle” and “in practice” reasons for rejecting theistic
explanations. In principle-reasons would be reasons for excluding theistic explanations from
ever being good explanations (within science or otherwise) and in practice-reasons are based
on the actual successfulness of theistic explanations.365 Strong methodological naturalism
requires that theistic explanations will in principle always lack some essential characteristic
that is required of scientific explanations. Weak methodological naturalists can admit that
theistic explanations can in principle possess explanatory power even within issues normally
studied by natural science, but argue that these cases are exceptional or nonexistent.
However, normally science is based on naturalistic explanations and these are science’s
preferred mode of explanation.
Words have socially agreed upon meanings. If the socially agreed on meaning of the
words “natural science” excludes design-based ideas, then that means that ID is not natural
science as a semantic matter. However, definitions cannot settle the questions that form the
more substantive content of the debate.366 If we were to accept scientism – the belief that
science is only way or at least the overwhelmingly best way of gaining knowledge about
anything – then the definition of science would indeed be the central philosophical question
of the discussion on Intelligent Design. However, as I argued in chapter 2.3, we can
recognize the immense success of the natural sciences without believing that science is the
only reliable way to gain knowledge, or even that scientific theories are in every case better
or more reliable than common experience, theology or philosophy.367 On my understanding,
the quality of the arguments for different points of view is the crucial thing to be analysed,
rather than the status of these arguments as science or non-science.368 If theistic explanation
and design can never be acceptable explanations, then natural explanations are the only
acceptable game in town not only within science but also outside of science. However, if
theistic explanations are good, then it can be rational to believe in them, whether they are
scientific or not.
364 Koperski 2008.
365 Dawes (2009, chapter 1).
366 Keener (2011, 189) argues the same for the discussion on miracles.
367 See further Ratzsch 2009b & Stenmark 2001.
368 In practice many arguments used to claim that ID is unscientific can be formulated as arguments that ID lacks
some explanatory virtue, however. For example, the idea that ID is not science because design is not a good
scientific explanation may imply that design is not a good explanation in any other sense, either.
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In my analysis of strong and weak methodological naturalism, I have argued that
defending methodological naturalism against ID´s critique cannot be done in a way that
allows us to bypass considering ID´s arguments entirely. Under both strong and weak
methodological naturalism, we need to be able to argue that phenomena like the origin and
evolutionof life are likely to be best explained on the level of the natural sciences without
invoking designers.
This type of rejection of a priori arguments against ID is also implicit in all accounts in
which the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory is seen as the central reason why biological
design arguments can now be rejected. Thus cosmologist Sean Carroll writes that “A few
centuries ago, for example, it would have been completely reasonable to observe the complexity and
subtlety exhibited in the workings of biological creatures, and conclude that such intricacy could not
possibly have arisen by chance, but must instead be attributed to the plan of the Creator. The advent of
Darwin’s theory of evolution, featuring descent with modification and natural selection, provided a
mechanism by which such apparently improbable configurations could have arisen via innumerable
gradual changes.”369 This implies that without Darwinian evolutionary biology, design would
still be the best explanation for biological order. This assumes that design possesses at least
some rationality as an explanation and cannot be dismissed on a priori grounds, just by
invoking methodological naturalism or the agreed upon boundaries of scientific disciplines.
At the very least, we need to argue that the generally agreed upon boundaries of scientific
disciplines reflect the historical success of certain methods in answering certain types of
questions.
Unlike some, I accept the ID theorists' claim that in the structure of their argument, a
separate step is needed to identify the intelligent designer as God. Therefore, I agree that
ID´s initial design inference is comparable to the detection of finite designers. So, ID's design
inferences can also be relevantly compared to the design inferences in forensics and history.
Forensics and history are not natural sciences, but they are still types of science,and so I think
there is merit to the argument that part of ID could in principle also be scientific, in the same
way as other disciplines where design is detected are scientific. On this understanding, ID is
a kind of integration of methods from the humanities and the natural sciences.370 However,
as I will argue in the following chapters, the ID theorists often move between this
minimalistic and a more robust theistic concept of the designer. Furthermore, their argument
would be stronger if it was formulated openly theologically, using all the resources of the
tradition of natural theology. In this case the ID theorists could also better engage the
different philosophical ideas that inevitably affect evaluations of their argument.
Seeing ID as either science or not science is likely framing the options too restrictively.
One could also believe that part of ID’s argument is scientific, while part is better
369 Carroll 2003, 631.
370 Again, I want to note the possibility of a different position. If one doesn't accept the conceptual separation of
the designer and God, then one can argue that ID's argument will always be theological, rather than scientific,
even if there are significant analogies between the detection of divine and human design. As noted, this is the
position taken by Russell (2005) and Sober (2007).
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characterized as philosophical. For example, Collins argues that the difficulty of developing
the basic idea of an intelligent designer into a detailed scientific theory makes it disanalogous
with the best scientific theories. Thus it is better thought of as a philosophical idea than a
scientific theory. However, Collins goes on to argue that the idea of a designer could still
function as a background assumption of a metascientific research programme of intelligent
design. This research programme could then include many parts (for example, the question
of the exact limits of Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms) which can be investigated
scientifically, and others which are better characterized as philosophical arguments (such as
the design argument).371
I have lingered on the question of methodological naturalism, since the discussion is
often quite muddled. On the popular level, strong methodological naturalism is still a
common argument used against ID, and the ID theorists themselves do not typically make
the distinction between strong and weak methodological naturalism. Rather, all
methodological naturalism is understood to be strong methodological naturalism, and
simply  an  a  priori  principle  used  to  reject  ID.  Furthermore,  the  hierarchical  model  of  the
relationship of the different sciences is also too seldom applied to the discussion. The
philosophical conclusions of this chapter, if accepted, have the potential to move the
discussion around ID towards the merits of ID’s arguments and away from the question of
the definition of science. The quality of the arguments is more important than the labels we
give them.
3.5. Theistic Science?
Intelligent Design as Theistic Science
In chapter 3.4, I analysed methodological naturalism and some of the critique against strong
methodological naturalism. I have argued that the question of the definition of science is a
side-issue for the evaluation of the argument. To understand the structure of the argument,
however, ID´s ideas about science do need to be understood. Whereas methodological
naturalism (as typically understood) seeks to build science on a non-religious foundation, the
ID movement has often been understood by both its critics and defenders to be a project of
theistic science, meaning a programme of natural science openly influenced by theistic
beliefs. But the ID movement’s relationship to the idea of theistic science is ambiguous, and
the views of the majority can fit in the framework on weak methodological naturalism.
In the contemporary discussion, Alvin Plantinga has been the foremost defender of the
idea of theistic science. Plantinga´s argument has two main parts. First (1), Plantinga argues
that science cannot always be religiously neutral. Though scientists can co-operate on many
scientific questions regardless of their worldview or religion, some parts of science (such as
371 Collins 2006.
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belief in Darwinian evolution) are inevitably worldview-colored. Plantinga also argues for
the non-neutrality of science on theological grounds: if the world is understood as the
battleground between the “City of God” and the “City of the world” then it would be
strange if natural science alone was outside the influence of this struggle. Second (2),
Plantinga argues that Christian believers should consult all they know when forming, testing
and evaluating scientific hypotheses. So, theological and philosophical knowledge should
influence the practice of science. According to defenders of this theistic science, this would
make getting at genuine truth about the world easier, because Christian beliefs are true. It
would also, in Plantinga's estimate, be important for protecting the believing community
from unwittingly embracing scientific theories that are based on naturalistic presuppositions
that are not credible to Christians.372
In the ID literature, Johnson’s “theistic realism” is an application of the theistic science -
approach to the debate on evolution, creation and design arguments. Johnson argues
explicitly that it is legitimate for Christian theists to take the existence of the Creator into
account when trying to understand natural history and when interpreting the results of
empirical science.373 On this understanding, since theists know that God could have used any
mechanism in creating life, they can be open to seeing the signs of design in nature, and to
discover gaps in the abilities of nature. These gaps can then be interpreted as evidence of
divine intervention beyond the laws of nature.374 Thus on this understanding of Intelligent
Design,  the  background  assumption  of  theism  makes  it  possible  to  consider  design  as  a
probable possibility for explaining the apparently rational structures of nature.
Other ID theorists have also sometimes been understood to be engaging in a project of
theistic science.375 William Dembski has argued that “Intelligent Design is just the Logos
theology of John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory.”376 From these and other
statements by Dembski, it can be inferred that his information-theoretical arguments have
been influenced by his interpretation of the biblical scriptures.377 Indeed, most of the ID
theorists are Christian theists, and it is not unreasonable to assume that this must have
influenced their thought about design. Understood like this, the ID movement’s design
argument might be seen as a reaffirmation of a pre-existing theistic belief through scientific
discoveries or as “faith seeking understanding” to use Anselm’s famous phrase.378
372 I am following Ratzsch’s (2004) understanding of Plantinga (1991; 2001).
373 Johnson 1995. Moreland (1994) also argues for theistic science in an early collection of ID-friendly articles,
showing the influence of theistic science on the formation of ID. For Johnson (2000, 176),  theism is actually the
foundation of all reasoning, not just science: “If reason is to be a reliable guide, it must be grounded on a foundation that
is more fundamental than logic and that provides a basis for reasoning to true conclusions about ends. Instrumental reason is
not enough. That is why the fear of the Lord is not the beginning of superstition but the beginning of wisdom.” I will return
briefly to Johnson’s broad understanding of the necessity of theism in chapter 8.
374 Reynolds 1998.
375 As seen in the introduction, critics of ID typically portray Intelligent Design as a religious project.
376 Dembski 1999c.
377 Similarly Forrest & Gross 2003, 140-141.
378 On Anselm, see Williams 2013.
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However, the reality is more complex than this, because in principle Johnson’s theistic
realism emphasises openness to different explanations. According to Johnson, theism
supposes that God created nature in an orderly way, which makes it possible for us to study
nature. However, theism is compatible with many different accounts of natural history. God
could have used an evolutionary mechanism or he could have chosen to create living beings
through miraculous instantaneous acts of creation. He could have hidden his actions, so that
the order of nature would not give evidence of his actions, or he could have given us at least
some evidence of his existence.379
Johnson argues that his theistic realism is actually a more open investigation of nature
than methodologically naturalistic science. Theists believe that God could have used natural
mechanisms and laws to do the creating, as in evolutionary theory, or God could have
worked through miraculous events inside history, as in creationism. Instead of metaphysical
speculation, theists must consult the empirical evidence to see what the most plausible
account of natural history is, and what mechanisms God used in creating life.380 Johnson’s
emphasis on the independence of God from the world and his ability to create any sort of
world at all is reminiscent of the medieval debates on the logic of “possible worlds”.381 Pierre
Duhem dates the beginning of the scientific revolution at March 7, 1277, when a set of theses
of  Aristotelian  physics  was  condemned  as  wrongfully  imposing  limits  on  God’s
omnipotence. Duhem argued that this lead to the rise of empirical science, because now
Christians could not discover how God had created the world based just on philosophical
first principles, but had to rely on empirical observations and experiments.382 This type of
theistic background assumption can also be identified in many of the founders of modern
science, such as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, and is commonly referred in the theology
and science -discussion.383
It seems that Johnson’s theistic realism is quite minimalistic and insufficient to provide
the conclusions of the ID movement’s design argument. For an ID theorist working under his
“theistic realist” paradigm, it is still necessary to examine the evidence and to make a design
argument to show that a certain pattern in nature does give evidence of intelligent design by
this Creator. Johnson too affirms this. He writes that “the intelligent design position is not that
miracles should be arbitrarily invoked in place of logical inferences from evidence, but rather that
evidence pointing to intelligent causes, where present, should not be disregarded due to bias.”384 In
practice, Johnson’s theistic realism therefore comes quite close to weak methodological
naturalism. The major difference is that Johnson’s theistic realism includes a higher
background  probability  for  the  occurrence  of  miracles  and  finding  evidence  of  design  in
nature.
379 Johnson 1995.
380 Johnson 1995, appendix.
381 Knuuttila 1993.
382 Koons 2003, 80.
383 Clark 2014, chapter 3.
384 Johnson 2000, 130.
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Is there nevertheless a tension between theistic realism and the ID theorists’ insistence
that the design argument works independently of any religious presuppositions? Though
they admit the effects of their Christian theology on the design argument, Dembski, Behe
and Meyer all regard the virtues of design as an explanation to be quite obvious and
commonsensical. Theism is not seen to a necessary background supposition for the design
argument. In Behe’s interpretation of Johnson, cultural, religious and philosophical reasons
are required to convince people that the intelligent designer is the God of Christianity.
However, Behe writes that the conviction that there is a designer is based on “inductive
evidential inference”. Scientific “observation and experiment” indicate that “law-like regularities
explain much of nature”, and “intelligence accounts for other aspects”. Behe notes that the
designedness of nature has also been affirmed by atheists and agnostics such as the
astronomer Fred Hoyle. This means that the argument cannot depend on controversial
religious premises, even though it may be more easily acceptable to religious thinkers and
have religious implications.385
Dembski and Meyer have explicitly shown some support for a complementarist
understanding of the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences. They believe that
theology and science provide independent, but convergent perspectives of reality which both
converge on the idea of intelligent design. On this model, science and theology are
understood to be quite independent of each other, though they can find common ground.
For Dembski and Meyer, design provides supportive evidence for Christian theism, rather
than Christian theism providing a necessary basis for ID.386 The  design  argument  does  not
have religious presuppositions, but it may have religious implications. This is where similar
to Barbour's dialogue model, or Robert John Russell's model of creative mutual interaction,
which I discussed in chapter 2.3. Dembski himself also notes the central difference: “Where I
part company with complementarianism is in arguing that when science points to a transcendent
reality, it can do so as science and not merely as religion. In particular, I argue that design in nature is
empirically detectable and that the claim that natural systems exhibit design can have empirical
content.”387
385 Behe 1999a . See also the discussion on Behe’s thought experiments in chapter 8.2 and Behe 2006b for Behe's
own account of how Johnson influenced Behe.
386 Dembski 1999, Meyer 1999a. The idea of convergence may be illustrated with a quote from the astronomer
Robert Jastrow (2000, 106-107): “For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad
dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final
rock,  he  is  greeted  by  a  band  of  theologians  who  have  been  sitting  there  for  centuries.” The difference between theistic
science and the type of neutral science seen in the convergence model seems to be parallel to the difference
between theologies of nature and natural theologies analysed in chapters 2.4 and 2.5. The question is: Do design
arguments start from a non-neutral religious starting point or from some supposedly neutral scientific starting
point?
387 Dembski 2000b.
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Intelligent Design as Naturalistic Science
In practice, most ID theorists’ views of science can be characterized as “weak methodological
naturalism”, whatever the influence of their background suppositions. They think that the
natural sciences should include a preference for finding natural explanations, but should also
be open to evidence of intelligent design. For example, Behe argues that even if supernatural
designers were allowed in science, “the fear of the supernatural popping up everywhere in science
is vastly overblown. If my graduate student came into my office and said that the angel of death killed
her bacterial culture, I would be disinclined to believe her.”388 According to Behe, science’s belief in
a rational, understandable, law-bound universe is not threatened by belief in a Creator, but is
something that religion and science can agree on.389 Behe’s weak methodological naturalism
leads him to always look for naturalistic explanations, but also allows him to say that
naturalistic explanations for something do not seem to be forthcoming.390 Behe attempts to
define science in a way acceptable to the broader scientific community as follows: “I count as
“scientific” any conclusion that relies heavily and exclusively on detailed physical evidence, plus
standard logic. No relying on holy books or prophetic dreams. Just the data about nature that is
publicly available in journals and books, plus standard modes of reasoning.”391 As I  will  show in
chapters five and six, the ID theorists argue that the problems of explaining the fine-tuning
of the cosmos, the origin of life, and the origin of biological machinery point to the necessity
of design as an explanation, using such “standard modes of reasoning.”
While critiquing what I have termed strong methodological naturalism, the ID
theorists typically also insist that their designer does not have to be supernatural. While
Johnson’s early argumentation in Darwin on Trial critiqued the way methodological
naturalism bars supernatural design from science392, later ID writings have emphasized that
design can be detected without knowing anything about the designer and without reliance
on any prior religious beliefs.393 The idea that ID does not require supernaturalism is
common in the ID literature. Dembski, Behe and Meyer all emphasizes that ID does not
violate the rule against supernatural agents, because ID’s designer is not identified as
supernatural and indeed the question of the designer’s identity cannot be settled by the
scientific evidence. As seen in chapter 3.1, the ID theorists generally  argue that the
identification of the designer requires philosophical and theological arguments which are
beyond science.394
Because of this emphasis, it seems to be open to the ID theorists to even accept strong
methodological naturalism, but simply argue that their design argument does not violate its
388 Behe 2006a, 241.
389 Behe 2006a, 241.
390 Similarly Monton 2009a, 62.
391 Behe 2007a, 233.
392 Johnson 1993, chapter nine.
393 See Luskin 2008 for one overview.
394 Meyer 2009, 428-430; Dembski 2004a, chapter 25; Behe 2006a, 251.
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limits. Sometimes later ID texts indeed agree with strong methodological naturalists that the
supernatural should be barred from science. Thus William Dembski and Jonathan Wells
argue in the ID textbook The Design of Life (2008) that “supernatural explanations invoke miracles
and therefore are not properly part of science. Explanations that call on intelligent causes require no
miracles but cannot be reduced to materialistic explanations.”395 However, the ID writers
themselves do not defend any criteria for excluding the supernatural from science beyond
saying that the supernatural is not required by their argument. The statement of the textbook
is not typical of Dembski’s writings: elsewhere he writes that science should not exclude the
possibility of “non-embodied designers”. This certainly sounds suspiciously supernatural.396
Allowing supernatural designers within science would be consistent with the ID movement’s
critique of demarcation criteria between science and non-science. Dembski writes that “the
fact that the designing intelligence responsible for life can’t be put under the microscope poses no
obstacle to science. We learn of this intelligence as we learn of any other intelligence – not by studying
it directly but through its effects.”397 Dembski's defence here is that human intelligences also
can't be studied directly, but are only known through their effects. However, this defence
also makes it clear that ID’s designer can’t be put under the microscope or studied directly
any better than a designer identified as supernatural. In both cases the evidence presented is
indirect, and it is unclear how the ID movement could consistently claim that supernatural
designers cannot be part of science if the ID movement’s designer can be.
In any case, these defences of ID make it clear that the ID theorists do not generally
believe their argument to require a theistic view of science. Behe, Dembski and Meyer all
admit the effect of theistic beliefs on the credibility of the design argument, but go on to
argue that their design argument and their critique of Darwinism is credible even without
these presuppositions – as long as one does not accept a naturalistic metaphysical bias which
makes such arguments impossible.398 The analysis of this chapter shows that the ID theorists
generally see the design argument as supported by theistic premises, but not absolutely
requiring them.
Intelligent Design and the Neutrality of Science
What should we think about this sort of influence of religion on the practice of science? In
chapter 2.3, I introduced Mikael Stenmark’s analysis of the four different levels of the
interaction between religion and science. These are the sociological level, the teleological
395 Dembski & Wells 2008, 13-14.
396 Dembski 2004a, 191. Similarly Behe 1998b, 34-35.
397 Dembski 2004a, 191.
398 E.g. Berlinski 2006 and Berlinski & Klinghoffer 2009; see also Monton 2009a. Antony Flew’s change of views
from atheism to deism was also partly motivated by biological design arguments related to the origin of life. See
Flew & Varghese 2007. Oppenheimer (2007) has challenged the evidential value of Flew’s change of views,
arguing  that  an  old  Flew  was  misled  by  his  Christian  friends  into  changing  his  views  without  adequate
justification.
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level, the epistemic level and the theoretical level. Stenmark also differentiates scientific
practice into the problem-stating phase, the development phase, the justification phase and
the application phase. Stenmark argues that though there are some complications, it is in
general acceptable for the problem-stating, development and the application of scientific
results to be influenced by religions and ideologies. In chapter 2.3, I also noted some cases
where science has influenced religion and vice versa. However, Stenmark goes on to argue
that on the level of the justification of theories, science should seek to be worldview-neutral
in the sense of not presupposing the truth of any ideology or religion.399
According to Stenmark, scientific theories should be accepted or rejected as science
based on their scientific merits, rather than their fit with a particular ideology or religion. He
gives several arguments in favour of this view. First (1), the neutral basis of science and the
collaboration of scientists from different religious backgrounds is a historical ideal of science.
Though scientists were influenced by religious considerations, they typically did not
reference these while trying to justify a theory scientifically. Second (2), there are examples
where ideologically directed science has led to serious distortions, such as Lysenkoism. This
should lead us to be cautious about worldview-partisan science. Third (3), the acceptance of
worldview-partisan science would lead to the fragmentation of the scientific community. In
addition to theistic science, other forms of worldview-partisan science would include
feminist science, left-wing science, Islamic science and naturalistic science. Fourth (4), if
naturalistic science distorts the meaning of empirical results because of a philosophical bias,
then this bias can be revealed and critiqued by a thorough philosophical analysis, even
without theistic science. Actually, the acceptance of theistic science would mean that we
could no longer critique scientists who present other ideological assumptions (such as
atheism) as a part of their science.400
So, Stenmark argues that even if belief in a scientific theory or the motivation for doing
scientific research is religiously motivated, this does science no harm. The important thing is
that the arguments scientists use must not presuppose the truth of any religious creed and
are as widely acceptable as possible. There are a few points which make Stenmark’s defence
of the neutrality of science friendlier to the project of theistic science than might initially
seem, however. First, because Stenmark rejects scientism, he believes that rationality is not
confined merely to science. Thus even if the evaluation of scientific theories must be
worldview-neutral within science, it does not have to be worldview-neutral outside of
science. “It is compatible with the idea of a worldview-neutral science, that individual scientists can
399 Stenmark 2004, chapter 9.
400 Stenmark 2004, chapter 9. Ratzsch (2004) defends Plantinga’s theistic science against Stenmark’s critique,
arguing that science requires deep metaphysical assumptions, and in some cases worldview-neutrality may not
be possible. Many open questions relate to this, and the history of science shows the influence of religious ideas
on  the  metaphysics  of  science,  as  seen  in  chapters  2.3  and  3.4  of  this  study.  However,  Ratzsch’s   critique  of
Stenmark  is  based  on  a  briefer  presentation  of  Stenmark’s  argument  which  doesn’t  mention  the  possibility
(discussed in the main text) that outside of science, religious believers can use evaluate scientific theories on the
basis of their religious beliefs. Thus some of Ratzsch’s critique (such as his suspicion that Stenmark comes close to
scientism) misses the mark.
Design, Natural Theology and Science
105
be rationally entitled to accept theories – – that are not accepted by the scientific community – – and
do this for ideological or religious reasons.”401 Second, it seems that questions like “supposing the
existence of God, what is the relative credibility of a naturalistic origin of life versus the
origin of life as a supernatural miracle?” can be investigated in a worldview-neutral way,
though these are better classified as philosophical and theological questions rather than
scientific questions. So, Stenmark’s model seems to allow for the work of formulating and
evaluating science based on theological and philosophical ideas, though this would not be
classified as part of natural science.402 But this seems like just the sort of work the proponents
of theistic science wanted, only without the prestige of the name of science. 403
The ID movement has attempted to state its design argument in a worldview-neutral
way, not presupposing the existence of God. In this way, ID is in agreement with Stenmark
about the need for a theologically neutral view of science. However, as the following
chapters will demonstrate, ID's quest for neutrality is a difficult one, because the evaluation
of evidence for intelligent design in the history of life does not seem to be a worldview-
neutral matter. While I adhere to the traditional ideal that the natural sciences should strive
to be as worldview-neutral as possible, I also think that the debate on ID shows that different
worldviews and theological ideas indeed have an impact on the assessment of the credibility
of design arguments and Darwinian evolutionary theories. It is clear that ID's design
arguments, however they are labeled, are not dependent just on natural science, but also on
theology and philosophy. This will become more apparent in the following chapters, as I
turn to investigate the logic of ID's design argument. However, I will return to some
unfortunate consequences of ID's emphasis on the necessity of a scientific defence of design
in chapter 8.
401 Stenmark 2004, 246.
402 Hopefully, influences can also happen in the other direction: in Stenmark’s model, scientific evidence can lead
us to change our theological and philosophical ideas.
403 As I understand the matter, it is a fact of human psychology that we tend to evaluate new ideas in the light of
our pre-existing beliefs. (Zagzebski 2012, chapter 10) It follows from this that if a scientific theory comes into
conflict with a pre-existing belief, then this will quite naturally lower our confidence in the scientific theory. It
also  follows  from this  that  we  will  tend to  have  more  confidence  in  scientific  theories  which  fit  with  our  other
beliefs. But this should not cause us to despair: sometimes new ideas can also cause us to change our beliefs. Nor
should  we  think  of  the  influence  of  our  beliefs  on  the  acceptance  of  new  ideas  a  strange  or  bad  thing.  The
foundation of our old beliefs and our human traditions is what allows us to understand, receive and create new
beliefs and even change our traditions. As seen in chapter 2.3, the history of natural science testifies to the effect of
religions  and philosophies  on  scientific  research  and vice  versa.  ID is  by  no  means  the  only  hypothesis  whose
evaluation is affected by worldviews and religious beliefs.
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4. THE LOGIC OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT
Design arguments are at the centre of the Intelligent Design movement’s thought. There are
many different kinds of design arguments, which differ not just by of the evidence used, but
also by their logical argument structure. The division of design arguments into analogical,
inductive and abductive (inference to the best explanation) forms is typical. All of these
arguments are attempts to elaborate on the intuitive logic by which all humans are able to
form their commonsense beliefs in design, and apply this logic to the order of nature.404
While the ID theorists have defended many different kinds of formulations of the design
argument, I will argue that their argument is best understood as an inference to the best
explanation, supported by analogies and inductive evidence. I will begin by analysing
design-beliefs based on intuition and proceed to analyse different forms of the argument. In
the process, I will also analyse many critiques of design arguments and present possible
strategies for answering these critiques.
4.1. Design Detection as Perception
The Intuitiveness of Design in ID’s Understanding
For the ID movement, belief in the designedness of the order of nature is a commonsensical
belief which we tend to form when faced with the order of nature. Design is understood as a
mode of explanation that all humans intuitively use in their everyday life. However, it is
argued that design can also be refined into a rigorous scientific explanation, as in fields like
archeology.
The intuitive credibility of design as an explanation is a commonly stated background
assumption of the ID movement. Behe argues that “the overwhelming appearance of design
strongly affects the burden of proof: in the presence of manifest design, the onus of proof is on the one
who denies the plain evidence of his eyes.”405 Behe is saying that the appearance of design can be
very clearly perceived in nature, and this means that the burden of proof should be on those
who dissent from this commonsense conclusion. According to Dembski, his mathematical
design arguments give “theoretical  support  to  intuitions  that  most  people  have  for  a  long  time
harbored.”406 Dembski argues that humans tend to intuitively infer design when they perceive
a complex pattern conforming to some “specification” or rational pattern. For Dembski, this
sort of intuitive design inference also triggers when humans perceive the order of natural
404 Ratzsch 2010.
405 Behe 2006a, 265.
406 Dembski 2005a.
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objects such as animal organisms. Meyer also argues that his design argument on DNA leads
to the same conclusion as “commonsense reasoning” on the matter.407
Recognizing the perceived commonsensical nature of the design inference helps make
sense of a perplexing attribute of some early ID works, such as Johnson’s Darwin on Trial
(1993 [1991]). The book contains little explanation of why design is a good explanation and
instead focuses merely on critiquing Darwinism. But supposing that Johnson’s critique of
Darwinian evolutionary theory were to be accepted, how would this prove intelligent
design? Often, our ignorance of natural explanations can also lead us simply to search for
other explanations. So, it is initially puzzling that Johnson does not appear to see the need to
provide a positive argument for design, not just a negative argument against Darwinism.
However, if the background assumption of the commonsensical nature of belief in design is
taken into account, Johnson’s argument becomes more intelligible. Johnson is assuming
design as an obviously logical and intuitively apparent explanation of biological life. Design
is the default explanation for the ordered complexity of nature, as in Behe’s writings.
Refuting the credibility of all alternatives means that design will continue to reign as the best
explanation by default, without requiring any further positive argument in its favour.
In later writings, Johnson expresses the intuitiveness of belief in design in more detail.
This is particularly clear in Johnson’s comments on natural revelation: “That God created us is
part of God’s general revelation to humanity, built into the fabric of creation.”408 That Johnson is
thinking particularly of the evidence of design in nature is apparent from what follows the
quotation – references to naturalistic biologists who nevertheless feel that nature bears the
appearance of design. Johnson quotes Dawkins’ definition of biology: “biology is the study of
complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”409 This quotation
from Dawkins and others like it are prominent in the ID literature and are quoted by Behe,
Dembski and Meyer to show the strength of the evidence of design. The argument is that if
even a strong critic of religious belief like Dawkins can acknowledge the appearance of
design as a central feature of biology, then that appearance must be very strong indeed.410
The intuitiveness of design is then used as part of the argument for at least considerating the
possibility of design as an explanation, rather than just dismissing it a priori: “there is
something curious about the scientific denial of our ordinary intuition about living things.”411
The intuitiveness of design-based explanations also helps make it more plausible that
the conclusion of design is different from the identification of the designer as God. If the
conclusion that nature’s order is designed is initially reached through the same cognitive
apparatus that is also responsible for detecting human design, then the initial basis of the
conclusion is not based in any religious tradition. In that case our cognitive processes will
only supply us with the initial idea that there is design, but the identification of the designer
407 Meyer 2009, 17.
408 Johnson 2000, 152.
409 Dawkins 1991, 1.
410 Behe 2006a, 264-265; Dembski 1999, 125; Meyer 2009, 20-22.
411 Meyer 2009, 20; similarly Dembski 1999, 125.
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will depend on some other process.412 A conclusion that is initially arrived at in this manner
could later be integrated into a religious tradition and supported by further philosophical
and theological arguments.
The Intuitiveness of Design in the Cognitive Science of Religion
In recent decades, the idea that humans intuitively see nature as designed has received
support from research in the cognitive science of religion. Teleological explanations are
argued to be natural to us humans in the sense that ithey accords with our natural cognitive
tendencies, and so are easy for us to accept. Some even argue that children are “intuitive
theists”.413 Even adults appear to have the same intuitive tendency to explain things by
reference to purposes.414 As Ratzsch puts the point, “design thinking may be natural to our sorts
of intellects”.415 There is some controversy over interpreting these results. While most
participants of the discussion agree that this natural tendency can help explain the
persistence of belief in the designedness of nature, there is disagreement over whether this
undercuts our rationale for believing in design, or in other religious beliefs which fit well
with our cognitive architecture.416
Some skeptics of design arguments have claimed that our detection of purpose in
nature is an evolutionary accident. A mechanism which has evolved to serve in the
recognition of natural agents erroneously also activates when observing the order of
nature.417 Justin Barrett has argued that the postulated human cognitive mechanisms
responsible for detecting agency are hyperactive: we have a hyperactive agency detection
device (HADD). In the distant evolutionary past, it may have been useful to have a bias to
regard noises produced in the forest as the product of agents, since this would have allowed
our ancestors to avoid predators. 418 Stuart Guthrie argues that such evolutionary explanation
for the functioning of our design-detecting faculties should lead us to be skeptical about our
intuition that nature is designed.419
What should we think about these results? One possible conclusion is that we should
reject all of our intuitive judgments about design as unreliable, and only believe in design
when a rigorous argument in favour of design can be made independently of the intuition of
412 See Mullen 2004, 4.
413 Kelemen 2004; see also Johnson 2003.
414 Järnefelt 2013, McCauley 2012.
415 Ratzsch 2010.
416 See Visala 2011 and De Cruz & Smedt 2010 for two helpful reviews of the discussion.
417 Recker 2010, Bloom & Weisberg 2007, Guthrie 2006.
418 Barrett 2004. Barrett himself does not draw any anti-religious conclusions from his research.
419 Guthrie 2006. Different explanations for why we intuitively perceive design in the universe lead to different
conclusions regarding the reliability of this perception. The existence of the HADD could help atheists explain the
persistence of religious beliefs, but from a different standpoint theists can argue that the Creator has designed us
to be able to see the order of nature as evidence of his existence. (See Visala 2011; DeCruz & De Smedt 2010)
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design.420 However,  I  think  this  is  taking  the  results  too  far.  First  (1),  as  Aku  Visala  has
argued, it would be strange indeed to discard some explanation as unreliable merely because
it fits with our cognitive architecture. This would be saying that unintuitiveness is a merit of
theories: we believe them because they are absurd. 421 Second (2), our argued propensity
toward teleological explanations does not make all our intuitive teleological explanations
unreliable. Those of us who are not eliminativists believe that we can indeed reliably identify
human artefacts as designed and identify that other humans also have minds, so it appears
that our design detection is still reliable most of the time. Furthermore, sometimes our
intuition of design is far stronger than at other times. For example, in the case of the noise in
the forest it is far weaker than when reading a book, or when observing the structure of
organisms or the rationality of the laws of nature.422 If the same process causes us to perceive
design in both human artefacts and in nature, we need to be able to specify why we reject the
intuition in one case but not the other. Otherwise it seems more coherent to accept the prima
facie reliability of the intuition either in both cases or in neither.423
It is clear that human intuitions and beliefs are often mistaken. This conclusion is
supported both by scientific research and our common human experience.424 However, the
idea that we should adopt a prima facie trust in the beliefs formed by our cognitive faculties
does not imply that we should believe our cognitive faculties to be infallible. Defenders of
commonsense rationality allow that our commonsense beliefs can be altered and defeated by
the evidence. They simply argue, quite plausibly, that we must have at least some trust in
our intuitions and common sense for the process of rational inquiry to get even started.425 So,
420 Nagasawa 2009, 56-57.
421 Visala 2011.
422 See de Ridde 2014, 42-51 for further defense of the prima facie reliability of our design detection mechanisms.
423 This strategy is taken up by Mullen (2004). Mullen argues that we can analyse the “triggering conditions” that
typically cause us to form an intuitive belief in design, and then see whether these conditions are fulfilled in the
case of the order of nature. If these conditions are met, then “the burden of proof shifts from the one who hold a design
belief to the one who does not, provided that there is agreement about what the triggering conditions are and whether they are
met.” (2004, 8) To determine the triggering conditions, Mullen analyses several examples of design detection that
any model of design detection should explain, as well as potential defeaters for the reliability of the design
perception.  This  is  one  possible  way of  bringing  the  discussion  forward,  even  if  design  detection  is  seen  as  an
intrinsic human capability not amenable to description as an argument.
424 Trout 2002.
425 See e.g. Dougherty 2014, 57-61. Ratzsch (2009; 2001) similarly argues that while natural science shows human
intuitions to be often unreliable, it also simultaneously depends on the reliability of human intuition. According
to Ratzsch, the entire enterprise of Western natural science is predicated on the assumption that there is a
fundamental correspondence between the rationality of the human mind and the rationality of the universe.
Because of this correspondence, we can investigate and understand the world. If we ask enough “why” questions
about why some evidence confirms a theory, at some point we will simply have to answer “because this is how I
feel”  even  in  justifying  scientific  theories.  At  some point  in  every  argument,  one  just  has  to  trust  our  ability  to
recognize  rationality.  According  to  Ratzsch,  one  could  argue  that  trusting  in  our  perception  of  design  in  the
universe is warranted just like any other conceptual capability. Another argument against total skepticism
regarding our everyday experience and cognitive capabilities is the following: It is difficult to see how we could
argue against the reliability of our prima facie beliefs without assuming the reliability of at least some such
beliefs. For example, when reading a scientific study about the unreliability of commonsense reasoning, one
nevertheless has to trust in the commonsense conclusion that one is reading a scientific study about the matter.
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it seems plausible to claim that the triggering of our design detection faculties in the case of
nature does provide at least some reason to believe in design. However, as with other
commonsense beliefs, this initial reason could be overthrown by some further arguments.
This is just what many critics of design arguments in fact claim. For example, Dawkins sees
biology as the study of things that appear to be designed, but goes on to argue that
Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that this design does not have its origin in a designing
mind, but in the operation of natural selection.426 Discussion of the validity of these defeaters
can also make discussion on the reliability of our intuitions on design possible. Thus Alvin
Plantinga, for example, argues that Darwinian evolutionary theory actually doesn’t provide
a defeater for belief in design even if it is correct, while the ID movement argues that
Darwinian evolutionary theory does not explain the appearance of design in biology.427
Perception of Design or Argument?
I have argued that there is validity to the idea that design beliefs are initially based on an
intuition about design. Those who trust in this intuition see our design detection as just
another human cognitive faculty that we simply have to trust in prima facie, just as we have
to have some trust in our other perceptual capabilities. But could design beliefs also be based
on arguments? Already Thomas Reid (1710- 1796) argued that belief in design is based on a
non-inferential capacity to detect design that all humans have and that is required to detect
even the intelligence of other humans. According to Reid, design arguments can act to
reinforce the reliability of this initial perception, but such arguments are not necessary for
belief. 428 Some defenders of this idea of design detection go further and argue that all design
arguments in fact presuppose the reliability of the design intuition. The argument is that
design arguments do not really add anything to our certainty of design, but only succeed in
restating the intuition. William Whewell (1794-1866) stated this view eloquently:
When we collect design and purpose from the arrangements of the universe, we do not
arrive at our conclusion by a train of deductive reasoning, but by the conviction which
such combinations as we perceive, immediately and directly impress upon the mind.
‘Design must have a designer.’ But such a principle can be of no avail to one whom the
contemplation or the description of the world does not impress with the perception of
design.  It  is  not  therefore  at  the  end  but  at  the  beginning  of  our  syllogism,  not  among
remote conclusions, but among original principles, that we must place the truth, that such
arrangements,  manifestations,  and  proceedings  as  we  behold  about  us  imply  a  Being
endowed with consciousness, design, and will, from whom they proceed.429
426 Dawkins 1991, 1.
427 Plantinga 2011, chapters 1-2; see also Mullen 2004, 174-184. I will return to the ID movement´s arguments on
this in chapters 6 and 8.
428 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay V.
429 Whewell 1834, 344, quoted in Ratzsch 2010.
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In this quotation, belief in design is understood to emerge as the result of how the order of
nature influences the mind. The mind is not portrayed as a wholly passive recipient of this
natural revelation. Rather, the mind interprets nature through the principle that certain types
of order imply a designer. Design arguments can be formulated only if we already believe in
desing before the argument.
In the contemporary discussion on design arguments, Plantinga has also defended the
idea that design beliefs are based on the normal functioning of our cognitive faculties, rather
than arguments. Just as we immediate form the belief that other minds exist, so also certain
types  of  order  elicit  in  us  the  belief  in  design.  According  to  Plantinga,  belief  in  the
designedness of the cosmos arises not primarily through arguments, but through design
discourse. This means that the description of certain features of the cosmos causes in us a
powerful impression that there must be an intelligent cause, and this is sufficient justification
for believing in design. Plantinga is not opposed to design arguments as such, but argues
that beliefs based on this non-inferential design discourse may be more resistant to critiques
than beliefs based on arguments.430
The debate about whether our own subjective experience of design already provides us
with sufficient grounds for belief in design resembles the contemporary epistemological
debate about the necessity of natural theology. The idea that we should trust in all of the
beliefs formed by our belief-forming faculties until we have reason to doubt them is
defended by a broad variety of thinkers based on very different epistemological views. For
example, it is accepted in both the reformed epistemology defended by Plantinga431 and the
evidentialism of Richard Swinburne.432 The difference between the viewpoints here is
whether it is necessary to also provide arguments for religious belief in addition to these
subjective reasons. Evidentialists like Swinburne believe that in the presence of disagreement
about the reliability of religious belief, presenting publicly available evidence and detailed
arguments in favour of the existence of God is important.433
430 Plantinga 2011, chapter 2. See also de Ridder 2014 and Kroeker 2014 for discussion and expansions of
Plantinga´s position.
431 Plantinga (2000) argues that believing in the reliability of Christian beliefs is dependent on our pre-existing
belief in God or lack of it. According to Plantinga, “warrant”, the property which for Plantinga differentiates
between knowledge and belief, is based on the reliable functioning of our belief-forming abilities. But the
reliability of our belief-forming abilities regarding the Christian God depends on whether God exists or not. If
God exists, then he can guide Christians by his Holy Spirit to gain true beliefs about God; if God does not exist,
then Christian beliefs are based on unreliable cognitive mechanisms.
Similarly, William Alston (1991) argues that human knowledge is typically based on different doxastic practices
which cannot be justified without assuming their reliability. Thus the reliability of perception cannot be justified
without appeal to perception and the reliability of reason cannot be justified without relying on reason. If Alston’s
account is correct, the same could in principle also be true of design detection.
432 According to Swinburne (2004b) we should have a prima facie trust in our beliefs. If I find myself with the belief
that there is a tree in front of me, then I have good grounds for believing that there is a tree in front of me. See also
Stenmark 1995 for another epistemology defending the necessity of a prima facie trust in the beliefs we find
ourselves with.
433 Swinburne 2004b.
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The extent to which design arguments depend on prior intuitions about the world is a
question that can only be settled by a detailed examination of the logic of design arguments.
It seems to me that the argument does indeed depend on the ability of our mind to recognize
a conceptual link between certain types of order and the purposeful actions of an intelligent
agent as a good explanation for this type of order. However, this does not mean assuming
the conclusion of the argument. As I argued in chapter 3.2, design arguments do not need to
assume the reality of teleology before the argument, but merely the appearance of teleology.
Given that design beliefs indeed appear to rise intuitively quite often, does this mean
that there is no need for arguments? I think not. Previously in this chapter, I have argued
that even basing the conclusion of design on intuition doesn't need to end the discussion.
There will still be many ways in which the validity of the intuition can be analyzed. For
example, we can ask if the triggering conditions for the intuition are similar to those of cases
where we trust such intuitions about design.434 In our everyday lives we can differentiate
between the weak evidence of design presented by conspiracy theorists and the reliable
knowledge that a computer is designed. It seems that we are not at the mercy of our “agency
detection device”, but can evaluate how convincing it is at least in some way.
In the discourse on natural theology, it is often also argued that the many of the
arguments of natural theology develop certain human intuitions about the world into
arguments, and thus help expand and evaluate the basis of our intuitive beliefs.435 Perhaps
design beliefs could be a case where we can formulate the underlying logic of the intuition in
the form of an argument. The credibility of our commonsense beliefs can often be tested by
reflective  thinking.  It  can  be  asked:  how  does  my  subconscious  cognition  come  to  the
conclusion that nature is designed? Furthermore, how sound is the basis of the intuition?
Discussion on the credibility of the design intuition would similarly be helped if it could be
developed into a rigorous argument. If the design argument’s premises can be shared by
both the theist and the atheist, and the argument is good, then this will help the case for the
reliability of the design intuition. If the credibility of the argument depends to a great extent
on our prior religious and ideological commitments, then this will also be good to note.
Furthermore,  even  if  belief  in  design  gains  some  prima  facie  credibility  from  simple
design discourse, it does not follow that the strenght of our beliefs in design could not be
influenced by arguments. As Daniel von Wachter has noted in response to Plantinga, “If
Miller first sees hoof marks in the field and think 'it seems to me that cows have entered the field' and
then sees a cow in the field, then his belief h is supported by evidence as well as by a perceptual
experience. So, a belief can have any mixture of inferential and non-inferential support.”436
Furthermore, it seems to me that such basic beliefs can also be contradicted by our further
evidence and arguments, as Plantinga himself recognizes. This means that both supporters
and critics of design arguments can find value in studying arguments, even if they accept the
434 Mullen 2004.
435 Evans (2010) makes the case for this understanding of natural theology well.
436 Von Wachter 2014, 60.
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idea that the design intuition grants prima facie plausibility to design. Supporters can argue
that the reliability of this intuition can be further supporter by arguments, while critics can
argue that arguments show the unreliability of the initial intuition by providing a sufficient
amount of counter-evidence.
It seems to me that this is a good way to proceed in order to enable reasoned dialogue
about the basis of our beliefs, but the fact that design beliefs are influenced by more than just
arguments is good to keep in mind. In this conclusion I agree with the ID movement, which
attempts to defend the reliability of the design intuition with design arguments.437 I will now
turn to analyse how its design argument should be understood and whether it can avoid the
critiques that are commonly directed against design arguments.
4.2. Traditional Ways of Formulating the Argument
Paley’s Watchmaker and Hume’s Critique
I begin my analysis with William Paley’s classic argument from his Natural Theology (1802),
and the understanding of the design argument as an analogy. This is the traditionally used
example of design arguments in the philosophy of religion, and it is important to
understanding Intelligent Design’s similarities and differences with Paley’s argument.
Paley's famous analogy runs as follows:
In  crossing a  heath,  suppose I  pitched my foot  against  a stone and were asked how the
stone came to be there, I might possibly answer that for anything I knew to the contrary it
had lain there forever; nor would it,  perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this
answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how
the watch happened to be in that place. I should hardly think of the answer which I had
before given, that for anything I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why
should  not  this  answer  serve  for  the  watch  as  well  as  for  the  stone?  Why  is  it  not  as
admissible  in  the  second  case  as  in  the  first?  For  this  reason,  and  for  no  other,  namely,
that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the
stone)  that  its  several  parts  are  framed  and  put  together  for  a  purpose  –  –.  Every
indication  of  contrivance,  every  manifestation  of  design,  which  existed  in  the  watch,
exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater
and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.438
Paley argues that nature has the same indications of design as the watch, only that the
evidence of design in nature is even stronger. Because of the prominence of the analogy at
the beginning of Paley’s Natural Theology, Paley´s argument has often been understood to be
an analogy also by its logical structure. So understood, the conclusion of design is formed on
437 According to Edis (2006, 9) this is the primary purpose of the Intelligent Design movement.
438 Paley 2006 [1803], chapter 1.
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the basis of nature’s likeness to human artefacts.439 The basic presupposition of the argument
understood as an analogy is that is plausible to believe that similar effects are created by a
similar cause. This then makes it possible to argue that because living beings are in some
ways machine-like, they are products of intelligent design, just like man-made machines.
Ratzsch formulates the logic of the analogical design argument as follows:
1. Entity e within nature (or the cosmos, or nature itself) is like specified human
artefact a (e.g., a machine) in relevant respects R.
2. a has R precisely because it is a product of deliberate design by intelligent human
agency.
3. Like effects typically have like causes (or like explanations, like existence
requirements, etc.)
Therefore:
4. It is (highly) probable that e has R precisely because it too is a product of deliberate
design by intelligent, relevantly human-like agency.
David Hume criticized this form of the argument on several points in his Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion (1779).440 Hume argued, against premise 1, that at least the
analogy between the cosmos and machines is very distant, and the strength of the inference
is thus logically weak. Against premise 3, Hume argued that similar properties may be
produced by different causes in different cases. Alternative explanations could be based on
chance, for example, or some natural principle capable of generating design-like order.441
Many philosophers and biologists consider Darwinian evolutionary theory significant here.
They argue that Darwin provided a natural mechanism which can explain the evidence used
in biological design arguments at least as well as the design hypothesis. Following Paley’s
watchmaker analogy in an ironical way, Richard Dawkins has thus termed Darwinian
natural selection “the blind watchmaker”.442 These concerns, if valid, render the probabilistic
conclusion of the argument quite weak.
Hume’s criticism identifies an important problem in analogical  design arguments.  As
Ratzsch notes, “any two (groups of) things have infinitely many properties in common and also
differ in infinitely many respects.”443 So, how can an observed similarity in some properties lead
439 For many references, see Oppy 2006, chapter 4.
440 I should note that Hume was not writing in response to Paley. Hume’s Dialogues was published posthumously
in 1779, well before Paley’s work. Paley explicitly mentions Hume’s arguments on the problem of natural evil in
chapter XXVI of his Natural Theology (1809). Hume’s argument may well have been directed against Newtonian
cosmic design arguments more than biological design arguments (Hurlbutt 1985).
441 Hume further argued that even if the argument succeeds, it at most succeeds at showing the existence of a
human-like designer, rather than the God of theism, and that the problem of natural evil militates against the
argument. These criticisms are significant, and will resurface continually during the following chapters.
442 Dawkins 1989.
443 Ratzsch 2010.
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reliably to the conclusion that the two objects are also share some other property (such as
being designed)? After all, the other property could also be one of the differences. It must be
shown that the similarity is somehow relevant with respect to the conclusion, or the
argument fails. As Ratzsch says: “Whether or not artefacts and natural objects are alike in ways
that would support transfer of design attributions from the former to the latter depends upon exactly
what the relevant Rs are.”444
In the ID movement, Michael Behe and William Dembski have both defended
analogical design arguments, though they state that analogy is not their preferred
formulation. Behe and Dembski argue that Hume’s understanding of analogical design
arguments is faulty. Their understanding of Hume’s criticism is that in the Dialogues, the
skeptic Philo represents analogical arguments as comparisons of the entire lists of properties
that objects have, rather than just the relevant properties.445  There  is  support  for  this
interpretation in the Dialogues. Philo argues that analogies are more reliable when two very
similar objects are compared. Comparing humans and dogs, and observing that humans
have circulation of blood, we might infer by analogy that dogs also likely have circulation of
blood. Comparing humans and vegetables, the analogical argument would be far less
reliable, because of the many differences of properties. Since the differences between the
cosmos and machines, and between biological organisms and machines are vast, this
difference therefore renders the analogy unreliable.446
In response to this understanding of Hume’s criticism of analogical design arguments,
Dembski and Behe argue that Hume has missed the point of analogies. There is no
consensus on the exact structure of analogical arguments, but they are often understood to
be comparisons between relevant subsets of properties which the compared objects have,
rather than all of their properties.447 In this vein, Behe argues that machines possess the
property of “irreducible complexity” (to be explained in detail in chapter 6.1.). Behe argues
that this property is known, in the case of man-made machines, to always require intelligent
design as its explanation. Furthermore, it is known to be extremely difficult to explain by
non-purposeful mechanisms. Therefore, Behe argues, the same property, when encountered
in biological life, is also probably the product of intelligent design, rather than non-
purposeful mechanisms. Furthermore, Behe argues that there is a very close analogy
between some biological systems and human machines.448
444 Ratzsch 2010.
445 Behe 2006a, 218; Dembski 2002, 211n84; Dembksi 1999, appendix.  Meyer (2009, 383-386) also discusses Hume’s
criticism of analogical arguments and responds that his design argument is not analogical, but an inference to the
best explanation.
446 Dialogues, chapter II.
447 Dembski 2002, 211n84; Behe 2006a, 218. For one defence of the logic of analogical arguments in this vein, see
Juthe 2005. See also McGrew 2004.
448 Behe 2006a, 218: “Incidentally, even by Hume’s criteria, the analogy between a watch and a living organism could be
made very strong. Modern biochemists probably could make a watch, or a time-keeping device, out of biological materials – if
not now, then certainly in the near future.” Behe is influenced by Denton 1986, 341, who argues that modern science
has confirmed Paley’s idea that organisms contain machines. It should be noted that the existence of machines in
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It seems possible to construct a theory of analogical arguments that is conducive to
design arguments, though no general theory of these types of arguments has found general
acceptance.449 Suppose that there is some clear connection between some property of nature
(which we can call “design” or “design-likeness”) and intelligent design as a good, fitting
explanation of this property. On this understanding of analogical arguments, the relevant
similarity between objects in nature and machines lends probability to the conclusion of
design, while differences relevant to the conclusion will undercut the argument.450 This
understanding of the analogical arguments allows the defender of analogical design
arguments to avoid Hume’s initial criticisms of the argument in the Dialogues. However, in
defence of Hume, the Dialogues (part II) does contain a similar response from Cleanthes, the
proponent of design arguments in the work.  In response to the criticisms of analogical
design arguments by Philo, Cleanthes argues that it is enough for the purposes of his
argument that the cosmos resembles machines in the crucial respect of “adjustment of means
to ends”.
Most of Philo’s criticisms of the analogical design argument come only after this
adjustment of the initial scheme. For example, the argument that there may be multiple
possible causes which could explain nature’s order remains relevant. The existence of causes
other than intelligence which can explain the relevant aspects of nature is an empirical
matter. Darwinian theory, for example, may well show a relevant difference between life
and machines: life can evolve, because it is reproducing, while man-made machines cannot
(at least so far) do so. As I will show in chapters 5 and 6, many argue that the progress of
natural science makes the explanation of natural order in terms of intelligence unnecessary.
The ID theorists also generally believe that some naturalistic explanations would indeed
count against the design argument. The properties of living organisms which allow for
Darwinian evolution to occur could be a relevant difference between machines and living
organisms in the sense discussed, even if the logic of the inference would be valid otherwise.
So, in analogical arguments, it must be argued that the compared objects share a
relevant property, and are not dissimilar in a way that is relevant for the explanation.
Otherwise, analogies are merely fallacious arguments from similarity.
biological organisms does not mean that biological organisms are just machines. Denton (2004) criticizes the
concept of organisms as machines while affirming that organisms contain machines.
Taken by itself, the newfound similarity of machines and some parts of organisms is not a sufficient response to
Hume, however. There are still differences, and it could in principle be that “being designed” is also one of the
features that makes human machinery different from organismal complexity, even if there are few other such
features. It would be desirable to be also able to argue that similarity of a certain sort is somehow relevant to the
conclusion: design just is a relevant type of explanation to consider for design-like order.
449 As Shaw and Ashley (1983) emphasize.
450 Juthe 2005.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
118
Inductive Arguments
Design arguments can also be described as inductive arguments, meaning generalizations
based on our past experience. The underlying principle of inductive reasoning can
summarised as follows: "If a large number of As have been observed under a variety of conditions,
and if all those observed As without exception have possessed the property b, then all As possess the
property b."451 The analogical arguments described previously actually make heavy use of the
logic of induction. Indeed these could be accurately called inductive analogies: the
conclusion  of  design  is  based  on  our  experience  of  how  certain,  highly  analoguous
properties are generated and the presence of these properties in both human artefacts and
nature.
Dembski and Behe have both also explicitly referred to induction.  Dembski writes that
connecting “specified complexity” with intelligence happens through "a straightforward
inductive argument: in every instance where the complexity-specification criterion attributes design
and where the underlying causal story is known (i.e., where we are not just dealing with
circumstantial evidence, but where, as it were, the video camera is running and any putative designer
would be caught red-handed), it turns out design is actually present."452 Dawes argues that
Dembski is making an inductive argument for design of the following form:
5. Every  observed  instance  of  specified  complexity  that  we  can  trace  back  ot  its  origin  is
explained by the acts of some intelligent agent who brought it about.
Therefore:
6. Every instance of specified complexity is explained by the acts of some intelligent agent who
brought it about. 453
Kenneth Himma has argued that such inductive arguments for design are implausible, since
no human could have brought about the specified complexity observed in nature.454
However, the inference doesn’t refer to human designers specifically, but only the general
category of designers. It is thought that the relevant property which explains specified
complexity is not a characteristic that must in principle be unique to the species Homo
Sapiens. Rather, the argument assumes that we can imagine the existence of a non-human
intelligent designer, who has the kind of properties which we inductively know are needed
to explain this type of complexity.
Responding to Himma, Dawes argues that the argument is very similar to commonly
used inductive arguments. So, if we accept inductive reasoning in general and we accept the
truth of the premises, the inductive design argument does succeed in establishing some
451 Chalmers 1982, 13.
452 Dembski 2002a, 25.
453 Dawes 2007, 76-77.
454 Himma 2005, 12.
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plausibility for design as an explanation. The greater problem for the argument is that other
explanations for the existence of specified complexity have also been proposed. So, as with
analogical arguments, it seems that reference to Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms
provide the best basis for critiques of inductive design arguments. 455
As is evident from the quote about the “straightforward inductive argument”,
Dembski indeed formulates his positive case for design as an inductive argument. However,
this is not Dembski’s entire argument. As I will show in chapter 4.5, Dembski has formulated
a methodology to eliminate natural explanations for specified complexity. Dembski argues
that the property of specified complexity can be identified using statistical methods, and
then inferred as designed through a process of elimination and induction. He also provides
conceptual arguments for linking design and specified complexity.456
Elliott Sober has argued that Behe’s design argument is inductive.457 In the Dover trial,
Behe indeed sometimes expressed his argument in these terms:
I testified that the intelligent design argument is an induction, not an analogy. Inductions
do  not  depend  on  the  degree  of  similarity  of  examples  within  the  induction.  Examples
only have to share one or a subset of relevant properties. For example, the induction that,
ceteris  paribus,  black  objects  become  warm  in  the  sunlight  holds  for  a  wide  range  of
dissimilar objects. A black automobile and a black rock become warm in the sunlight,
even though they have many dissimilarities. The induction holds because they share a
similar relevant property, their blackness. The induction that many fragments rushing
away  from  each  other  indicates  a  past  explosion  holds  for  both  firecrackers  and  the
universe (in the Big Bang theory), even though firecrackers and the universe have many,
many dissimilarities. Cellular machines and machines in our everyday world share a
relevant property – their functional complexity, born of a purposeful arrangement of
parts  –  so  inductive  conclusions  to  design  can  be  drawn  on  the  basis  of  that  shared
property.  To  call  an  induction  into  doubt  one  has  to  show  that  dissimilarities  make  a
relevant difference to the property one wishes to explain.458
In this long quotation, Behe again emphasizes that the design argument involves a
comparison of the relevant properties of different objects. The basic principles underlying
the argument are clear. The same kinds of properties are argued to have the same kinds of
causes, based on our knowledge of these properties. But in contrast to his argument in
Darwin’s Black Box, here Behe does not call the argument an analogy, but an induction. One
problem with identifying Behe’s argument as either an analogy or induction is that is that
Behe provides several different formulations of the design arguments, including analogy,
induction and inference to the best explanation. Rather than relying on Behe’s own
terminology alone, it should be asked what type of logical structure best captures the ideas
of Behe’s inference. And one idea that is not present in the inductive formulation is the
455 Dawes 2007, 76-78.
456 Dawes 2007, 78.
457 Sober 2008, 168n37.
458 Behe 2006c, 89-90.
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comparative nature of the inference. Earlier in the same article, Behe writes that “a theory
succeeds by explaining the data better than competing ideas.”459 This is the sort of language that
fits better with understanding the design argument as an inference to the best explanation,
as I will argue in chapter 4.4. But this inference to the best explanation is supported by
inductive knowledge which is argued to link certain kinds of effects with certain kinds of
causes, and rule other kinds of causes out.
Hume did not think inductive design arguments could succeed. In his broader work,
Hume criticized the reliability of inductive reasoning in general. 460 However, in the
Dialogues, Philo admits the possibility of inductive reasoning in general, but argues against
the possibility of inductive design arguments. His claim is that we can only identify objects
like watches as designed because we have collectively observed humans creating watches so
many times. However, this method is not suited for gaining knowledge about the origin of
life or the origin of the cosmos, since we were not present to observe the creation. Even if we
had been present, we would only have a sample size of one, much too small for an inductive
argument. To establish an inductive link between universes and design as a cause, we would
need to observe several universes being created by a designer. So, inductive design
arguments are in practice impossible.461
The ID movement’s can respond to this critique of inductive design arguments by
arguing that we can still have inductive knowledge about the types of properties that are
commonly linked with design. When we find such properties in biology, this is argued to
justify belief in design. However, there are also other ways of responding to Hume. The idea
that causes can only be identified by observing the constant conjunction of cause and effect
has been questioned after Hume’s time, because this seems to rest on a very narrow
conception of what justified inferences are.462 Today, induction based on repeated
observation is generally not understood to be the only valid way of inference even in the
natural sciences. Theories of cosmic evolution such as the big bang can be well supported by
the evidence, even though we have never observed anything like the big bang.463 This leads
to the possibility of the design argument as an inference to the best explanation.
Hume’s  criticisms  also  rest  on  his  own  peculiar  notion  of  causation,  which  not  all
philosophers agree with.464 Feser argues that in Hume’s notion of causation, cause and effect
seem to be linked only accidentally. Under Hume’s notion, we can only identify a cause by
459 Behe 2006c, 82.
460 See Dawes 2009, 103.
461 Dialogues, Part I.
462 We  could  also  observe  that  when  we  perform  an  inductive  inference  and  add  up  the  evidence  of  our
observation, no two observations are typically exactly alike. Rather, they are at best very similar or analogical.
Could we then say that induction in some sense depends on our ability to see analogies between different
situations?
463 Big Bang theory could be an inference to the best explanation (IBE), for example. For more on IBE’s, see section
4.4 below.
464 Ratzsch 2010.
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observing the constant conjunction of cause and effect.465 But perhaps we could also look at
the nature of the cause to determine why it had this or that effect, for example, and this
could help us when trying to discover the cause of some new phenomena. Based on this
understanding, a cause could be discovered by understanding the nature of the cause and
the nature of effect, rather than just through observing a statistical correlation between some
objects. This could allow for analogies based on relevant similarities to make the design
inference a possible explanation.
As Ratzsch argues, the intuition behind design arguments is not just that certain
properties (termed R’s by Ratzsch) of nature are constantly conjoined with intelligent design,
and that this inductively observed connection allows us to explain these properties by
reference to the intelligent operation of a mind. Rather, it is that “the appropriate Rs in question
were in their own right directly reflective of and redolent of cognition, that this directly suggested
mind, that we could see nearly directly that they were the general sort of thing that a mind might or
even would generate, and that consequently they did not depend for their evidential force upon
previously established constant conjunctions or other associations with known instances of design.”466
Ratzsch argues that a written text, for example, says “mind” to us in a way not related to
analogy or induction based on past experience. For many people, the order of nature speaks
of the existence of a designer in just this way. So perhaps the design argument does not need
to be based on an inductive generalisation, but on such a rational intuition.
Ratzsch and Graham Oppy have argued that William Paley, too, actually intended his
argument to be simply an application of this rational intuition to the study of nature, not an
analogical argument. The watch analogy was meant only to illustrate our typical way of
detecting design.467 The ID movement also often uses analogies simply to illustrate the
detection of design, not as analogical arguments. For example, Behe argues that “just as in the
everyday world we immediately conclude design when we see a complex, interactive system such as a
mousetrap, there is no reason to withhold the same conclusion from interactive molecular systems.”468
This is clearly not an analogy where we conclude the designedness of life’s molecular
systems based on the previously known designedness of man-made interactive systems.
Rather, in this quote Behe is arguing that the same properties lead us to the design inference
in both cases. 469
465 Feser 2009.
466 Ratzsch 2010.
467 A  strong  case  can  be  made  that  Paley’s  argument  was  indeed  not  an  analogical  argument,  but  was  just  an
example illustrating the design inference. Paley says explicitly that the watches design could be detected without
prior experience of watches. See Ratzsch 2010 and Oppy 2002. However, I concur with Schupbach (2005) that
Paley’s argument was an inference to the best explanation, not a deduction.
468 Behe 1997a.
469 Oppy (2006, 188-190) argues that formulations like this show Behe’s argument to be a deduction, but it seems
to me that what Behe is saying here is merely that the design inference happens automatically when we observe
certain properties. This is related to the intuitiveness of the design inference, and does not show how Behe would
formulate the design argument in writing. As I have noted, Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box contains many formulations
of  the  design  argument.  Another  example  of  the  analogical  argument  mentioned  above  is  as  follows: “the
irreducibly complex Rube Goldberg machines required an intelligent designer to produce it; therefore the irreducibly complex
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So, in the ID literature, I find that both this type of rational intuition and the inductive
generalisation are used to support design arguments. It is argued that some things exhibit
properties which are linked to intelligent design as a cause both by our rational intuitions
and our inductive experience of how such properties are created. I will now consider this
issue in more detail.
4.3. The Design Connection
Arguments for a Design Connection
A central finding of my analysis of analogical and inductive design arguments is that they
rely on a connection between design as an explanation and the property to be explained.
Design must in some way be an especially apt and sense-making explanation of just the
particular kind of order we find in nature. As mentioned, the existence of a connection can
be argued for based on inductive observation. However, it can also be argued to exist on the
conceptual level, known through our rational intuitions and rational consideration of the
nature of the cause and effect. I will now present some further examples of these inductive
and conceptual arguments.
Induction involves observing the connection in a sample of test cases, and then
extending the generalization to objects that belong to the same class. Here, the ID theorists’
argument is that our experience shows a correlation between intelligence and some
property. In addition to the examples from Dembski and Behe, this argument is also present
in Meyer´s work. He argues that “undirected materialistic causes have not demonstrated the
capacity to generate significant amounts of specified information. At the same time, conscious
intelligence has repeatedly shown itself capable of producing such information.”470 Meyer uses this
argument to demonstrate the causal adequacy of intelligent design in explaining
information.471
The Discovery Institute’s definition of Intelligent Design I quoted in the introduction
also conceives of the connection in inductive terms. According to the definition, research on
design “is conducted by observing the types of information produced when intelligent agents act.
Scientists then seek to find objects which have those same types of informational properties which we
commonly know come from intelligence.”472 So, based on our experience of how certain
“informational properties” are produced, it is argued that the same type of explanation can
also be used outside the context of human activity.
blood-clotting system required a designer also.” (Behe  2006a,  218).  Here  Behe’s  argument  is  clearly  based  on  our
previous knowledge of how such systems originate and the presence of similar (according to Behe, even the
same) properties in biology.
470 Meyer 2010, 341.
471 However,  for  Meyer,  the  design  argument  is  not  an  analogy,  but  an  inference  to  the  best  explanation.  See
chapter 4.4.
472 Discovery Institute 2011.
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At the same time, the ID literature also contains critiques of this inductive argument for
connecting design and certain properties.473 First, it seems that induction cannot be the only
possible way of gaining knowledge about intelligence. Dembski argues that we must have
been able to see evidence of intelligence at some point without having prior experience of it.
If  we  can  only  find  evidence  of  design  based  on  our  prior  experience  of  design,  then  how
was this prior experience gained? At some point, we must gain evidence of design through
some other way than induction. There must be some feature of the world which is evidence
of design in itself. For Dembski, teleology and specified complexity are such features.474
Design is an “inherently teleological” process, thus it is able to explain teleological patterns.475
Here using design as an explanation is not based on induction, but on the understanding of
the natures of cause and effect.
Second, it is argued that we need a way to differentiate between different things
human beings produce. Not all we produce is equally a product of intelligent design, but the
method of mere statistical correlation does not allow us to distinguish between various
things produced by humans. We might accidentally break vines in a forest, or we might
designedly form a trap from these vines. Though both are equally the product of humans,
only one provides evidence of design. According to Behe, “we know that all these things were
designed because of the ordering of independent components to achieve some end.”476 So, observing
that humans create something is not sufficient infer that such things must be the products of
design. Rather, we must also understand the properties of these things and the properties of
human intelligence to know why such properties are evidence of design.477
In these arguments, the rational nature of specified complexity and the purposeful,
irreducible complexity of organisms are seen to be reliable evidence of design, which we
even use to identify human design. The rationality of explaining teleology by teleology is not
based on just an inductive generalization, but a connection between the essential features of
designing agents and these types of order. This is a link based on the understood nature of
the cause and the effect, rather than just on an empirical correlation between them. It could
be that the conceptual link is believed because of rational intuitions that our cognitive
capacities tend to produce – recall the arguments of chapter 4.1. However, it could also be
that that we learn to understand the existence of such a conceptual link between design and
some property only based on our subjective experience of the human capacities that are
473 These  also  apply  to  the  Humean account  where  design  is  detected  by  observing  the  constant  conjunction  of
cause and effect. (See chapter 4.2 and Ratzsch 2010)
474 Dembski even argues that we detect our own intelligence through observing specified complexity. Of course,
we don't intuitively use the term “specified complexity”, but Dembski claims that we nevertheless use the
methodology Dembski describes. (Dembski 2004, chapter 32)
475 Dembski & Wells 2007, glossary.
476 Behe 2006a, 196. See also Dembski 2004b, 228–229; Behe 2000b, 7.
477 Again, this is seen in the way Behe’s definition of “design” as a pattern in nature is “purposeful arrangement of
parts”. For Behe, the cause of such apparently purposeful arrangements must possess the capability to act
purposefully, arranging parts with a purpose in mind. A process without the capabilities of minds is, for Behe, a
very improbable explanation in comparison. (Behe 2006a, 193.) I will analyse Behe’s biological arguments in more
detail in chapter 6.
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needed create new artefacts. The inductive argument for design would be strengthened by
appealing more clearly to our own subjective experience of what it is like to be an intelligent
designer. This is seen sometimes in the ID literature, such as when Dembski writes that
“Intelligent Design is one intelligence determining what another intelligence has done.”478
The Significance of the Connection
Ratzsch also presents a serious problem with the inductive establishment of the connection
between design-likeness and design. All cases of design-likeness whose origins we can
investigate are human artefacts, while the majority of design-likeness resides in natural
objects, whose origins cannot be directly investigated. Thus the generalization is being made
based on a small sample and extended into a different category. According to Ratzsch, this
should at least lower the probability of the conclusion of design, though it does not entirely
remove the value of induction.479
Ratzsch’s point is important and shows that the possibility for other explanations of
design-likeness cannot be dismissed. However, the goal of making a “design connection” is
simply to show that design is in some way a non-frivolous explanation for certain types of
order. To have explanatory power, design must be at least better than an appeal to chance,
the null hypothesis. So if such inductive arguments can give design as an explanation even
the modest probability described by Ratzsch, they will have served their purpose. I am
inclined to agree that the inductive arguments from human experience make the appeals to
design much less frivolous than they would otherwise be. Even with just the inductive
connection, design arguments are not explaining just random features of nature with ad hoc
-hypotheses, but features which we know to require design in the case of human artefacts.
The explanation is made even less ad hoc if we also think (perhaps based on our natural
intuitions or experiential knowledge of the creation of artifacts) that there is a conceptual
link between certain properties found in nature and design as a cause.
As I will argue in chapters 5 and 6, most participants of the debate don’t deny the
design-likeness of nature, or the triggering of our agency detection device. It seems to me
that best line of response from a critic of design arguments should not deny the connection
478 Dembski 1998c, 19. I find that Intelligent Design’s inductive arguments for linking purposeful complexity and
intelligent design repeat the basic points already made in Paley’s Natural Theology, expanded and spiced with the
terms of modern biology and information science. Speaking of “contrivance” meaning the purposeful structure of
machines and organisms, Paley writes:
“Wherever we see marks of contrivance, we are led for its cause to an intelligent author. And this transition of the
understanding is founded upon uniform experience. We see intelligence constantly contriving: that is we see intelligence
constantly producing effects, marked and distinguished by certain properties – not certain particular properties, but by a
kind and class of properties, such as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another and to a common purpose. – – We
conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and design; because in the properties of relation to a purpose,
subservience to a use, they resemble what intelligence and design are constantly producing, and what nothing except
intelligence and design ever produce at all.”( Paley 2006 [1802], chapter XXIII: “Of the Personality of the Deity.”)
479 Ratzsch 2010.
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between design-likeness and design altogether. Rather, the critic simply can argue that the
connection does not establish the conclusion in a necessary way. We can also imagine that
design-likeness can be created without design, and so perhaps in some case (such as
biological evolution) the non-purposeful explanation will be superior to the design-based
explanation. I already presented this critique in analysing the traditional design arguments
in chapter 4.1.
It can be argued that other factors besides design-likeness strongly influence our
conclusions about design in the context of humans. For example, when something is already
known to be the product of humans, then its properties may be clearer evidence that it has
also been intentionally designed. Oppy and Ratzsch have argued that our recognition of
human design works in this way. We recognize its artefactuality by signs other than its
purposeful complexity. Ratzsch argues that artefactuality is our most important sign of the
activity of humans, rather than natural laws and mechanisms. However, in the context of
artifactuality, there are several signs which further signal that an object has been
intentionally designed. Through our knowledge of humans, we know that the creation of
these properties takes time, effort and intelligent design. 480
Within Ratzsch’s model, however, properties which are evidence of design in the
context of artefactuality can also be at least weak evidence of design outside the human
context.481 Ratzsch calls these properties “bridge properties” and uses thought experiments
to argue for the possibility that they could be evidence of design.482 In Ratzsch’s argument,
the property of “mind correlativity” refers to patterns in nature which appear somehow
rational to the human mind, apparent goal-directedness being a part of mind correlativity.483
“Mind affinity” is a yet stronger version of mind correlativity, where the rationality of some
pattern appears particularly deep to us. Ratzsch’s examples of texts fall into this category.484
There are several different ways of explaining this mind correlativity and teleology, as seen
in chapter 3.3. Nevertheless, under this understanding design does remain at least a better
explanation than the null hypothesis (random chance) and it could in principle be possible
for design to be the best explanation.
The possibility of natural explanations shows that there is no deductively certain way
to reason from mere design-like properties to the existence of a designer. Rather, the
credibility of different explanations will have to be weighted on a case-by-case basis. In some
cases (at least in the case of objects we know to be artefacts created by humans), design may
be the better explanation for design-like properties, and as certain as possible for us finite
creatures. In other cases, perhaps naturalistic explanations are more credible. Because of the
comparative nature of the design inference, the inference to the best explanation seems to be
the best way of formulating the argument.
480 Ratzsch 2001, chapter 1.
481 Ratzsch 2001, 58; Oppy 2006, chapter 4.
482 I will have more to say about these thought experiments in chapter 7.2.
483 Ratzsch 2001, 23.
484 Ratzsch 2001, 63.
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4.4. Inference to the Best Explanation
The Design Argument as an IBE
In recent decades, the inference to the best explanation has emerged as one of the most
promising ways to formulate the logic of scientific arguments.485 The basic logic behind the
inference to the best explanation (IBE) is generally thought to be “abductive” as described by
C.S. Peirce.486 The idea of abductive reasoning is that if our empirical evidence would be a
reasonably expectable occurrence given the truth of some hypothesis, then this gives us
evidence in favour of this hypothesis.487 Peirce formulates this logic as follows:
7. The surprising fact C is observed.
8. But if A were true, C would follow as a matter of course.
9. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.488
Many believe that this is the basic form of inference which underlies many forms of science,
Darwinian evolutionary theory being one standard example.489 For  example,  if  all  animals
have a common ancestor, then we would expect them to have biological similarities.
Biological similarities exist, so we have grounds for believing the hypothesis of common
descent. This kind of abductive reasoning can fail, because the same evidence can fit several
different hypotheses. In practice abductive explanations (hypotheses) are evaluated based on
several different criteria such as enhanced likelihood, explanatory power and scope, causal
adequacy, plausibility, evidential support, fit with already accepted theories, predictiveness,
fruitfulness, precision, unifying power and the like. If one explanation emerges as superior in
this comparison, we are justified in accepting it as the right explanation, until a better one
emerges. Because the exact criteria and their application are controversial, deciding on the
best explanation is a process dependent on background beliefs and subjective
considerations.490
The history of science knows many examples where the same data could be explained
by several models. In Galileo Galilei’s time, the Earth-centric cosmology of Tycho Brahe was
able to explain the same data as the heliocentric cosmology of Copernicus and Galileo.
However, over time the situation has changed in favour of the heliocentric model of the solar
system. This feature of inferences to the best explanation is known as explanatory
485 Lipton 2003.
486 Peirce 1955, 151. Quoted in Ratzsch 2010.
487 Ratzsch 2010.
488 Peirce 1955, 151. I am following the arguments from Ratzsch 2010 and Dawes 2009, 20-23.
489 See Banner 1990, 125-130. For more on the general logic of inferences to the best explanation, see Lipton 2003.
490 Ratzsch 2010.
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underdetermination.491 The ID theorists’ claim that the design argument does not reveal the
identity of the designer can also be stated in terms of underdetermination: the same data can
be explained based on a wide variety of different design hypotheses. For example, perhaps
the designer could be a Platonistic demiurge, a space alien or Zeus instead of the God of the
Bible.492
Within the ID movement, Meyer explicitly refers to his argument primarily as an
inference to the best explanation (IBE), whereas Behe makes several different formulations of
the argument. However, the probabilistic nature of Behe’s argument makes seeing it as an
inference to the best explanation credible. As I will show in chapter 6.1, Behe argues that the
probability of the design conclusion varies based on the properties of the natural systems
under analysis. The more complex and purposeful the order appears, the more certain our
conclusion of design becomes for him.493 He compares the likelihood of design and natural
explanations and argues that our background religious and non-religious beliefs effect our
assessment of the probability of the conclusion.494 He further argues that the presence of
consilience, several independent lines of argument leading to the same conclusion, lends
more probability to the design argument.495 These are features of inferences to the best
explanation.496
Ratzsch formulates the design argument as an inference to the best explanation (IBE) as
follows. Here the first premise is related to Pierce’s premise that “the surprising fact C is
observed” and the second premise is the hypothesis which explains this datum. After
comparison with alternative explanation, it is concluded that the design hypothesis is the
best explanation and probably true.
10. Some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) exhibit exquisite complexity, delicate
adjustment of means to ends (and other relevant R characteristics).
11. The hypothesis that those characteristics are products of deliberate, intentional design
(Design Hypothesis) would adequately explain them.
12. In fact, the hypothesis that those characteristics are products of deliberate, intentional
design (Design Hypothesis) is the best available overall explanation of them.
491 Lindberg 2003.
492 For example, John Leslie (1989) and Michael Denton (1998) have advocated such non-traditional design
hypotheses. See Ratzsch 2001, 81-82 for some ideas about the concept of underdetermination in relation to design
arguments.
493 Behe 2006a, 256.
494 Behe 2001.
495 Behe 2007, chapter 10.
496 Paley’s  design  argument  can  also  be  stated  as  an  inference  to  the  best  explanation.  Schupbach  (2005),
responding to Oppy (2002) argues that Paley even intended his argument as an inference to the best explanation,
while  Oppy  (2006)  continues  to  argue  that  it  is  a  deduction,  but  acknowledges  the  possibility  of  other
interpretations. I am inclined to agree with Schupbach.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
128
Therefore (probably):
13. Some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are products of deliberate, intentional
design (i.e., the Design Hypothesis is likely true).
The conclusion (13) is not always included in formulations of the inference to the best
explanation. It simply states the common belief if some explanation is the best, then we have
grounds for believing that it is also probably true, not just the best currently available
explanation. This may not always be true. If all considered explanations are not very
convincing and the best explanation is only slightly better than the rest, then we may still not
have grounds for believing that it is true. However, assuming that the criteria for selecting
the best explanation are conducive to truth – that is, assuming the reliability of our rational
intuitions concerning explanations and the philosophy of explanations – it seems that often
we are at least rationally justified in accepting the best explanation as probably true.
However, it is not always clear what exactly makes one of the hypotheses so much better
than the others that such confidence is warranted.497
Related to this, Peter Lipton makes the distinction between potential and actual
explanations. A potential explanation is one that entails the data in some way; an actual
explanation is simply a true potential explanation. Different criteria can then be used to try to
identify the most likely actual explanation from the pool of potential explanations we have
available.498 In the case of “design-like” objects in nature, potential explanations could
include evolutionary explanations, design-based explanations, explaining the apparent
rationality as an illusion created by our minds and so on. However, if design is at least a
potential explanation – if it has explanatory force – then this comparison could in principle
lead to the result that design is the best explanation.
Critiques of the Design Argument as an IBE
In the preceding formulation of the argument, premises 11 and 12 are the crucial
controversial premises of the argument. As Gregory Dawes argues, there are two alternative
lines of critique which can be made of any abductive theistic explanation. First (1), it can be
argued (against premise 11) that theistic explanations actually don’t explain at all, meaning
that they are not part of the pool of potential explanations. Divine action or (in the case of the
ID movement) the actions of an unidentified intelligent designer do not show why we
should expect to observe the data. This is an “in principle” objection to design arguments.
No matter what the universe looks like empirically, design cannot explain it. This means that
497 Dawes 2009, chapter 6.
498 Lipton 2004, 56-66. For Lipton, the inference to the best explanation is indeed concerned with finding reasons
to  believe  in  some hypothesis.  However,  it  is  also  possible  to  interpret  the  inference  to  the  best  explanation  as
merely  a  heuristic  method  for  comparing  hypotheses  that  will  then  have  to  be  confirmed  using  some  other
methodology. (Iranzo 2007, 340-341.)
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there is no conceivable evidence that could speak in favour of design – a very strong
conclusion. According to Dawes, the more promising critique of the argument is a “de facto”
critique based on the competition between different potential explanations of the same data.
This critique is targeted at premise 12 – the comparison of explanations. Though theistic
explanations and design could in principle explain natural order, in practice naturalistic
explanations like Darwinian evolutionary theory can be argued to work better and thus
make design an unnecessary explanation.499 So, even if design is a potential explanation of
the data, it can still be argued that it is not a very good explanation, and this is relevant for
assessing the credibility of premise 12. Indeed, in the discussion on Intelligent Design,
critiques of the explanatory power of design are common.
Common critiques concern the lack of independent support and frivolous nature of
design hypotheses. Elliott Sober has illustrated the difficulties facing design arguments with
an interesting parable. Suppose that we hear a strange sort of rumbling from the basement.
We could argue that the hypothesis “the noise is caused by a bunch of trolls bowling”
explains the noise quite well, as it predicts the observed empirical evidence. This is causally
sufficient explanation involving designers, but it does not feel quite satisfactory.500
Two related difficulties help understand the unsatisfactory nature of the troll
hypothesis. First (1), we do not have any independent reasons for believing in trolls, which
means that the prior probability of the troll hypothesis is very low. We will rather hold out
for a more reasonable explanation than accept something this strange. Even though the
evidence increases the probability of the troll hypothesis, it is not sufficient to raise the
probability into the realm of credibility, since the beginning probability is so low. Second (2),
any data can be explained by a modified troll hypothesis, supposing that the trolls are
postulated to have the motivation and adequate powers for producing the evidence we see.
For example, supposing that cookies are missing from the cookie jar, we could hypothesize
that an invisible troll ate them. This would explain the data, but it would be totally frivolous.
The technical term for this frivolousness is that the troll hypothesis is ad hoc – a hypothesis
artificially constructed just to explain this one piece of data, but which has no other
grounds.501
According to Sober, the design hypothesis for explaining the evolution of life also has a
very low prior probability and suffers from the problem of frivolousness. What is needed for
the design hypothesis to work is independent evidence of the existence of the designer and
some plausible reason for supposing that the designer has the capabilities and the motivation
499 Dawes 2009, chapter 2.
500 Sober 1993, chapter 2.
501 This is also related to what Phillip Kitcher (1981, 528) has called the problem of spurious unification – if a
pattern  of  explanation  could  fit  any  state  of  affairs,  it  cannot  explain  why  this  particular  state  of  affairs  exists
rather than some other state of affairs which would fit the hypothesis equally well. (See also the commentary in
Dawes 2009, 43-46.) Similarly, Robert Pennock (1999, 275) argues that explanation in terms of a designer’s
purposes is non-explanatory, because a designer’s purposes can conceivably be invoked to explain anything. For
example, supposing that we want to ask a question about why apples fall down from trees, we could answer that
it is because God wills it.
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for  producing  the  order  we  see  in  nature.  This  is  the  only  way  to  avoid  frivolous  design
hypotheses which can be invoked to “explain” anything at all, but which we nevertheless
have no grounds for accepting. Interestingly, Sober’s remarks are directed also against David
Hume’s critique of the design argument. According to Sober, the design argument as an
inference to the best explanation can avoid most of the Humean critiques of design
arguments. For example, it does not depend on the exactness of the analogy between the
universe and a machine. But Sober’s conclusion is very Humean: we can reliably infer the
presence of human design, but our inferences about supernatural design are far less
certain.502
So, for a design argument to work, the reasoning behind premises 11 and 12 must be
made as clear as possible. It must be specified what is required before a design hypothesis
can possess explanatory power, and to assess how much evidential support this really gives
to the design hypothesis in relation to other hypotheses. Here the strategies of theistic
natural theologians and the ID theorists differ, though both employ the same logic of the
inference to the best explanation. In order to bring out the core ideas of ID and relate them to
theistic natural theology, I will first introduce one way of defending natural theology and
then go on to discuss ID’s approach. The similarities and differences of the two schools of
thought will become clearer in the coming chapters.
Differences Between Design Arguments
The arguments of theistic natural theology are different from the troll hypothesis because
they are not just artificially constructed to explain one facet of reality. Rather, there is a
cumulative case of many theistic arguments which support each other. If – as many argue –
the explanatory dimensions of theistic belief are not the reason for its origination, then this
seems to show that theism is not an ad hoc hypothesis invented to explain some small amount
of data.503 Kenneth Himma has similarly argued that we are justified in making design
inferences only in contexts where there is already strong independent reason to think that
there exist intelligent agents with the ability to bring about the occurrence of the relevant
entity, feature, or property. Only in such contexts, Himma argues, is there sufficient
information to justify assigning a probability to the design hypothesis that is higher than the
probability that we are presumably justified in assigning to the chance hypothesis.504
502 Sober 2004. This type of conclusion is very common in the critique of ID. See Pennock 2001 and Hurd 2004 for
other examples of the objection.
503 The non-explanatory origins of belief in God were discussed in chapter 2.5. Of course, it could be that the non-
explanatory  account  is  not  correct.  For  example,  if  humans  do  have  an  intuitive  tendency  to  explain  nature
teleologically (as discussed in chapter 4.1), then perhaps this is partly responsible for the origins of belief in God.
If  design  arguments  are  just  more  rigorous  statements  of  the  logic  of  this  intuition,  then  belief  in  God and the
design arguments come at least partly from the same source.
504 Himma 2005, 1.
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As Dawes notes, it is also not the case that just any data could be explained by
reference to the theistic God. This is why theistic believers would find the existence of
gratuitous evil in the world very puzzling. God is thought to have certain attributes which
make some ideas about what God would do more reasonable than others. For example,
because God is good, he is expected to create a good world. The arguments of theistic natural
theology thus often depend on clear ideas about God’s nature and motivations.505
It is nevertheless clear that such theistic explanations are quite different from any
natural explanation based on lawful regularities. God is thought to be free and thus it is
difficult to argue that any empirical result could be derived from the existence of God as a
“matter of course”. This difficulty doesn’t seem fatal, however: the same seems to be true of
all intentional explanations, even those used of humans. Though determinists believe that it
is in theory possible to predict the behaviour of humans completely, in practice it is not. We
can never be sure that another human being has the exact intention which will result in
exactly this sort of behaviour, though we may have very good reasons to believe so. Theistic
philosophers of religion argue that the same is true of personal explanations referencing the
intentions of  God. Though God is  free in his  actions,  he does not act  without reason.  Thus
some outcome can be reasonably expected of the theistic God. For the theistic hypothesis to
have explanatory power, it seems that it is enough for it to make the evidence more likely
than the chance hypothesis. Its explanatory power can then be measured by how great the
difference between the theistic hypothesis and the chance hypothesis is.506
The ID movement’s inference to the best explanation is different, though the following
chapters will also show that there are some points where the ID movement comes closer to
the theistic arguments.507 Typically ID’s design arguments are stated without the support of a
cumulative case of other theistic arguments and without appealing to such theistic
presuppositions. As I argued in chapter 3.5, the ID theorists recognize that theistic
background beliefs can make the design argument more credible, and that atheistic
background assumptions can make it less credible. However, they also emphasize that the
design  argument  can  be  convincing  on  its  own,  as  long  as  the  possibility  of  design  is  not
dogmatically denied a priori. ID’s design argument also leaves the question of the motives of
505 Dawes  2009,  43-46.  I  will  look  at  some  of  these  ideas  in  more  detail  in  chapter  five  as  I  analyse  theistic
formulations of the fine-tuning design argument. The most influential defenders of theistic design arguments I
will  look at there are Robin Collins and Richard Swinburne. The idea of the high prior probability of theism is
also crucial to Swinburne’s argument. According to Swinburne (2004a, chapter 5), because theism attempts to
explain  the  whole  world,  its  prior  probability  cannot  be  evaluated  in  the  light  of  any  background  evidence.
Rather, the background probability of theism must be based purely on a priori considerations such as the
simplicity of the hypothesis. Since Swinburne sees theism as a very simple hypothesis, he assigns it a relative high
intrinsic probability of 0,5.
506 Dawes (2009, appendix) argues that intentional explanations are deductive, whereas Swinburne (2004a) sees
them as probabilistic.
507 One way of doing this would be to construct ID as a theistic science starting from the presupposition that God
exists. This would then supply the basic knowledge that a designer capable of creating life exists. The aim of ID’s
project would then be to determine whether signs of the divine intelligence can be seen in the order of nature, and
whether God created life through evolution or through miracles surpassing the laws of nature.
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the designer open.508 As I argued in chapter 4.3, certain types of “design-like” order are
thought to be best explained by design even if we know nothing about the designer’s
motivations beforehand.509
So, in the ID movement's thought, the design argument does not need to predict what
the designer would do. Rather, the argument simply posits that based on our experience,
designers have the right sort of causal powers to explain certain types of order, and that this
is sufficient to make design into a potential explanation. In chapter 3.3, I pointed out that in
the philosophy of explanation, there has been a tendency to separate the concepts of
predictive capability and explanatory power. This trend seems to work in favour of the
possibility of design arguments like those of the ID movement. If there is some property
which is conceptually linked to intelligent agency, then this could help make the design
hypothesis far more intuitively plausible than any frivolous troll hypothesis. Sober’s thought
experiment about trolls in the basement can be modified to show the importance of the
connection. Suppose that the noise from the basement was not just some random rumbling,
but was analogous to beautiful orchestra music. Then the hypothesis of design would seem
to be the best explanation, even if we did not have independent evidence of a designer in the
basement. The pattern in this case would arguably be enough to confirm the design
hypothesis without additional evidence. Because of our background knowledge, the most
reasonable possibility would be a human designer.
The Bayesian probability calculus can be used to further elucidate the differences
between ID and natural theology. Bayesian logic allows for the calculation of the probability
of the hypothesis given the evidence. The probability of the hypothesis depends on both the
background probability of the hypothesis without the evidence, the background probability
of the evidence, and the degree to which the hypothesis predicts the evidence.510 Natural
theologians assess all of these factors, but the Intelligent Design literature only directly
addresses the background probability of the hypothesis without the evidence and argues
that the this surprising evidence is well explained on the hypothesis of design, but poorly
explained without it. ID assumes that the background probability of the design hypothesis
can even be very low, but it will still be confirmed by the data, since the data is so poorly
explained without it. As long as the prior probability of the design hypothesis is not set to
zero (in which case no conceivable evidence could confirm it), we can indeed imagine a body
of evidence that would be sufficient to confirm the hypothesis. I will argue this further in
chapter 7.3. 511
508 In chapters 3.2. and 3.3., I argued that “intelligent design” used as explanation by the ID theorists nevertheless
assumes that the designer has some purpose for creating. For this purpose, the designer then forms a plan, and
arranges  matter  to  fulfil  this  plan.  Only  the  designer’s  will  to  create  a  certain  type  of  order  is  assumed,  but
nothing is said about his deeper motives.
509 For example, see Behe 2006a, 196.
510 See Joyce (2003) and Howson & Urbach 2006 for more on Bayesianism.
511 The  case  has  an  interesting  analogy  in  the  discussion  of  the  probability  of  Jesus'  resurrection.  Richard
Swinburne (2003) argues that the credibility of Jesus' resurrection is highly dependent on having at least a
moderate  background probability  for  the  existence  of  the  kind of  God who might  reveal  himself  in  history.  In
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Nevertheless, it may well be that the movement's argumentation suffers from not
discussing the background probability of the design hypothesis more clearly. Helen De Cruz
and Jonathan De Smedt have argued, it is plausible that different opinions about design are
often influenced to a large degree by different background probabilities given to design
because of different basic beliefs.512 In chapter 3.4, I have also argued that different
philosophies of mind affect the argument. As Ratzsch argues, the background assumptions
affecting evaluations of the argument are “highly diverse and contentious”.513 So, what does the
ID literature have to say about the matter?
The Requirement of Independent Evidence and the Design Connection
As I argued in chapters 3.4 and 3.5, the Intelligent Design theorists do recognize the effects of
background beliefs on evaluations of the design argument. The designedness of nature’s
order is clearly much more of a live possibility for theists than it is for naturalists.
Nevertheless, the ID theorists emphasize that their design argument does not require
background knowledge about the designer. Stephen C. Meyer has provided the most in-
depth defence of this possibility within ID literature.
Meyer makes a distinction between the causal adequacy criterion and the causal
existence criterion. The causal adequacy criterion simply means the causal powers of the
supposed cause in relation to the data, whereas the causal existence criterion refers to
independent evidence supporting the existence of this cause at the proper time. To refer back
to Sober's example of the troll hypothesis, causal adequacy refers to the power of the trolls to
cause the strange sound, and causal existence refers to the probability of the existence of
trolls with these powers in the right place to cause the sound. Contrary to Sober, Meyer
argues that it can be sufficient for the design argument to fulfil the causal adequacy
condition. This can in turn demonstrate the existence of a designer at the right time, even
without any further supporting evidence.514
Meyer's  argument  for  this  conclusion  is  twofold.  First  (1),  according  to  Meyer,  causal
adequacy is sufficient to establish the existence of the cause, if this cause is the only cause
which is known to have the powers to explain the evidence. In this case, even a low prior
probability will be enough to make the design hypothesis plausible, since it is far superior to
its eliminated alternatives. This transforms the design argument into an inference to the only
explanation and requires quite a stringent rejection of naturalistic explanations. This is
problematic for Intelligent Design if its arguments do not succeed in completely eliminating
contrast to Swinburne, McGrew (2009) argues that the historical evidence favoring Jesus' resurrection is so strong
that even a much smaller probability for the existence of this kind of God will suffice for the argument.
512 De Cruz & De Smedt 2010. Himma (2005) also argues that an evalution of the prior probability of the
hypothesis is important for the design argument.
513 Ratzsch 2010.
514 Meyer 2009, 166-168.
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naturalistic explanation in the sense of removing all plausibility from them.515 Here Meyer
refers to discussion in the philosophy of science as support: many philosophers have indeed
argued that if some type of cause is the only one known to be able to explain some type of
phenomena, then finding such phenomena does typically constitute evidence of the existence
of such a cause. For example, the finding of iridium at the K-T boundary worldwide
provides evidence of an asteroid impact roughly 65 million years ago. So, using the causal
adequacy criterion in this way is not without precedent.516
Second, Meyer argues that design detection does not in practice require prior
knowledge of the designer. For example, archaeologists can infer the existence of a
previously unknown human civilization when they find the remains of a city, because
human civilization is the only known cause which can explain the remains. The motives of
the designers are only inferred after we have first detected their existence. The existence of
extraterrestrial aliens could also in principle be inferred based on the discovery of some
artefact on an alien planet or a signal in space, even if we had no previous knowledge of the
existence of these aliens or their motivations.517
I  do not think the analogies of  the meteor impacts and human design allow Meyer to
wholly sidestep the causal existence criterion. Even if we had no prior evidence of a
meteorite impact 65 million years ago, we could still give this kind of event a non-zero
probability based on our general cosmological knowledge. In the case of human design, we
similarly already have knowledge that humans live on our planet, and have lived for quite
some time. So, in both cases, some estimate of the background probability of design can be
made. At least on a Bayesian scheme, the background probability cannot be avoided.
Furthermore, Meyer's design argument also differs from these cases by the amount of
details it can provide. We also often have a good idea of what designed objects are for and
how they are made, as well as about the possible motivations of designers. We have much
knowledge of humans and artefactual objects, which helps in making such design inferences.
Critics of the design argument can claim that the lack of such detailed knowledge speaks
against ID’s design inference, because it has less predictive power and testability than
inferences of human design. Even in Meyer’s example of the detection of extraterrestrial
alien intelligence, we do have at least an inkling of the possibility that such intelligences
exist, and could perhaps form hypotheses about possible motives based on human
comparisons.518
Despite these criticisms, I think Meyer's basic usage of the causal adequacy criterion is
sound, as long as the prior probability of the design hypothesis is not set to zero. If there is a
design connection of the sort analysed in chapter 4.3, the design argument does not require
knowledge of the designer's motivations. Rather, our knowledge of the nature of design as a
cause, acquired through induction and rational intuitions, can help answer the charge that
515 Meyer 2009, 381-383
516 See Cleland 2011 for an overview of the history of this discussion.
517 Meyer 2009, 381-383.
518 For further discussion of such thought experiments, see chapter 7.3 of the present study.
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design hypotheses are frivolous. Though a design hypothesis can in principle be formulated
to explain any sort of affairs (designers are crafty creatures), it is plausible that there are
some  features  (such  as  teleology)  that  design  is  a  more  fitting  explanation  for.  So,  in  the
Intelligent Design movement’s formulation, the design argument is an inference to the best
explanation that is supported by analogical and inductive arguments as well as rational
intuitions about the nature of design as a cause. Whereas the arguments of theistic natural
theology are based on a hypothesis both about the nature and the motivations of the deity,
the ID movement’s design argument is based only on a general knowledge of what designers
are like and what sort of capabilities they have. The only motivation that is assumed of the
designer is the motivation to create the observed order.519
It could be argued that the requirement of independent evidence, taken to extremes,
would make knowledge about any new kind of entities impossible. For example, suppose
that physicists discover that a new type of matter is required to explain the properties of the
observed universe. It would not be reasonable to argue that we cannot accept this theory,
because we have not previously believed in the existence of this new kind of matter. John
Leslie argues that even the existence of something as improbable as telepathy could in
principle be demonstrated like this, even though we have no previous knowledge of it.
Suppose that after creating a painting of the countryside, Jones tries to transmit the results to
Smith  by  the  mere  power  of  thought.  Behold,  Smith  is  able  to  reproduce  the  painting  in
every detail. Suppose further that this happens many times and there is evidence against any
cheating. Are we justified in rejecting the possibility of telepathy as an explanation just
because we do not have previous evidence of it?520 Again, the evaluation of any purported
instance of telepathy would indeed also depend on our background beliefs.
It seems reasonable to suppose that independent evidence of the designer would
indeed help the design argument. However, what form this independent evidence could
take? Intelligence cannot be observed directly. Rather, it seems that we only know our own
intelligence through introspection and others through intuition or inference. So in practice all
our evidence of the existence of some non-human intelligence would be indirect, and so it
could be analysed by using the inference to the best explanation. Then the requirement of
independent evidence translates to a request that the design hypothesis should also be the
best explanation for independently discovered facts B, C and D, rather than just fact A. It
should not just explain a small amount of data, but should be a conclusion based on many
independent lines of evidence. But according to proponents of ID, this is just what the design
hypothesis already does. The cosmic and biological arguments for design are collections of a
vast variety of facts which are all thought to be explained by the same hypothesis of design.
So the design argument is not alone after all – it is itself a cumulative case argument. Perhaps
the cumulative evidence of design could in principle be so convincing that, like the above
519 McGrew (2004) argues similarly that the general properties of the designer are in principle sufficient for a
design argument.
520 Leslie 1989, 18.
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example of music from the basement, it could provide a reason to believe in design without
other supporting arguments. I will look at this possibility in more detail in chapter 7.3. As I
will argue further in that chapter, this does not mean that our world necessarily contains
evidence like this in actuality, but the logical possibility of this type of inference is
nevertheless interesting.
In chapter 3.4, I argued against a priori criteria for excluding design inferences and in
favour of using criteria that allow for design in principle. I argued that evaluating the
evidence for these kinds of arguments is important. Here, in arguing against the independent
evidence requirement as an absolute requirement, I am again coming to the same conclusion.
However, just as in chapter 3.4, this conclusion does not mean the end of the discussion. A
critic of ID’s design arguments could well admit the possibility that we could have evidence
of life’s design, while denying that we actually have such evidence. Different design
inferences could also exhibit different degrees of explanatory virtues.
4.5. Inference to the Only Explanation
I have argued that the inference to the best explanation is a promising way to formulate the
design argument’s logic. Often ID proponents go further than merely propose ID as the best
explanation, however. It is also argued that ID is the only explanation for some things and
that all remotely plausible competing hypotheses can be decisively eliminated. Building on
the concept of the inference to the best explanation, Alexander Bird has defended an account
of “inference to the only explanation” (IOE).521 Bird’s purpose is to develop the logic of the
inference to the best explanation further so that it can give a stronger guarantee of the
reliability of the hypothesis. Bird’s development of the idea follows the logic of Sherlock
Holmes: “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable,
must be the truth.”522 It is important to note that according to Bird, not nearly all inferences
even in natural science can be legitimately called inferences to the only explanation. The
problem of underdetermination prevents this – often there will be several different
explanations for the same data, and not all of them can be decisively eliminated. Showing
other alternatives to be improbable is sufficient for rational belief and the use of the inference
to the best explanation, but the inference to the only explanation requires more than
improbability – it requires elimination.523 Again, in these types of inferences, the initial
background probability of the hypothesis can be very low, as long as the hypothesis is
strongly confirmed by the evidence, and all other explanations can be eliminated.
The ID theorists themselves have not used the term “inference to the only explanation”
of their inference. However, this development of the inference to the best explanation does fit
521 E.g. Bird 2005, 2007, 2010.
522 Doyle 1892, “The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet”.
523 Bird 2005, 26-28.
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the way Behe, Meyer and Dembski argue. The emphasis on the ability to eliminate
competitive explanations and the confidence in the reliability of the hypothesis are certainly
present in their formulations of the design argument. In the previous chapter, we saw that
because Meyer sees intelligent design as the only causally adequate explanation for certain
types of order, he is able to bypass the requirement of independent evidence for the
designer. This is in line with the Holmesian methodology: once you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains must be the truth, even if it is highly improbable. However,
within the Intelligent Design movement, William Dembski has emphasized the elimination
of alternative explanations the most, even calling his methodology an “eliminative design
inference” or the design filter, where design is inferred only after all other explanations have
been eliminated. I will first introduce Dembski’s methodology, then consider some problems
of these eliminative design arguments.
Dembski’s Eliminative Design Argument
Dembski’s argument is complex and multi-staged, construed as an eliminative argument
where a pattern exhibiting “specified complexity” is seen as designed after finding
reasonable grounds for eliminating chance and necessity (conincidences and law-like
regularities) as plausible explanations.524 A short sequence of letters like “CAT” is specified
but not complex – finding such a pattern written in Scrabble letters might still be explained
as the coincidental result of pieces dropped randomly. A long sequence like
“QNEDFJEFOIJKFEES….” is complex but not specified – it does not match a previously
known pattern. A Shakespearean sonnet, on the other hand, is both complex and specified.
Specified complexity like this is, for Dembski, a reliable sign of intelligent design and far too
difficult to explain by referring to chance processes or the regularities of nature.
The argument could be formulated as follows in a simple deductive manner:
14. Some things in nature exhibit specified complexity.
15. Specified complexity is not producible without intelligent design.
16. Therefore, the specified complexity in nature is a product of intelligent design.
Dembski’s description of designed patterns as “specified complexity” and his arguments for
the elimination of chance and necessity are the most original parts of Dembski’s project.
Though his process for eliminating chance and design is complex, Dembski argues that this
form of inference also underlies our intuitive reasoning about design – without it, we could
524 E.g. Dembski 1998a, Dembski 2002, Dembski 2004. Dembski’s definitions for chance and regularity are as
follows: “To  attribute  an  event  to  law  is  to  say  that  the  event  will  almost  always  happen  given  certain  antecedent
circumstances. To attribute an event to chance is to say that its occurrence is characterized by some (perhaps not fully
specified) probability distribution according to which the event might equally well not have happened. To attribute an event
to design is to say that it cannot plausibly be referred to either law or chance” (Dembski 1998c, 98).
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not even infer that our family members have signs of intelligence.525 As we will  see below,
some critics have contested that Dembski’s procedure is an accurate description of how we
detect design. But the validity of the process for detecting design can be evaluated regardless
of whether it is the procedure we typically use. The following quote illustrates the complex
nature of Dembski’s argument:
a. A subject S learns that an event E has occurred.
b. By examining the circumstances  under  which E occurred,  S  finds that  a  chance
process characterized by the chance hypothesis H and the probability measure P
could have been operating to produce E.
c. S identifies a pattern D that delimits the event E.
d. S calculates the probability of the event D* given the chance hypothesis H, that is
P(D* | H) = P
e. In  accord  with  how  important  it  is  for  S  to  avoid  a  “false  positive”  (i.e.
attributing E to something other than the chance hypothesis H in case H actually
was  responsible  for  E),  S  fixes  a  set  of  probabilistic  resources  Ω characterizing
the  relevant  ways  D*  (and  by  implication  E)  might  have  occurred  and  been
specified given the chance hypothesis H.
f. Using the probabilistic resources Ω, S identifies the saturated event D* Ω and
calculates (or approximates) the associated saturated probability P Ω (= P(D *Ω |
H)
g. S finds that the saturated probability P Ω is sufficiently small.
h. S identifies side information I and confirms that I satisfies the conditional
independence condition, that is, that for any subinformation J generated by I, J is
conditionally independent of E given H, that is, P(E | H & J) = P ( E| H).
i. With respect to a bounded complexity measure Φ ( = φ, λ) that characterizes S’s
problem-solving capacity, S confirms that D and I together satisfy the tractability
condition,  that  is,  that  the  problem  of  formulating  the  pattern  D  from  the  side
information I is tractable, or equivalently, Φ (D | I) < λ.
j. S  is  warranted  in  inferring  that  E  did  not  occur  according  to  the  chance
hypothesis H. 526
Dembski’s method for eliminating chance as an explanation is based on the statistical
methods developed by mathematician Ronald A. Fisher (1890 - 1962). Fisher uses a statistical
approach for testing hypotheses. If the observed measurements are far from what would be
expected based on a random distribution (i.e. they lie in the “rejection region”), then the
chance hypothesis can be discarded. Dembski argues that if some improbable event also has
a clear pattern, which Dembski elsewhere calls a “specification”, then the chance hypothesis
can be eliminated, as in Fisher’s statistical analysis.527
525 Dembski 2003, chapter 32.
526 Dembski 1998a, 167-174.
527 E.g. Dembski 2005, 12-13: “specifications are patterns delineating events of small probability whose occurrence cannot
reasonably be attributed to chance.” Specified complexity, for Dembski, can also be characterized as having low
descriptive complexity while having high probabilistic complexity. Dembski also links the concept to
mathematical “Kolmogorov complexity”. (Dembski 2008, 168-169.)
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For Dembski, all complex patterns are also defined as highly improbable, and
improbability in itself is thus not evidence of design. For instance, the precise arrangement
of the grains of sand on any given beach is extremely improbable given the chance
hypothesis, as is any combination of cards in a poker game. However, this improbability in
itself does not give evidence of design. Rather, it is only when some highly improbable order
matches an independently specifiable, easily describable pattern, that we can be justified in
eliminating the chance hypothesis.528
In Dembski's schema, just how much improbability the eliminative argument requires
depends on what we think the “probabilistic resources” available to generate the pattern
without design are, and how certain we want to be before eliminating chance. Not all
examples of specified complexity we observe must be due to design, because the
probabilistic resources must also be considered. In poker, a straight flush is a specification,
but a player can get a straight flush without cheating. However, a player who always gets a
straight flush will be considered a cheater, because this is so extremely improbable
(complex) and the outcome is specified. Dembski himself formulates an “universal
probability bound”, meaning the amount of specified complexity that he argues is
impossible to produce by chance, given the limited temporal history and finiteness of the
universe. This is calculated by multiplying the amount of atoms in the observable universe,
the amount of maximum physical interactions that can occur in a second, and a billion times
the age of the universe in seconds. The resulting number (10^-150) is fantastically large, and
according to Dembski, we usually will not need to set the universal probability bound this
high before we can eliminate chance-based explanations. In practice he argues even smaller
amounts of specified complexity (such as multiple straight flushes) can be justifiable seen as
designed.529
Fisher argued that the rejection region must be specified in advance of the
experiments, in order to avoid cherry-picking the data or what Dembski calls “fabrications”:
the imposing of a pattern upon truly random data. In contrast to this, Dembski argues that
the concept of a specification allows us to also specify a “rejection region” after the pattern
has been observed. The conditional independence condition and the tractability condition,
discussed in steps h and i of the above formulation, are meant to ensure that the pattern is
not just a fabrication, but a true specification.530
528 Dembski & Wells 2008, 168-169.
529 Dembski 1998a, 167-174. Elsberry (2007, 285) criticizes Dembski’s inability to define the precise point where we
can use the criterion of specified complexity as a reliable marker of intelligent agency. I don’t think the difficulty
is serious – Dembski does state that we can set this based on how confident we want to be of the conclusion of
Intelligent Design. The other difficulties that I outline in the main text are more severe.
530 See Dembski 2005, 32-34.
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Philosophical Critiques of Dembski
Some critics have argued that Dembski errs in arguing that patterns can be recognized even
if the “rejection region” is not specified temporally before seeing the event being discussed
(e.g. biological complexity or some other putative example of specified complexity).531
However, I do not think this is a weak point of Dembski’s analysis. The natural sciences
seem to abound in examples of how a real pattern can be found in some data after its initial
discovery. For example, biological order has become better and better understood over time.
Dawkins even uses arguments similar to Dembski when concluding that random chance is
not a good explanation for biology, because biological order is complex and “specified”,
fitting a certain function.532 Dembski provides the example of cryptanalysis, where an
apparently random signal is later deciphered by counter-intelligence officers and revealed to
contain an encrypted message. In these examples, a real pattern is found temporally after the
event.533
A much more serious problem in Dembski’s design argument is his initial definition of
design simply as the exclusion of chance and necessity. As noted, Dembski’s methodology is
reminiscent of the Holmesian method: “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever
remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.”534 However, to even qualify as
“improbable”, design must have some positive arguments in its favour, not just arguments
against alternatives. It is not enough to say that a chance-based explanation is impossibly
improbable if design is equally improbable; rather, design must be a better explanation than
chance.535 Dembski’s formulation of his argument as an eliminative inference has been
criticized on this basis as a “designer of the gaps”-argument.536 Dembski himself recognized
this problem already in his book The Design Inference (1998).537 In this work, Dembski wrote
that “the design that emerges from the design inference must not be conflated with intelligent agency.
Though they are frequently linked, they are separate.”538 As Ratzsch argues, Dembski seems to be
531 E.g. Elsberry 2007, 253.
532 Dawkins writes: “Hitting upon the lucky number that opens the bank’s safe is the equivalent – – of hurling scrap metal
around  at  random  and  happening  to  assemble  a  Boeing  747.  Of  all  the  millions  of  unique  and,  with  hindsight,  equally
improbable, positions of the combination lock, only one opens the lock. Similarly, of all the millions of unique and, with
hindsight, equally improbable, arrangement of a heap of junk, only one (or very few) will fly. The uniqueness of the
arrangement that flies, or that opens the safe, is nothing to do with hindsight. It is specified in advance.” (Dawkins, 1991,
8).
533 Dembski 1998a.
534 Doyle 1892, “The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet”, spoken by the character Sherlock Holmes. Dembski himself
recognizes the similarity here (2005, 28).
535 Himma 2005, 1; Dawes 2007, 74-75.
536 E,g. Elsberry 2007, 259-260. For further criticisms of Dembski see also Pennock 2001.
537 The Design Inference is  still  Dembski’s  most  extensive  analysis  of  the  design  argument  and  the  concept  of
specified complexity, though he has later modified his argument in many respects. (Dembski 2005, 32-34.)
538 Dembski 1998a, 5.
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presupposing that there is some further step, in addition to his explanatory filter, which is
required for having evidence of intelligent agency.539
In The Design Inference Dembski does indeed also argue that “there is an intimate
connection between design [as identified by the explanatory filter] and intelligent agency.”540
Later Dembski has often written of specified complexity as positive evidence of the action of
intelligent agency. Specified complexity, for him, eliminates chance and necessity as
explanations, and also acts as evidence for intelligent design as the true explanation of some
event: “Often, when an intelligent agent acts, it leaves behind an identifying mark that clearly
signals its intelligence. This mark of intelligence is known as specified complexity.”541 As I argued in
chapter 4.3, Dembski and the other ID theorists see a connection between teleological
features of nature and intelligent design as a cause.
Unfortunately, Dembski does not focus much time on defining the logic of the further
step required to move from his eliminative argument to the conclusion that intelligent
design is responsible. In many of his accounts of specified complexity, Dembski seems
simply to argue that his methodology makes explicit our common, intuitive logic of design
detection.542 He emphasizes that specified complexity is linked in our inductive experience to
intelligent design as a cause, as seen in chapter 4.3. However, the connection between
teleological causes and teleological order is much more intuitively clear than the connection
between Dembski’s specified complexity and intelligence. Dembski’s explanation for the
connection is that intelligence is fundamentally about making choices, and choices (such as
between 0 and 1 in binary code) are what define information. So, intelligent beings naturally
produce information.543 But this definition of information and choice is much too broad – as
will become clear in chapter 6.1, the informational content of any types of order can be
described and counted in bits using information theory, even though in many cases it is clear
that it is not produced by intelligence. It is not clear how patterns are recognized as
“specified” and what is the relationship of “specified complexity” to the more intuitive
categories “teleology” and “rational order.” It could be argued that teleology and rational
order are both examples of “specified complexity”, since in both cases the observed order fits
a complex pattern. However, this still does not make the link between the general category
“specified complexity” and intelligent design clear. Dembski uses the term “specified
complexity” to provide a more rigorous and non-subjective definition of design, but the
problem is that design as an explanation is not as clearly linked to specified complexity as it
is to the more subjective concept of teleology. It is therefore not clear how specified
complexity can help us avoid the traditional evidences of design such as the rationality,
teleology and beauty of nature.544
539 Ratzsch 2001, 155.
540 Dembski 1998a, 62.
541 Dembski & Wells 2008, 165.
542 E.g. Dembski & Wells 2008, chapter 7; Dembski & Witt 2010.
543 Dembski 1998a, 62.
544 Similarly Murray 2003, 7-8.
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In the same vein, many critics of Dembski have also argued that our actual methods for
detecting design are quite different. For example, Mark Perakh and Matt Young argue that
our design inferences work in the cases outlined by Dembski only “because of our extensive
knowledge about such objects and the human designers who create them. “545 Perhaps our design
inferences are actually based on the comparison of different likely explanations based on our
background knowledge, so that the role of background assumptions is much greater than
Dembski’s methodology can acknowledge.546 As noted, Ratzsch similarly argues that we
recognize design first by signs of artefactuality and only secondly by markers of intelligent
agency such as complexity and rationality. Though Ratzsch defends the possibility of design
arguments, he also rejects Dembski’s specified complexity as a description of this
rationality.547
The power of Dembski’s argument to eliminate explanations based merely on chance is
often acknowledged in the discussion. However, typically critics of Dembski have argued
that nature itself might nevertheless possess self-organising powers that do not rely merely
on random chance or natural regularities, but on a dynamic evolutionary process combining
both. It has been argued that evolutionary theory provides a counter-example to Dembski,
because it shows that specified complexity can be generated by the regularities and
probabilistic processes of nature. Evolutionary theory does not postulate any random events
exceeding Dembski’s universal probability bound. Rather, biological order is thought to
emerge through small successive steps. Though the emergence of all biological complexity at
once would be a random event too incredible to be believed, its emergence through small
successive steps is thought to be well within the normal operation of nature.548
Dembski has initially tried to provide a mathematical formula for showing that there is
“law of conservation of information” which makes the generation of new specified
complexity impossible even through combinations of lawful regularity and random chance.
However, when responding to the above crucial evolutionary critique of his argument,
Dembski depends completely on other arguments against the plausibility of the Darwinian
mechanism. The main argument referenced by Dembski is Michael Behe’s argument from
irreducible complexity. Dembski argues that the problem of irreducible complexity shows
that biological specified complexity cannot be broken up to sufficiently small steps; even the
emergence of one new irreducibly complex biochemical machine is so improbable through
Darwinian mechanisms that it would violate the universal probability bound.549 Recently,
Dembski has expanded his argument to accommodate Darwinian evolution. According to
Dembski, if evolution does work, then his information-theoretical arguments show then it
must have been designed to do so. If this argument succeeds, then even the production of
545 Perakh & Young 2006, 194-195.
546 Sober, Fitelson & Stephens 1999.
547 Ratzsch 2001, appendix. Similarly Muller 2004 argues that Dembski’s explanatory filter does not adequately
describe how we detect design, though Dembski is on the right track.
548 Sober, Fitelson & Stephens 1999.
549 Dembski 2002a, chapters four and five.
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specified complexity through evolution would not necessarily provide a counter-example to
Dembski.550 I will continue this discussion in chapters six and eight.
Inference to the Best Explanation or to the Only Explanation?
The critique of alternative explanations is also important for inferences to the best
explanation, so in a sense it does not matter whether the design argument is called an
inference to the best explanation or an inference to the only explanation. The differences
between the two arguments are mainly of emphasis and degree of certainty. It seems that in
principle it would already be interesting to argue that design is simply the most plausible
explanation for some pattern in nature, rather than being the only remotely plausible
explanation. This would mean that the effects of background knowledge on the argument
would have to be considered in more detail, and the positive case for design would have to
be emphasized more. Perhaps Dembski’s argument could be better formulated as an
inference to the best explanation, comparing the combination of chance and law-like
regularities and design as explanations. He could then argue against the plausibility that
chance and law-like regularities could have produced some of the order in nature using the
same arguments.
Puzzlingly, Dembski himself rejects this interpretation of the design inference in favour
of his own eliminative design inferences.551 Dembski’s argument is that inferences to the best
explanation are based on Bayesian reasoning while his design inference is based on Fisherian
reasoning for rejecting a chance-based explanation. However, only Dembski’s rejection of
chance-based explanations is based on Fisherian reasoning. His acceptance of design has an
inductive basis that would be well described by Bayesian reasoning.
Dembski has argued his case for specified complexity in at times highly technical and
mathematical form, beginning with his book “The Design Inference” (1998). Both Behe and
Meyer have seen specified complexity as a good description of design. Behe’s definition of
design as the “purposeful arrangement of parts” and his idea that the strength of the design
inference increases as the complexity and specifity of order increases come rather close to
Dembski.  Behe  also  explicitly  refers  to  Dembski  as  providing  a  possibly  more  rigorous
definition of design.552 Meyer, too, uses specified complexity in his work to argue against
chance and natural law as explanations for the origin of life. For Meyer, Dembski’s “specified
complex information” well describes the sort of information found in DNA.553 However,
neither Behe nor Meyer use Dembski’s mathematical formulations, or Dembski’s explanatory
filter as a premise of their arguments. Rather, they rely more on the common understanding
550 Dembski & Marks 2009
551 E.g. Dembski 2005, 35-37; Dembski 2003, chapter 32.
552 Behe 2006a, chapter 9, note 5.
553 Meyer 2009.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
144
of inferences to the best explanation, with Dembski’s arguments serving in an auxiliary role
to help eliminate chance and regular natural processes as explanations.
In chapter four, I have argued that the ID movement’s design argument is best
understood as an inference to best explanation, with inductive and conceptual arguments
supporting the credibility of design as an explanation.554 However, several different
formulations of the argument are logically valid. As Gregory Dawes has argued, “While a
great deal of abuse has been directed at intelligent design theory (ID), its starting point is a fact about
biological organisms that cries out for explanation, namely “specified complexity” (SC). Advocates of
ID deploy three kind of argument from specified complexity to the existence of a designer: an
eliminative argument, an inductive argument, and an inference to the best explanation. Only the first
of these merits the abuse directed at it; the other two arguments are worthy of respect. If they fail, it is
only because we have a better explanation of SC, namely Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection”.555 My analysis supports Dawes’ contention that Intelligent Design’s analogical,
inductive arguments and the inference to the best explanation could all in principle be
convincing. Whether they actually are convincing depends on the state of the evidence. I also
agree with Dawes that eliminative arguments without positive reasons to believe in design
are not worth much. Eliminative arguments must be used as part of an inference to the best
explanation or an inference to the only explanation to be of use.
The Intelligent Design movement and many commentators agree with Dawes that the
critique based on naturalistic explanations for “design-like” properties is the central critique
of design arguments. This is the central reason why proponents of Intelligent Design spend
so much time arguing against naturalistic explanations. In my analysis of the logic of the
design argument in this chapter, I have also presented reasons for seeing this comparison
with natural explanations as crucial. However, in later chapters I will be arguing that design
arguments and natural explanations are not necessarily opposed, but could also be
conceived as explanations that work on different levels. The acceptance of the Darwinian
process need to imply that biological design does not give any evidence of design at all. But
arguing for this conclusion cannot proceed until I have examined the details of Intelligent
Design’s cosmic and biological design arguments.
554 Dawes (2009, 107-108) similarly argues that Stephen Meyer’s design argument is an inference to the best
explanation supported by inductive arguments.
555 Dawes 2007, 69.
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5. COSMIC DESIGN
This chapter focuses on ID's cosmic design arguments, which are based on global properties
of nature such as the fine-tuning of the natural laws necessary for the existence of complex
life, and the rationality of the cosmos which makes scientific discovery possible. Cosmic
design arguments have been created outside the Intelligent Design movement, and the ID
theorists use these theorists in formulating their own cosmic design arguments. The most
influential proponents of the fine-tuning argument are outside the ID movement. However,
Robin Collins, who presents the most in-depth contemporary defence of the fine-tuning
design argument, has previously been a fellow of the Discovery Institute. Though Collins has
since parted ways with the ID movement, this history makes it probable that there has been
some cross-pollination between contemporary cosmic and biological design arguments.556
Because much of the important discussion has happened outside the discussion on
Intelligent Design, I will also reference many arguments made outside the ID literature in
this chapter. I then analyse how these arguments relate to the discussion within Intelligent
Design.
However, as I argued in chapter 3.3, cosmic design arguments are also important for
the ID movement. In the movement's discourse, cosmic design arguments function to
legitimize the question of biological design: if there is design on the cosmic level, why not
also on the level of biological details? However, there are also differences between cosmic
and biological design arguments. Though cosmic design arguments utilize empirical data,
they nevertheless operate on a different explanatory level than natural science, and their
proponents can accept all mainstream scientific theories as they are. Biological design
arguments, however, are often construed as a comparison of the explanatory powers of
naturalistic evolution and intelligent design in explaining biological complexity.
5.1. The Suitability of the Cosmos for Life
The basic idea that nature must have properties which allows for the existence of complex
life seems to be as true as the fact of our existence.557 At the everyday level, this can be seen in
the way human life depends on the environment. Life operates in a complex ecosystem
which is itself dependent on antecedent conditions: soil must have nutrients that allow the
556 For Collins’ defence of the fine-tuning argument, see e.g. Collins 2012; for his quite friendly critique of
Intelligent Design, see Collins 2006.
557 According to Ikeda & Jefferys (2006), though, this is only obvious on the naturalistic understanding of reality.
Supposing that God wanted to create and sustain human life, he could in principle also do so through constant
miracles without creating a cosmos that allows for the evolution or sustenance of complex life. However, this is
not the traditional Christian understanding of how God creates. For philosophical criticisms of Ikeda & Jeffreys,
see Monton 2008.
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growth of plants, water must be present, as must air and light. Water, wind and fire have
been used to power our economies and technology and the phenomena of astronomy have
allowed the creation of calendars. It may be quite natural to wonder whether these and other
environmental factors were not in fact designed for our benefit, and are not just accidentally
useful.558 A design argument to this effect was already formulated by the Jewish philosopher
Philo (20 BC - 40 AD), who argued that the cosmos can be compared to a house which has
been built to accommodate people. According to Philo, just as we would immediately see
that a well-built house has an architect, so we should also see the cosmos as designed. In
both cases, Philo sees the apparent teleology as a sign of purposive design.559
The Fine-Tuning Argument
The fine-tuning design argument is based on the observation that the laws of nature allow
for the existence of complex life. The “weak anthropic principle”, popularised by John
Barrow and Frank Tipler, states that “the observed values of all physical and cosmological
quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there
exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough
for it to have already done so.”560
The modern fine-tuning design argument is based on the way the natural sciences have
explicated the requirements for the evolution of carbon-based complex life. It appears that
the requirements for the emergence of complex life are very stringent, and if the constants of
nature were slightly different, the evolution and continued existence of complex life would
be impossible. In the discussion concerning fine-tuning, the use of the term “fine-tuning” is
not typically understood to assume that there is a designer. The idea is rather that the laws of
nature are balanced between extremes and are just right to allow for the existence of life.
Supposing that the laws of nature were slightly different in this or that direction, then life
would not be possible. ID theorists Gonzales and Richards illustrate this with the analogy of
a universe-creating machine. The machine contains a dial for each law and constant of
nature. All of the different variables have to be set just right for life to be possible. The
conditions required for life are stringent, and it seems that “if we were just to pick these values
at random, we would almost never find a combination compatible with life or anything like it.”561
There are many examples of fine-tuning in the scientific literature, and very few critics
of the fine-tuning argument question the fine-tuning of the cosmos for life.562 Cosmologists
558 Barrow & Tipler 1996, chapter 2. The idea about providence can be found in Scriptures like Psalm 104.
Interestingly, this psalm emphasizes God’s providential care not just for humans, but also for animals.
559 Legum Allegoriae III, 32, 98-99. Hurlbutt 1985, 8.
560 Barrow & Tipler 1996, 16. ID theorists Gonzales and Richards simplify the principle as follows: “we should
expect to observe conditions, however unusual, compatible with or even necessary for our existence as observers.”(Gonzales
& Richards 2004, 136.)
561 Gonzales & Richards 2004, 197.
562 Stenger (2011) is a prominent exception to this trend.
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and physicists with very different worldviews– such as Martin Rees563, Paul Davies564, and
Stephen Hawking565 – acknowledge the reality of fine-tuning. In light of this quite broad
consensus, Collins seems to be right to argue that while some examples have been shown to
be poor in the course of time, most have stood the test of time. It thus seems unlikely that the
majority of the examples will be shown to be scientifically incorrect.566 There is vast literature
on fine-tuning, where these and other examples are explored and many are shown to have
good evidence.567
The evidence for fine-tuning can be broadly classified into four types. First (1), the
general existence and properties of the laws and forces of nature is important. For example,
all of the four basic forces have to exist.568 Second (2), The relative strenghts of the basic
forces of nature must be such that they allow life to exist.569 Third (3), the starting conditions
of the cosmos must be appropriate, with the proper arrangement of matter and anti-matter.570
Fourth (4) the properties of the elements which are consequences of the previous three
factors must allow for life: life needs suitable “building blocks.”571
In the general literature about fine-tuning, a common example of this fitness of the
laws of nature for life comes from the fine-tuning of the four basic forces of nature. These
examples fall into the first and second category, and are commonly used by the ID
theorists.572 The strengths of gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force and the
weak nuclear force must be in right proportion to each other. The strong nuclear force holds
the protons and neutrons of the atomic nuclei together, offsetting the natural repulsion
between positively charged protons. With a weaker strong nuclear force, we would have
much fewer elements, missing many of those crucial to life. The lighter elements would also
be radioactive to the extent of making life impossible. If the gravitational force were weaker,
the expansion after the Big Bang would have been too rapid and clumps of matter like stars
and galaxies could not have formed. If it were stronger, the universe would have collapsed
in on itself. It is that in addition to existing, all of the major constants have to have values
which are suitable for life.573
Examples of the fourth type of fine-tuning have also been commonly used by the ID
movement, and here the movement has even advanced the discussion itself. These examples
are closer to the level that is observable in our everyday lives or with basic scientific
instruments. It is argued that the properties of water, oxygen, light and carbon are fine-tuned
563 Rees 2000.
564 Davies 1982, chapter 4; Davies 2006.
565 Hawking & Mlodinow 2010.
566 Collins 2003.
567 See e.g. Barrow, Conway-Morris, Freeland & Harper (eds) 2008.
568 Collins 2012.
569 Rees 2000.
570 Davies 1982, chapter 4; Davies 2006.
571 Denton 1998; Barrow, Conway-Morris, Freeland & Harper (eds) 2008.
572 Gonzales & Richards 2004, 201-205. Denton 1998, Behe 2007, Dembski 2003, Meyer 1999.
573 Leslie 1989, 2-6; Collins 2003, 183-190.
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for life.574 The properties of water are a popular example. Water is an essential liquid to life
for many reasons: it appears to the ID theorists that all of its properties are fine-tuned to
benefit life. Water has anomalous thermal properties when compared to other substances.
Typically, things contract when they cool and expand when they are heated. Water, by
contrast, contracts up to 4 °C, and then starts to expand, turning into ice at 0 °C. This is
important because the densest water will also sink to the bottom. If frozen water was more
contracted and thus heavier than water at 4 °C, lakes and oceans would freeze from the
bottom up. This ice, untouched by the melting rays of the sun, would accumulate year by
year and eventually our planet would be locked in a perpetual ice age. The ID theorists are
able to present numerous examples like this from the other properties of water, as well as the
properties of carbon, oxygen and light. Again, the argument is that these properties are
remarkably fine-tuned for allowing the existence of life, and that this is best explained by
intelligent design.575
The Rationality of the Cosmos
The data used in cosmic design arguments is not limited to the fine-tuning of the cosmos,
however. The cosmic design argument also appeals to the general rationality of the cosmos.
Albert Einstein famously said that “the most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is
comprehensible.”576 In the broader discussion on fine-tuning, this argument has been
developed by philosophers like John Leslie, Richard Swinburne and Robin Collins.577 The
argument has also been taken up and extended by the ID movement’s theorists Benjamin
Wiker, Jonathan Witt, Guillermo Gonzales and Jay Richards.578
The design argument based on the rationality of the cosmos is not based just on the
general intelligiblity of the cosmos. Rather, particular features of the order of nature are
argued to be fine-tuned so as to make nature comprehensible and amenable to scientific
discovery. Thus the possibility of natural science and the development of technology are
upheld alongside the possibility of complex life as another outcome of fine-tuning. The ID
theorists consider these features of the universe to be surprising and in need of
explanation.579
574 Gonzales & Richards (2004) and Wiker and Witt (2006) follow Denton 1998 in developing this argument. Behe
repeats parts of the argument, but doesn’t develop it much further (2007, 207-216). There is one difference in how
the  ID  theorists  construe  the  fine-tuning  argument  when  compared  to  many  theistic  evolutionists:  for  the  ID
theorists,  the  fine-tuning  of  the  natural  laws  is  not  sufficient  to  make  the  evolution  of  all  of  life  possible,  but
further actions from the designer are required.
575 Wiker & Witt 2006, Gonzales & Richards 2004.
576 Quoted in Wiker & Witt 2006, 237.
577 Leslie 1989, 58-61; Swinburne 2004a, chapter 8, Collins 2005a.
578 E.g. Wiker & Witt 2006, Gonzales & Richards 2004.
579 It  is  interesting  that  these  two  possibilities  are  used  as  the  most  central  examples  of  fine-tuning.  Richard
Swinburne’s (2004) fine-tuning argument is on a more general level: he argues that the laws of nature are
structured in this way not just to allow for natural science,  but to allow for fruitful interaction between people
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As one example of such an empirical argument, Guillermo Gonzales and Jay Richards
have argued that empirical studies have revealed a correlation between the conditions that
allow for habitability and the conditions that allow for scientific discovery. They argue that
only a very small section of the universe is habitable, and it is this same section which also
allows for scientific discovery. The features which are fine-tuned for life are, according to this
analysis, simultaneously fine-tuned for discovery. 580
The properties of the Earth’s atmosphere form one example of the correlation discussed
by Gonzales and Richards. The atmosphere contains elements like oxygen, which are highly
beneficial for life and technology. Oxygen is reactive and can thus provide energy for larger
living organisms as well as the fires of technology. It protects us from solar radiation in the
form of ozone. Simultaneously, our atmosphere also allows for the visible spectrum of light
to pass through it. Here our atmosphere is different from many other planets which have a
dense cloud covering at all times. Many gases do not allow for the passage of light. Thus the
Earth’s atmosphere is simultaneously beneficial to life and allows for scientific discovery,
unlike the atmospheres of other known planets. Gonzales and Richards provide many other
examples of this correlation, and conclude that this pattern is best explained by intelligent
design.581
A similar argument comes from the effectiveness of mathematics in scientific theories
about the universe. According to Benjamin Wiker and Jonathan Witt, for scientists “the
greatest and most peculiar intellectual exhilaration occurs when they find that the order of
mathematics illuminates the order of reality.”582 Mathematics is a human language, which is
nevertheless highly applicable to the study of nature. The possibility to formulate the basic
laws of physics in simple mathematical language has been highly conducive for the
development of natural science. Highly theoretical developments in mathematical theory
which have been studied simply for the sake of developing the system in a logically
consistent way have turned out to be highly useful in studies of nature.583 This pattern is not
an invention of the ID theorists. Eugene Wigner’s classic 1960 paper “The Unreasonable
Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” is an interesting and widely discussed
discussion  on  this,  which  the  ID  theorists  follow.  According  to  Wigner, “The miracle of the
appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a
wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve.”584
and the world in general. The ID movement’s emphasis reveals the emphasis it gives to the importance science
and technology and its desire to show the importance of design for natural science.
   This design argument is different from the more general "argument from intelligibility" championed by Huge
Meynell (1977). While Meynell argues that it may be incoherent to claim that some part of the universe could be
unintelligible, the design argument makes no such claim. It is rather based on the idea that empirical studies have
revealed many apparently contingent features of the universe which make it intelligible.
580 Gonzales & Richards 2004.
581 Gonzales & Richards 2004. Similarly Behe 2007, 208-209; Denton 1998, 21-46; Wiker & Witt 2006.
582 Wiker & Witt 2006, 103.
583 Wiker & Witt 2006.
584 Wigner 1960, discussed also in Dembski 1999b. A critic could argue that there are also theories of mathematics
which are useless for natural science, but this would be missing the point. It is still remarkable that mathematics
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Wiker and Witt admit that the progress of science has been a long and arduous journey
of discovery. No matter how far we probe, we encounter ever further mysteries. Our best
scientific  theories  turn  out  to  be  just  approximations  from  which  we  can  proceed  to  more
accurate theories. For Wiker and Witt, this nevertheless does not provide counterevidence to
the claim that the universe is intelligible. This is because on each level of increasing
understanding, our models of reality still work and allow us to proceed deeper into
understanding nature.585 In response, one could argue that many current theories of physics,
such as quantum mechanics, are counter-intuitive and are only understood by a handful of
brilliant physicists. There may be some truth to this critique, but on the other hand quantum
theory can also be understood as a further example of our coming to understand the
cosmos.586 Einstein thought the universe was intelligible, even though his work on general
relativity is certainly not understood by all.
Wiker and Witt thus interpret the simultaneous mysteriousness and intelligibility of
nature as a strength of the design argument. Using the periodic table as one example, they
argue that the order of nature is built in a way that makes it possible for us to proceed to an
ever deeper understanding of nature: “The universe, and our privileged place in it, proves not
only meaningful; the cup of its meaning continually overflows into mystery and wonder. The universe
is crafted to condescend to our capacities as a teacher to a student and to draw us patiently upward;
and  the  superabundance  of  intelligibility  is  a  sign  that  it  was  made  by  a  mind  that  far  exceeds  the
merely human.”587 For  Wiker  and  Witt,  the “marks of genius” in  a  work  of  design  include
clarity, depth, elegance and harmony. The argument is that if genius is recognized in the
human context by these marks, then genius can also be discerned in the cosmic order by
these same marks.588 Wiker and Witt thus argue that if the universe was intelligible without
being mysterious and open to ever deeper understanding, we would be left with a lesser
appreciation of its Creator. Their argument tries to go beyond the conclusion that there is an
intelligent designer to the conclusion that this designer possesses the attribute of ingenuity.
Here the design argument almost approaches the tone of worship: Wiker and Witt revel in
the magnity of the the wisdom and power of the “intelligent designer”.
In the latter stages of their analysis, Wiker and Witt bring the concept of beauty into
their analysis of fine-tuning as something that complements our appreciation of how special
the order of nature is.  They argue that the true meaningfulness of fine-tuning can only be
seen when we consider the marvelous beauty and plurality of complex life which fine-tuning
makes possible. “The chemical elements themselves (made possible by fundamental, cosmological
fine-tuning) point toward living things, carrying in their very structures extraordinary and exact
is  so useful for natural science,  and that many highly esoteric and at first  useless theories of mathematics have
later turned out to be essential for the progress of natural science. Coincidence is a poor explanation for this. See
Steiner 1999 for a critique of naturalism based on the applicability of mathematics.
585 Wiker & Witt 2006.
586 See e.g. Barrow 2002.
587 Wiker & Witt 2006, 245.
588 Wiker & Witt 2006, chapter 3
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chemical potentialities beautifully designed for actualization in the biological world.”589 This fine-
tuning helps us appreciate the surface beauty of the world: “a  rose  is  most  meaningful  to  us
when we understand it as a kind of dramatic culmination, one possible only because all these layers of
complexity are integrated by and toward the whole, brought into harmony in and by the living form
itself.”590 Similarly, Gonzales and Richards note that the need for an explanation for fine-
tuning becomes more clear if we share the assumption that a “fine-tuned habitable universe has
an intrinsic value that an uninhabitable one would lack.”591 Thus  even  ID’s  cosmic  design
arguments are clearly influenced by considerations of value and beauty, though these are
typically not included when the argument is stated formally.
5.2. Understanding the Cosmic Design Argument
The Argument in Theistic Natural Theology
Within theistic natural theology, cosmic design arguments have typically been formulated as
inferences to the best explanation. The data to be explained is the fine-tuning of the cosmos
for life (given the stringent requirements for building life) and the rationality of the cosmos.
The hypothesis that this order is created by a theistic God is thought to be a far likelier
explanation than any naturalistic explanation, particularly random chance.592
But what are such claims of likelihood based on? In inferences to the best explanation,
the hypothesis must somehow help make the data more likely than without the hypothesis.
For example, if this type of order is something that we would expect a designer to produce,
then this gives the hypothesis some likelihood. On the hypothesis that there is a designer
who wanted to create life, and intended to arrange the laws and properties of nature to allow
for this, the data is thought to make more sense than on the hypothesis that there is no such
designer.
The hypothesis that the designer is the good God of theism plays an explanatory role in
the cosmic design arguments of theistic natural theology. Swinburne, for example, argues a
good God would likely create laws of nature in a way that make it possible for his creatures
to exist and interact with their environment. This leads to the conclusion that God would
create a rational cosmos amenable to discovery and fine-tuned for life. Furthermore,
Swinburne argues that there is no atheistic explanation which makes these features of the
universe probable. Thus the observed properties of nature form, for Swinburne, evidence in
favour of theism.593 Collins similarly argues that if we can assume that the existence of life is
589 Wiker & Witt 2006, 223.
590 Wiker & Witt 2006, 242.
591 Gonzales & Richards 2004, 300. Similarly Ratzsch 2001.
592 Collins 2005a, 179. For Collins’ extended defence of the fine-tuning argument, see Collins 2012.
593 Swinburne 2004a, chapter 8.
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a good thing, then it is not frivolous to assume that a good God would want to create life.594
Here a connection can be made to the classical doctrine of creation, where God’s motive for
creation is based on his goodness: God wants to create good things and give love.595
However, it should also be noted that medieval theologians generally believed that
God did not need to create in order to satisfy his goodness: the inner love of the Trinity
already satisfies the need to give love. Speaking of the probability that God would do
something seems strange, but the general idea of identifying some reason (e.g. love) in what
God does is central to the traditional Christian theology of creation.596 As I argued in chapter
3.3, personal explanation is different from mechanistic explanation invoking law-like
regularities. Agents have reasons for their actions, but they are often quite difficult to predict
beforehand.
Within theistic natural theology, cosmic design arguments are used as part of a
cumulative case of theistic arguments, and are not thought to work alone. Theistic theologies
of nature can also make use of the argument, and argue that the fine-tuning of the cosmos is
evidence that is consonant with the doctrine of creation, but does not suffice to prove it. Once
we already believe in the value of life and the rationality of God, however, we can find that
this belief receives support from the cosmic design argument.597
The Argument in the Intelligent Design Literature
Intelligent Design theorists have referred to the formulations used by Collins and Swinburne
approvingly.598 However, because these formulations are openly theistic, they are in tension
with the ID movement’s strategy of not identifying the intelligent designer as the good God
of theism. To be consistent, the ID movement needs to provide a cosmic design argument for
an unidentified designer. This inference would also be an inference to the best explanation,
though here the hypothesis lacks the support of broader theistic philosophical arguments
which Swinburne and Collins believe are essential to the argument. This tension is not
sufficiently explored in ID literature.
However, Robin Collins himself does provide an alternative way of stating the
argument that is more congenial to ID’s minimalistic design hypothesis. Collins writes: “In
the case of the fine-tuning, we already know that minds often produce fine-tuned devices, such as
Swiss watches. Postulating God – a ‘supermind’ – as the explanation of the fine-tuning, therefore, is a
natural extrapolation from of what we already observe minds to do.”599 In this inference, the
motives of the Creator do not do the explanatory work. Rather, this inference relies on the
594 Collins 2012.
595 Hart 2003.
596 See Kretzmann 1991 & 1999 for discussion.
597 Thus McGrath 2009a.
598 E.g. Dembski 2003 and Meyer 1998.
599 Collins 2005b, 661.
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design connection as described in chapter 4.3. The features of the universe discussed in
cosmic design arguments are treated as independent “parts” of the cosmos that all appear
teleologically directed to the purpose of allowing rational life in the cosmos. If producing
teleology is something that minds do well, and the cosmos appears to exhibits teleology,
then positing a “supermind” to explain this appearance would at least be some kind of an
explanation of the data. Again, the causal powers attributed to the designer do the
explanatory work, and it is not required that we need to be able to predict the existence of
the cosmos based on the hypothesis.
William Lane Craig has also used William Dembski’s  work in formulating the cosmic
design argument. As I showed in chapter 4.5, Dembski’s design argument works by
eliminating chance and necessity as possible explanations for some pattern or event and then
concluding that design is its only plausible explanation. Craig formulates the argument as
follows:
(1) The fine-tuning of the initial state of the Universe is due to either physical
necessity, chance or design.
(2) It is not due to physical necessity or chance
(3) Therefore, it is due to design.600
Craig and many others argue that the probability of the constants and quantities of nature
having the precise values which are needed for life by random chance is extremely low, well
exceeding Dembski’s universal probability boundary.601 The pattern formed by several
natural laws and constants, which have to fall into a limited range, is according to Craig both
complex and specified. This allows for the use of the Fisherian method to reject chance as an
explanation. Again, identifying a specification relies on the ability of the human mind to
identify a real pattern needing explanation in the data. Probabilistic arguments like this have
also been used in theistic cosmic design arguments to help eliminate naturalistic
explanations.602
One problem with this argument stems from evaluating the probability of the fine-
tuning. On the understanding that evaluations of probability are based on our knowledge of
the causal processes which operate in a given situation, this is impossible, since evaluating
the likelihood of the values would require background knowledge of the natural procesess
which could have generated these values. However, since we do not know any natural
processes which are at a deeper level than the data used in the cosmic design argument, we
cannot give a statistical probability to the values. This has been called the “normalization
problem”.603 However, Collins has argued that it is possible to construct a different
understanding of probability which makes it possible to give some estimate of the likelihood
600 Craig 2003.
601 Craig 2003, Gonzales & Richards 2004, Denton 1998, Behe 2007.
602 Collins 2012.
603 See e.g. McGrew, McGrew & Vestrup 2003; and Manson 2009.
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of natural constants for the purposes of the argument. Collins emphasizes that this argument
only requires the evaluation of epistemic likelihoods (understood as what we have grounds to
expect based on some hypothesis) instead of physical likelihoods (what is in actual physical
reality likely or necessary). The procedure for calculating the likelihoods of the constants of
nature is similar to the process for creating a null hypothesis in statistics, and assuming that
the range can vary is also the standard beginning hypothesis used in other cases. So, in this
case we could indeed calculate some probabilities for the constants of nature, and use these
to compare the design-based explanation to chance.604
5.3. Cosmic Design and Naturalism
The formulations of the cosmic design argument again reveal the importance of contrasting
design with naturalistic explanations. It is argued that the rational order of the cosmos has
something that is explained better by a design hypothesis than by any naturalistic alternative
– and perhaps even that some things about the cosmos cannot be explained at all on the
naturalistic picture. I will now analyse four different naturalistic rejoinders to the argument
and the discussion surrounding them. First (1), there are naturalistic alternative explanations
for the order of the cosmos. In effect, these explanations are allies of the design argument,
because they at least admit that there is something to be explained about the laws of nature.
Second (2), the problem of natural evil is used as counter-evidence to the fine-tuning.
Perhaps the cosmos is not so fine-tuned after all, it is argued. Third (3), it is argued that it is
possible to just accept the existence of the cosmos as a brute fact, and deny the rationality of
seeking any further explanations. Fourth (4), the explanatory power of the design argument
is criticized. It is argued that it is better to state that one does not know the explanation than
to posit that design is the explanation for fine-tuning.
Naturalistic Explanations for Fine-Tuning
Collins divides naturalistic explanations for fine-tuning into atheistic one universe -models
and atheistic many universes -models.605 In one universe -models, it is hypothesized that the
fine-tuning can be explained by referring to some physical explanation beyond the known
laws of nature. For example, perhaps string theory can help explain the values of the
604 See further in Collins 2005a, 179, and the extended discussion in Collins 2012, 226-252. The possibility of fine-
tuning arguments against the normalization problem is also defended with a different strategy by Koperski
(2005).
605 Collins 2005a, 184-185. These critiques thus typically admit the existence of fine-tuning beneficial  to life.  For
further discussion of the distinction between different uses of the word “probability” in fine-tuning arguments,
see Monton 2006, 407-413.
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constants of nature. It is thus hoped that ultimately nature’s order can be explained without
intelligence.606
Another naturalistic explanation for cosmic design is the multiverse hypothesis.607 The
idea is that there may be an infinite or at least enormously large amount of universes, with
varying constants of nature and natural laws. 608 This may be supported with the many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, which states that our world is continually
dividing up into new worlds.609 The weak anthropic principle is then used to explain why we
find ourselves in a world with laws of nature that can sustain our existence. The answer is
simply that we could not live and observe a world which did not allow for our existence.610
So, if the universe appears designed to us, this is only because of this selection effect, which
ensures that we will only ever observe a fine-tuned universe. However, the vast majority of
universes may well be hostile to life.611
A common way of arguing for the explanatory superiority of design is based on how
well supported each hypothesis is by our background knowledge. Many argue that
multiverse hypotheses are simply ad hoc to explain the data. For example, Dembski argues
that potentially any data could be explained by a multiverse hypothesis, since it gives
unlimited probabilistic hypothesis and destroys any notion of a probability bound, thus
leaving us with no basis to reject chance hypotheses. For example, it could be argued that the
pianist Arthur Rubinstein manages to play the piano beautifully by chance, rather than
because of his skill. Though the design hypothesis is commonsensical, one could argue that
given an infinite amount of universes, we can expect to observe an infinite amount of
bumbling idiots who can play the piano just as well by random chance.612
To avoid this critique, the ad hoc nature of the multiverse hypothesis needs to be
denied. There is indeed some independent rationale for the hypothesis. For example, some
interpretations of inflationary theory and quantum mechanics require a multiverse.613 In
response, a proponent of the design argument could argue that there is no reason to accept
these models, other than the rejection of the design argument. Proponents of design
arguments who accept theism could also argue, following Collins, that the theistic
hypothesis at least is less ad hoc than the multiverse hypothesis, since it was formulated and
strongly believed already prior to the discovery of fine-tuning.614 Using this strategy would
606 E.g. Greene 2005.
607 E.g. Dawkins 2006a.
608 Rees 2003.
609 Susskind 2006a.
610 John Leslie’s  example  of  a  firing  squad is  often  used  to  show that  the  anthropic  principle  does  not  by  itself
explain the fine-tuning. (See Leslie 1989, 13-15).
611 Dawkins 2006a.
612 Dembski 2003b; see also similar arguments in Behe 2007. Behe’s critique is directed against the absurdity of an
infinite multiverse. However, it is also possible to formulate a multiverse hypothesis where the multiverse is
finite, and probabilistic resources are not infinite.
613 For more on these, see Rees 2003, Susskind 2006a.
614 Collins 2012, 205-209. A further way of arguing that theism has a higher background probability is to argue
that theism is a simpler explanation than the multiverse. (See Swinburne 2004c, 305-306). In response to this, it has
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require the Intelligent Design movement to give up its minimalistic design argument,
however, and engage in a more robust theistic natural theology.
In a way, naturalistic explanations for fine-tuning are congenial to design arguments,
since they at least admit that there is something to be explained in the order of the universe.
Proponents of the multiverse hypothesis agree that it is not satisfactory to just argue that the
universe is a brute fact. Leonard Susskind puts the point as follows: “Our own universe is an
extraordinary place that appears to be fantastically well designed for our own existence. This
specialness is not something that we can attribute to lucky accidents, which is far too unlikely. The
apparent coincidences cry out for an explanation. – – But this [design] is an intellectually
unsatisfying, if emotionally comforting, explanation. Left unanswered are: who designed the designer,
by what mechanism the designer intervenes to guide evolution, whether the designer violates the Laws
of  Physics  to  accomplish  its  goals,  and  whether  the  designer  is  subject  to  the  laws  of  quantum
mechanics.”615 In Susskind´s analysis, the multiverse hypothesisis is explanatory better than
the design hypothesis, because the design hypothesis leaves unanswered questions.
However, the basic admission of the need of an explanation leaves the door open for natural
theologians and ID proponents to answer these questions, and to argue that design actually
explains the data better.
The goodness of the universe we inhabit, and so the problem of natural evil, is relevant
for evaluating the explanatory power of the design argument against naturalistic hypotheses.
In the multiverse hypothesis, the explanation for why we find ourselves in a habitable
universe is that otherwise we could not be alive at all. However, this hypothesis only
explains fine-tuning that is necessary for life. The defenders of the cosmic design argument
claim that the fine-tuning actually extends well beyond that needed for survival. For
example, the rationality of the cosmos and its amenability to discovery does not seem to be
predicted at all by the multiverse hypothesis. Thus design is argued to explain the properties
of nature better.616
Within the Intelligent Design movement, Behe argues similarly that the amount of
different biological forms possible and the amount of purposeful biological complexity in the
universe are also not predicted by the multiverse hypothesis, but are explained by design.617
Denton argues that the multiverse hypothesis also does not explain the evolution of our
abilities for art, music and philosophy, which are unnecessary for our survival.618 As I argued
in chapter 5.1, here the concept of fine-tuning used in the ID literature is quite broad,
encompassing the whole spectrum of “natural good”: the beauty, rational orderliness and
the useful arrangements of the natural world as a problem for atheism. This is another
been  argued  that  naturalism  nevertheless  has  a  simpler  ontological  economy,  since  it  posits  fewer  kinds  of
entities. (Dawes 2009, chapter 7) Here the debate is again strongly influenced by our philosophy of mind and our
general ontological views.
615 Susskind 2006a, 343.
616 Leslie 1989, 58-61; Swinburne 2004a, chapter 8.
617 Behe 2007, 223.
618 Denton 1998, Behe 2007.
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example where the ID movement seems to move between a minimalistic and a more robust
conception of the designer.
When the evidence of fine-tuning is stated as a problem of natural good, the relevance
of the problem of natural evil – the second naturalistic objection to cosmic design arguments
– becomes clear. Defenders of the design argument claim that the fine-tuning of our universe
is in excess of that needed for survival, and that this is not explained by the multiverse
hypothesis. In this they seem to be correct: the multiverse hypothesis does not explain these
other features of the cosmos. The best available response of the multiverse proponent is
instead to shift to the attack, and to argue that the theistic hypothesis also does not explain
all of the features of the cosmos, particularly the existence of natural evil. The point is made
eloquently by the character Philo in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, comparing
the universe to a poorly built house where tenants live in suffering. Philo argues that the bad
outweights the good in our universe, and that this provides evidence against the claim that
the Creator is good.619 In defending the multiverse hypothesis, the claim that there is more
evil than good seems unnecessary. Perhaps it is sufficient to claim that our universe is
neither bad nor good but simply mediocre. While the multiverse hypothesis does not explain
all of the characteristics of our universe, perhaps the design hypothesis does not either. The
evaluation of this argument depends on our views of theodicy and our overall estimate of
what sort of cosmos we live in. I will analyse the problem’s relationship to design arguments
in depth in chapter 9.
Level-shifting and the Need for Explanations
The previous discussion has treated naturalistic explanations and design as competing
explanations for the same data. On this understanding, both attempt to explain the natural
laws, constants and conditions of the cosmos, and the question is simple which one does it
better. However, though interesting for the purposes of argument, this way of stating the
question does contain a problem. As several proponents of design arguments have stated,
the naturalistic explanations do not seem to be able to answer the question that the theists
are asking. Thus it can be argued that design and naturalistic explanation operate on
different levels.
For example, consider atheistic one-universe explanations for the fine-tuning. As
stated, these rely on finding a fundamental natural mechanism that has the properties
needed to produce our fine-tuned universe deterministically. However, as Collins notes, this
appears to only move the problem of fine-tuning, since this fundamental natural mechanism
would then have to be fine-tuned itself, or it could not produce such a specific outcome. If
the question of the origin of fine-tuning was reasonable in the case of our cosmos, then it
appears that it should also be reasonable in the case of this fundamental physical
619 Dialogues, chapters X ja XI.
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mechanism.620 Thus a proponent of cosmic design arguments can always argue that the
designer works on a different level than the laws of physics.
A similar strategy is also available in the case of multiverse hypotheses. Collins has
argued that proposed multiverse hypotheses typically require precisely fine-tuned laws of
nature to generate the universes and their varying natural constants. The multiverse
hypothesis does not explain the existence of the fine-tuning required for a multiverse capable
of generating life-supporting conditions. Because of this, Collins argues that the multiverse
hypothesis only moves the problem back, and does not eliminate the evidence for the
designer.621
Ratzsch calls this type of defence of the design argument “level-shifting”, identifying
both plausible and implausible examples of level-shifting. On the one hand, suppose that an
elderly uncle dies in suspicious circumstances, and relatives suspect the niece killed the
uncle. Police investigations, however, reveal a natural cause for the death: the uncle’s
medication was mixed up. The relatives can plausible claim that the niece killed the uncle by
mixing up his medication, thus moving their design-explanation up one level. Here the
natural explanation does not eliminate the evidence for design. On the other hand, suppose
that crop circles (which some UFO enthusiasts suppose are produced by aliens) are proven
with  video  evidence  to  be  made  by  humans.  An  UFO  enthusiast  could  respond  to  this
alternative explanation by claiming that the aliens must be mind controlling the humans.
However, here level-shifting is clearly implausible.622 The central factor separating plausible
and implausible level-shifting in these examples seems to be whether the natural explanation
eliminates the reason why the design hypothesis was made in the first place.
Is level-shifting then a plausible strategy in responding to naturalistic counter-
arguments in the case of fine-tuning? I would argue that it is, insofar as the naturalistic
hypothesis does not eliminate the evidence of design, but only moves it back one level. This
seems to be exactly what Collins argues: proposed naturalistic explanations for fine-tuning
themselves require fine-tuning to work.
Here the third naturalistic response to design arguments is relevant: perhaps we
should simply stop looking for explanation with the ultimate theory of physics or the
multiverse, rather than seeking an explanation for it. Perhaps an ultimate theory of physics is
not even needed – one could also say that the laws and constants of nature we now know
provide the natural stopping point for seeking explanations. The existence of our universe is
just a brute fact which we cannot explain. This line of argument does not really try to present
an explanation for the properties of natural explanations. Rather, the question is about the
legitimacy of the design inference and what the proper stopping point for seeking
explanations is.
620 Collins 2012, 256-262; see also Collins 2005a, 184-185. Collins argues that this holds for restricted multiverse
hypotheses where the amount of universes is not infinite and eternally existing, not for unrestricted multiverses
where all logically possible worlds exist.
621 Collins 2005, 185.
622 Ratzsch 2010.
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The idea that we should not seek explanations for the order of nature is perhaps best
defended with an old Humean argument. In the Dialogues, Philo argues that if we can accept
the mind of a designer as the stopping point, we can just as well accept the material world as
the stopping point to avoid the conclusion of design.623 The answer of classical theism to this
problem has been that God, being existence himself, is capable of being the foundation of
reality in a way different from contingent natural laws. One could argue that it is always
reasonable to seek further explanations and understanding, until no more can possibly be
found. In the case of natural order, we can find a further explanation in divine design.
However, because of the properties which this divine designer has, we can’t possibly find for
any explanations for God. Thus the divine designer arguably forms a more natural stopping
point for explanations than the order of nature. This conclusion is also supported if we
accept the cosmological argument which infers that contingent beings have their origins in
the absolute, necessary being – God. Here it simply does not make sense to ask where God
came from, though it does make sense to ask such questions of any contingent being or
composite of contingent parts, such as the universe.624
The above response is more credible for someone who accepts the existence of the
theistic God, who has just these properties.625 The ID movement, however, claims that its
design argument is credible even without assuming God. Thus it needs another strategy for
responding to the “who made the designer” -objection. One possible strategy is to argue that
evoking the further question of where the designer came from does nothing to invalidate the
logic of the design argument as such. The design argument can explain fine-tuning even if it
evokes some further questions. They can also appeal to the history of science, where new
explanatory factors have frequently been proposed without knowing what explains these
new factors. If design is thought to have explanatory value at all, there is no reason to not
accept the design hypothesis merely because this then creates additional questions.626 Here
the fourth and final naturalistic objection – that design is not explanatory – is relevant, and
seems to be the one the whole case for rejecting cosmic design arguments ultimately hangs
upon.
I have already argued that the Intelligent Design movement sees evidence for cosmic
design as providing one reason for seeking evidence for design from biology, as well. Here
the ID movement’s rationale is inverse to that of many naturalists, who argue that the
evidence from evolutionary biology increases our confidence of finding naturalistic
explanations for cosmic design, as well. Richard Dawkins, for example, argues that the
success of Darwinism in explaining the appearance of design in biology makes it rational for
us to seek such explanations for cosmic order, as well.627 The idea is that the progress of
science demonstrates the replacement of intentional explanations with reductionistic and
623 Dialogues, chapter II.
624 See e.g. Feser 2008, Hart 2013 and Spitzer 2010. For some critique, see Mackie 1982, chapter 5.
625 Craig & Copan 2004.
626 Leslie 1989, chapter 5; Lennox 2007, 62-64.
627 Dawkins 2006a.
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non-purposeful explanations. Any appeal to design is seen as a “God of the gaps” -argument
based on our ignorance of the natural causes which are in fact the only necessary
explanation. Victor J. Stenger thus argues that “the fine-tuning argument and other recent
intelligent design-arguments are modern versions of God-of-the-gaps reasoning, in which God is
deemed necessary whenever science has not fully explained some phenomenon.”628 As noted, for
some naturalists, confidence in the successes of naturalistic reductionism extends not just to
the evidence for cosmic design, but also into explaining our own consciousness.629 Design is
not seen as a sufficiently detailed or informative explanation from the point of view of the
natural sciences, and so even ignorance is though to be better than belief in design. I relegate
further discussion of these points to the following chapters.
628 Stenger 2006, 184. See further also Stenger 2011.
629 Goetz & Taliaferro 2008.
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6. BIOLOGICAL DESIGN
Most of the Intelligent Design movement’s literature focuses on biology: on the defence of
biological design arguments and on critiques of Darwinian evolutionary theory. In Behe's
terms, though it values the cosmic design argument, ID focuses more on finding evidence of
design “beyond the laws of nature”.630 Behe thinks that if there is a designer responsible for the
order of the cosmos, and this order is designed for the benefit of life, then it helps make it
more reasonable to suppose that the designer may also have directed the development of life
inside the universe.
However, there are also differences between cosmic and biological design arguments.
In  my  analysis  of  cosmic  design  arguments  in  the  previous  chapter,  I  showed  that  cosmic
design arguments can be defended with “level-shifting”. If design-based explanations can be
argued to function on a higher explanatory level than the naturalistic explanations employed
in the natural sciences, then there does not necessarily need to be a conflict between them.
Perhaps a similar argument could be constructed in biology, so that natural explanations and
design could be seen as different and complementary modes of explanation. However, in
biological design arguments, Darwinian evolutionary biology and design are often seen as
competing explanations for the same data. In many ID works, critiquing Darwinism often
takes much more space than positive defence of the design argument.631
In chapter 4, I considered two different explanations for this strategy. First, because of
the intuitive nature of belief in design, the ID theorists sometimes present design as the
default explanation for biological order. If Darwinism is seen simply as an attempt to refute
this default position, showing that Darwinism does not succeed in explaining biological
order would be sufficient to uphold design as the default explanation. The second reason for
this strategy comes from the importance of the elimination of rival explanations for many
formulations of the design argument. However, I also emphasized that a critique of other
explanations does not suffice to defend design as the best explanation without positive
reasons for seeing design as a potential explanation by its own merits.
In this chapter, I will analyse the ID movement’s biological design argument and the
discussion on Darwinian evolutionary theory. The goal of the chapter is to understand the
structure of ID’s argumentation and the crucial philosophical assumptions in the discussion.
I will first discuss the concepts of biological teleology or functional complexity further. I will
then go on to analyse ID’s understanding of evolutionary theory, with particular attention
given to the argument from “irreducible complexity”. I will then discuss critiques of ID’s
arguments in order to lay the groundwork for further analysis in the following chapters.
630 Behe 2001, 696; similarly Dembski 2003.
631 For example, see Johnson 1993 and Behe 2006a.
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6.1. Biological Design?
Biological “Machinery”
As seen in the previous chapters, design is understood within ID as a teleological cause that
functions well as an explanation for teleology in nature. But what does this mean in the case
of ID’s biological design arguments? What form does teleology take in biology? As explained
in chapters 4.4 and 4.5, the comparison of explanations is central for the ID theorists’ design
inference. But before design and evolution can be compared as explanations for the order of
life, it should be asked how these explanations work as potential explanations and what they
propose to explain.
Though evolutionary biologists and the ID theorists agree that there is something to be
explained in nature, it may be that there is some difference in the way this order is described.
The central examples of biological order used in the ID movement’s design arguments are
examples of (1) functional, apparently purposeful complexity and (2) biological information.
The argument based on biological purposeful complexity has been most developed by
Michael Behe, and the argument from information has been developed by William Dembski
and Stephen Meyer. The elucidation of what exactly is meant by biological “functions” and
biological “information” is a thorny problem. Here I limit myself to some general comments
on what sort of concepts the ID theorists use and what this implies for their arguments.
In general terms, even something as simple as the color of fur can be a biological
adaptation and an example of functional order. Behe focuses on machine-like purposeful
complexity, however. His focus is on “irreducibly complex” structures. While Paley argued
based on the anatomical features of organisms known in his time, Behe bases his argument
on the properties of “biochemical machines” only visible with advanced instruments.
According to Behe, “it  was  once  expected  that  the  basis  of  life  would  be  exceedingly  simple.  That
expectation has been smashed. Vision, motion, and other biological functions have proven to be no less
sophisticated than television cameras and automobiles.”632 Behe calls these objects “machines”:
“The cumulating results show with piercing clarity that life is based on machines – machines made of
molecules!”633 In Darwin’s Black Box (1996), Behe uses five different molecular machines as
examples of structures that he argues difficult to explain by referring to Darwinian evolution
and that instead require design. His examples are ciliar motors, the blood clotting system,
the cellular transportation systems, the immune system and the system for the biosynthesis
of the energy molecule amp.634
For Behe, design is “purposeful arrangement of parts”, and this definition applies
equally well to man-made artefacts and biological machines.635 This is linked in Behe’s
632 Behe 2006a, x.
633 Behe 2006a, 4.
634 Behe’s descriptions of these systems have generally been regarded as accurate, though his understanding of
the plausibility of evolutionary scenarios has been criticized. See e.g. Perakh 2004, 118-119 & Orr 1997.
635 Behe 2006a, 193.
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argument to the property of irreducible complexity. According to Behe, an irreducibly complex
system is “a single system composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the
basic function, wherein the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease
functioning.”636 For Behe, irreducible complexity is simultaneously both evidence against
Darwinism and evidence for design. He writes that the strength of the design argument is
“quantitative and depends on the evidence; the more parts, and the more intricate and sophisticated
the function, the stronger is our conclusion of design.”637 Irreducibly complex systems have
multiple parts which are arranged for an intricate function. They thus exemplify Behe’s
definition of the design as the “purposeful arrangement of parts”. Behe argues that the
strength of the design argument is probabilistic, and gets stronger when there is more
purposeful complexity, because it becomes progressively more difficult to explain in any
way other than design. This is in line with understanding Behe’s argument as an inference to
the best explanation. I will focus more on Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity in
chapter 6.3. Here I will focus on the idea of biological machinery.
Talk  of  “biochemical  machines”  is  common  in  scientific  journals.  Biologist  Bruce
Alberts explains that these objects are called machines because “like machines invented by
humans to deal efficiently with the macroscopic world, these protein assemblies contain highly
coordinated moving parts”,  and  because  terminology  used  in  engineering  has  proven  to  be
useful in biology.638 Here, the definition of a machine is simply a system composed of several
coordinated moving parts, and this definition encompasses both human machines and
biochemical machines as machines. Like Behe’s definition of irreducible complexity, Alberts’
definition of a machine references systems which require the coordination of several
interacting parts.
However, Massimo Pigliucci and Peter Boudry have argued that the ID theorists use
machine-like language more literally than naturalistic biologists. There is plausibility to this
claim, because the ID theorists are teleological realists, whereas naturalists are typically
teleological reductionists and teleological eliminativists. That is, though Darwinian
evolutionary biology recognizes the reality of teleology in biology, it is argued that it is
ultimately  produced  by  non-teleological  causes.  Pigliucci  and  Boydry  argue  that  calling
biological objects machines is a metaphor, useful in the history of science but also misleading
in other respects. The usefulness of the metaphor can be seen, for example, in the way the
concept of the human heart as a pump was important for William Harvey (1578 –1657)
discoveries about blood circulation.639 But  Pigliucci  and  Boydry  feel  that  calling  biological
structures machines also leads astray, because it easily leads to inferring, by principles of
analogy, that biological machines must also be designed. This overlooks the differences
636 Behe 2006a, 39.
637 Behe 2006a, 256.
638 Alberts 1998, 291. Quoted in Pigliucci & Boydry 2010, 6. Dembski (2002a, 247) also quotes Alberts approvingly.
639 Pigliucci & Bouydry 2010, 3. Ratzsch 2001 also argues for the usefulness of the concept of design in the history
of biology, and claims that this validates the use of the concept even in modern biology, as well as in biological
design arguments.
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between biological machines and man-made artefacts which make evolution possible.
Biological machines are more amenable to change, for example.640
So, Pigliucci and Boydry want to avoid calling biological structures machines because
they want to avoid giving credibility to the design argument. To state the criticism in terms
used in chapter 4, Pigliucci and Boydry believe that understanding biological structures
machines is a way of establishing a conceptual and inductive connection between the type of
order observed in biology and intelligent design as an explanation. Their critique is that this
connection is weak, because organisms are different from machines in a way that enables
organisms to evolve. This calls to mind Humean criticisms of the analogical design argument
based on the similarities between objects. The question is whether there really is a relevant
similarity between biological machinery and man-made machinery. It is argued that there is
a relevant difference, because biological machinery is evolvable without design, whereas
man-made machinery requires design as its cause.641
Does Behe use machine-like language in a different way than biologists generally?
Given Behe’s theistic background assumptions, he has at least the possibility of being a
teleological realist, in contrast to many naturalistic views. However, Behe’s idea of organisms
as  literally  machines  does  not  seem  to  be  based  on  this  teleological  realism,  but  simply  a
definition of machines which encompasses both man-made and biological machines.
Complex functional systems seem to exist in biology, whether we call them machines or not.
Behe  does  also  speak  of  purposeful  complexity  in  biology,  identifying  purposes  with
functions. Here it could again be argued that there cannot be real purposes in biology under
naturalism, but only the appearance of purposes. Thus Behe’s talk of purposes could be seen
as presupposing teleological realism and associated metaphysical ideas. However, this
would be a mistake, because Behe himself states that he assumes only the appearance of
design, not the reality of purposes in biology. He then posits the purposes of an intelligent
designer as the best explanation for this appearance of purposefulness. Behe argues that
given this “apparent design” in biology, it is a rational conclusion to say that the design is
not only apparent but real. An intelligent designer created the apparent design in biology.642
How then does Behe identify the purpose of a given biological system? Behe’s
definitions reveal that his definition of purpose is immanent to the system under analysis.
According to him, “the function of the system we must look at is the one that requires the greatest
amount of the system’s internal complexity. The function of a system is determined from the
system’s internal logic: the function is not necessarily the same thing as the purpose to which the
designer wished to apply the system.”643 He then explains this immanent purposefulness based
on the purposes of the intelligent designer. Following these definitions, we may separate
between two levels of purpose in intelligent design theory. First (1), there is the purpose of
the designer in designing a given object, which, Behe argues, is unknown without a
640 Pigliucci & Bouydry 2010. For similar views, see Shanks 2003 and Ruse 2003.
641 See chapter 7.1 for more on the design argument as an analogical argument.
642 Behe 2006a, 265.
643 Behe 2006a, 196. Emphasis in the original.
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revelation from the designer. The designer must have purposed to create the known
functions of the system, but he may have had other purposes for the system as well. As seen
in the previous chapters, the ID theorists do not believe that a hypothesis of the designer’s
precise motivations in designing the object is necessary for the design argument. Second (2),
there is purposeful complexity of the object which, it is argued, we can reliably infer to have
a certain function.644 Behe argues that a system can have many different effects in nature. The
function of a system seems then to be some state of affairs brought about by the system
which requires the greatest amount of the system’s internal complexity to bring about.645 This
idea of identifying function does not seem very controversial or problematic – recall the idea
of testing teleological descriptions discussed in chapter 3.2. The controversy is about whether
ID is a good potential explanation of the data or the best explanation of it, not about whether
biological structures are amazingly complex and functional.
Biological “Information”
I have argued that the biological functional and machine-like complexity form the first
important type of biological order which the ID theorists believe is best explained by design.
The second type of order is formed by biological information. Stephen Meyer has argued
that the genetic information in DNA is a “signature in the cell”, strong evidence of intelligent
design in biology.646 Some concept of information is generally thought to be essential to
modern biology. The genetic information of DNA is needed for all of the vital functions of
life, since organisms need it to produce all of the proteins they need for their molecular
machinery and various tasks. In addition to the information required for building proteins,
information is also needed for directing the development of the organism. Developmental
biology is just beginning to unravel the secrets of animal developments, but there is research
on genetic regulatory networks and epigenetic information (hereditary information residing
outside the DNA) which govern the development of the biological form of animals, such as
the growth of a human embryo into an adult.647
The main two definitions of information used by the ID theorists are statistical (or
causal) information, and specified information. In modern information theory, following
Claude Shannon (1948), the concept of information can be used to quantify the amount of
information into units called “bits”. The initial use of Shannon’s ideas was in
644 Ariew (2002, 8) has argued that Intelligent Design argues for the existence of Platonic extrinsic teleology on the
basis of Aristotelian immanent teleology. The quotes in the main text confirm Ariew’s interpretation.
645 Behe 2006a, 196.  In Behe’s text, the requirement of “greatest internal complexity” is there to avoid mistakenly
thinking that some effect which does not require much of the system’s complexity is its main function. Behe limits
his analysis to biochemical systems partly because he thinks that this enables us to reliably infer the system’s
basic function. In more complex systems, identifying the main function is difficult, because these systems tend to
be composed of many subsystems, each with their own function.
646 Meyer 2010.
647 See Noble 2008 and Noble 2013 for two fine and interesting popular accounts of this change.
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communications technology, in analyzing the way messages can be compressed and
transmitted. Information signifies a correlation between some two states of affairs. With such
a broad definition, information can be seen everywhere. There is a causal connection
between genetic information and the structure of proteins, and this can be described as
information. However, there is also an informational connection between smoke and fire, for
example.648 So this definition of information is quite broad and does not seem to provide
grounds for seeing a connection between information and design, as required by ID’s design
argument. This definition of information also does not include references to any semantic
content a series of symbols has. Thus, as Meyer notes, a completely random sequence of
symbols can have more information content when measured with Shannon information than
a meaningful sequence.649
The second kind of information as understood by the ID theorists is specified
information, meaning information which fits a predetermined pattern, such as the fulfilling
of a function. Again, the terms “specified information” and “specified complexity” are based
on Dembski’s analysis of the concept of information, though the terms have not originated
with the ID movement.650 Meyer too uses the concept of specified information when
describing biological information, but uses the terms in a very general sense as a synonym
for “functional information”, and does not utilize the technical apparatus developed by
Dembski in his writings in detail.651
In addition to containing a function, the information in DNA also shared some other
similarities with codes produced by humans. The ID theorists compare DNA with computer
code. Computers store all information as series of zeroes and ones. DNA, by contrast, has
four different “letters”. These are the bases tyanine, adenine, cytocine and guanine. The
information about what sequence of amino acids are needed to produce the proteins needed
by the cell is stored in the sequence of these four letters. The four letters form codons which
are three letters long. There is a complex translation and transcription machinery in the cells
which forms proteins on the basis of this sequence. There are markers in the DNA for the
translation machinery, so that it can find the code for the required protein from the genome.
Each codon is translated into an amino acid, and the resulting chain of amino acids is formed
into a protein.652
According to many biologists and information-theorists, DNA appears to be written in
a language and requires translation to discover its function, just like computer code is
written in a language. Like any language, there does not appear to be any necessary
connection between the genetic code and the sequence of amino acids which is selected. The
code seems arbitrary. The translation system could well also be set up differently, and the
648 Godfrey-Smith 2007, 106.
649 Meyer 2009, chapter 4.
650 Dembski 2002a.
651 Meyer 2013, 168.
652 Meyer  2009,  chapter  4.  Meyer´s  accuracy  in  these  basic  biological  facts  has  not  been  questioned  in  the
discussion. For basic information on the cell and genetics, see Campbell & Reece 2007, chapters 13-18.
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meaning of the codons could be changed. The same information could be expressed in many
different ways. There are some examples of slightly different genetic codes in different
biological organisms, and the information contained in DNA can also be expressed in human
language. Meyer also emphasizes that the code is not reducible to the chemical interactions
of the chemicals which form DNA. No physical law causes tyanine, adenine, cytocine and
guanine to form into a particular sequence. This makes it possible to form a wide variety of
different codes using these four letters.653
In Meyer’s view, this means that information is in some sense irreducible to mere
chemistry and thus the origin of the system is better explained by intelligent design than
naturalistic theories of the origin of life. The functional information is also structured and
controlled by regulatory networks, which in Meyer’s view closely resemble the complex
purposeful programmes that intelligent designers can create. According to Meyer, we have
experience linking intelligent design and this type of coded information systems, but no
experience which would enable us to infer that natural causes can create systems like this.
For Meyer, this makes ID a better explanation for the origin of life. The form of his
explanation is the inference to the best explanation as stated in chapters 4.4 and 4.5.654
I will analyse the ID movement’s critique of Darwinian evolutionary theory further in
chapters 6.2 and 6.3. For now I want to discuss some issues in these definitions of
information. As in the case of the machine-like complexity of biological order, the terms used
by the ID movement to describe biological information as encoded information, as building
instructions and even as a genetic programme are ubiquitous in biology.655 However, some
critics of ID have questioned the literal application of these terms to biology. In response to
ID, philosopher of biology Peter Godfrey-Smith distinguishes between three different
applications of informational concepts:
(1) The description of whole-organism phenotypic traits (including complex
behavioral traits) as specified or coded for by information contained in the genes);
(2) The  treatment  of  many  causal  processes  within  cells,  and  perhaps  of  the  whole-
organism developmental sequence, in terms of the execution of a programme stored
in the genes;
(3) The idea that genes themselves, for the purpose of evolutionary theorizing, should
be  seen  as,  in  some  sense,  “made”  of  information.  From  this  point  of  view,
information becomes a fundamental ingredient in the biological world.656
According to Godfrey-Smith, the first of these theses is the most well-founded, but it remains
possible to question the other two. Godfrey-Smith agrees that on the level of DNA, a limited
653 Meyer 2009, chapter 4; similarly Campbell & Reece 2007, chapter s 15-18.
654 Meyer 2013, chapters 13 and 14.
655 This is attested to by both critics of and defenders of ID. (E.g. Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny 2008, Meyer 2009).
656 Godfrey-Smith 2007, 103-104.
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sort of semantic information is required, but argues that this is yet a very limited concept of
semantic information, far removed from the robust semantic information produced by
humans. For Godfrey-Smith, Shannon information succeeds in describing most of biological
information.657 For Godfrey-Smith, the ID movement makes an error in equating the type of
information found in biology with the type of information humans produce. The critique is
similar to what we saw above in the case of machine-metaphors. Critics argue that the ID
movement is taking analogies too far in concluding that information is best explained by an
intelligent source.
The ID movement’s information-based design argument is stronger if information can
be understood to be present in biology in a stronger sense than just functionality. If we can
justifiably claim that organisms have a teleological tendency to develop a certain type of
form, and that the development of the organism is guided by some kind of information,
whether genetic or epigenetic, then this does seem like the sort of teleology that is congenial
to the ID movement’s argumentation. If there is a strong analogy between human-produced
information and biological information, then this also strengthens the design argument,
particularly if it can be argued that information is something irreducible to physics and
chemistry. If the analogies are not as as strong, then the information argument can be
understood as just a subset of the more general argument from functional complexity. In the
case of biological machinery, I argued that the ID movement merely needs to suppose the
appearance of teleology in biology. It can then argue for the reality of teleology as the best
explanation for this appearance. The functionality and apparent teleological nature of the
information encoded in DNA may be sufficient to make it another example of teleological
order which is not completely arbitrary to explain by reference to design, thus getting the ID
movement’s design argument moving.
In addition to the teleological order of biological organisms, proponents of ID have also
sometimes pointed to other features of biological nature which they believe are best
explained by intelligent design. First (1), it has been argued that the fossil record reveals the
abrupt appearance of new organisms in the fossil record. Since intelligent designers typically
produce new order very quickly, Stephen Meyer argues that intelligent design explains such
abrupt appearances better than evolutionary theory. Second (2) ID is also argued to predict
some amount of similarity between organisms, since designers often re-use functional
components in different designs. The similarities between different organisms also form an
important class of evidence for evolution, as we will see in chapter 6.2, but the ID theorists
argue that the pattern of life is better explained by design. Third (3), ID is argued to better
explain the level of biological perfection seen in nature. This argument may be in tension
657 Godfrey-Smith 2007, 110; 2007b. See also Yockey 2005 for an account of information in biology that accepts
quite a strong definition of information but is nevertheless critical of ID. Denis Noble (2008) and other expanders
of the modern synthesis also argue that the focus on genes is misplaced. Teleology is in the entire structure of the
organisms, not merely in the genes. Meyer´s newer work (2013, chapters 13 and 14) shows that he is cognizant of
these new developments.
Biological Design
169
with the ID theorists’ responses to the problems of bad design and natural evil. I will come
back to this third point in chapter 9.2.658
In these three cases, the logic of the ID theorists can be formulated as an argument to
the best explanation supported by our inductive experience about what intelligent designers
generally do. I have argued that there is justification for connecting teleology with designers,
but what about these other features? It seems to me that here the connections are much more
fragile. We also know from experience that designers can sometimes take a long time to
produce something new and do this through many iterations (contra 1), though designers do
not  typically  indeed  need  millions  of  years  for  their  work.  Furthermore,  we  know  from
experience that designers often strive for originality and can produce tools which are unique
and only suited for one task (contra 2), and that designers often make errors and produce
imperfect designs and barely working junk (contra 3). Here the predictions of the general
hypothesis of intelligent design seem weaker than in the case of teleology. It seems that to
produce such predictions, a more specific hypothesis of intelligent design would have to be
defended.
It may be that the ID theorists making these predictions do have such a hypothesis in
mind or are unconsciously guided by their Christian expections of God. For example,
perhaps a perfect, miracle-working God could indeed be expected to create perfect life forms
abruptly, and perhaps this God could also have a motive for creating similar forms of life.
For example, perhaps he does not want us to think that there are many creators. Perhaps a
variety of completely different life forms might cause us to believe that there must have been
many different creators, rather than one.659 But this type of hypothesizing about the nature
and motives of the designer also has its problems. Many different hypotheses about the
designer could be made. For example, others have posited that we should rather expect the
Christian God to create life forms through a gradual process of evolution, rather than
through miracles.660
In order to make use of their more detailed predictions about what we should expect
from the intelligent designer, it seems that the ID movement will have to present and defend
a more specific understanding of the nature of the intelligent designer and perhaps even get
into  this  theological  discussion.  One  way  of  arguing  for  such  a  more  robust  design
hypothesis that might not necessary require in-depth theological arguments would be by
trailing the data, as I argued in chapter 3.3. Over time, in observing an agent’s activity, we
can form an opinion of the characteristics of this agent. For example, the expectation that the
designer would create perfect designs could be based on the observation of some designs
that we believe are perfect or at least close to perfection. However, if this is the intention of
the ID movement, then it would be interesting to see such a more robust design hypothesis
658 Luskin 2013.
659 The creationist Walter ReMine defends a theory like this in his book “The Biotic Message” (1993).
660 See chapter 7.2 of the present study.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
170
openly defended. Currently it seems that the ID movement is still moving between such a
more robust designer and the minimalistic designer in its argumentation.
6.2. Understanding Evolution
Evolutionary Biology and Intelligent Design
In the previous chapter, I have briefly explained some features of life which the ID theorists
see as evidence of design. But as noted, the ID movement’s biological design arguments
include critiques of naturalistic explanations of the biological order of nature. Darwinian
evolutionary theory agrees with ID that the functional complexity of biology requires an
explanation – the explanation given is just different. But what exactly is Darwinian
evolutionary theory and what parts do the ID theorists accept or reject?
Ernst Mayr, one of the 20th century’s leading evolutionary biologists, divided
Darwinian evolutionary theory into five distinct parts. First, (1) there is the general thesis of
evolution as such. This states the changeability of species as opposed to a constant,
unchanging world. Second (2), there is common descent, the thesis that all different branches
of animal species share a common ancestor. Third (3), there is the thesis of gradualness,
which states that species change by small, successive and cumulative mutations. Thus there
are no big “jumps” in evolution where a completely new form of animal is formed through
just one mutation. Fourth (4), there is the thesis of populational speciation, which states that
new species can emerge from existing populations through changes. Fifth (5), there is natural
selection – the Darwinian mechanism for explaining evolutionary adaptations.661 As  Mayr
argues, it is in principle possible to accept just parts of Darwinian evolutionary theory. For
example, many of Darwin’s contemporaries did not accept natural selection as the
mechanism of evolutionary change, but accepted the thesis of common descent.662 Modern
expansions of the evolutionary synthesis also tend to modify one of these parts. For example,
there are different views about the relative importance of natural selection and how large the
mutations can be.663
There is a broad variety of different views within modern evolutionary biology, as
well. Recent discussion on evolutionary theory has complicated the picture. For example,
there has been discussion of evo-devo, neutral evolution, endosymbiosis, punctuated
equilibirium and even “natural genetic engineering” as complementary mechanisms to
Darwinian natural selection.664 However, the standard Darwinian mechanism is typically still
661 Mayr 2002, 94-95.
662 Mayr 2002, 95. See also Bowler 2009, chapters 6 and 7, particularly pages 196-199.
663 Pigliücci & Muller 2010.
664 See e.g. Cunningham 2010, Cobb 2008 and Noble 2013 for discussions emphasizing the breadth and continuing
development of evolutionary theory; see Shapiro 2011 & Wilkins 2012 for discussion on natural genetic
engineering.
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seen as the only way to explain the presence of complex biological adaptations, such as the
eye which appears to be formed for the purpose of sight and other such examples of
biological “teleology” or whatever name we wish to use of this feature of life.665
In any case, Mayr and the mainstream of current evolutionary biologists still regard
accepting the whole package of Darwinism as the most consistent and scientifically
reasonable thing to do. New developments in evolutionary biology are seen as
supplementing the basic naturalistic picture of neo-Darwinism rather than overthrowing it
and returning to a Paleyan understanding of the origin of species. Evolutionary biologist
Mark Ridley summarizes four main lines of evidence for Darwinian evolutionary theory.666
First, (1) small scale changes in organisms can be directly observed. It is then extrapolated
that past changes in organisms can be explained through the same evolutionary mechanisms
observed in the present. Second (2), the similarities of living things can be explained by the
proposition that they are descended with modification from a common ancestor. Such
similarities can be seen both in the appearance (phenotype) and the genetic structure
(genotype) of organisms. The classification of living things into different species and classes
by pre-Darwinian biologists was historically necessary for the emergence of Darwinian
theory. It then became possible to argue (for example) that all different cats were descended
from the same cat-like ancestors, all mammals from the same ancestors and so on.667 Third,
(3) the geological evidence demonstrates that past forms of life were different from those that
now live, and fits well with the supposition of descent with modification. Fourth (4),
evolutionary  biology  acts  as  a  unifying  theory  for  all  of  biology  and  helps  explain  many
details which seem to be without any other explanation.668 As Theodosiuz Dobzhansky
famously stated in 1974, “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.”669
Dobzhansky admitted that not all details about how evolution happens have been worked
out, but this should not stop us from accepting the general picture given by the theory as
correct. The logic of the inference to the best explanation does not demand that all questions
related to a hypothesis are resolved before it can emerge as a clearly better explanation than
any rival hypothesis.670
665 E.g. Freeman & Herron 2007, 98-99. Even Fodor & Piattelloi-Palmarini (2011, chapter 8) recognize in their
critique of neo-Darwinian theory that this is the strongest argument in favour of the importance of natural
selection; similarly Cunningham (2010, chapter 3) notes the importance of natural selection in explaining
adaptations, while otherwise emphasizing the importance of other factors in evolution.
666 Ridley 2004, 66. There are other ways of summing the evidence for evolution. Campbell and Reece (2007) add
the evidence from biogeography to this list:  similar animals live close to each other.  This is better explained by
assuming that these species have a history of common ancestry and migration, rather than assuming that all
species are created by God in the places which they are found.
667 See Bowler 2009, chapter 3 for this history. See also Freeman & Herron 2007, Dawkins 2009 and Coyne 2009 for
presentations of the evidence for common descent.
668 As  Dawes  (2007,  80)  notes,  there  is  massive  amount  of  research  in  evolutionary  biology.  It  is  now over  140
years from the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) and evolutionary biology has since been worked on
by generations of biologists.
669 Dobzhansky 1974.
670 Lipton 2003, Sober 2008.
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In addition to these four reasons, many defenders of evolutionary biology also
reference philosophical and theological arguments as powerful reasons for accepting
Darwinian evolutionary biology over any idea of creation involving miracles and gaps in
nature. I will analyse some such reasons further in chapters 7, 8 and 9.
The ID movement's critique of evolutionary biology is mostly aimed at the sufficiency
of the Darwinian mechanism for explaining the origin of complex functional order in life
(part 5 in Mayr’s division above). As John G. West puts it, “intelligent design is simply the effort
to investigate empirically whether the exquisitely coordinated features we find throughout nature are
the result of an intelligent cause rather than a blind and undirected process like natural selection.”671
All of the ID movement’s main thinkers similarly affirm the compatibility of common
descent and ID’s biological design arguments. This theme is already present in Johnson’s
Darwin on Trial672, and continues in later ID works. Dembski, for example, argues that
“intelligent design is also fully compatible with large-scale evolution over the course of natural
history, all the way up to what biologists refer to as “common descent” (i.e., the full genealogical
interconnectedness of all organisms.)”673 The reason for this is that the thesis of common descent
does not by itself provide any explanation for biological adaptations, and thus does not
compete with design as an explanation, whereas the Darwinian mechanism is understood to
compete with design. 674
However, Behe is the only major ID theorists who actually believes in common descent
as the best explanation of the similarities of living beings and who restricts his critique to
naturalistic mechanisms of evolution. All of the other major ID theorists do recognize Behe’s
position as coherent and as part of ID. However, they also make extended critiques of
standard evidence for common descent, including ID textbooks like the The Design of Life
(2007) by Dembski and Jonathan Wells.675 This critique is thus a part of ID, but the major ID
theorists do not consider it a necessary part of ID’s project or its design argument. Therefore
I will leave discussion of the first four parts of Mayr’s thesis aside and focus on the central
question of natural selection as the mechanism driving the evolution of new functional
structures.676
671 Gauger, Axe & Luskin 2012, 11.
672 Johnson (1993, 4) argues that one can be a creationist in the broad sense and accept evolution, as long as one
believes that the process of evolution was directed by God.
673 See also Meyer 2010. I will have more to say about ID’s relationship to theistic evolution in chapter 8.
674 The ID theorists’ engagement with evolutionary mechanisms other than the standard neo-Darwinian account
has been limited. Behe’s analysis of Lynn Margulis’ theory of endosymbiosis (2006, 26-31) and evo-devo (2007,
chapter 9) is one exception.
675 Jonathan Wells’ (2002a and 2002b) critiques of standard evidences for common descent are among the deepest
in the ID movement.
676 Though many sources (e.g. Mayr 2002, Bowler 2009) argue that the idea of common descent was historically
acceptable without accepting the other parts of Darwinian evolutionary theory such as gradualism and natural
selection, Korthof (2005) argues that there is tension between Behe’s acceptance of common descent and his
rejection of the Darwinian mechanism as the explanation for macroevolution. Common descent, gradualism and
the Darwinian mechanism fit in well together, but I find Korthof’s argument unpersuasive. It seems that other
evolutionary theories also imply some degree of discontinuity between parents and their offspring, as long as
there is change from generation to generation.
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According to evolutionary biologists Stanley Freeman and Jon C. Herron, evolution by
natural selection is the logical outcome of the following four facts. First (1), individuals vary
in most or all traits. Second, (2) some of this variation is genetically based and can be passed
on to offspring. Third (3) there is differential reproduction: some organisms are more
successful than others in passing on their genes. Fourth (4), reproductive success is not
completely random. Rather, the better adapted (or more fit) individuals in the population
will reproduce the most.677 But this results only in a proving a very general definition of
evolution defined as a change in the genetic makeup of the population over time. This
definition does not yet tell us what sort of variations occur and whether the cumulation of
these variations over time can explain even complex, functional biological structures. One of
the best discussions of this is still Richard Dawkins’ classic The Blind Watchmaker –  also  a
central text discussed by the ID movement.678
The ID movement’s thinkers admit the powers of naturalistic evolutionary
mechanisms in explaining minor changes, but do not accept them as a sufficient explanation
for all of life’s complexity. In other terms, at issue is the extrapolation from microevolution to
macroevolution.679 According to Johnson, “If empiricism were the primary value at stake,
Darwinism would long ago have been limited to microevolution, where it would have no important
theological or philosophical implications.”680 In the ID movement’s terminology, microevolution
is “small-scale genetic and structural changes in organisms”, whereas macroevolution means
large-scale genetic and structural changes “leading to new and higher level of complexity.”681 In
the Edge of Evolution (2007), Behe attempts to determine the limits of Darwinian evolutionary
mechanisms and concludes that Darwinian evolution is likely possible beyond the species
level and the limits of Darwinian mechanisms are somewhere on the levels of animal genera,
families and orders. For the ID theorists, the boundaries of the system of classification are not
what limit the possibilities of the Darwinian mechanisms. Rather, the argument is that
though this mechanism can explain some features of life, there are many features which it
cannot explain. Thus Behe writes that “the major architectural features of life – molecular
677 Freeman & Herron 2007, 105.
678 For example, Freeman & Herron (2007, 98-99) and Ridley (2004, 70) direct the reader to Dawkins for the best
defence of the powers of the Darwinian mechanism and reference Dawkins’ ideas about evolution as the “blind
watchmaker.”
679 The distinction is also common in creationism. See Ratzsch 1996, 86-90. For an example within ID see Dembski
& Wells 2007, 102-104.
680 Johnson 1993, 118.
681 Dembski & Wells 2007, 315-316. Unfortunately there are several different ways of making the distinction
between microevolution and macroevolution, leading to misunderstandings. In the standard terminology of
evolutionary biology, microevolution refers to the evolutionary change within the species, while macroevolution
refers  to  evolutionary  change  above  the  species  level.  However,  the  biological  species  line  (meaning  a
reproductively  isolated  population)  can  be  crossed  without  changes  that  the  ID  theorists  would  term
macroevolution. (Dembski & Wells 2009, chapter 4). Nevertheless, similar broader definitions of micro- and
macroevolution are also used within the philosophy of biology, and the question is typically seen as a valid one.
(See Sepkoski 2008 for discussion)
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machinery, cells, genetic circuitry, and probably more – are purposely designed. But the architectural
constraints leave spandrels that can be filled with Darwinian adaptations.”682
Philosopher of biology David Sepkoski formulates the basic question in the move from
micro- to macroevolution as follows: “Do major taxonomical groups represent real, ontologically
distinct entities with their own emergent properties, and are the factors that govern their development
discontinuous with the mechanisms that produce variation and fitness among individuals?”683 In the
typical usage of the terms in Neo-Darwinian biology, macroevolution has been understood
as the same process as microevolution, only on a bigger scale. In this understanding, there is
no qualitative difference between microevolution and macroevolution. Rather, if there is a
sufficient amount of time, microevolution can lead to macroevolution without the need for
further mechanisms.684 It is tempting to see a parallel between the arguments for natural
selection and design as the best explanations for functional biological complexity. In chapter
4, I argued that ID’s design inference is best formulated as an inference to the best
explanation where inductive and analogical arguments are used to support design as an
explanation. Similarly, natural selection can be defended as the best explanation of functional
biological complexity, and its capabilities for explaining this type of order can be defended
using inductive arguments, just as is done for design. The Darwinian mechanism is observed
to do similar work on a smaller scale today; therefore we can infer that it has the capabilities
required for producing macroevolutionary changes given a much larger amount of time.
This comes very close to the way the case for the Darwinian extrapolation is often made.685
There are some important differences in the arguments for the Darwinian mechanism
and design, however. Both the ID theorists and the Darwinians agree that the existence of the
Darwinian mechanism in the past is not in doubt. The existence of the Darwinian mechanism
is guaranteed by the existence of variation, inheritance and differential reproduction, as we
saw above. Darwinian evolutionary biologists also argue that this mechanism fits with what
we know about the progress of evolution from fossils and homological evidence, though ID
theorists argue that these do not demonstrate the mechanism of evolution.686 By contrast, as I
showed in chapters 4.4 and 4.5, design arguments are often critiqued for lack of independent
682 Behe 2007a, 202.
683 Sepkoski 2008, 212.
684 Sepkoski 2008, 213-216. As Sepkoski notes, there is some dispute about whether the (well-evidenced)
mechanisms of microevolution can be extrapolated to also explain macroevolution. The majority opinion within
evolutionary  biology  is  that  the  extrapolation  can  be  made,  but  there  is  a  growing  number  of  biologists  who
would supplement the basic Neo-Darwinian understanding with other mechanisms. These include appeals to
mechanisms  working  on  a  larger  scale,  such  as  selection  on  the  level  of  groups  and  species  rather  than
individuals, large-scale events such as extinctions, epigenetic evolution, macromutations, endosymbiosis,
structural constraints and other factors.
685 E.g. Ridley 2004, 54-55.
686 Ridley 2004, 54-55. Behe 2006a, 22: “The fossil record has nothing to tell us about whether the interactions of 11-cis-
retinal with rhodopsin, transducin and phosphodinesterase could have developed step-by-step.” The existence of natural
selection is already accepted by Phillip Johnson in his Darwin on Trial (1993, chapter 2). Though Johnson
discusses  the  critique  that  natural  selection  is  a  tautology  and  meaningless,  he  goes  on  to  state  that  it  can  be
formulated in a meaningful way and indeed works in explaining microevolution.
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evidence of the designer’s existence and characteristics. For the ID theorists, the crucial
question is not the existence of natural selection in the past, but the causal powers attributed
to it. The reliability of the extrapolation from miroevolution to macroevolution is denied. The
observed evolutionary changes are not thought to demonstrate the possibility of much larger
or qualitatively different evolutionary changes through the same mechanism.
ID and Macroevolution
But what is it that, in the ID theorists’ view, stops the processes of microevolution from
leading to macroevolution? How do the ID theorists justify their rejection of the Darwinian
mechanism’s capabilities for macroevolution? Their basic idea is that though small gradual
changes are known to produce some positive changes in modern-day organisms, explaining
all of life’s features through the same process is difficult. I will now summarize four features
of biological order the ID theorists believe are resistant to Darwinian explanations. These are
(1) irreducibly complex molecular machines, (2) proteins and genes, (3) animal body plans,
and (4) the pattern of the fossil record.
(1) Irreducibly complex molecular machines. Both critics and defenders of ID have
identified Behe’s irreducible complexity (IC) as ID’s most central argument against the
Darwinian extrapolation.687 Behe focuses on biochemical machines which he believes are not
credibly explained by a gradual process, because producing the function of these machines
requires the interaction of several fine-tuned parts. In recent ID literature, there seems to be a
move away from using IC as the central ID argument. Rather, the ID theorists are starting to
argue that producing even one part of an IC machine is beyond the capabilities of the
Darwinian mechanism. IC is then used to argue for the severity of the problem – if
producing even one new protein is beyond the capacities of the Darwinian mechanism, then
surely producing a new machine requiring tens of such proteins is utterly incredible.688 I will
have more to say about this argument and its critique in chapter 6.3.
(2) Proteins and genes. Proteins  are  the  basic  building  blocks  of  life.  For  example,  the
parts of the biochemical machines described by Behe’s argument are proteins. Proponents of
ID argue that new proteins are themselves beyond the capacities of evolution. Based on
research into protein evolution, Douglax Axe and Ann Gauger have argued that the
structures of many proteins are very sensitive to changes. The amino acids have to be in the
right places for the protein to fold into a functional three-dimensional form. While proteins
can sustain some mutations without breaking, too many changes result in the loss of protein
function. Axe estimates that only about 1 / 1064 protein folds are functional. If this is correct,
then explaining the emergence of new protein folds through a random search is
687 E.g. Shanks 2003, 160. and Woodward 2003, 155. The argument from irreducible complexity takes much space
in many sources both for and against ID. For examples, see Dembski 2002a, chapter 5; Shanks 2003, chapter 5;
Dawkins 2006, 144-150; Miller 2002, chapter 5.
688 E.g. Gauger, Axe & Luskin 2012; Meyer 2013, 205-206.
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implausible.689 Axe admits that random mutations can make small beneficial changes to
existing proteins. However, he argues that the mutation experiments he performed with Ann
Gauger show that changing the protein’s basic structure in this way is mathematically
beyond the capabilities of the Darwinian mechanism in the timescales available on Earth,
because it would require many coordinated mutations.690
Typically critics of this argument admit that the rarity of protein folds does
demonstrate the difficulty of random evolution, but argue that evolution does not have to
rely on a completely random search. Even if protein folds are rare, it could be that the
distance from one functional protein fold to a new protein fold does not require one to search
through the entire realm of possibilities, which could make the odds of generating new
proteins much better. Though evolving new protein forms from modern-day proteins is
difficult, it may be that ancestral protein forms were more malleable. Similarities among
current proteins are interpreted as evidence of their evolution through natural selection.691
A related difficulty is posited by Behe, who argues that developing new proteins
would require mutations that increase the functional specificity of proteins. However, Behe
argues that such mutations appear to be extremely rare. According to Behe's review of the
literature, most beneficial mutations degrade functional specificity or do not increase it and
the accumulation of such mutations would not lead to the evolution of new functional
protein structures over time. This is another way to argue for a difference between
microevolution and macroevolution.692 Meyer also uses Behe’s arguments from population
genetics to buttress the argument against protein evolution. According to Behe, if some
feature requires the emergence of multiple mutations at the same time, then its emergence
will require ever more time and larger population sizes. Behe calculates that any feature
requiring more than two simultaneous mutations is too unlikely for the use of Darwinian
evolutionary mechanisms.693
Some other calculations of the frequency of mutations are more optimistic, but still
seem to make the waiting time for two mutations too long for Darwinian evolution.
689 Axe 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012.
690 Gauger & Axe 2011; Gauger, Axe & Luskin 2012; Leisola & Turunen 2007.
691 E.g. Wood (2011), Myers (2011), Matzke 2013. Carroll, Ortlund & Thornton (2011) is a study hypothetically
reconstructing some postulated ancestral protein forms. In response, Gauger (2012) has argued that if the minor
changes Axe and Gauger (2011) tried to generate in their experiments is impossible for the Darwinian mechanism,
then this reveals the weakness of the Darwinian mechanism and its dependence on the fine-tuning of the fitness
landscape. ID theorists also argue that ancestral proteins could not have been much more malleable, because then
they would have lacked the specificity necessary for function. (e.g. Berlinski 2013). ID theorists also argue that
orphan genes without homologues are difficult to explain in this way. On orphan genes, see the review article by
Tautz and Domazet-Loso (2011) and Meyer’s comments (2013, 215-216.)
692 Behe  2010a;  a  previous  paper  in  the  same vein  is  Behe  2004b.  In  response,  Coyne  (2010)  argues  that  though
Behe’s research describes the mutations observed in the laboratory well, we have indirect evidence that the
mechanism of gene-duplication, mutation and selection can produce gains of function in nature. Miller 2007a and
2007b as well as Farmer & Habura 2010 are examples of other responses to Behe’s thesis. Behe’s responses can be
accessed through Michael Behe’s blog (behe.uncommondescent.com); see e.g. Behe 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and
2010b.
693 Behe 2007a.
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Discussion is ongoing.694 The best response to the argument seems to be to say that
Darwinian evolution does not generally require any coordinated mutations to produce new
beneficial traits. The preceding arguments about the necessity of coordinated mutations for
the emergence of new proteins and irreducible complexity are designed to make such a
response difficult, and so the validity of the argument from mutations hinges on the success
of the other arguments.695
(3) Animal body plans. The ID theorists generally focus on the level of biochemical
complexity which is not visible to the naked eye. However, there are several ID-arguments
that focus on the difficulty of developing animal body plans in a gradual Darwinian manner.
First, the argument from irreducible complexity can be formulated again on the level of body
plans. Though natural selection is thought to be able to alter the body plans slightly,
developing a new type of body plan is argued to require too many coordinated simultaneous
changes to be possible for natural selection. For example, developing an eye would not only
require developing the eye, but would also require developing a nerve connecting the eye to
the brain and an ability to process the visual information gathered by the brain. Small
gradual changes to existing body plans are thus argued to be unable to change body plans
entirely.696 Formulated in this manner, the argument is quite old and resonates with the
typological conception of species used by pre-Darwinian biologists.697 Darwinian biologists
starting with Darwin himself have had much experience in answering arguments like this on
the anatomical level. The argument from irreducible complexity on the biochemical level is
partly an attempt to sidestep these Darwinian arguments. I will come back to these questions
in chapter 6.3.
The ID theorists also make some arguments about the difficulty of developing new
body plans, however. These are based on the insights of developmental biology. First, it is
also argued that developmental biology shows that only mutations which affect the early
development of organisms could conceivably lead to the evolution of wholly new body
plans. However, mutations affecting early development are typically extremely harmful or
even deadly. Though mutations in control genes (like HOX genes) can create large changes
in the organism’s body plan, no known beneficial mutations like this are known. Rather,
known examples of beneficial mutations only affect later development. But the accumulation
694 Behe (2007a, 61 ) estimated that though the occurrence of two coordinated mutations by random chance is
rarely feasible in bacterial populations, the emergence of such a mutation in humans would take 100 million times
10  million  years.  In  response,  Durrett  &  Schmidt  (2008)  estimate  that  it  would  only  take  216  million  years  in
humans. See also Behe 2009 for Behe’s response.
695 On the origin of new genes and ID, see also the review article by Long, Betrán, Thornton & Wang 2003 and
Meyer’s comments (2013, 211-229.)
696 E.g. Behe 2007, chapter 9; Denton 1998, chapter 14; Dembski & Wells 2007, 102-109; Axe 2012, 39-43; Nelson &
Gauger 2011.
697 Denton 1986, chapter 5; Denton 2013. See also Bowler
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of beneficial mutations which happen late in development cannot even in principle lead to
the evolution of wholly new body plans.698
Second, the ID theorists reference research on genetic regulatory networks and
epigenetic information. The evolution of new proteins is not sufficient to produce new
animal body plans, because the information required for developing new animal forms
resides in complex genetic regulatory networks and even in structures outside the DNA.
However, genetic regulatory networks and epigenetic information are argued to be resistant
to change. The beneficial mutations observed in the present day do not affect genetic
regulatory networks, and observed changes to the epigenetic information revert back in a
few generations. Meyer argues that the beneficial microevolutionary changes observed
cannot be extrapolated to explain macroevolution if the observed changes do not explain the
generation of new genetic regulatory networks or epigenetic information.699
If these arguments about animal development are correct, then there is indeed a
difference between the microevolution observed in the present day and the macroevolution
required to produce new body plans. Very few responses to this line of argument have been
in the discussion on ID. However, it needs to be noted that those scientists whose work the
ID theorists’ developmental arguments rely on do not themselves generally believe that the
modern developments of evolutionary theory require abandonment of the theory. Though
they agree with the ID theorists about the existence of unsolved mysteries in biology, they
strongly disagree with ID about what the implications of such mysteries are. Rather, they
argue that these mysteries are already in the process of being solved. One possibility is that
ancient regulatory networks were not yet solidified in a way that prevents macroevolution.700
698 Meyer  2013,  315.  According  to  Meyer,  a  hundred years  of  research  in  developmental  biology  backs  up this
claim.
699 Meyer (2013, 269) quotes Davidson (2006, 195): “contrary to classical evolutionary theory, the processes that drive the
small changes observed as species diverge cannot be taken as models for the evolution of the body plans of animals.” And
“neo-Darwinian evolution – –  assumes that all processes work the same way, so that evolution of enzymes or flower colors
can be used as current proxies for study of  the evolution of  the body plan.  It  erroneously assumes that change in protein-
coding sequence is the basic cause of change in developmental program; and it erroneously assumes that evolutionary change
in body-plan morphology occurs by a continuous process. All of these assumptions are basically counterfactual. This cannot
be surprising, since the neo-Darwinian synthesis from which these ideaws stem was a premolecular biology conconction
focused  on  population  genetics  and  –  –   natural  history,  neither  of  which  have  any  direct  mechanistic  importance  for  the
genomic regulatory systems that drive embryonic development of the body plan.” (Davidson 2011, 35-36) These types of
quotes  sound  very  critical  of  Neo-Darwinian  theory,  and  Meyer  is  able  to  use  them  to  great  rhetorical  effect.
However,  the force of these quotes is weakened by the fact that Davidson himself (who knows his own results
best)  argues  that  these  findings  should  lead  only  to  a  modification  of  evolutionary  theory  and  the  continued
scientific research of the processes behind macroevolution, not rejecting the naturalistic understanding of
evolution.
700 Davidson  (2011,  40),  whose  work  Meyer  builds  upon,  himself  infers  that  ancient  regulatory  networks  must
have been different, and not yet solidified in a way that prevents evolution. Korthof (1998) similarly suggested in
response to the earlier arguments of Denton (1998, chapter 14) that the creatures Denton uses as examples may be
exceptionally resistant to evolutionary changes, and Denton’s idea of interdependent functional constraints can
help evolutionary biologists explain why some organisms do not change much over time. However, Korthof
argues that the developmental constraints of other animals may not be as tight. Perhaps the ancestral forms of
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Though ID’s new arguments about the development of animal forms are significant for
the movement, I will not discuss them further because the purpose of this study is not to
form a scientific evaluation of ID’s merits and because there has not yet been enough time for
comprehensive discussion of these arguments to emerge. Analysis of the argument from
irreducible complexity is sufficient to demonstrate the nature of the debate.
(4) The pattern on the fossil record. ID’s fourth argument is based on the patterns of stasis
and abrupt emergence of new animal forms. Johnson and Meyer in particular have argued
that this pattern contradicts the expectations of the traditional evolutionary paradigm.
Johnson and Meyer reference the work of punctuated equilibirists Gould and Eldredge.
Though Gould and Eldredge believe in the existence of animal fossils demonstrating
evolutionary transitions between animal forms, they also argued that the pattern of the fossil
record is different from what we would expect based on classical neo-Darwinian
evolutionary theory. The neo-Darwinian theory would lead us to expect to find gradually
changing fossils, but the dominant patterns of the fossil record are stasis and the abrupt
appearance of animals. To account for this, Gould and Eldredge devised their theory of
punctuated equilibirium, which states that the development of new animal forms occurs in
relatively small populations over a short period of time. In his Darwin on Trial, Johnson used
the arguments of Gould and Eldredge to undermine belief in Darwinian evolution.701
Following the publication of Darwin on Trial, Gould himself responded Johnson’s
arguments, arguing for the existence of some transitional fossils.702 Though the experience of
proponents of ID was that Johnson did well in his debate with Gould, and the arguments are
repeated in ID textbooks, the arguments from fossils have nevertheless not been as central
for the other proponents of ID.703 A recent exception is Meyer’s recent book Darwin’s Doubt
(2013), roughly one third of which focuses on the argument from fossils, particularly the
Cambrian explosion.
The Cambrian explosion means the geologically sudden appearance of many major
animal groups (phyla) in the fossil record about 542 million years ago. Meyer argues that this
sudden emergence contradicts the Darwinian thesis of gradualism. Like Johnson, he too pits
defenders of punctuated equilibirium and classical neo-Darwinism against each other on the
question of fossils. However, for Meyer, the Cambrian explosion is just an example of the
animals were not as constrained developmentally as modern organisms. In response to Meyer’s argument,
Charles R. Marshall (2013) similarly argues that the biological forms were easier to mutate in the past.
Just how tight the developmental constraints of organisms are is a topic of study in evolutionary developmental
biology (see e.g. Carroll 2006), and this research is also discussed in the newer ID sources on the argument (e.g.
Behe 2007, chapter 9). (Similarly Matzke 2013. ) The evolutionary arguments for common descent presuppose that
the  basic  body  plans  of  animals  do  not  mutate  freely.  Rather  than  changing  the  entire  body  plan  of  animals,
evolution is forced to change existing structures slightly. This is used to explain the similarities between
mammals, for example. Andrew Wagner (2007) argues that successful living organisms must have a balance
between robustness and evolvability: their form must be stable enough to ensure survival in the current situation,
yet evolvable enough to also survive in changing circumstances.
701 Johnson 1993, chapter 4. Similarly Dembski 2002a, 344-346; Behe 2006a, 27.
702 Gould 1992.
703 Woodward 2003, chapter 7.
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difficulty of explaining the emergence of new proteins, genes and body plans in a Darwinian
fashion. The Cambrian explosion merely accentuates the problem because the emergence of
these body plans must have happened in a short time period. So, this ID argument depends
on the other ID critiques of the Darwinian mechanism. However, the dependence does also
run the other way. Meyer uses the fossil record to argue that even ancient creatures had
highly adapted body plans, and thus their body plans were probably no more malleable than
those of modern creatures. Recall that the possible greater malleability of ancient animal
body plans was one possible response to the third ID argument above.704 ID’s arguments are
therefore meant to form a whole in which each part of the critique support others.
There are several different major critiques of the argument from the Cambrian
explosion. First, (1) the Darwinian theory can be saved by postulating the existence of un-
fossilized creatures before the Cambrian explosion. This makes the time frame for the
appearance of new biological forms much longer. Fossilization is quite rare, and perhaps it
didn’t occur as frequently before the Cambrian. It has long been estimated that the fossil
record only contains remains from 1% or less of the species that have lived on the Earth.705
Second (2), evo-devo and other new developments in Darwinian evolutionary biology may
help explain the more rapid emergence of new biological body plans in animals, so the
critique is better answered by expanding evolutionary theory rather than by abandoning it.706
Third (3), the fossils in the Cambrian explosion are argued to have similarities best explained
by the hypothesis of common descent. If a pattern of evolution can be discerned even in the
Cambrian explosion itself, then Meyer's argument no longer appears as strong.707 Fourth (4),
philosophical critiques of intelligent design can be made.708
There are other arguments in addition to these five in the ID literature. For example,
Dembski has argued that there is a “law of conservation of information” which shows that
no process combining randomness and selection can build new information that was not
already built into the process. Dembski’s point is that genetic algorithms, which attempt to
simulate evolution on the computer, do not demonstrate the capability of the evolutionary
process for macroevolution – unless the process of evolution was designed by an
intelligence.709 But when he comes to arguing that the mechanism of Darwinian evolution
doesn’t actually work in nature to explain macroevolution, Dembski relies on the argument
704 Meyer 2013 and Meyer 2004a.
705 See e.g. Raup 1994, 6759-6760.
706 Related to this, Susumo Ohno (1996) argues that if the Cambrian explosion was only 6-10 million years, then
the most likely explanation is that “all the animals animals involved in the Cambrian explosion were endowed
with nearly the identical genome, with enormous morphological diversities displayed by multitudes of animal
phyla being due to differential usages of the identical set of genes.”
707 Matzke 2013.
708 E.g. Miller 2010.
709 E.g. Dembski & Marks 2009; Dembski 2002a, chapter 4. Because Dembski’s argument relates to interpreting the
evolutionary process as designed, I will say a bit more about this argument in chapter 8. For critique of Dembski’s
law of conservation of information, see Elsberry & Shallit 2003. For a discussion of whether Darwinian evolution
can produce new information, see Venema 2011; for ID responses, see Luskin 2011.
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from irreducible complexity.710 Dembski’s idea that evolution can never generate new
information is also not shared by all other ID theorists. For example, Behe argues that
evolution can indeed build very small quantities of new functional information, but that this
nevertheless cannot explain the generation of more complex structures.711 So, the argument
from  irreducible  complexity  is  much  more  central  to  ID  than  Dembski’s  proposed  Law  of
Conservation of Information.712
Most of the discussion on ID has focused on Darwinian evolution, but there is also
another biological design argument which claims that design is a better explanation for the
origin of life and its genetic code than any of the naturalistic alternatives. There has been
much research on the origin of life (abiogenesis) since Darwin’s speculation that life may have
begun in some “warm little pond, with all sorts of ammonia and phosphoric salts, lights, heat,
electricity, etc. present, so that a protein compound was chemically formed ready to undergo still more
complex changes”.713 Many chemicals necessary for life have been synthesized in origin of life-
experiments, but the experiments and the accumulation of biological knowledge have also
revealed major problems in all proposed origin of life-scenarios.714 The first  book of  the ID
movement was The Mystery of Life’s Origin (1992 [1984]) by Charles Thaxton, Walter Bradley
and Roger Olsen. This shows the importance of the issue for the movement, though it was
not the focus of analysis in the movement’s literature again until Stephen Meyer’s major
work Signature in the Cell (2009). Meyer’s focus is on the concept of biological information
and the difficulty of generating it without intelligence, as seen in chapter 6.1.715
The cumulativity of the ID theorists’ argument against Darwinian evolution is
important to note. In chapter 6.1, I noted that for Behe, the strength of the design argument
increases as the purposeful complexity of the system(s) being explained increases.
Cumulativity is also a central characteristic of their argument against naturalistic
explanations of biological complexity. Thus Behe argues that the problems in the evolution
of one irreducibly complex system are multiplied when we consider the interdependency of
irreducibly complex systems. As an example, Behe argues that the assembly of the bacterial
710 Dembski 2002a, chapter 5.
711 Behe 2013.
712 Another  argument  that  ID  proponents  sometimes  make  is  related  to  the  problem  of  consciousness.  The
philosophy of mind is not really ID’s home territory, and not much space is spent arguing that the emergence of
consciousness, particularly human consciousness, cannot be reduced to Darwinian mechanisms. The argument is
still  present  in  ID  literature,  however,  and  may  be  part  of  the  ID  theorists’  shared  thought.  The  Discovery
Institute’s Wedge Document (2003),  stating  the  goals  of  the  movement,  is  very  concerned  about  the  effects  of
reducing human consciousness to materialistic terms. Menuge (2004b) contains much critique of materialistic
understandings of human persons; Menuge’s book has the endorsements of Dembski and Behe on the back cover.
Behe states that Menuge “clears  the  fog  to  show  that  the  universe  contains  not  only  matter  and  energy;  it  contains
agents.” See  also  Dembski  & wells  2007,  14-17.  For  an  early  ID-friendly  discussion  of  the  issues,  see  the  article
“Origin of the Human Language Capacity: In Whose Image” (Oller and Omdahl 1994).
713 Darwin 1888.
714 E.g. Shapiro 1986.
715 Meyer 2009. For critique see e.g. Berry 2012, chapter 4 and Venema 2011. For defences of Meyer’s argument see
and Luskin 2011.
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flagellum itself requires another irreducibly complex system.716 Wiker and Witt thus term the
complexity of life “intergrated complexity”. For them, life is composed of hundreds of
different complex systems all working together for the good of the organism. For example,
the evolution of vision also requires the evolution of the nervous system to use the new
visual data, or the evolution of vision is useless.717 In the same vein, Meyer and Dembski
argue that the problem of the origin of life to exemplify irreducible complexity particularly
well. Cells need DNA to reproduce, while the survival of DNA and its reading is dependent
on the existence of cells and their systems.718 So, for ID, the problem of irreducible
complexity and the problem of the origin of life are linked.719
There is vast discussion on ID’s anti-Darwinian arguments, and there is no need here
to go through the entire discussion. To analyse the general structure, the philosophical ideas
and theology of the debate, the example of irreducible complexity is sufficient. It remains
ID’s  most  popular  and  most  commented  on  argument.  Thus  an  analysis  of  IC  will  help
understand typical arguments used in the debate.
6.3. Irreducible Complexity
Questioning the Existence of Evolutionary Pathways
Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity is often construed as deductive, but it is
actually a two-part argument. The deductive first part is his criticism of what he terms
“direct evolutionary pathways”. However, I will argue that Behe’s criticism of “indirect
evolutionary pathways” is probabilistic, not deductive. Behe admits Darwinian evolution as
an in principle possible explanation for biological machinery, but argues that empirical
details pose great difficulties for this Darwinian explanation. Instead, he argues that the
details of biology strenghted the design inference.
I return to Dawkins' argument from The Blind Watchmaker (1989), since it provides the
backdrop to Behe's argument. Dawkins argues that it is highly rational to believe in the
capacities of the process of mutation and natural selection to explain even complex
structures. Consider the evolution of the mammalian eye, a highly complex structure that
was already used as an example of design by William Paley.720 Dawkins argues that
716 Behe 2007a.
717 Wiker & Witt 2002.
718 Meyer 2009, for Dembski’s comments see Barham 2012.
719 The implication is that if a system is necessary for life, then their evolution is a part of the problem of the origin
of life, and thus not part of the explanatory scope of Darwinian evolutionary theory. (Barham 2012.) The
naturalistic answer to this is that although these systems are necessary for the current form of life, they may not
have been necessary for some unknown form of life which preceded the current one, and in which the basic
functions of life such as protein systems were handled in some other way. See Griesemer 2008 for a review article
of the state of origin of life research.
720 Natural Theology, chapter III.
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evolution may have started with a small light-sensitive patch on the skin. When mutations
improving the capability for vision appeared, they were beneficial and thus contributed to
the fitness of the organism. Natural selection preserved these mutations, and accumulated
them. Over a long period of time, the modern eye was evolved.721 Dawkins presents the
central assumptions of this evolutionary explanation as follows:
1. Could the human eye have arisen directly from no eye at all, in a single step?
2. Could  the  human  eye  have  arisen  directly  from  something  slightly  different  from
itself, something that we may call X?
3. Is there a continuous series of Xs connecting the modern human eye to a state with no
eye at all?
4. Considering each member of the series of hypothetical Xs connecting the human eye
to  no  eye  at  all,  is  it  plausible  that  every  one  of  them  was  made  available  by  random
mutation of its predecessor?
5. Considering each member of the series of Xs connecting the human eye to no eye at
all,  is  it  plausible  that  every  one  of  them  worked  sufficiently  well  that  it  assisted  the
survival and production of the animals concerned? 722
Dawkins’ answer to the first question is negative: explaining the emergence of new complex
organs through large random mutations is too improbable to believe. Dawkins answers the
remaining four questions in the affirmative, however.
Behe regards the example of eye as misleading, because the small steps described by
Dawkins are actually extremely large on the biochemical level. According to Behe, there is no
such thing as a “simple” light sensitive cell. Rather, the biochemical basis of vision is highly
complex, an irreducibly complex cascade of proteins.723 So, explaining the evolution of the
eye in Dawkins’ manner is, for Behe, akin to explaining the production of a stereo set by
saying that you just first make a cassette player, then add a cd-player, then loudspeakers,
then a remote controller and so on. The small leaps described by Dawkins are, for Behe, giant
leaps between canyons.724
Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity is directed against the idea that all
biological structures can be explained by the accumulation of small, useful mutations. Behe’s
critique of Dawkins’ logic is directed against the fifth point of Dawkins’ argument: the
plausibility that all mutations necessary for the evolution of the current form are useful. With
his argument, Behe is attempting to answer Darwin’s challenge, as set out in the Origin of
Species:   “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have
been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.
But I can find out no such case.”725 If some biological organ could not be developed through the
721 Dawkins 1991. See also similar arguments in Freeman & Herron 2007, 98-99.
722 Dawkins 1991, 77-81.
723 Behe 2006a, 38.
724 Behe 2006a, 22.
725 Darwin 2008 [1859], chapter VI. The basic idea remains part of the mainstream of current evolutionary theory.
As Jerry Coyne (2007) puts the point: “It  is  indeed  true  that  natural  selection  cannot  build  any  feature  in  which
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mechanism of natural selection and mutation, then evolutionary theory’s claim to explain
life’s order would be jeopardized. Behe argues that “irreducibly complex” machines in cells
satisfy Darwin’s challenge.726
Behe assumes that each mutation in the evolutionary series has to be useful or at least
neutral in order for natural selection to help generate new biological structures. Otherwise,
natural selection will act against its preservation. The basic idea is common in explanations
of evolution: As Denis Noble states, if we compare the design of an organism to an aircraft,
evolution must modify and improve the aircraft without foresight while the aircraft is in
flight and all systems are in use.727 The basic idea of Behe’s argument is that this sort of
useful  modification and building up of new structures is  very difficult  or impossible in the
case of irreducibly complex systems.
According to Behe, an irreducibly complex system is “a single system composed of several
well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any one
of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning.”728 He argues that there are multiple
irreducibly complex structures in cells. His basis for this is both empirical and conceptual.
First, biochemical experiments can be used to test the necessity of the parts of biochemical
machines. If the functioning of the system ceases when a part is removed, this part can be
judged essential for the functioning of the system. Second, upon understanding how a
system works, we can determine that certain parts are crucial for its operation. Behe argues
that a system for swimming, for example, requires a minimum of three parts: a paddle, a
motor and a part connecting the two. These parts also have to be fine-tuned to fit each other,
or “well-matched” as Behe defines.729
In the discussion on ID, the bacterial flagellum has emerged as the most often used
example of biological irreducible complexity. The flagellum, according to Behe, is an
outboard motor which propels bacteria forward. Behe argues that the flagellum requires tens
of  parts  to  function.730 Additionally, he argues that the flagellum is part of a network of
interlinked irreducibly complex machines. For example, the building mechanism of the
flagellum is argued to be irreducibly complex.731
Some problems with Behe’s initial definition of irreducible complexity have emerged
in the discussion. The definition of irreducible complexity assumes that all of the parts of a
system are necessary for its function, but in practice no biological system is like this. For
example, many parts of the bacterial flagellum are unnecessary for its functioning. Behe
intermediate steps do not confer a net benefit on the organism.” Like Darwin, Coyne argues that the existence of any
such feature has not been demonstrated. Note, however, that evolutionary biology does not require all features of
life to be selected for by natural selection. On this see the classic paper Gould & Lewontin 1979, as well as
Pigliucci & Müller (eds) 2010.
726 Behe 2006a, 36. See also Behe 2001b, 2003a and2004.
727 Noble 2006, 109.
728 Behe 2006a, 39.
729 Behe 2006a.
730 E.g. Behe 2004a.
731 Behe 2007, chapter 5.
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himself recognizes this already in Darwin’s Black Box, and admits that ciliar motors have
many parts whose function is even unknown to us. However, for Behe, this does not mean
that we cannot identify many other parts as crucial.732 The adjustment by Behe and Dembski
is that Behe’s definition applies only to the irreducible core of the system – there can be
additional parts which make the system more robust, and which can be removed without
necessarily losing the function.733
Behe argues that irreducible complexity is a barrier to “direct evolutionary pathways”.
By direct evolution, Behe means evolution which works by improving some existing
function step by step, as in Dawkins’ depiction of the evolution of the eye, where each
modification results in a slight increase of vision. A direct evolutionary pathway means the
evolution of a system from humble origins by small improvements in the system’s “core
function”. Irreducible complexity is, for Behe, impossible to evolve in this way, because the
core function of the system emerges only after all of the necessary parts are in place. Natural
selection, however, cannot select for a function that emerges only after all of the parts are in
place. The system thus cannot be evolved by small beneficial steps through a direct
evolutionary pathway. For example, the bacterial flagellum cannot have evolved from a
simpler system for moving the bacterium.734 Instead,  its  evolution  is  –  according  to  Behe  –
better explained by the actions of an intelligent designer, who can arrange parts to fulfil
some future end.735
So, the idea is that the mutations leading up to an irreducibly complex system could
not generate the benefit given by the whole system and thus the series leading up to the
system would not fulfil Dawkins’ condition number five, and natural selection does not help
explain the system. Most of Behe’s critics have admitted that the argument works against
direct evolutionary pathways, but have still considered indirect evolutionary pathways
possible.736 Behe’s argument is that the parts of an irreducibly complex system would not
have the function of the system, and so would not be selected by natural selection. However,
this does not mean that they could not have had some other function, and then only later
been transformed into parts of the newly formed irreducibly complex system. The
evolutionary history of Behe’s irreducibly complex systems, such as the bacterial flagellum,
732 Behe 2006a, 39, 72-73. Miller (2002, 141) interprets Behe without noticing these. According to Miller’s
interpretation, Behe errs by assuming that all of the parts of the flagellum are essential for its function. But this is
shown to be false by the fact that there are many different flagella with slightly different parts. However, Behe’s
original argument includes the admission that a motor can be built in several different ways (Behe 2006a, chapter
3).
733 Dembski 2002a, 285.
734 Behe 2006a, 39.
735 Behe 2006a, 36-39. The argument has a predecessor in Michael Denton’s (1986, 90-91) argument from
”integrated complexity”, which Denton traces back to biologist Jean Cuvier (1796-1832). Denton also uses the
bacterial flagellum as one example of biological complexity which Darwinian evolutionary theory fails to explain
(Denton 1986, 224-225). Forrest & Gross (2004) find similarities in Behe’s argument to creationist Ariel Roth’s
argumentation (e.g. Roth 2001, 86-87).
736 E.g. Miller 2002, 132-136, Orr 1996.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
186
could be very complex, with similar parts serving in many slightly different systems with
different functions.
Evolutionary Co-Option as a Response to Behe
The adaptation of an existing biological structure for a new function is called evolutionary
co-option. In responses to Behe, it has been illustrated with examples from the larger
anatomical level. Behe focuses on biochemical phenomena, but critics have noted that his
definition could just as well be applied to larger structures. It seems difficult to say that no
system on the larger anatomical level requires more than one part to function. For example,
paleontologist Alan Gishlick has argued that under Behe’s definition of irreducible
complexity, a bird’s complex wing is irreducibly complex, requiring the coordinated action
of nine “well-matched” parts to provide the capability of flight. However, Gishlick goes on
to argue that the wing has evolved through Darwinian evolution. Based on the anatomical
similarities of birds and theropod dinosaurs, paleontologists have concluded that birds
evolved from flightless dinosaurs. Several intermediates have been postulated. For Gishlick,
these provide evidence that the irreducible complexity of the bird’s wing can be explained
through an indirect evolutionary pathway.737 The possibility of evolutionary explanations on
this level thus provides reason to also accept them as possible for biochemical irreducibly
complex machines.
Behe has dismissed the use of paleontological evidence by remarking that the fossils
only provide evidence of change, but not of the mechanism which affected the change. Behe
accepts common descent, but not the Darwinian mechanism of selection and mutation.738
However, it seems that the fossil record does provide evidence for the possibility of co-
option, supporting it as a possible evolutionary explanation. Behe’s argument thus does not
prove that Darwinian mechanisms are in principle incapable of generating irreducible
complexity. Precursors to the bacterial flagellum, for example, may have had other functions.
Indeed, it has been argued that even the modern bacterial flagellum doubles as a secretory
system, and that the metaphor of a motor thus leads us astray.739 The co-option -argument
has been the most popular response to Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity.740 The
737 Gishlick 2006, 71.
738 Behe 2006a, 22.
739 Musgrave 2006.
740 E.g. Miller 2002, 151; Dawkins 2006, 143-146; Coyne 1996, 227; Kitcher 2007, 89.  In addition, other scenarios for
the evolution of irreducible complexity have also been proposed. Not all defenders of evolution find the co-
option scenario plausible for all of Behe’s systems (Orr 1996; 1997; Forrest & Gross 2004, 303-304). For Behe’s
comments on these other scenarios see Behe 1997a, 1997b, 2001a.
Interestingly, biologist Allen Orr argues against the co-option scenario on grounds quite similar to Behe.
According to Orr,  adapting biochemical parts for another function is a good general solution to the problem of
irreducible complexity: “we might think that some of the parts of an irreducibly complex system evolved step by step for
some other purpose and were then recruited wholesale to a new function. But this is also unlikely. You may as well hope that
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idea of the argument is that the precursors of irreducibly complex machines had other
functions, and thus natural selection preserved them. Serendipitously, the parts initially
useful in other machines were also useful for the construction of current irreducibly complex
machines.
The co-option scenario can be defended with further biological evidence. The most
important category of evidence is homology: the similarity of the parts of irreducibly
complex machines with parts of other systems. Miller argues that an important part of the
bacterial flagellum is similar to the type III secretory system also found in bacteria, and
Musgrave argues that homological parts are known for around 90 percent of the parts of the
flagellum.741 Similar homological evidence can also be found for most of Behe’s other cases,
strenghtening the evidence for the evolution of irreducible complexity.742 It  can  thus  be
argued that we already have at least the beginnings of plausible evolutionary histories for
many of Behe’s irreducibly complex systems.743
However, few critics have noted that Behe himself considers the co-option answer in
Darwin’s Black Box, and presents another version of his irreducible complexity -argument
against it. Directly after presenting his argument against the direct evolution of irreducible
complexity, Behe argues as follows:
Even  if  a  system  is  irreducibly  complex  (and  thus  cannot  have  been  evolved  directly),
however, one can not definitively rule out the possibility of an indirect, circuitous route.
As the complexity  of  an interacting system increases,  though,  the likelihood of  such an
half your car's transmission will suddenly help out in the airbag department. Such things might happen very, very rarely,
but they surely do not offer a general solution to irreducible complexity.”(Orr 1997)
Orr’s argument against the co-option scenario is the same as Behe’s: the applicability of parts with one function
to a different function is too unlikely. Orr’s own solution to the problem of irreducible complexity is to defend the
possibility of direct evolution. Evolution might work by adding parts improving an existing function, like motion.
At first, these parts simply complement the function, but over time, they may become essential to the system’s
function. Parts which at first interact haphazardly are formed into a seamless whole, where the removal of one
part destroys the function. Thus irreducible complex systems can evolve from simpler beginnings. Behe’s
response is that this scenario needs detailed evidence to make it plausible. (Behe 2000b, 3-4; 2001a, 692-695.)
741 Miller 2004, 85-87; see also Musgrave 2006, 81.
742 Miller 2002, 152-161.
743 In Darwin’s Black Box,  Behe  argued  that  the  biological  research  literature  does  not  contain  any  good
evolutionary explanations for irreducible complexity. Behe admitted that the literature contains many examples
of homology in biochemical systems, but mere similarity, for Behe, does not prove the mechanism which created
this similarity (Behe 2006a, 175-176). Behe’s assertion has provoked much debate. Some of Behe’s critics have
agreed with him about the lack of explanations (Harold 2001, 205, Coyne 1996, 227, Behe 2001a, 686). However,
others  have  vigorously  disputed  Behe’s  assertion,  arguing  that  the  literature  contains  many  examples  of  how
biochemical complex systems can evolve (e.g. Miller 2002, 147-152; Forrest & Gross 2007, 304; Inlay 2007; Weber
1999). See also Venema 2012.
In the Dover trial, where Behe testified about his views on irreducible complexity, the opposing attorney was
able to present Behe with a stack of peer-reviewed papers and books which were claimed to present evidence for
the evolution of irreducible complexity. Based partly on this evidence, the judge concluded that Behe’s argument
was not good science (or actually scientific at all). However, the evidence wasn’t actually reviewed or discussed
in the trial. (Jones 2005, 78; Behe 2006a, 7.) Behe responds to criticisms in e.g. Behe 2000c; 2000d; 2000e; 2000f and
2000g.
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indirect route drops precipitously. And as the number of unexplained, irreducibly
complex biological systems increases, our confidence that Darwin’s criterion of failure
has been met skyrockets toward the maximum that science allows.744
Here Behe is admitting the point of his critics already in the course of stating his original
argument. Irreducible complexity can in principle evolve through an indirect route, by which
Behe means the co-option account. However, Behe argues that as the complexity of the
system increases, the probability of such evolutionary accounts decreases to extremely low.
Behe’s argument against Darwinian evolution is thus probabilistic, just as his argument for
design is also probabilistic. In Behe’s argument, as the amount of apparently purposeful,
irreducible complexity increases, so the probability of design goes up and the probability of
naturalism goes down.
Niall Shanks is one of the few critics who have noted this statement from Behe.
However, Shanks does not recognize any arguments from Behe to support this conclusion,
and does not comment on this. Most critics of Behe’s irreducible complexity have bypassed
this argument, and stated the co-option account without referencing Behe’s critique.745 The
fragmentariness of Behe’s argument may be partly to blame for the misunderstanding. Behe
does not state his argument against indirect evolution concisely, but elaborates on it further
only as he analyses his examples of irreducible complexity in more detail. Behe has further
developed this argument in his later works. Inside the ID movement, the two-pronged
nature of Behe’s argument has been more widely recognized, however.746
In describing molecular motors, cilia, as irreducibly complex, Behe himself considers
the possibility of co-option: “So an evolutionary story for the cilium must envision a circuitous
route, perhaps adapting parts that were originally used for other purposes.”747 He  argues  this  by
himself referring to homology: it is clear that proteins similar to the parts of the motor are
used in cells to serve other functions. Behe speculates that perhaps the building of the motor
could proceed by adapting these parts first into some simple system serving an unknown
function, and then add further parts until we come to the ciliar motor.748 Behe’s scenario is
exactly like the co-option arguments used by many of his critics.
However, Behe rejects the co-option argument based on the functional requirements of
proteins for a specific machine. He argues that a protein serving in a given irreducibly
complex machine has to be fitted to the other proteins required in that machine, attaching
itself automatically only to those proteins, and not to any others.749 Because a machine is
composed of many proteins that have to form a seamless whole, the requirements for
proteins are, according to Behe, quite strict. The prior functions of the parts make them
744 Behe 2006a, 40.
745 Shanks 2004, 162.
746 E.g. Dembski 2004b.
747 Behe 2006a, 66.
748 Behe 2006a, 66.
749 Behe 2006a, 66; 2007, appendix A.
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poorly fitting to serve in the new system.750 Behe concludes that “analogous parts playimg other
roles in other systems cannot relieve the irreducible complexity of the new system; the focus simply
shifts from ‘making’ the components to ‘modifying’ them.”751
Angus Menuge has developed Behe’s argument against indirect evolution into more
systematic form. Menuge elucidates five which have to be fulfilled in order to evolve an
irreducibly complex structure: (1) Availability: parts fitting to build the irreducibly complex
machine have to be available in the cell. (2) Synchronization: the parts of the machine must
be available at the same point in time. (3) Localization: the parts must be moved to the same
part of cell, where they can be assembled into a whole. (4) Coordination. The parts have to be
fitted together in the correct order. Having the right sort of parts is not enough, if they are
not also assembled in a functional order. (5) Interface compatibility: The parts have to be
precisely compatible and capable of acting together. Menuge sees the fulfilment of these
conditions as unrealistic, just as Behe does. Behe’s responses to the co-option-argument focus
on conditions four and five.752
Is the problem of modifying and assembling the components of irreducibly complex
biochemical machines difficult for Darwinian evolution? Here Behe’s argument seems to
depend on the details of how proteins work and the ID arguments about the difficulty of
protein evolution. As I showed in chapter 6.2, Dougles Axe and Ann Gauger have argued
that functional protein folds are extremely rare and transitions even between homologous
proteins are difficult. If this is correct, then Behe’s response to the co-option argument seems
strong. If Axe and Gauger are wrong and transitions between homologous proteins are easy,
then Behe’s response to the co-option argument is greatly weakened. Behe himself has
referenced Axe’s calculations in this way.753
The probabilistic version of the argument from irreducible complexity has not been
interacted with in any detail by the critics. The arguments of the critics, as reported above,
are that (1) homologies of the parts of “irreducibly complex” systems are just the sort of
evidence one would expect on the co-option account, and (2) detailed evolutionary histories
of many biochemical systems are beginning to be written, (3) evolutionary histories written
on the larger anatomical level are supported with paleontological evidence. In biochemistry,
finding such explanations may be more difficult due to the lack of fossils. These arguments
do provide indirect evidence in support of the evolution of irreducible complexity, and they
cannot be lightly dismissed. However, they also do not provide a direct answer to Behe’s
argument. This misconstrual of Behe's argument in much of the literature is unfortunate and
needs to be corrected for the sake of fairness.
750 Behe 2006a, 66.
751 Behe 2006a, 112-113.
752 Menuge 2004b, 104-105. Some similar conditions are elucidated by Dembski (2004b, chapter 4).
753 Behe 2007, appendix A references Axe 2004; see also Behe 2007a, 248n15.
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6.4. The Importance of Philosophy for the Biological Debate
The Existence of the Unexplained
Whether the evolutionary origins of Behe’s examples of irreducible complexity remain a
mystery or not, it seems that there are still unsolved mysteries within biology. It is not
difficult to find acknowledgements of this in the discussion on Intelligent Design even from
some critics of ID. For example, JohnJoe McFadden (an atheist professor of molecular
genetics) explains one difficulty as follows:
The basic problem is that the complexity of biochemical pathways (unlike the eye) do not
appear reducible. For instance, one of the cell’s essential biochemical is AMP (adenosine
monophosphate), the precursor of ATP (the energy carrying molecule), which also finds
its way into DNA, RNA and many other cellular components. AMP is made from ribose-
5-phosphate, but the transformation involves thirteen independent steps involving
twelve  different  enzymes.  –  –  Each  of  the  twelve  enzymes  involved  in  this  pathway  is
absolutely essential for the biosynthesis of AMP. Darwinian evolution would require this
complex system to have evolved from something simpler. But, unlike the eye, we cannot
find the relics  of  simpler  works.  Half  or  a  quarter  or  a  twelfth of  the pathway does  not
generate any AMP or indeed anything else of value to the cell. IT appears that the entire
sequence of  enzymes is  needed to  make any AMP. But  without  viable  stepping stones,
how can an entire complex system have evolved through Darwinian natural selection?754
Here McFadden’s idea is very similar to Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity
succinctly: it is difficult to understand how the complex molecular system required for the
production of AMP could have evolved, since the parts do not appear to have any use
otherwise, and since AMP seems essential for life. McFadden argues that this presents a very
difficult, even unsolvable problem for current conceptions of Darwinian evolution, and
motivates transitioning into a new “quantum” understanding of evolution. Cellular biologist
Franklin Harold similarly argues that “there are presently no detailed Darwinian accounts of the
evolution of any biochemical or cellular system, only a variety of wishful speculations.” However,
“we should reject, as a matter of principle, the substitution of intelligent design for the dialogue of
chance and necessity.“755
As I have argued, the literature does seem to contain at least some beginnings of
accounts for biochemical evolution. However, Harold’s point is still interesting. Supposing
that such detailed accounts are indeed missing at least to some degree, would we still have
some other reasons for rejecting ID? Harold emphasizes the importance of philosophical
principles rather than detailed evolutionary explanations in rejecting intelligent design.
Many defenders of evolutionary biology similarly present philosophical arguments against
ID, though they also argue that there are scientific arguments for believing that the mysteries
754 McFadden 2000, 76. Quoted in Cunningham 2010, 277-278.
755 Harold 2001, 205.
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of biology will be solved without ID. Previous successes in explaining complex systems like
the eye should give us hope in also explaining presently unexplained complex structures.
Freeman and Herron also argue that appealing to design would be tantamount to invoking
miracles, and this is unallowed in science.756
Though the estimates of proponents of ID and their critics differ on the severity of
unsolved problems within evolutionary biology, both agree that evolutionary biology is still
an incomplete science. Whereas critics of ID see waiting for naturalistic explanations of any
problems as the most reasonable course, proponents of ID argue that the progress of science
has only made the problems facing naturalistic theories worse. They want exact details of
how the evolutionary transitions in questions could have happened before believing in the
possibility of macroevolution through naturalistic mechanisms.757
The difference of opinion in the amount of unsolved problems and mysteries in
evolutionary biology is significant for the philosophical interpretation of the remaining
mysteries. There is a great deal of difference between the following three options: (1) over a
hundred years of scientific work has only produced evidence against the possibility of
macroevolution, not for it, (2) some ideas for explaining how macroevolution happens exist,
but it is still mostly a mystery, and (3) every supposed mystery brought forward by skeptics
of macroevolution has been thoroughly explained. Options 1 and 3 in particular make it
possible to make an inductive prediction about the future direction of research. If all research
so far has tended to refute the hypothesis of macroevolution by naturalistic mechanisms,
then probably future research will also tend to refute this possibility. On the other hand, if all
examples of mysteries and difficulties (like the origin of life or the origin of irreducible
complexity) have been throughoutly explained by naturalistic evolutionary mechanisms,
then probably future problems will be solved as well. This type of inductive argument does
not guarantee the conclusion, but it does seem to offer a rational reason to believe in it.
If our own opinion of the matter falls somewhere between the extremes of the first and
third option and comes closer to option 2, however, then it seems that the scientific
arguments by themselves are not sufficient to determine what we should think about
intelligent design. Though there is difference in whether things like irreducible complexity
are seen as problems, an even more central difference would then seem to be the
philosophical interpretation made of the incompleteness of evolutionary theory. The
questions “should we reject intelligent design, even if natural explanations are incomplete”
and “what counts as evidence against Darwinism or intelligent design” are philosophical. It
seems that not just scientific arguments, but also philosophical arguments are required to
resist ID´s arguments.
756 Freeman & Herron 2007, 102.
757 Behe 2006a, chapters 10 & 11; Behe 2007; Axe 2012, 41-43. Critics could note that they do not require similar
exact details about the nature and modus operandi of the designer before believing in intelligent design as the
best explanation. ID’ers certainly seem to make more stringent demands of Darwinian explanation than of design.
Perhaps this could be justified by the difference of design-based explanations from mechanistic explanations. (See
chapters 3.2. and 3.3.)
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Typical  philosophical  critiques  of  ID’s  biological  design  arguments  are  based  on  the
varieties of methodological naturalism analysed in chapter 3.4. Some of the reasons are based
on strong methodological naturalism and “in principle” arguments which aim to exclude all
types of theistic or design-based explanation from science. Others are based on weak
methodological naturalism and “in practice” arguments. In these types of arguments design
is seen as a possible explanation of biology, which could in principle succeed in explaining
biological order, but which does not in practice succeed in being a plausible explanation. For
example, as seen in chapter 3.4, several evolutionary biologists argue that the design
inference was completely reasonable a few centuries ago, but is only invalid today because
Darwinian evolutionary biology provides a better explanation of the data.
Jerry Coyne’s defence of Darwinian evolutionary biology shows the way philosophical
arguments are often used in the debate. Coyne, argues that we can be sure that mechanism of
selection and mutation explains complex adaptations partly because the only alternative –
creationism, including intelligent design – is so bad. Coyne’s arguments are that (1) ID is
unscientific, because it is untestable, (2) ID is a “God of the gaps” -argument, (3) ID can
explain potentially any feature of nature, and thus explains nothing, and (4) the burden of
proof is not on naturalists to provide a step-by-step demonstration of how complex systems
can evolve, but rather on critics who should demonstrate that the step-by-step evolution of
some complex system is impossible. Coyne’s case does not rest only on these philosophical
arguments, because he goes on to explain empirical evidence for the evolution of complex
adaptations (using the evidences from homology and the evolution of the eye, for
example).758 Nevertheless, Coyne’s philosophical arguments certainly seem to affect the level
of certainty he has regarding natural selection as the mechanism of evolution. My point is
not that it is illegitimate to use such philosophical arguments (as long as they are good
arguments), but simply that their importance for the debate between ID and naturalism
should be recognized.
Must Evolutionary Biology and Design be Opposed?
In chapter 6, I have focused on the debate between ID and naturalistic evolution. In this
debate, design and naturalistic evolution are seen as two competing explanations of the same
data. However, it is important to note that this is not the only way to understand the
relationship between evolution and design. As theistic evolutionists argue, evolution and
design could be compatible. Theistic evolutionist can still accept cosmic design arguments,
even if there is a conflict between design and evolution as explanations on the biological
level. However, I wonder if theistic evolutionists could also get some use out of ID’s critique
of naturalistic evolution.
758 Coyne 2009, 136-143.
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Consider Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity. Behe argues that it is unlikely
that proteins which are specialized for one function just happen to be easily convertible to
serve in another role, and that the evolution of irreducible complexity truly can proceed
without multiple simultaneous mutations. For Behe, this just seems too serendipitous and
incredible to be true. But suppose that such evolutionary pathways nevertheless exist. A
theistic evolutionist could argue that this just goes to show how strict the conditions for
evolvability are, and how much fine-tuning evolution allows. In a universe designed to allow
for evolution, perhaps such serendipity could be expected, rather than being unlikely. Thus a
theistic evolutionist who believes both in mainstream evolutionary theory and in the
designedness of the cosmos could argue that Behe’s argument simply reveals the extent of
fine-tuning required by evolution, rather than refuting evolution. This is a philosophical and
theological point, of course – the existence of such pathways is an empirical question. My
point is merely that that this may be a possible strategy for a defender of the cosmic design
argument to get some use out of Behe’s argument, even if Darwinian evolution is accepted as
a valid explanation for biological complexity. ID theorist Ann Gauger notes the same point
when discussing the fitness landscape required for protein evolution: “So unless someone
paved a highway to Mt. Whitney that went uphill every step of the way, Darwin’s engine would never
get out of Death Valley. But a paved highway isn’t evolution, it’s design.”759 I will come return to
these ideas on the compatibility of design and Darwinism in chapter 8.
The present chapter has brought two important questions to the surface. First, how
should we react to (naturalistically) unexplained mysteries in nature? Second, how should
we understand the relationship between natural explanations and belief in the designedness
of nature? Both of these questions are related to another common philosophical and
theological critique of ID: understanding it as a “God of the gaps”-arguments. I now turn to
this topic.
759 Gauger 2013.  A recent study at the University of Helsinki also notes that natural selection works in some types
of fitness maps, but not others. See Salazar-Ciudad & Marin-Riera 2013. The evolution of “evolvable” organisms
must be possible. (Sansom 2008).
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7. DESIGNER OF THE GAPS OR NATURALISM
OF THE GAPS?
What should we think about naturalistically unexplained mysteries in cosmology and
biology? Can there be a situation where it would be more rational to believe in the existence
and actions of a creator as the true explanation, rather than believing that a naturalistic
explanation exists? Or could creation and natural explanations be conceived as
complementary, rather than contradictory modes of explanation?
One of the criticisms of design arguments presented in the previous chapters has been
their critique as “God of the gaps”-arguments. However, there are many different
understandings of what makes an argument a “God of the gaps” and why it is
impermissible. The God of the gaps -critique is also often made very briefly and without
considering the responses of the ID movement. This is problematic for fruitful discussion of
ID’s design arguments. The purpose of this chapter is to understand both the criticism and
the ID movement’s argument better.
The critique of the ID movement’s design argument as a “God of the gaps” -argument
is extremely common and presented by both theistic and naturalistic critics of ID. For
example, the collections Debating Design760, Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics761,
Scientists Confront Creationism762, The Panda’s Black Box763, and Why Intelligent Design Fails764 all
include several articles making this characterisation of ID’s design argument. The God of the
gaps-critique is made by thinkers representing as different viewpoints as John F. Haught and
Richard Dawkins. Thus Haught argues that “ID is a ‘science stopper’ since it appeals to a God-of-
the-gaps explanation at a point in inquiry when there is still plenty of room for further scientific
elucidation.”765 Richard Dawkins argues that “admissions of ignorance and temporary
mystification are vital to good science. It is therefore unfortunate, to say the least, that the main
strategy of creation propagandists is the negative one of seeking out gaps in scientific knowledge and
claiming to fill them with ‘intelligent design’ by default.  - - It is precisely the fact that ID has no
evidence of its own, but thrives like a weed in gaps left by scientific knowledge, that sits uneasily with
science’s need to identify and proclaim the very same gaps as a prelude to researching them.”766 Many
more examples of this line of critique could be quoted from both naturalistic and theistic
sources.767
760 Dembski & Ruse 2004, 67, 142, 238.
761 Pennock 2001, 158-159, 184-185.
762 Petto & Godfrey 2007, 309-338, 416-417.
763 Comfort  2007, 86.
764 Young & Edis 2006, 3-5, 24-25 178-182.
765 Haught 2004, 238.
766 Dawkins 2006, 152-153.
767 For two further prominent developments of the critique, see Cunningham 2010, 275-280 and Pennock 1999,
163-172.  Even  where  this  characterisation  of  ID  is  not  present,  the  question  of  what  we  should  think  about
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The critique of the “God of the gaps” has Christian origins. The first known use of the
term comes from Scottish evangelist Henry Drummond (1851-1897): “There are reverent minds
who ceaselessly scan the fields of Nature and the books of Science in search of gaps – gaps which they
will fill up with God. As if God lived in gaps?”768 The phrase was subsequently adopted by many
Christian theologians and natural scientists looking for a theology in harmony with the
natural sciences. Dietrich Bonhoeffer famously argues in a letter written while imprisoned by
the Nazis in Tengel in 1944 that “It is wrong to use God as a stopgap for the incompleteness of our
knowledge. If in fact the frontiers of knowledge are being pushed further and futher back (and that is
bound to be the case, then God is being pushed back with them, and is therefore continually in retreat.
We  are  to  find  God  in  what  we  know,  not  in  what  we  don’t  know;  God  wants  us  to  realize  his
presence, not in unsolved problems but in those that are solved.”769 A further important figure in
this development was Charles A. Coulson (1910-1974), who put the point succintly: ‘when we
come to the scientifically unknown, our correct position is not to rejoice because we have found God; it
is to become better scientists. ”770 As I pointed out in chapter 3.3, the God of the gaps-critique is
even made against Intelligent Design by many who defend cosmic design arguments.
However, some naturalistic thinkers think the criticism applies equally to all theistic
explanations: even cosmic design arguments are non-explanatory God of the gaps-
arguments.771 The manifold usage of the term requires clarification: what, exactly, is meant
by the term, and what makes an argument a God of the gaps? And why are God of the gaps-
arguments problematic? 772
In what follows, I will analyse four main critiques of God of the gaps-arguments. First,
it is argued (1) that gaps-arguments are logically fallacious arguments from ignorance, and
second (2), that the past success of the natural sciences provides grounds to believe that
current mysteries will ultimately be solved without reference to the supernatural. Third, (3)
such arguments are thought to needlessly restrict divine activity merely to mysteries, rather
than seeing God as the Creator of natural laws, and fourth (4) gaps-arguments are argued to
be apologetically dangerous: if faith in God is based on the existence of gaps, then the
mysteries currently unexplained by science is still often there. Though there may be gaps in the current scientific
understanding, we should search for natural explanations, rather than believe in supernatural miracles as a
substitute for these explanations. For one example of this kind of rhetoric, see Susskind 2006b, 30.
768 Drummond 1894, 333. Quoted in Ganssle 2012, 130.
769 Bonhoeffer 1997, 311.
770 Coulson 1958, 16. Quoted in McGrath 2010, 202. On Coulson’s significance, see Hough 2006. Richard Bube is
also an important figure in this history. Bube describes God of the gaps -arguments as follows: “There is  a long
history of the attempt by Christians to prove or at least to defend their belief in the existence and activity of God by proposing
that it  is  God alone who acts in areas in which man is  ignorant of  any natural  mechanism. – – In this interpretation God
remains the Great Mechanician, and the possibility of a complete physical, chemical or biological description - even in
principle - is forever ruled out by the very existence and activity of God.” Bube 1971, 206-207. On Bonhoeffer’s
significance, also consult Bube 1971.
771 E.g. Stenger 2004, 182.
772 Plantinga (1997) and Rusbult (2004) similarly argue that the term “God of the gaps” is not useful without a
precise definition of what is meant.
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progress of science in closing these gaps will tend to undermine faith. The first two critiques
are philosophical, and the latter critiques are theological.773
I begin in chapter 7.1. by analyzing the philosophical form of the criticism of God of the
gaps-arguments, and the theological criticism in chapter 7.2. I argue that both forms of the
criticism make important points that should be taken into account in the discussion, but that
the ID movement’s design argument can in principle be formulated in a way that avoids the
critiques. The ID movement also makes the counter-critique that its naturalistic opponents
are guilty of “naturalism of the gaps”-reasoning, where no explanation referencing a
designer is allowed, even if the evidence calls for it. Rather, the ID movement argues that it is
possible to discover evidence of intelligent design in nature without this being a fallacious
God of the gaps-argument. In chapter 7.3, I consider thought experiments that have been
made to support the in principle possibility of design arguments.
7.1. Philosophical Critiques of the God of the Gaps
The Argument from Ignorance?
As seen in chapters five and six, ID argues that we do not know any good naturalistic
explanations for some important features of the cosmos and biological life. Some critics have
argued that this type of argument makes ID into an argument from ignorance, which is
commonly understood to be a logical fallacy: “the mistake that is committed whenever it is
argued that a proposition is true simply on the basis that it has not been proved false, or that it is false
because it has not been proved true.”774 For example, Neil Blackstone has criticized Behe’s design
argument as a God of the gaps -argument based on ignorance.775 The  problem with  Behe’s
argument, Blackstone argues, is that even if we do not know how something could be
explained naturalistically, this does not necessarily imply that there is no natural explanation
for this order. In scientific reasoning, the critique of different theories and alternative
explanations is obviously important – scientific journals are full of such critiques. However,
no matter how bad the prospects for finding a natural explanation for the origin of life
seems, this does not in itself make supernatural design a good explanation. Rather, there
have to be some sort of positive reasons for thinking that supernatural design is a good
explanation for the origin of life. Like Pennock, Blackstone also argues that the progress of
science is continually closing up such gaps in our understanding. Thus, in the absence of
positive reasons to see something as a sign of intelligent design, we should rather wait for a
773 In the case of ID’s design arguments,  describing them as “designer of the gaps-arguments” would take ID’s
separation between the designer and God into account more clearly. Nevertheless,  the term “God of the gaps” is
commonly used by the participants of the debate and theological issues are also involved. I will use the term here
with  the  caveat  that  it  does  not  reflect  the  separation  between  the  designer  and  God  which  ID’s  argument
includes.
774 Copi & Cohen 1990, 93; quoted in Walton 1992, 381.
775 Blackstone 1997. Pennock 1999, Peterson 2010. See also Giberson 1993, Reynolds 1998.
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naturalistic explanation than believe in design.776 The point of this philosophical critique of
the God of the gaps is then that the ID proponents have, in the critics’ estimation, failed to
provide adequate positive reasons in favour of the design hypothesis. The ID movement’s
conclusion of design seems, to these critics, to rest too heavily on just our ignorance of
naturalistic explanations.777
Earlier, while analysing the design inference as an inference to the only explanation, I
quoted Sherlock Holmes’ dictum: “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, no
matter how improbable, must be the truth.”778 However, for an explanation to be even
“improbable”, I argued, it must be possible and somehow explain the pattern in question. No
matter how implausible natural explanations are, this does not help the design argument if
design is also just as implausible as an explanation. Instead, design needs to be in and of
itself a possible and plausible explanation. I think one general point of these critiques is
sound: we need some positive reasons in favour of design, not just arguments against
naturalistic explanations. It also seems very defensible that one should generally prefer
naturalistic explanations within science – this type of weak methodological naturalism even
seems to be accepted by proponents of ID, as I argued in chapters 3.4 and 3.5.
Nevertheless, I wonder if characterisation of the design argument as an argument from
ignorance is very helpful. It is correct that the ID movement’s design argument includes a
substantial amount of critique of naturalistic alternative explanations, but this is not logically
improper if the argument is understood as an inference to the best explanation or an
inference to the only explanation. In these modes of explanation, the critique of alternative
explanations does play a large part. Furthermore, it is clear that analogies and inductive
arguments based on our knowledge of intelligent design as a cause are also important for the
ID movement’s design arguments.
Some critics making the God of the gaps -critique of ID acknowledge that ID
proponents have attempted to provide positive reasons for belief in design, not just critiques
of alternative explanations. Robert Pennock, for example, argues that it is simply the bad
quality of all theistic and design-based explanations of natural history that makes them
equivalent to fallacious arguments from ignorance.779 As Pennock recognizes, ID proponents
themselves do not believe that they are presenting a God of the gaps-argument. Rather, they
explicitly deny this and argue that they are making a good positive case for design.780 As I
showed in chapters 4, 5, and 6, ID proponents argue that patterns in nature provide good
evidence for design. The point is made succinctly by Gonzales and Richards: “It’s not simple
improbability that leads us to believe there’s something fishy that needs explaining. It’s the presence of
a telling pattern, a pattern we have some reason to associate with intelligent agency.”781 In the ID
776 Blackstone 1997.
777 Pennock 2007.
778 Doyle 1892, “The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet”, spoken by the character Sherlock Holmes.
779 Pennock 2007, 315-323.
780 Behe 2006a; Behe 2007f; Dembski 2002, Meyer 2009.
781 Gonzales and Richards 2005, 303. Similarly Behe 2000a.
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movement’s arguments, the critique of alternative explanations is important, but the
conclusion of design is not thought to follow purely from the failure of non-personal
explanations.
Here the validity of the designer of the gaps -criticisms is linked to thoughts on the
validity of design as an explanation. If the properties of nature the ID theorists discuss do not
provide positive evidence for design, and if the postulation of a designer does not have any
explanatory value in any realistic circumstance, then design cannot act as a competitor to
naturalistic explanations. In this system of thought, believing in a designer is not better than
ignorance. However, this is a different criticism from the criticism of design arguments as a
“God of the gaps”. The criticism is no longer based merely on the lack of a positive argument
for design, but on the failure of these positive arguments.
Also, if belief in design has its origins at least partly in the intuitive perception of
design in the universe, as seen in chapter 4.1, then this belief is not based primarily on the
lack of naturalistic explanations, but on the typical operation of human cognitive faculties.
Proponents of ID do defend the reliability of this intuitive belief in design by criticizing
naturalistic explanations, but the ultimate origin of their belief is not in these critiques. Thus
the research from the cognitive science of religion supports the contention that there is more
to ID than just an argument from ignorance. Given the way our cognitive faculties work, it
may be that certain features of nature are fairly automatically seen as positive evidence of
design. Even if it is impossible to express this intuition as a rigorous scientific argument, this
does not mean that it is therefore an argument from ignorance. In this case, “a design belief
based on design discourse, rather than arguments” or “a commonsensical non-scientific
argument” would be more accurate labels of the ID movement´s ideas.
Clarifying the nature of “arguments from ignorance” further will help understand the
crucial differences between proponents of ID and its critics better. Arguments from
ignorance  are  commonly  understood  as  logical  fallacies.  Our  lack  of  knowledge  about
something does not yet prove anything, it is argued. Yet philosophers studying arguments
from ignorance have questioned this simple characterisation. It seems that in the right
conditions, our ignorance about something can indeed constitute evidence. Robert Larmer
provides a story to illustrate the point:
If my son tells me that there is a Great Dane in the bathroom and I go look and find no
evidence of a Great Dane, I conclude that it is false there is a Great Dane in our bathroom.
My  lack  of  evidence  of  it  being  the  case  that  there  is  a  Great  Dane  in  our  bathroom  is
good evidence that there is not a Great Dane in our bathroom because I have knowledge
that  if  a  Great  Dane  were  there,  there  should  be  positive  evidence  to  confirm  its
presence.782
It seems that sometimes we are in a position where we should be able to discover evidence of
something, if it indeed existed. Our lack of evidence for the existence of a Great Dane in the
782 Larmer 2002, 131.
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bathroom, for example – in other words, our ignorance of a Great Dane – is actually good
evidence that there is no Great Dane in the bathroom.783
It also seems that we are often able to discover the limits of natural processes, not just
their capabilities. John C. Lennox makes a useful distinction between two types of gaps in
natural science. First, there are “gaps of ignorance”, where our inability to explain something
by reference to physical processes is merely a product of our ignorance. But there are also
“gaps in principle” which are a product of what we do know, and are only deepened as we
come to further understand science. Lennox gives the example of writing: no matter how
much we study the physics and chemistry of paper and ink, we will not find reductionist
explanation which will help us explain writing without design.784 Other examples of gaps in
principle include all scientific laws such as the laws of thermodynamics and the law of
gravity. Based on our knowledge of empirical reality, we can argue, for example, that apples
do not have the capability to start spontaneously levitating without the action of some force
other than the Earth’s gravity.785
ID’s critique of naturalistic explanations in chapters five and six assumes that we can
find limits of naturalistic processes, just as the gaps-based arguments just analysed. The ID
theorists do not mean to argue merely based on ignorance, but based on things that they
believe we are in a position to know. It is argued that based on what we know, processes
unguided by intelligence do not have the capacity to create certain types of order in the
cosmos. It is also argued that as science progresses, these gaps in naturalistic explanations
have only widened, and that we now have a sufficient body of research to be able to
conclude something about the limits of natural processes. The crucial question in the debate
is whether the ID theorists are correct in these estimates about the state of scientific research.
If they are, then their argument about the limits of natural processes can be formulated as a
valid argument from ignorance following the model of the “Great Dane”-argument.786 For
example, Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity (chapter 6.3) could be formulated as
follows:
(1) If there were a naturalistic non-design based explanation for irreducible complexity, we
would probably know it.
(2) But we do not know any such naturalistic explanation for irreducible complexity.
(3) Therefore, there is probably no such naturalistic explanation for irreducible complexity.
Now we just need to add a few premises to infer that an intelligent designer was involved.
783 See Ganssle 2012 for further analysis of Larmer’s example and exact formulations of its logic. Walton (1996)
provides a thorough analysis of arguments from ignorance in various fields of science.
784 Lennox 2007, 188-192.
785 Ratzsch 2001, Snoke 2001.
786 As Larmer (2002, 131) puts the point: “we can ask whether those who appeal to gaps in our scientific understanding as
evidence of supernatural intervention in the course of nature do so solely or simply on the basis of ignorance of how natural
causes operate or rather on the basis of presumed positive knowledge of how natural causes operate.”
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(4) Irreducible complexity is created by either an unguided naturalistic process or by intelligent
design.
(5) Therefore, irreducible complexity was probably created by intelligent design.
This argument implicitly assumes that intelligent design is at least a plausible explanation
for the features in question. As Gregory Ganssle notes, our background assumptions
strongly affect our evaluation of these types of God of the gaps -arguments.787 How
improbable does a naturalistic explanation have to be in order for divine design to be a more
probable explanation? Do we have independent reasons to support belief in divine action as
an explanation at this point, and does the context of the event fit with this explanation? Does
the event fit into a divine plan that we can understand? For a committed naturalist the very
idea of a supernatural designer may be so doubtful that even the extreme improbability of
natural explanations after hundreds of years of research may not be sufficient to make this
kind of argument credible.788 Someone who regards design-based explanations as
explanatorily empty could also argue that the above gaps-argument is unconvincing: if
design is no better as an explanation than random chance, then there is no benefit to
exploring design-based explanations.789 On these understandings the divine designer will
remain the more improbable explanation, the non-explanatory God of the gaps, even if
naturalistic explanations currently seem astronomically improbable. For someone beginning
with the belief that there exists a God who wanted to create life, the explanation may not be
as incredible.790 Different theologies of divine action will also lead to different expectations
about gaps, as I will argue in more detail in chapter 7.2.
It seems to me that ID’s critics do not need to question the in principle possibility of
arguing that natural processes have limits. It also doesn’t need to be argued that ID’s
argument here is a logical fallacy. It seems that even arguments from ignorance can in
principle be quite valid. Rather, the crucial question is whether we have enough knowledge
to conclude that the present existence of mysteries in cosmology and biology gives enough
reason to conclude that at least some of these mysteries will remain unsolved naturalistically.
This is what proponents of ID and their naturalistic critics disagree on.
The ID theorists' critique of methodological naturalism is relevant to the God of the
gaps-theme. In addition to the fallacy of the God of the gaps, the ID theorists argue that there
is also the fallacy of the “naturalism of the gaps”. Their critics are confident that natural
explanations for all currently unexplained natural phenomena will be found. But it seems to
787 Ganssle 2012.
788 As seen in chapter 3.1, ID theorists would protest that the designer of the design argument does not have to be
supernatural.  However, as also seen in that chapter, there are also reasons against the hypothesis of alien
designers, and the ID theorists themselves do not regard it as a satisfying hypothesis about the identity of the
designer. Like the ID theorists, the naturalists could also think that invoking alien designers merely pushes the
problem of the origin of biological complexity back one step: how did alien life evolve, then? If it can be explained
by a naturalistic process of evolution, then why invoke design in the case of planet Earth?
789 This  is  actually  the  central  reason  Pennock  (2007)  regards  ID’s  design  arguments  as  God  of  the  gaps-
arguments.
790 Ganssle 2002, 135-138.
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be in principle possible that real “gaps” in the capabilities of natural processes exist, and the
true explanation for some features of nature cannot be found unless we are open to this
possibility. “Naturalism of the gaps” is argued to assume, before empirical investigation,
that nature is a self-contained system and that the true explanation for every phenomenon is
naturalistic.791 To phrase the ID theorists’ view of naturalism in terms of the  above quote
from Arthur Conan Doyle: if alternatives to naturalism are impossible, then even improbable
and otherwise implausible natural explanations can be accepted as true.792 As in the case of
methodological  naturalism,  I  think  the  critique  of  the  God  of  the  gaps  must  also  be
formulated in a way that evades this criticism. I will now turn to one possible way of doing
just that.
Arguments Based on the Success of Science
Another way to argue that some argument is a God of the gaps is to argue on the basis of
history that a given scientific mystery is likely to be eventually explained naturalistically.
Pennock, for example, argues that design has historically been used as an explanation for
natural order when some phenomenon is mysterious and unexplained by naturalism. But
this sort of design inference has been, argues Pennock, always historically falsified with the
progress of science, which provides better naturalistic explanations for the phenomena. So
design inferences have historically been based on ignorance and have been discarded when
knowledge has increased. This past history should lead us to be cautious about making
arguments based on present scientific mysteries.793
In contrast to Pennock, Ratzsch argues that “the ‘erosion of gaps’ argument is both factually
and philosophically weaker than usually acknowledged. Gaps have certainly evaporated in some cases
under pressure of scientific advance, but I don’t know of anyone who has actually done the work of
constructing a historical induction for the usually assumed constant drumbeat of collapsing empirical
gaps. The case is complicated by e.g. Kuhn's contention that sometimes in scientific revolutions
ground is lost and previously closed gaps suddenly re-open. (Of course, from a design perspective,
even one genuine gap would be of logical interest.) And intriguingly enough, at least one gap – cosmic
fine-tuning –  seems to be gaping ever wider the more fully it is investigated. The platform for this
induction is missing a couple legs.”794 So, there is disagreement about the history of science: has
791 E.g. Dembski 2003b. ID critic Bradley Monton (2013, 46) similarly argues that strong methodological
naturalism actually assumes metaphysical naturalism: “Given the commitment to methodological naturalism, the
success of science hinges of the contingent fact that naturalism is true.” This is a strong statement –theological views
where God is not expected to act with miracles outside the web of natural causes in a scientifically discoverable
way also fit with strong methodological naturalism.
792 As seen in chapters 3.4. and 3.5. the ID theorists thus argue that methodological naturalism includes an unfair a
priori prejudice against the possibility of design. No matter how strong the evidence of design, a methodological
naturalist could never see it while being faithful to his basic assumptions.
793 Pennock 1999, 198.
794 Ratzsch 2006.
Designer of the Gaps or Naturalism of the Gaps?
203
the progress of research tended to favour naturalism, or have the mysteries only gotten
deeper with the advancement of science?
A further way to criticize an argument for limits is to argue that those limits have not
yet been established by the scientific research. In chapter six, I showed saw that there is
disagreement about how well evolutionary mechanisms for the evolution of biological
information and biological complexity are known. Even when all parties agree that we
cannot yet fully explain the naturalistic origin of life or its basic molecular machinery, they
disagree on whether this allows us to make the sceptical conclusion about the prospects of
future naturalistic research. Jerry Coyne, for example, argues that “biologists are beginning to
provide plausible scenarios for how ‘irreducibly complex’ biochemical pathways might have evolved.
As expected, these systems involve using bits co-opted from other pathways originally having different
functions. – –  In view of our progress in understanding biochemical evolution, it is simply irrational
to say that because we do not completely understand how biochemical pathways evolved, we should
give up trying and invoke the intelligent designer. If the history of science shows us anything, it is
that we get nowhere by labeling our ignorance ‘God.’”795 According to Daniel Dennett, the present
lack of knowledge about the details of biological evolution is caused by the lack of incentive
for researchers to work on mapping out the evolutionary pathways: “The young researchers
who have the training to do it prefer to tackle other topics.” According to Dennett, this is because
showing that these routes exist will not get them any fame; they will merely be proving what
all of their colleagues already believe. They don’t want to waste their professional career on
merely confirming a theory they already believe to be well-evidenced.796 So, the validity of a
given gaps-argument will depend on what we think about the state of the research.
All of these critiques are ways of questioning the credibility of the premises of the
gaps-argument, rather than the fundamental logic of the argument. So, the basic point that
science can also give us knowledge about the limits of natural processes seems to be one that
both parties of the debate could in principle agree on. Gaps-arguments don’t need to be
called fallacious before one can question one or more of their premises.797 One  can  also
recognize that it is in principle possible to imagine empirical evidence that would count
strongly against any naturalistic explanation of the origin of life, for example. Ratzsch argues
that if we had already done ten thousand years of research on naturalistic origin of life-
hypotheses and the problems seemed similar to those afflicting the creation of perpetual
motion machines, we would certainly be in a position to argue that these results tell us
something about the inability of natural processes to produce life.798 The reasoning here
doesn’t seem fallacious. Our ability to gain knowledge about the limits of natural processes
795 Coyne 2005, part V.
796 Dennett & Plantinga 2011, 33-34.
797 Thus several critics of Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity have also recognized that Behe is not
attempting to argue out of ignorance, but based on the known structural properties of biological organisms. See
Kitcher 2001, 262 & Depew 2003, 441. This is also Behe’s own understanding of the argument (e.g. Behe 2000b).
ID’s biological arguments were presented and analysed in more detail in chapter 6.
798 Ratzsch 2001, 142.
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does not mean that we actually have knowledge of the limits of evolutionary processes. This
is a question for scientific study. Nevertheless, the in principle possibility of gaps-arguments
(given that the research comes to the conclusion that natural processes are limited at some
point) is a philosophically interesting conclusion.799 Again, I am converging on the same
conclusion as when I analysed strong and weak methodological naturalism and the logic of
design arguments: design arguments can in principle be possible, and whether they succeed
or not depends on our background assumptions the validity and credibility of these types of
explanations, and the state of the evidence.
Are Cosmic Design Arguments also Gaps-Arguments?
Some regard both cosmic design arguments and biological design arguments as gaps-
arguments. For critics like Victor J. Stenger, cosmic design arguments are just as vacuous and
just as likely to be overturned by the progress of natural science as biological design
arguments.800 Only if some phenomenon were to be “not only currently scientifically
inexplicable but can be shown to forever defy natural description” would Stenger be prepared to
allow theistic explanations.801 Ratzsch concurs with the assessment that cosmic design
arguments also presuppose a gap in naturalistic explanations, but argues that there is no
reason to believe that this gap will ever be closed by natural science. Design arguments
based on gaps can be reasonable, even if they are fallible.802 Others see only biological design
arguments as gaps-arguments. Thus cosmic design arguments are seen as plausible even by
many who simultaneously criticize the ID movement’s biological design arguments as a
gaps-argument.’803
The issue is further complicated by the concept of the “limit question”, which Ian G.
Barbour defines as “ontological questions raised by the scientific enterprise as a whole but not
answered by the methods of science.”804 In the theology and science community, it is often
argued that science itself can indeed find its limits and raise questions which it itself cannot
answer. For example, science can study the laws of nature, but the explanation of the
fundamental laws of nature is a matter of metaphysics, not the natural sciences. The ethical
799 I am agreeing here with Allan Harvey’s (2000) assessment: “If we truly want to find out ‘what happened,’ we should
not exclude any possible explanation a priori, be it God or invisible unicorns. Some explanations may be more plausible or
more  amenable  to  scientific  testing,  but  I  see  no  good  reason  why  theistic  explanations  of  the  GOG-1  type  should
automatically be dismissed without consideration of the evidence. One can question whether invoking the supernatural can
actually be considered science, but just because something is not science doesn't mean it is an invalid means of gaining
understanding.”
800 Stenger 2004, 182. See also Susskind 2006b, 30.
801 Stenger 2004, 13-14.
802 Ratzsch 2006.
803 For one example, see Miller 2002, chapter 8.
804 Barbour 1997, 90.
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questions raised by science and the question “why is there something rather than nothing?”
are also considered to be outside the capacity of science to answer.
However, what differentiates limit questions (which are legitimate) from God of the
gaps-arguments (which are thought to be illegitimate)? Both of them concern issues where at
least the proponent of the argument thinks that science has reached its proper limit, and the
area of theology begins. The central differentiating factor seems to be that the label "limit
question" is used of arguments which we think are good, whereas the label "God of the gaps"
is used of arguments which we think are bad. If we should reject one of these arguments and
not the other, it is not so much because of it falls into a class of "gaps"-arguments, but
because we find the premises less than credible. It is just that sometimes it really is credible
to argue that science has reached its limits, and at other times it is not. So, in the theology
and science community, the question of cosmic fine-tuning is typically regarded as a limit
question, where explaining the fine-tuning by reference to God is thought to be relevant
possibility. However, in the case of biological design, explanations that reference design are
thought to be examples of God of the gaps-arguments, because these are in competition with
Darwinian evolutionary biology.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that this type of distinction between cosmic and biological
design arguments cannot be made a priori, but only on the basis of what the evidence seems
to support as the true limits of the natural sciences. Based on the doctrines of the freedom of
God and creatio ex nihilo, we cannot know what the world is like without empirical
investigation. There is a possible world where the origin of life happens through a natural
chemical process, whether deterministic or indeterministic. Most scientists believe that we
live in this kind of world. In this possible world, the origin of life is clearly not a limit
question, but can be studied and explained exhaustively on the level of the natural sciences.
But there is also a logically possible world where the origin of life cannot happen by any
naturalistic process, but can only happen as a divine miracle, an event going beyond what
nature could produce on its own. In this world the origin of life is indeed a limit question,
since it can never be explained by naturalistic processes. In this world, what we here call a
biological God of the gaps-argument would actually be true. It seems that God could have
created either one of these worlds, and so we must do empirical research in order to find out
what kind of world we live in.
So, are cosmic design arguments also gaps-arguments? It seems to me that both sides
have a point. Stenger and Ratzsch are correct that both types of arguments attempt to refer to
features of nature that are difficult or even impossible to explain naturalistically. As seen in
chapter five, defenders of cosmic design arguments also spend much time arguing that
proposed alternative explanations for fine-tuning (such as the multiverse hypothesis) are not
actually better explanations of the evidence. Both biological and cosmic design arguments
refer to positive evidence for design, not just the lack of naturalistic explanations. The
arguments have much in common in their logical structure. It therefore would be strange to
criticize biological design arguments as logically invalid while accepting the logic of cosmic
design arguments.
However, those opposing the God of the gaps-designation in the case of cosmic design
arguments seem to be correct that the phenomena described in cosmic design arguments are
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more difficult to explain naturalistically than the biological phenomena. It may be that the
explanation of natural laws has traditionally been outside the purview of natural science and
part of metaphysics for good reason. Scientists like Stenger do not wish to acknowledge any
limits to the possibilities of natural science. However, it seems at least currently plausible to
argue that there are some questions here that natural science does not seem equipped to ever
resolve. The question of why something exists rather than nothing certainly seems like a
good candidate for a “gap” that will never have a naturalistic explanation as a matter of
logic.805 Using the strategy of level-shifting, it can be argued that finding a naturalistic
explanation for cosmic fine-tuning and rationality is also in principle impossible. In contrast,
biological design arguments are often formulated in competition with fairly broadly
accepted scientific theories. Even though it is possible that the generation of irreducibly
complex systems is also impossible for naturalistic processes, it also seems possible to
imagine a world where naturalistic evolutionary routes for developing such systems indeed
exist
Both  cosmic  and  biological  design  arguments  therefore  include  gaps  where  no
naturalistic explanations are thought to exist. However, for cosmic design arguments it is
easier to argue that the gaps are such that no naturalistic explanations will ever be found.
Because their logical structure is similar, both can in a way be characterized as gaps-
arguments. To avoid hiding this similarity, but to nevertheless understand the differences
between the two, I submit that it would be helpful to think of the difference between cosmic
and biological design arguments as one of degrees rather than kind. The difference is about
just how difficult it is to explain (or even imagine explaining) some phenomena
naturalistically, and so about how credible the premises of the gaps-argument. Even though
the logic of the arguments is similar, the existence of gaps could thus well be more credible
in the case of cosmology.806 It could also be that the cosmic level of explanation is where
theistic explanations are more at home theologically. These reasons may well be more
pressing for theists – perhaps theists do not reject God of the gaps-explanations for
philosophical reasons, but for theological ones.807 I will now turn to consider this possibility.
7.2. Theological Critiques of the God of the Gaps
Above, I referenced two theological critiques of God of the gaps –arguments: (1) Such
arguments are thought to needlessly restrict divine activity merely to mysteries, rather than
seeing God as the Creator of natural laws, and (2) gaps-arguments are argued to be
805 See Hart 2013, chapter 3; Turner 2004, chapter 11 and 12.
806 It  seems in  principle  possible  to  imagine  a  situation  where  the  gap would  be  just  as  credible  in  the  case  of
biology. For example, consider Ratzsch's example referenced in the main text, where we had ten thousand years
of naturalistic origin of life-research, with insuperable problems. It seems that something like this would indeed
increase the credibility of biological gaps-arguments.
807 Collins 2012, 224.
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apologetically dangerous: if faith in God is based on the existence of gaps, then the progress
of science in closing these gaps will tend to undermine faith. I will now analyse these
theological issues in more detail.
Models of Divine Action
Does God act in nature, and if so, how? Robert J. Russell suggests that the major problem
with locating God’s activity primarily in interventions into the natural order rather than in
the natural processes themselves is that this “suggests that God is normally absent from the web
of natural processes, acting only in the gaps that God causes.”808 The problem of a God of the gaps-
theology is, then, that it does not recognize God as the Creator of natural laws and processes.
In the traditional Christian understanding, God can act through secondary causes, not just
directly. God’s activity is not restricted merely to the miraculous events. Rather, God is
understood to also work through natural laws and mechanisms and to sustain their existence
continually. So, gaps-arguments arguably create an unnecessary conflict between natural
explanation and belief in divine activity.809
Russell’s warning is an important reminder of the breadth of divine activity. However,
it is questionable whether anyone in the Intelligent Design debate believes that God’s activity
is restricted purely to miracles. It is possible to distinguish between three broad ideas about
divine action in nature. The first (1) argues that God acts only through miracles, not at all
through natural laws. This view comes close to occasionalism, which holds that all events
happen by the will of God, and nature does not have any causal powers of its own.810 The
second view (2) argues that God acts both through natural laws and through miracles
(understood as acts of God which supersede what nature normally does).811 This view
suggests that God acts both in the web of natural processes in its gaps. The third view (3) is
that God acts only through natural laws and processes.812
As Craig Rusbult has noted, views that restrict God’s activity merely to miracles are
extremely rare or non-existent.813 Instead, theists have traditionally believed in something
like the second view.814 Proponents of Intelligent Design clearly also identify with the second
view, not the first view. They thus do not restrict divine activity just in the gaps unfilled by
808 Russell 2006, 584.
809 McGrath 2009b, chapter 8. See McGrew 2013 for a good discussion on different concepts of miracles and
Carroll 2010 for a discussion of different understandings of “natural laws”.
810 Larmer 2014, chapter 1.
811 Both Plantinga (2011) and Robert Larmer (2014) have criticized understanding miracles as violations of natural
laws, preferring to understand them as special divine action that is religiously significant and which differs
substantially from what regular natural processes would have caused on their own.
812 Rusbult   (2004)  provides  a  more  complete  description  of  the  possibilities  with  seven  different  types  of  gap-
theologies. Here I have used Jaakko Sorri’s (2013) simpler threefold division, since it is sufficient for my analysis.
813 Rusbult 2004.
814 The biblical tradition also includes both aspects of divine activity. (See Gustafson 1994).
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natural processes. As I showed in chapter five, the ID movement affirms the designedness of
the natural order as a whole and believes that the laws of nature are designed. Dembski
follows the traditional doctrine of creation in arguing that “not only has God created the world,
but also God upholds the world moment by moment.”815 However, as I argued in chapter 6, the ID
movement also wants to find evidence of the intelligent designer’s activity in natural history
beyond the natural laws.816 Proponents of ID want an account of natural history where
reference to the purposive actions of an intelligent designer is a central part of the
explanation for biological complexity, and natural, undirected processes are clearly
insufficient for explaining all of biology.817 The ID theorists do emphasize that their account
of the intelligent designer does not require that the designer work through miracles
understood as violations of natural law. It could be that the designer works through a
directed natural process or by influencing quantum events, for example.818 However, they
are also not willing to dismiss the possibility of miracles and gaps in nature. Thus Dembski
argues that it is in principle possible to argue that there are real gaps in nature: “A full and
efficient use of our empirical and theoretical resources for discovery should be made before we accept a
proscriptive generalization. But once this has been done, to suppose that all the gaps in extraordinary
explanations must be fillable by natural causes cannot be justified.”819
There is a conflict between different models of divine action here. What sort of world
and what sort of God we believe in will influence our ideas about the plausibility of gaps in
nature and the plausibility of miracles. If we accept a model of divine action which precludes
miracles, then any God of the gaps-argument will indeed be theologically problematic. In the
discussion on Intelligent Design, such models have been proposed prominently by Michael
Ruse and Howard Van Till. Ruse’s argument is based on the problem of natural evil, which I
will look at in more detail in chapter 9. Briefly, Ruse argues that if we believe in a God who
acts in nature through miracles and supervises the details of biology, then it becomes
inexplicable why this God does not act more to prevent evil. It is better, Ruse argues, to reject
all gaps and miracles. This even includes Jesus’ resurrection: Ruse argues that it is much
815 Dembski 1998c, 14.
816 Dembski 1998c, 14-15.
817 Johnson 1995; 2001.
818 See e.g. Behe 2007, chapter 10; Dembski 2002a, 333-337. This leaves open questions. Why do the ID theorists
reject Darwinian evolution as incompatible with design, but believe that some other type of natural process could
be  employed  by  the  designer?  I  will  come  back  to  these  questions  in  chapter  8.  Dembski's  proposal  that  God
works through quantum events is likely influenced by the work of Robert J. Russell, who argues that God can act
in the world non-interventionistically through influencing quantum events. For more on Russell's work, see
Russell 2008, chapters 4-6. However, Russell is not pleased with Dembski's use of his concepts.
819 Dembski 1999a, 245. Michael J. Murray (2003, 9-12) has argued that there is a tension in ID’s argument at this
point. Since Dembski’s method of inferring design in practice works by eliminating natural explanations, doesn’t
this mean that any design detected by Dembski’s method must be interventionist? There is a point to Murray’s
criticism –  sometimes  the  ID theorists  do  seem to  oppose  natural  explanations  and design  needlessly,  as  I  will
argue  further  in  chapter  8.  However,  the  criticism  is  not  necessarily  fatal  for  Dembski’s  position.  Dembski’s
category “design” can also include natural processes that are directed by intelligence; he is seeking to eliminate
merely those naturalistic explanations that are argued to work without design at any level.
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better to understand it simply as a change in the disciples’ mental states than as a real
physical miracle.820
Van Till’s argument has a quite different basis, beginning from God’s goodness, rather
than natural evil. According to Van Till, it is a great good for the universe to possess the
capacity to self-organize itself. Since God wants to create a maximal amount of good, his
goodness would lead him to gift creation with the ability to self-organize itself, and thus
work  through  naturalistic  evolution  in  creation.  According  to  Van  Till,  biological  design
arguments suppose a cosmos that God has to continually interact and tinker with, which is
contrary to his picture of what a good God would do.821
There are many different models of divine action, and it is clearly possible to formulate
an understanding that makes all appeals to divine interventions in history theologically
dangerous.822 However, given that the mainstream of the Christian theological tradition has
held that God can be found both in beauty of  nature’s  order and in his  miraculous activity
within history, it is difficult to argue that the ID movement’s acceptance of divine activity
both in secondary causes and through miracles is theologically heterodox.823 There are many
different understanding of divine action, and it seems quite possible to construct an
understanding of the world where God’s interaction with his creation is expected. As Robin
Collins argues, it could be that God is the sort of a Creator who likes to meddle in what he
has created.824 Collins himself defends a theology of divine action where God works through
Darwinian evolution, but his motivation for this defence comes from the empirical evidence
for Darwinian evolution. This seems a much better founded position than basing one’s
acceptance of Darwinian evolution on contested theological arguments.
ID proponent Dembski has argued that Van Till’s theological critique of gaps-
arguments rests on the picture of the world as a vast machine, akin to a watch. A
820 Ruse 2003, chapter 15 & 2001, chapter 6. Though Ruse argues that it is most coherent for Christians to also
reject Jesus’ resurrection as an example of a real physical miracle within history, one could in principle modify his
position to be more compatible with traditional Christian doctrine. One could argue that miraculous divine action
is a more credible possibility at theologically important points, such as in the events of salvation history.
However, a proponent of ID could then well argue that some events in natural history (such as the origin of life
and the origin of humanity) are also important theologically, and thus miraculous activity could also be expected
at these points. Ganssle (2012, 138) makes a similar point.
821 See e.g. Van Till 2000 & 2001.
822 Recent decades have seen much interest in the theme of divine action. There is a broad variety of opinions:
Nicolas Saunders (2002) argues that all theories of providential, miraculous divine action are inadequate, and that
this leads to a crisis of traditional Christian theology. However, the mainstream of scholars within the “divine
action project” agree that a coherent concept of divine providential action can be formulated. Wildman 2004, 31-
32. Plantinga (2011, chapters 3-4) similarly argues that there is no contradiction between belief in miracles and
modern science. According to Plantinga, all arguments for a contradiction actually depend on non-scientific
philosophical presuppositions. Plantinga also rejects the concept of a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature
as unworkable. Halvorson (2012) and Silva (2014) criticize and develop the argument further. Savuoja (2007) is a
fine survey of recent analytic discussion of miracles.
823 Ross McCullough (2013) makes this point forcefully: “There is no natural explanation for the Resurrection: The
explanation is that God did it. Here is a gap and a God we all already believe in. The inevitable theological conclusion is that
there can be nothing wrong with a God of the gaps, so long as it is not a God made to fit the gaps.”
824 Collins 2009, 242-243.
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watchmaker who constantly has to repair his product is not a good watchmaker. Good
watches require no intervention to keep functioning. Assuming that God is the greatest
conceivable watchmaker, we can expect God to have created the world with all the resources
needed to function (and produce the various forms of life) without intervention. However,
Dembski  asks  us  to  imagine  the  world  not  as  analogous  to  a  watch,  but  to  a  musical
instrument. Unlike watches, musical instruments are made to be interacted with, and there is
nothing strange about playing a piano one has made. On this picture of the world, it is quite
plausible that God would interact with the world.825
So, it does seem to be in principle possible to construct a model of divine action that
allows for ID. The metaphor of the world as a musical instrument has good precedent in the
Church Fathers. As backup for his theological argument, Dembski is able to point to Gregory
Nazianzus. Gregory compared the universe to a lute and claimed that God’s glory is
manifest in nature, just as the skill of the luteplayer is visible in the lute: “For everyone who
sees a beautifully made lute, and considers the skill with which it has been fitted together and
arranged, or who hears its melody, would think of none but the lutemaker, or the luteplayer, and
would recur to him in mind, though he might not know him by sight.”826 Michael Murray has
similarly argued that it possible to construct, from within the Christian tradition, a
conception of God where God’s love leads God to interact not just with humanity, but also
with nature in a way that transcends natural laws. God’s action within human salvation
history is the more important for classical Christianity, since human persons are thought to
have special significance for God. Nevertheless, natural history is also traditionally believed
to be valuable in itself and as a necessary prelude for human history, so it is not impossible
that God’s miraculous activity could extend outside human salvation history.827 However, it
is important to note that this type of model also does not require God to act miraculously in
natural history: interaction with natural history through secondary causes or through
scientifically invisible quantum events would be just as real interaction as miraculous
activity.
Apologetic Concerns
The second theological concern with God of the gaps-arguments is apologetic: if belief in
God is primarily based on gaps in nature, then the progress of science in filling these gaps
will tend to undermine belief in God.828 Based on some examples from the history of science,
many argue that it is better to argue for God based on phenomena which are not expected to
825 Dembski 2002a, 328.
826 Dembski, Downs & Frederick (2008) is a collection of the writings of the Church fathers on creation and design.
Nazianzus’ comments are found in his Oration XXVIII.
827 Murray 2006. This essay somewhat softens Murray’s earlier theological and philosophical critique of the ID
movement (Murray 2003).
828 Brooke 2010, 78-79.
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ever be open to scientific study.829 As John Haught argues, theological accounts of nature are
typically understood to concern the ultimate character of reality, rather than operating on the
level of scientific theories.830 The traditional question “why is there something rather than
nothing”, for example, does not seem liable to be ever answered by natural science. Thus
natural theology based on this question does not seem as liable to be falsified with the
progress of science as gaps-arguments831
I have argued that a theological model compatible with the existence of gaps in natural
history can be formulated; otherwise the existence of gaps would be a good argument for
atheism. The point of the apologetic concern is different, however. Even if God’s
interventions into natural history are a possibility that our theology of nature allows, it may
still be a good idea to be careful about making such claims about divine action. Since the
main focus of theology is outside God of the gaps-arguments, at least faith should not be
thought to depend on gaps-arguments. As Allan Harvey has noted, there is a temptation “to
forget God’s work in routine things and only acknowledge his hand in obvious miracles.”832 The
theological critique of the God of the gaps can guard against this temptation. I will argue in
chapter eight that ID sometimes comes close to making the rationality of belief in God
depend on the existence of gaps in nature, and so this warning is important for ID.
However, the necessity of gaps for belief in God does not seem to be an inevitable
conclusion of the ID position. Suppose that one believes that there are broad grounds for
belief in God, that evolutionary theory is fully compatible with Christian belief, and that
Christian faith therefore does not depend on gaps in natural history. These theological and
philosophical beliefs do not seem to determine scientific beliefs about evolution in any
necessary way. It seems logically possible for someone who accepts these theological ideas to
believe that there actually are empirically discoverable gaps in the abilities of natural
processes, and that there is evidence of miraculous divine activity within natural history.
Believing that some scientific theory is theologically unproblematic does not mean that I
have grounds for believing that this scientific theory is true. Thus one can believe that the
phlogiston theory of burning is compatible with Christian belief without believing that it is
true. It seems conceivable that someone could also believe that Darwinian evolution is
compatible with Christian belief, but not true.
829 As Ratzsch (2010) points out,  there does not currently seem to be any study showing that religious believers
have typically argued for God based on phenomena that have later been explained scientifically. The examples
typically invoked are thunder as the wrath of the gods, the explanation of the order of the solar system as a result
of Laplacian naturalistic processes and Darwinian evolutionary biology. But it is questionable whether these few
examples show the prevalence of God of the gaps-thinking, or the general shrinking of gaps. Hart (2013) points
out that classical theologians have typically argued for God based on features of the world (such as the existence
of  anything  at  all,  the  rationality  and beauty  of  the  cosmos  and the  features  of  consciousness)  that  science  still
seems incapable of explaining.
830 Haught 2008, 35.
831 Turner 2004, chapters 11 and 12.
832 Harvey 2000.
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Many Christians also believe that miracles of healing continue to happen in the
modern day and provide additional evidence for the existence of the Christian God, but this
does not mean that their Christian faith depends on the authenticity of every individual
miracle story. Similarly, someone could believe that God has acted miraculously in natural
history, and construct a gaps-argument to provide evidence of this, without their faith
depending on this argument. This type of gaps-argument is not as worrying from an
apologetic standpoint, since it does not make the truth of the entire Christian faith depend on
the success of a particular apologetic argument.
According to theologian Ross McCullough, once the critique of the gaps-arguments is
understood as apologetically motivated, it becomes possible to introduce countervailing
apologetic concerns.833 McCullough argues that gaps-arguments could be helpful “without
being taken as either necessary or sufficient for belief. At present, as in the past, such arguments can
serve as breaches in the dam of atheism without being meant to clear the river on their own, or then to
baptize you in the stream.”834 For example, if real miracles have happened in human or natural
history, then this would be very difficult for naturalism, but good confirming evidence for
theism. It could be argued that strong methodological naturalism is also dangerous for
theistic faith apologetically, or that accepting it would concede more ground to metaphysical
naturalists than is necessary. Current gaps in the naturalistic explanations for the origin of
life, the origin of consciousness or the origin of fine-tuning could at least be used to argue for
the necessity of humility in constructing a full naturalistic narrative of the cosmos. Openness
to signs of the activity of God beyond the laws of nature is at least part of traditional
Christianity in the case of human history. 835 McCullough´s argument is that perhaps an
openness to such activity in natural history could also help create openness in the case of
human history.836
Here different views about the significance of miracles are important. For someone
who believes that miracles are powerful signs of the existence and moral attributes of God, it
could be that gaps requiring miracles in the history of life would provide especially clear
evidence that God is indeed theistic and not just deistic, and that God indeed values the
existence of life. As I will argue in chapter 8, the ID theorists indeed believe that it would be
religiously valuable to have evidence of God’s interaction with the world beyond the laws of
nature. For others, divine action within human history may well be enough, and it is clear
833 McCullough 2013.
834 McCullough 2013.
835 Larmer (2014, chapter 2) provides an interesting quotation from Aquinas supporting this possibility: ”the divine
power at times works apart from the order assigned by God to nature, without prejudice to His providence. In fact, He does
this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject
to the divine will, than by the fact that He sometimes works independently of the order of nature; for this shows that the order
of things proceeded from Him, not through natural necessity, but through his free will.” Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 3,
chapter 99. As others have noted, Aquinas also emphasized the functional integrity of the creation, but perhaps
miracles  do  not  need to  be  though as  contrary  to  this,  if  they  are  not  seen  as  violations  of  natural  laws.  (Feser
2008, Hart 2013).
836 Some thinkers argue the other way around: because there was no divine intervention in evolutionary history, it
is not credible to believe in divine intervention within salvation history, either. (E.g. Ruse 2000, 96-98).
Designer of the Gaps or Naturalism of the Gaps?
213
that this is the more important thing for Christianity. 837 The concept of divine action in
natural history also raises the problem of theodicy: if God intervened even to create
something as minuscule as the bacterial flagellum, why did he also not intervene to stop the
evolution of diseases and parasites? I will come back to this question in chapter 9.
Are these countervailing apologetic concerns pressing enough to make gaps-
arguments attractive? It seems to me that this should depend on our assessment of the
evidence as described in chapter 7.1: Does it look like the progress of science is steadily
providing naturalistic solutions to these puzzles, or are they just getting deeper with the
progress of science?  Does it seem like we are in a position to make an informed assessment
that there really is a “gap” at this point in nature, and not just a gap in our knowledge? If so,
then seems possible to argue, following McCullough, that there are some apologetic payoffs
to such a gaps-argument, as long as one can also avoid the dangers of the gaps-argument. If
we admit the possibility of God’s interventions into natural history even while emphasizing
theology’s role as an ultimate explanation, we can critically examine the cases for both the
sufficiency of naturalistic theories of origins and intelligent design. Theists can follow the
evidence in deciding whether and what sort of “gaps” there are in nature. An openness to
miracles and the adoption of weak methodological naturalism does not require supporting
ID. Thus theistic evolutionist Keith Ward can also argue “if there is a God, a Creator of the
universe, it is plainly possible that God might perform miracles, might bring about events that no
created cause has the power of  itself  to  bring about.”838 Based on Ward's example, acceptance of
the possibility does not logically require accepting that it has actually happened in a given
case. It simply requires openness to the arguments.
It seems to me that the Christian tradition can in principle live with many different
models of divine action, and go with either Paley, Darwin or a combination of both. If one
comes to believe, based on the empirical evidence, that natural processes indeed have limits
and God has intervened in natural history, then the Christian tradition certainly has the
resources to deal with this. If this were not true then the discovery of gaps in nature’s
capabilities to produce life would actually provide an argument against the existence of the
Christian God. But I will argue that this conclusion is far too ambitious, despite the problem
of evil. Rather, the discovery or non-discovery of gaps would merely provide arguments
against some models of divine action.839 As theistic evolutionist Denis Lamoureux remarks:
“God can intervene into ‘gaps’ or ‘discontinuities’ in nature to introduce new species or add/modify
body parts or genes of already existing species. After all, He is God! But the question is whether the
Lord actually intervened this way in origins.”840 The critique of the “God of the gaps” still has a
837 For one recent discussion on the religious significance of miracles, see Larmer 2014, chapter 2.
838 Ward 2003, 742.
839 I  am  not  aware  of  any  fully  developed  argument  to  show  that  the  existence  of  miracles  in  natural  history
would indeed be evidence against God. Some arguments based on the problem of natural evil come the closest to
this. (See chapter 9.3) Hart (2013, 36-41) and Cunningham (2010, 275-288) do argue that gaps in the abilities of
evolutionary  processes  would  actually  count  against  theism,  but  do  not  present  a  developed  argument  to  this
effect. In chapter 8, I will agree with some of the other criticisms Hart and Cunningham make against ID.
840 Lamoureux 2013, 177.
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use, however, since it can be used to stress the compatibility of belief in evolution and
creation and to warn against frivolous theistic hypotheses and models which restrict God’s
activity merely to mysteries which are currently unexplained by natural science.
For some naturalistic thinkers theistic explanations always seem to be either fallacious
arguments from ignorance (as in the case of biological gaps-arguments) or unnecessary
explanations that are cut by Occam’s Razor (as in the case of cosmic fine-tuning). On this
understanding, one can reject a priori both theistic natural theology which operates on a
different explanatory level than natural science, and ID’s attempt to construct design-based
explanations on the level of science. I have argued that both types of arguments can in
principle be interesting and it is possible for them to be explanatory.  I will now continue to
analyse some further arguments for the point that our criteria of good explanations should
not be such that they rule out theistic, design-based explanations for these phenomena a
priori.
7.3. Thought Experiments and the Naturalism of the Gaps
The Importance of Thought Experiments for the Debate on ID
Testability has traditionally been considered an important criterion of scientific theories. In
situations where two different scientific theories compete as explanations for the same data,
scientists will attempt to find an additional empirical test that will enable us to finally see
which theory is better. In the discussion on Intelligent Design, it is clear that the conflict is
not just between different understandings of the empirical data, but also between different
philosophies. Thought experiments are one of the traditional ways of bringing out the
implications and testing the intuitions behind different philosophical ideas. They are the
“laboratory of the mind” for deciding between competing ideas.841 In the debate on design
arguments, thought experiments have often been used to defend the possibility of evidence
for design against common critiques and examine how detection of non-human design could
be possible. For example, the thought experiments arguably show that it is in principle
possible to have strong evidence of design even if the designer’s motives are previously
unknown.
In this chapter, I will analyse this seldom-discussed, but important side of the ID
discussion. Thought experiments are important not just for ID’s design arguments, but also
for the design arguments of broader natural theology. I will begin by introducing the idea of
thought experiments. I will then consider two Pre-Darwinian thought experiments (from
Paley and Hume) before moving on to the ID movement’s thought experiments and possible
avenues for critique.
841 Brown & Fehige 2011.
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Thought experiments are vehicles to explore our concepts and their relations by
supposing some counterfactual situation. There are many types of thought experiments and
precise classification is difficult.842 Thought experiments are usually thought to be essential to
philosophy, but they have even played a surprising role in natural science. For example,
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) used a thought experiment to argue that Aristotelian physics is
contradictory843, and modern physicists also use thought experiments in discovering the
implications of theories.844 Famous thought experiments include the “brain in a vat”, arguing
the possibility that our perceptions are just illusions, “monkeys and typerwriters”, arguing
that chance can generate order given infinite resources, and Searle’s “Chinese room”,
designed to show that computers do not think or understand. The examples listed are all
controversial, and this goes to show that a thought experiment seldom ends the debate. A
philosopher who wants to dispute the conclusion of the thought experiment can argue that
the experiment is built on false or improbable assumptions and thus leads to an erroneous
result. However, thought experiments are nevertheless useful tests of our thinking. Whereas
scientific experiments provide a way to test our theories against the reality of nature, thought
experiments test the logical coherence and intuitive plausibility of our ideas.845
The significance of thought experiments is disputed. This is particularly in thought
experiments which are used to argue for strong metaphysical conclusions, as is often done in
the philosophy of mind. For example, it is often argued that since we are able to conceive of
the existence of our minds without our bodies, this is evidence that our bodiless existence is
actually possible. This assumes a connection between conceivability and possibility, and has
sometimes been disputed.846 But the thought experiments in the discussion on ID are not
built on this controversial assumption, so I think they should be much more universally
acceptable. These thought experiments are not aimed at providing evidence for the existence
of a designer, but at testing our intuitions about different models of design-based
explanations.
In response to this use for thought experiments, it could be argued that intuitions are
generally unreliable, and thus thought experiments that test our intuitions do not yet tell us
842 For  example,  Karl  Popper  (1959)  distinguished  three  types  of  thought  experiments:  (1)  heuristic,  meant  to
illustrate a theory, (2) critical (against a theory), and (3) apologetic (in favour of a theory). But this doesn't yet tell
us very much about how thought experiments work, just what the purpose of presenting them is.  For different
analyses of thought experiments, see Wilkes 1988, Sorensen 1992 and Häggvist 1996; for general reviews of the
discussion see Brown & Fehige 2011 and Roux 2011. The discussion on Intelligent Design would benefit  from a
thorough analysis of all thought experiments used in the debate, what sort of conclusions are drawn and how
they are used to support different models of design detection. In this chapter I will limit my discussion mostly to
thought  experiments  in  opposition  to  “naturalism  of  the  gaps”  and  in  favour  of  the  in  principle  possibility  of
evidence for design.
843 Palmerino 2012.
844 See e.g. Hossenfelder 2013, 11-22.
845 Brown & Fehige 2011.
846 See Gendler & Hawthorne 2002 and Taliaferro 1994 for different perspectives on this. I personally think that
since our personal experience is the way we gain information about minds in the first place, our intuitions about
what minds are like should count as at least some evidence about the matter. However, this may not be enough to
override all other arguments in the philosophy of mind.
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much. However, I would argue that our intuitions about explanations continue to be
important even in science. As philosopher Petri Ylikoski argues, “science has its origin in
common sense cognition. There should be some kind of continuity. Of course, it now includes much
that is apparently incompatible with common sense, but I seriously doubt that this incompatibility
also extends to the general principles of explanatoriness.”847 If our common-sense intuitions can
tell us anything, then they should be able to tell us about philosophical principles of
explanation. Actually, if our intuitions cannot tell us about principles of explanation, then it
is  difficult  to  see  how  we  could  gain  this  knowledge.848 If our intuitions are wrong in the
cases of the thought experiments, it would at least be desirable to be able to explain why and
how they are wrong.849
Two Classic Thought Experiments on Design
Thought experiments are not just important in the contemporary debate on Intelligent
Design, but also historically. I will consider just two examples here: Cleanthes’ “voice from
heaven” in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) and William Paley’s famous
“watch on a heath” in his Natural Theology (1802). These thought experiments have the same
purpose as the modern ones I will consider: they aim to defend the in principle possibility of
evidence for design and also a certain account of what constitutes such evidence.
Cleanthes’ thought experiment in the Dialogues is made in response to several
criticisms of natural theology by the sceptical philosopher Philo. First, for Philo, repeated
observation is the only reliable way to demonstrate the connection of cause and effect.
Because we have not observed the generation of several universes, we cannot make general
claims about what is required to make one. Secondly, Philo argues that there is a profound
dissimilarity between human works of art and the cosmos, rendering analogical design
arguments unsound.850 With his thought experiment, Cleanthes wants to demonstrate the
flaws of Philo’s criticism:
Suppose,  therefore,  that  an articulate  voice  were heard in  the clouds,  much louder  and
more  melodious  than  any  which  human  art  could  ever  reach;  suppose  that  this  voice
were extended in the same instant over all nations and spoke to each nation in its own
language and dialect; suppose that that the words delivered not only contain a just sense
847 Ylikoski 2001, 51. Ylikoski is not commenting on thought experiments here, but his comments are applicable to
the matter. Similarly Hållsten (2007, 25) argues that a theory of explanation must give justice to our intuitions
about explanations.
848 Ratzsch (2009) argues that science would be impossible without the reliability of at least some human
intuitions  and  some  correspondence  between  human  rationality  and  the  structure  of  the  cosmos.  For  a  good
general discussion on the definition of intuitions and their importance see Pust 2012. I am using his definition of
rational intuitions: briefly, they are “mental states in which a proposition seems true”.
849 See  also  Dougherty  2014,  chapter  4  for  a  defense  of  taking  the  reliability  of  our  common  sense  beliefs  as  a
starting point.
850 Dialogues, part II.
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and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being
superior to mankind – could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this
voice, and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see
but all the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of
theism may also be produced against this inference.851
The problem, according to Cleanthes, is that Philo’s objections could also make it difficult to
consider such a voice from heaven designed. For example, we could argue that we have no
example of any previous event like this, and therefore an inductive design inference won’t
work. We would need to observe several such voices caused by divine beings before being
able to make the inference. It might be responded that we know the cause of the voice by
analogy with human voices. However, an analogical inference could be criticized because of
the dissimilarities between human voices and the divine voice. No human voice could be so
powerful, and no human so virtuous and wise. The vocal chords required to produce such a
voice would be difficult to imagine, and so on. Cleanthes argues that such objections are
intuitively absurd, and this reveals the emptiness of Philo’s skepticism: “You see clearly your
own objections in these cavils; and I hope too, you see clearly that they cannot possibly have more force
in one case than in the other.”852
Cleanthes’ thought experiment is an attempt to test the cogency of Philo’s sceptical
arguments by applying them to a new case. It is a reductio ad absurdum where Cleanthes is
trying  to  show  the  falsity  of  Philo’s  premises  by  extending  them  to  their  logical  (but
intuitively absurd) conclusion. His argument is that either Philo’s sceptical arguments also
work against the evidence in the thought experiment, or they do not work at all. So Philo
should either reject the intuitive conclusion of design in the case of the voice of heaven, or
also accept it in the biological world. For Cleanthes, the design argument works both in the
case of the voice and of the cosmos.
Enter Paley’s example of a watch on a heath. I have already quoted the example
previously in chapter 4.2, but will do so again to help in the analysis:
In  crossing a  heath,  suppose I  pitched my foot  against  a stone and were asked how the
stone came to be there, I might possibly answer that for anything I knew to the contrary it
had lain there forever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this
answer.  But  suppose  I  had  found  a watch upon  the  ground,  and  it  should  be  inquired
how the watch happened to be in that place. I should hardly think of the answer which I
had before given, that for anything I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet
why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as
admissible  in  the second case  as  in  the first?  For  this  reason,  and for  no other,  namely,
that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the
stone)  that  its  several  parts  are  framed  and  put  together  for  a  purpose  –  –.  Every
indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch,
851 Dialogues, part III.
852 Dialogues, part III.
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exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater
and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.853
This is the part of Paley’s example that is usually quoted, and here it is not clear that it is
clearly a counterfactual thought experiment like the voice from heaven. It seems like finding
a watch on a heath is an event that all participants of the debate believe to be possible, and so
the thought experiment is only weakly counterfactual. However, Paley’s further analysis of
the example moves it further from our actual situation in the direction of counterfactuality.
Paley first presents eight different notes of the example in the first chapter and then makes
one larger modification of the example in the second chapter. Through these subtle
modifications of the example, Paley indirectly answers the criticisms of the design argument
made by Hume and others, arguing that inferring life to be designed is possible. Paley
believes that the thought experiment of the watch shows the criticisms of the design
argument to be weak, even irrational.
I will briefly go through Paley’s nine points to show what the nature of his thought
experiment is. First (1), Paley argues that it wouldn’t weaken the conclusion of design if the
person observing the watch had never seen one made or known anyone capable of making
one. Thus background knowledge of and previous experience of the designer’s capabilities is
not necessary for the design inference. This is an indirect response to Hume’s argument that
only inductively gathered experience of the creation of life forms would make the design
argument possible. Second, (2) Paley argues that small errors in the operation of the watch
would not invalidate the conclusion of design. This is in response to the problem of natural
evil. Third (3), the mysterious nature of some of the parts of the watch would not also not
weaken the conclusion of design. Fourth (4), nobody would be satisfied by the objection that
the order of the watch does not need to be explained because it is just one possible
configuration of matter, and some configuration had to exist. Fifth (5), a vague reference to
some unknown naturalistic “principle of order” would not be a better explanation than
design. Sixth (6), seeing the purposeful order of the watch as something that exists merely as
an illusion in the eye of the beholder would also be an unsatisfactory answer. Seventh (7), a
vague argument that the watch is produced by laws of nature would be unsatisfactory
because laws do not themselves create anything under Paley’s definition. Eighth (8), the
observer’s small amount of knowledge related to the whole universe should not make it
difficult to conclude that the watch is designed based on what he does know. Ninth (9), the
conclusion of design would be only strenghtened, if the watch possesses the capacity to
reproduce itself. It would lead to a different understanding of the designer and the process of
design, but not change the conclusion. This final modification of the example finally brings
the case of the watch identical to the case of biological order, and thus Paley is in a position
to make his design argument.854
853 Natural Theology, chapter 1.
854 Natural Theology, chapters I-II.
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As can be seen from these points, the thought experiment of the watch on a heath is
crucial for Paley’s response to the typical criticisms of design arguments in his day. The nine
points consider nine different grounds for objecting to the biological design argument and
reject all of them by pointing out that these responses would be absurd in the case of the
watch. The first of Paley’s points is already relevant for the modern discussion on Intelligent
Design. As we saw in chapter 4.3, many modern critics of the design argument argue
(following Hume) that background knowledge of the designer’s existence, abilities and
intentions is necessary for the design argument. Paley’s thought experiment is aimed at just
this sort of criticism. He argues that in the case of the watch, we can form the conclusion of
design just by observing the order of the watch, using our general knowledge of how
designers generally operate. So we do not need to know beforehand that a designer capable
of producing precisely this type of object exists.
Both thought experiments are used as responses to criticisms of design arguments in
the same way. My own understanding of the logic of this response is as follows:
7. Assumption X says that we cannot have evidence of design unless condition Y.
8. In hypothetical situation Z, we have evidence of design, even though condition Y is not
fulfilled.
9. Therefore, assumption X is faulty.
The examples presented here are somewhat different, however. Cleanthes’ thought
experiments are clearly fanciful, while Paley’s thought experiment starts out quite close to
our practical reality. Its initial closeness to our actual situation gives Paley’s thought
experiment some rhetorical force – the critic finds it difficult to deny that we can see the
designedness of watches, since in our actual experience we do find that they are designed.
However, this also makes it more difficult to evaluate how our intuitions in the example are
formed. Would we indeed have the intuition that watches are designed, if we did not have
previous experience of them?855
A critic of Paley could thus argue that it is difficult to get beyond our knowledge that
watches are designed to get a good sense of our intuitions regarding what we would think if
we did not already possess this background knowledge and merely discovered watches
whose order was a natural consequence of the operation of natural laws. One response to
this objection is provided by the more fanciful sort of thought experiments outlined by
Cleanthes. In these cases, we are dealing with something that is merely highly analoguous to
the products of human design, yet the conclusion of design seems intuitively quite clear. If
the intuitions seem to be very similar as in Paley’s more realistic case, then it seems that the
degree of fancifulness in the thought experiment is not greatly responsible for the way our
intuitions operate in these cases.
As noted, despite presenting such thought experiments, the Dialogues remains overall
critical  of  natural  theology.  I  will  return  to Dialogues-inspired lines of response to thought
855 Similarly McGrath 2011, 110.
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experiments at the end of this chapter, but first I will turn to consider the ID movement’s
thought experiments. Like their predecessors from the time of the English Enlightenment,
the ID movement presents both fanciful and realistic thought experiments.
Some of Intelligent Design’s Thought Experiments
In both Hume’s and Paley’s texts, thought experiments occur early on in the argument,
underscoring their importance for their argument. The ID movement’s literature also
includes many thought experiments used as answers to important criticisms of the design
argument, but these are not typically presented at the beginning of ID’s argument. One
exception is provided by William Dembski’s “On the very possibility of the design
argument”.856 The essay is one of the first essays of the earliest collection of ID articles, The
Creation Hypothesis.857  The  point  of  the  essay  is  to  defend  the  possibility  of  ID’s  project  of
seeking evidence for intelligent design in nature, and Dembski’s thought experiment of “the
Incredible Talking Pulsar” is the central argument used. Dembski aims to show that the
detection of supernatural design is in principle possible, and thus the exclusion of design
from consideration of possible explanations is not rational. The example is broadly as
follows. Suppose that a pulsar star some billions of light years away emits regular
radiomagnetic signals, which are found to be a message in Morse code. As the worldwide
scientific community studies the signal, the pulsar identifies itself as “the mouthpiece of
Yahweh, the God of both Old and New Testaments, the Creator of the universe, the final Judge of
humankind.” To confirm this claim, the pulsar agrees to answer any questions we might put
to it. Soon, through the messages, medical doctors learn how to cure AIDS, archaeologists
find lost civilizations, physicists find their unifying theory of the forces of nature, and
mathematicians obtain proofs for problems which are impossible to solve without infinite
computational resources. Dembski argues that this would be clear evidence of divine
design.858
Dembski acknowledges the outlandishness of his example, arguing that no theologian
would expect God to reveal himself in this way. Thus the example is for Dembski a mere
logical possibility, not something that would realistically happen. However, for him the
example demonstrates that “design has at least the possibility of becoming perfectly evident.”859
This then opens up the possibility of considering whether we have at least some evidence of
856 Dembski 1994.
857 Moreland (ed.) 1994.
858 Dembski 1994, 113-138. Interestingly, Dembski explicitly rejects Cleanthes’ “voice from heaven” -example.
According to Dembski, a skeptic faced with such a voice would be more likely to think that he had become insane
than to believe in God. Dembski’s critique of the example does not take into account the intersubjective element
in Cleanthes’ example: the voice was heard simultaneously by all people of all nations. This would make it
difficult for the skeptic to use this strategy. The skeptic would have to claim that all people had simultaneously
become insane for this “insanity defence” to work – a quite incredible proposition.
859 Dembski 1994, 129.
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design in our universe. Dembski goes on to argue that design can also be the best
explanation for some pattern of nature even the evidence is not quite as strong as in his
example. For him, the thought experiment opens up the further three questions: “Q1. Have
any events that would constrain us to postulate design actually occurred, and if so, what are they?
Q2. How subtle can the evidence for design be and still constrain us to postulate design? In
particular, what methods of inquiry would enable us reliably to detect these more subtle instances of
design? Q3. Why isn’t the evidence for design as obvious as it might be?”860
In this early text, the thought experiment is presented as the main argument for the
possibility of detecting intelligent design. In his later texts, Dembski has used many different
strategies for defending design arguments. For example, his book No Free Lunch (2002)
Dembski begins with the importance of design-based explanations for practical life, and only
later uses more fanciful, science-fiction based examples to show how we could in principle
also detect the existence of non-human intelligence.861 Similarly, Behe’s discussion of design
detection in his Darwin’s Black Box (1996) begins with thought experiments describing very
ordinary events such as scrabble games and trap construction. Only after does Behe
reference more fanciful examples of design detection taken from science fiction in order to
show that the detection of non-human design is also in principle possible.862
Dembski, Behe and Meyer have all referenced the Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence -project (SETI) as an example of how the methods of intelligent design are
already used in science. Here their central example is SETI pioneer Carl Sagan’s science
fiction book Contact (1985, also as a movie in 1997). In Contact, a signal from space is found to
contain a long series of prime numbers. When scientists investigate the signal deeper, they
discover the blueprints for a vast machine. The signal is understood to be a message from an
alien civilization. The Intelligent Design theorists argue that this conclusion would indeed be
the only reasonable one, and it would be foolish to insist that we search for a materialistic,
nonpersonal explanation for the message. Again, this is thought to show how nonhuman
design can in principle be detected, and insistence on naturalistic explanations can in some
cases be foolish. The ID theorists go on to argue that just the same type of order is also found
in nature, for example in the genetic information of organisms, and that this provides
evidence that life is intelligently designed: the existence of its features can only be explained
if we suppose the operation of a mind.863
As noted, some of the thought experiments used by ID proponents are not as fanciful.
For example, Behe uses a thought experiment about a shipwreck onto an apparently
uninhabited island while discussing the effect of background beliefs on the assessment of
860 Dembski 1994. 130.
861 Dembski 2002a, 1, 6-8. However, Dembski does continue to use his “Incredible Talking Pulsar” as an example
in his later book The End of Christianity (2009, 91-92).
862 Behe 2006a, 192-196; 196-199.
863 Dembski 1998c, 17;  Dembski 2002a, 6-8; Behe 2006a, 196; Behe 2000b, 7 & Meyer 2004. The ID link to SETI is
also prominently expressed in the ID friendly Illustra Media films Unlocking the Mystery of Life (2003) and The
Privileged Planet. (2005)
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evidence for design. According to Behe, theistic beliefs do make it easier to see evidence of
intelligent design in nature, but it is in principle possible even without theistic
presuppositions. To illustrate his point, Behe asks us to suppose we are the survivors of a
shipwreck, crashed on an apparently uninhabited island. Suppose that we find stones
arranged in a circle on the beach. If we have reason to believe that there may be someone else
on the island, we might see this circle as a product of intelligent design. Supposing that we
are convinced there is nobody else there, we would conclude that the arrangement of stones
is just a strange coincidence. But the evidence could be stronger up to a point where we
would be convinced of design almost regardless of our initial presuppositions. For example,
if the stones were arranged to form the words “WELCOME, SURVIVOR”, we would be
certain of design. Behe argues that the order of nature might also contain very strong
evidence of intelligent design, which can be seen to have evidential value even without
religious presuppositions. However, both atheism and theism do effect the evaluation of the
strength of the design inference: an atheist, giving a low prior probability to the hypothesis
of design, will require more evidence for the conclusion of design than the theist, for whom
even supernatural intervention into nature can be a possibility.864
These thought experiments are all very similar to those presented by Paley and
Cleanthes. It is argued that in the situations of the thought experiments, we have clear
evidence of the existence of a nonhuman intelligence, even though some critique presented
against ID could also be presented against these examples. For example, if only designers
whose existence, motives and capacities were known beforehand could function as
explanations, then design would not be a good explanation in these cases.865 However, since
design nevertheless seems to be explanatory in these cases, then the conditions posited in the
critiques cannot be absolute. The thought experiments are used to argue that while it is
helpful to have information about the designer beforehand, a more detailed conception of
the designer can also be formed after the initial design inference.
Other Modern Thought Experiments
I stated previously that thought experiments in defence of design arguments have also been
used by philosophers outside the ID movement. For example, John Leslie’s influential
defence of cosmic design arguments in his book Universes (1985) includes references to
thought experiments in practically every chapter.
The purpose of Leslie’s thought experiments is to test the force of objections to his
argument. For example, it has been argued that we cannot have evidence of design, because
(1) this is the only universe we have observed, (2) it is unreasonable to seek for an
explanation for the properties of the laws of nature, since the laws are themselves the
864 Behe 2001a, 105.
865 In chapter 4 I examined examples of such arguments against ID.
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fundamental reality, and (3) there is nothing mysterious about the fact that natural laws
allow for life, because otherwise we couldn’t be here. Responding to these arguments, Leslie
formulates his thought experiment: “the question-begging would be obvious were electron
microscopes to reveal that particles regularly formed long chains which spelled out ‘GOD CREATED
THE UNIVERSE’, this then being shown to result inevitably from basic physics”.866 If it is valid to
claim that we cannot have evidence of divine design because this is the only universe, then
surely the pattern “GOD CREATED THE UNIVERSE” as a result of natural laws also would
be evidence of design. Likewise, if seeking to explain the basic laws of nature is
unreasonable, then wouldn’t it be unreasonable even if the basic laws created a pattern like
this? Furthermore, of course we could not observe the pattern if it did not exist, but this does
not yet provide an explanation for the pattern. Leslie argues that the order of the cosmos we
observe is also reasonable to explain by reference to the action of a deity, even if the evidence
for divine design is not as obvious as in the example.867
Lydia McGrew likewise argues that it is unreasonable to expect a theory about the
exact motivations and psychology of a non-human designer before being able to make a
design inference. Rather, the similarity of some order with products of human design should
be enough to infer design. Suppose that we found a massive Volkswagen-like car orbiting a
distant planet. McGrew argues that the analogical design inference would be possible, even
if we did not have previous experience about these designers and found it difficult to fathom
why anyone would build a giant Volkswagen and place it like this. We would be able to
infer the existence of a designer with properties necessary for the production of the
Volkswagen, namely intelligence and ability to build car-like objects. McGrew argues that
this undercuts many objections to biological design arguments. For McGrew, independent
knowledge of the designer’s specific attributes are not needed. Rather, our knowledge of the
general capabilities of designers is sufficient for realizing that explanation here requires the
sort of capabilities which designers have.868
Del Ratzsch’s analysis of the logic of design arguments in his Nature, Design and Science
(2001) utilizes many thought experiments for many purposes. Ratzsch does not merely
respond to criticisms of design arguments through his thought experiments. Rather, his
whole model of how design is detected is built largely by using practical examples and
thought experiments.869 One of Ratzsch’s thought experiments must be mentioned here
simply because it is one also mentioned in a critique of thought experiments. Ratzsch argues
that “should we find an alien bulldozer on Mars, it will be perfectly safe to say that without alien
design and activity that object simply would not have been there. Design is thus explanatorily
implicated not only in some of the specific characteristics of a designed entity, but sometimes in its
866 Leslie 1985, 109.
867 Leslie 1985, 109.
868 McGrew 2004, 13.
869 Ratzsch  2001.  Similarly,  Mullen  (2004)  builds  his  argument  on  design  detection  based  on  “paradigm  cases”
which any model of design detection should be able to explain. Mullen's cases are not just thought experiments,
but include historical examples.
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very existence.”870 With this thought experiment, Ratzsch is arguing against those who think
that design as an explanation is always illegitimate. Rather, design can be also be an
extremely well-supported explanation. Specific characteristics of the designed object like its
purposeful complexity can also be unnecessary for the conclusion of design – sometimes
simply the extreme difference of an object from what natural processes normally create can
be sufficient proof of design. Ratzsch’s thought experiment has also received the approval of
Dembski, who has used it to argue that design can indeed be detected even if the
motivations of the designer remain unknown.871
Some Critical Responses
To deny the conclusions of these thought experiments, the critic needs to argue that the
assumptions or the logic of these thought experiments are faulty. I will illustrate a few ways
to respond by criticizing one of the ID movement’s thought experiments which is somewhat
easier to criticize and then move on to analyse how these types of criticisms could be made
against the thought experiments analysed above.
Arguing that we do not need independent evidence of the designer in order to make a
design inference, Dembski provides a thought experiment about space travellers who claim
to have designed life. As evidence for their claim, the aliens show us technology that can
demonstrably assemble even the most complex organisms, as well as evidence that they have
visited the Earth previously. There is no “smoking gun” and no “made in Alpha Centauri”
markings can be found in biological life. The evidence is indirect, since the alien’s technology
was too advanced to leave any trace of their activity on Earth. In this situation, it seems to
Dembski that design would clearly become the better explanation of life’s evolution even for
naturalistic thinkers. But this raises a worry for Dembski: “If design is a better explanation
simply because we have independent knowledge of technologically advanced space aliens, why should
it not be a better explanation absent such evidence? If conventional evolutionary theory is so poor an
explanation that it would cave the instant space aliens capable of generating living forms in all their
complexity could be independently attested, then why should it cease to be a poor explanation absent
those space aliens? The point to appreciate is that specified complexity can demonstrate this poverty of
explanation even now — apart from space aliens and bizarre thought experiments.”872
Dembski’s example is unconvincing for two reasons. First, Dembski and ID’s
naturalistic critics have a different understanding of how strong the evidence for evolution
is. If Dembski’s criticd maintain that they would not see design as a better explanation even
in the case of this thought experiment, then the thought experiment has no force to convince
them. Second, the thought experiment seems to again undervalue the importance of
870 Ratzsch 2001, 21.
871 Dembski 2002c.
872 Dembski 2005b, 30.
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independent evidence and background knowledge supporting the conclusion. As seen in
chapter 4, the prior probabilities we estimate for different explanations do have
consequences for our evaluation of what the best explanation is.
This weakness of Dembski’s thought experiment can perhaps be made clearer by a
comparable thought experiment of my own. Suppose that there emerges a large group of
people claiming to be wizards responsible for controlling weather. They claim that
naturalistic explanations for meteorological phenomena are mistaken, and a hypothesis of
wizardly design is the true explanation. As evidence for their claim, they bring forth their
spellbooks and proceed to demonstrate how they can cause any and all meteorological
phenomena. The wizards also bring forth antique books demonstrating that the existence of
their wizard’s circle extends throughout known human history. There is no smoking gun,
but there is plenty of circumstantial evidence making the wizards’ claims plausible. In this
situation, many might indeed fairly reasonably accept the hypothesis of wizardly design as
the best explanation for meteorological phenomena. But does it follow from this that the
wizard hypothesis is the best explanation without this additional supporting evidence?
Clearly this has not been demonstrated. So, the assumptions and the logic of Dembski’s
thought experiment can be contested by the critic.873
But can the assumptions and logic of the other thought experiments be similarly
contested? Though the ID theorists and other defenders of the design argument often use
thought experiments, critics of Intelligent Design have made relatively few comments on
them in the discussion. Three exceptions are Robert Pennock’s analysis of Dembski’s
“Incredible Talking Pulsar”874, the analysis of Del Ratzsch’s bulldozer in space provided by
Mark Perakh and Matt Young875, and Elliott Sober’s analysis of the thought experiments in
Hume’s Dialogues.876 All three focus on the differences between the evidence of design we
witness in the thought experiments and the actual evidence we have.
Pennock argues that Dembski’s example is misleading because of the difference
between the “Incredible Talking Pulsar” and the biological evidence: “in each case we infer an
intelligent signaller not because these are cases of complex specified information in a generic sense, but
because the pattern of information matches a previously known pattern that we associate with
intelligence.”877 Perakh and Young argue that the example of an alien bulldozer, recognizable
as designed despite our lack of knowledge about the designer, is misleading. Because we can
recognize the bulldozer as a bulldozer, we can infer at least something about the designer’s
characteristics and purposes. The designer must be of a certain height to sit inside the
bulldozer, he needs bulldozers to create buildings and so on. But organisms, on the other
873 Despite these criticisms, Dembski’s example may work as evidence for a more limited claim. If we accept that
design would be at least a good competitor for the title of the best explanation in the situation Dembski describes,
then this seems to admit that the design hypothesis at least has some explanatory force. It is not a totally empty
explanation comparable to chance, as some have argued. (See chapter 4.3.)
874 Pennock 1999, 230-233, 254, 272, 303.
875 Perakh & Young 2006, 194-195.
876 Sober 2009,8, 168-177.
877 Pennock 1999, 254.
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hand, do not have such a clear purpose for their designer. Perakh and Young also see the
capacity of organisms to reproduce and undergo evolution as important: because of this
capacity, the order of the organisms can be explained without design, whereas the order of
the bulldozer cannot. Thus differences between the thought experiments and the evidence
we actually have is crucial for the critics: “We know nothing whatsoever about the alleged
disembodied designer of the intelligent design theory or about what that designer’s creations should
look like. The case is therefore very different from bulldozers and poems. A reference to such a designer
lacks explanatory power.”878
Sober recognizes that Cleanthes’ thought experiment about the voice from heaven
presents a challenge for his position that background knowledge of the designer’s existence
and motivations is necessary for making the conclusion of design: “These arguments do not
require us to say anything concerning how probable it is that an intelligent designer who lives in the
dark or in the clouds will produce an English sentence. – – And who knows how inclined a celestial
intelligence would be to boom English sentences down to Earth?”879 Sober recognizes that
Cleanthes’ design argument is based on an inductively observed connection between the
type of order seen and intelligent design as a cause, and grants that “there is nothing wrong
with inferring that the voice in the dark and the voice in the clouds were both probably produced by an
intelligent being.”880 Yet Sober denies that this makes ID’s biological design arguments
plausible. His reasons for this are twofold. First, Sober argues that while there is good
evidence to establish a high-frequence connection between intelligible voices and intelligent
agents, there is insufficient evidence to establish any such high-frequency connection
between purposeful complexity and intelligent designers. Second (and this is the more
weighty criticism in Sober’s own estimation), the biological design argument does not take
into account theories which argue that the useful complexity of biological organisms can be
formed through mindless processes. Sober is not convinced by ID's critique of evolutionary
biology.881 If accepted, these differences between the thought experiment and the situation of
biology mean that the design argument cannot work in the same way as argument based on
the “voice from heaven.”
SETI-researcher Seth Shostak has also criticized the use of SETI as an analogy to
biological design arguments. According to Shoshtak, the thought experiment of the movie
Contact (1985) where the information content of a signal testifies of the existence of
extraterrestrial life is misleading, though the idea comes from SETI-pioneer Isaac Asimov
(1920-1992). Shostak argues that SETI actually does not investigate the content of signals at
all, but focuses on finding an intensive narrow-wavelength signal. These sorts of signals,
Shostak argues, are known to be produced by civilizations, but are not produced by
nature.882 This criticism of ID is curious, however, because Shostak’s own formulation of
878 Perakh & Young 2006, 194-195.
879 Sober 2008, 171.
880 Sober 2008, 174.
881 Sober 2008, 175-176.
882 Shoshtak 2005.
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SETI-logic seems to have the same logical structure as many design arguments. Because
some property (in Shoshtak’s example, the narrow wavelength-signal) is found, based on our
experience, to be a marker of intelligent life (and cannot be well explained otherwise), then
this property can be used as evidence of design. However, the same logic would seem to also
allow us to conclude that a radio signal containing information (e.g. prime numbers and the
blueprints for a machine) is designed, as in the ID movement’s example. The basic
underlying logic of the arguments is identical.
It seems to me that the critics’ insistence on the difference between the thought
experiments and our own situation is the most credible way to deny the conclusion of the
thought experiments. Nevertheless, it seems to me that these responses to thought
experiments also inevitably include make some important philosophical concessions to
defenders of the design argument. Because the critics do not deny the intuitive conclusion
that the order observed in the thought experiments can indeed be reliably detected as
designed, they must formulate the logic of design detection in a way that makes it possible in
the thought experiments, but rules it out in the case of ID’s project. So, Pennock, Sober and
Shostak affirm that a pattern of order which we have learned by experience to associate with
intelligence can be evidence of design even outside the context of human activity. This leaves
the door open for the ID proponents to argue that rationality, specified information and
purposeful complexity are also traits strongly associated with intelligence. The critics’
position  thus  seems  to  lead  to  giving  up  the  philosophical  a  priori  criticisms  of  ID.  But
leading the discussion to this point was the purpose of the thought experiments.
Most examples of purposeful complexity occur outside the context of human activity,
so it seems correct to say (following Sober) that proponents of ID cannot argue that there is a
high-frequency observed connection between all examples of purposeful complexity and
intelligent design. Nevertheless, they can argue that there is some sort of a connection, which
is sufficient to give ID as an explanation some content and help it overcome at least chance-
based explanations in the contest for the best explanation. It would be strange to argue that
the connection has to be as clear as in the case of the voice from heaven before the design
argument starts to have any explanatory power at all. It seems more credible to me that the
evidence of design does not have to be either completely convincing or completely absent.
Perhaps the amount of evidence and the quality of arguments we have is rather somewhere
between these two extremes.
Because thought experiments are hypothetical, they do not themselves provide
evidence of design, but only test our concepts. In my view, the more enduring strategy of
response to these thought experiments is not to argue that the situations of the thought
experiments are completely dissimilar from our own, but to argue that they are sufficiently
dissimilar  that  scepticism of  design  arguments  is  made  possible.  This  also  seems  to  be  the
point of the responses to Cleanthes’ thought experiments in the Dialogues. These
counterarguments aim more at limiting the power of design arguments and opening up the
possibility for scepticism (and religious faith) rather than a proof against the very possibility
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of  design  arguments.  First,  religious  belief  in  God,  in  any  case,  is  requires  more  than  the
design argument. The God of Christian theism is much more than a designer, and faith is
based on grounds much broader than arguments.883 Secondly, the order of nature is different
from the cases in the thought experiments. In nature, we do not find talking pulsars or
“MADE BY YHWH” signs on particles. We do find rational order, fine-tuning and
astounding complexity, but the evidence for design isn’t of quite the same nature as in the
thought experiments.884
Despite these criticisms, the major point of the thought experiments seems to stand. If
seeking to explain the patterns described in the thought experiments in terms of design and
purpose would be rational, then this seems to make it possible to consider that there may
also be other situations in which the design argument is rational, and that we may ourselves
live in such a situation. If we believe that the design argument is irrational in all conceivable
situations, then we reach the conclusion that no conceivable order of nature could be
evidence for design. Even if we found the words “GOD MADE THE UNIVERSE” regularly
created by the normal operation of the laws of nature, explaining this by reference to design
would only be a vacuous God of the gaps. If the naturalist adopts this line of argument, then
he can answer the design argument based on metaphysical philosophical arguments alone,
rather than the empirical evidence usually valued by naturalists.885 This  is  line  of  thought
that is vulnerable to the ID’ers criticism of naturalistic science as merely applied philosophy,
not empirical investigation based on the unending search for truth. In this chapter, I have
once again found myself  defending the in principle possibility of  intelligent design.  This is
once again in agreement with Gregory Dawes’ conclusion: “Intelligent design theory is an
attempt to explain a fact that requires explanation, and at least some of the arguments offered deserve
to be taken seriously. If at the end of the day they fail to convince, it is simply because we have a better
explanation available, one that makes no appeal to a mysterious cosmic designer.”886 It is easy to
criticize a “naturalism of the gaps” which allows only for natural explanation no matter what
the evidence is. A naturalism based on the actual state of the evidence is much more
credible.887
Or as Ross McCullough puts the point: ”There need to be criteria for when inferences to
divine activity are reasonable. This is of course true, and the nature of such criteria is not obvious,
depending as it does upon the phenomena in question. Still, some such criteria exist. Even the atheist
can acknowledge that at some point the hypothesis needed to avoid God might become so improbable as
to be unbelievable. If there were no fossil record of evolution, and snakes and birds and human beings
had all just appeared suddenly in the past, the case for a divine designer would be a rather strong one.
883 Vainio (2010) is one of the best recent studies of the nature of religious faith. See also chapters 2.4 and  2.5 of the
present work for thoughts on faith and reason.
884 In  Ratzsch’s  (2001)  categories,  we  might  say  that  nature  contains  mind  correlativity,  but  perhaps  not  mind
affinity.
885 Collins 2005, 188-189.
886 Dawes 2007, 70.
887 Similarly Orr 2007.
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The atheists who fete evolution do by their feting acknowledge this: It is just because the world is so
and not otherwise that they claim belief in God is irrational.”888 The thought experiments seem to
show that we can imagine situations where we have plenty of evidence for a divine designer
acting even in natural history. This seems to show that even the biological design hypothesis
can  in  principle  possess  explanatory  power,  and  in  possible  worlds  it  can  be  the  most
rational thing to believe.
However, does the rationality of belief in design truly depend on a competition
between evolutionary biology, as the atheists McCullough references seem to imply?
Couldn’t a theistic evolutionist position combining design and evolutionary biology also be
possible? In chapter eight, I will turn to consider ID’s position on theistic evolutionism. One
argument I will be making is that thought experiments can also be used to argue for the
compatibility of evolutionary biology and design arguments.
888 McCullough 2013.
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8. INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THEISTIC
EVOLUTIONISM
In the previous chapters, my emphasis has been on analysing Intelligent Design’s conflict
with naturalism. However, ID’s conflict with theistic evolutionism is also important.889
Because theistic evolutionism is also opposed to the naturalistic worldview, it might initially
seem plausible that the ID movement would seek to ally with theistic evolutionism. Indeed,
ID theorist Paul Nelson explains that ID is meant to be a “big tent” to  unite  all  those  who
believe that the order of nature is evidently designed. Nelson writes that “under the canopy of
design as an empirical possibility, however, any number of particular theories may also be possible,
including traditional creationism, progressive (or “Old-Earth”) creationism, and theistic
evolution.”890 This purpose of uniting those who believe in design and oppose a purely
naturalistic understanding of the universe was also behind the ID conference “Mere
Creation” (1996) and the corresponding conference volume (1998). Questions about the
method and timing of creation were seen as secondary to the basic idea of creation, which all
Christians could accept.891
In Nelson’s statement, combining belief in evolution and theism appears as a
possibility that is in principle acceptable to Intelligent Design theorists. However, as I argued
in chapter 2.1, theistic evolution includes a variety of ways of thought. These are opposed to
the naturalistic worldview of thinkers like Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins in many
ways. Theistic evolutionists typically defend the compatibility of science and theology and
the rationality of belief in God. Nevertheless, Nelson and the broader ID movement reject
most forms of theistic evolutionism as highly problematic and incompatible with ID’s vision.
Dembski notes that while C.S. Lewis tried to defend only the essentials of Christianity in his
Mere Christianity, proponents of Intelligent Design try to go further by developing their
theory of creation so as to best oppose a purely naturalistic (and atheistic) understanding of
the world.892 In the opinion of the mainstream of the ID movement, theistic evolutionism fails
to properly challenge the atheistic understanding of the universe.893
Some theistic evolutionists have also criticized ID in strong words. For example, as I
showed in chapter 2.5, theologian Conor Cunningham even argues that ID comes close to
being a heresy, and those those accept ID´s design arguments are led away from the
889 For example, the ID blogs Evolution News and Views and Uncommon Descent contain frequent critiques of theistic
evolutionism alongside critiques of evolutionary biology and naturalistic views. Richards (2010) is a collection of
ID-articles with the common goal of critiquing theistic evolutionism.
890 Nelson 2002. This view of Intelligent Design was more closely argued in the introduction, where works like
Giberson & Yerxa 2002 were also referenced.
891 The title references the work of C.S.  Lewis,  who wanted to define the essence of Christian doctrine in a way
acceptable to all Christians in his book Mere Christianity. (Lewis 2001, originally published 1942-1944).
892 Dembski 1998, 13-14.
893 Richards 2010.
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knowledge of the true God: “the god of Intelligent Design” is one that orthodox Christians
should find “diabolic”, and as destructive to true faith as Dawkins’ atheism.894
In my assessment, the ID theorists’ four central lines of argument against theistic
evolutionism are (1) the evidential argument; (2) the argument from apparent contradictions,
(3) the argument against Darwinism as a worldview, and (4) the argument from the
insufficiency of theistic evolution. In this chapter, I will analyse these lines of argument to
clarify the relationship between Intelligent Design and theistic evolution. In analysing each
line of argument, I contrast Intelligent Design with some defences of theistic evolution,
finding tensions in each of these lines of argument. However, I will not be arguing that ID is
heretical.895
8.1. The Evidential Argument
ID´s Emphasis of the Importance of Scientific Evidence
As I have argued throughout this study, the ID movement emphasizes the importance of
empirical research in deciding what sort of natural history our world has. In chapters 3.4 and
3.5, I argued that a basic assumption the ID theorists make is that theological and
philosophical reasons cannot eliminate the possibility that there is evidence of design in
nature. As I showed in chapter 6, the ID theorists believe that the empirical evidence shows
the inadequacy of evolutionary theory. Because of this, they believe that the evidence is also
against theistic evolution as a model of divine action in history, and that a model where an
intelligent designer’s (God’s) activity is seen as an important explaining factor of natural
history is better. The evidential argument against theistic evolution is that this type of open
evaluation of the evidence leads to the rejection of theistic evolution.
As I showed in the introduction, in the rhetoric of the ID theorists, they are the open-
minded and honest scientists looking for the truth, whereas defenders of the theory of
Darwinian evolution are influenced by philosophical and religious bias. Similarly, the ID
theorists emphasize that their rejection of theistic evolutionism is primarily based on
scientific reasoning, rather than theological reasons. The evidential argument against theistic
evolutionism is simply that the relevant science renders theistic evolutionism unnecessary.
According to Dembski, “the design theorists’ critique of Darwinism begins with Darwinism’s
failure as an empirically adequate scientific theory, not with its supposed incompatibility with some
system of religious belief”.896 Dembski has also written that he doesn’t know of “any ID advocate
who claims that Darwinian evolution entails atheism.”897 This is correct, but as I will show, many
ID advocates, including Dembski himself, do think that Darwinian evolution tends to be
894 Cunningham 2010, 280.
895 Chapter 8 is an updated and expanded version of Kojonen 2013.
896 Dembski 1998, 112.
897 Dembski 2011.
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linked with atheism, even if it atheism is not an absolutely necessary conclusion from
evolutionary theory.
In the evidential argument, it is assumed that there is a need for the harmonisation of
scientific theories and religious beliefs only when the scientific theories are likely to be
correct. Thus Jay Richards argues that prior to examining “such arcane possibilities” as the
compatibility of Darwinism and theism, we should first ask the prior question of whether
Darwinian evolutionary theory is even true.898 If the theory is not true, then there is no need
to harmonize it with Christian belief. On one level there is truth to Richard’s argument. If
Darwinian evolutionary biology is not true, then the need for harmonizing it with Christian
belief seems far less pressing. Were Darwinian evolutionary biology to become broadly
rejected, we would probably see far fewer articles about its compatibility with theism in
journals of religion and science. Similarly, currently there is little interest in articles about the
compatibility of phlogiston theory and theism.
However, on another level such a harmonisation might still be useful even from the
point of view of the ID theorists for four reasons. First (1), the question of the in principle
compatibility of natural processes and belief in creation is an interesting one. If theism and
Darwinism are compatible, then understanding this possibility might provide us with a
better understanding of the basis of Christian belief, the nature of the doctrine of creation,
and its relationship to scientific theories. Second (2), a broader use of good theological and
philosophical arguments, such as those theistic evolutionists rely on, would strengthen ID’s
overall argument against naturalism and scientism. Third (3), the theory of evolution is
currently widely believed to be true in academia, even by many who are acquainted with the
ID theorists’ critique of Darwinism. Theological and philosophical arguments could help
these people avoid embracing atheistic metaphysical interpretations of Darwinian
evolutionary  biology.   Even  if  a  scientific  theory  is  likely  to  be  incorrect,  showing  its
compatibility with belief in creation might still be interesting, if the theory is widely believed
to be true. Fourth (4), the acceptance of theistic evolutionism as a philosophically and
theologically defensible position would help avoid the impression that theological reasons
are important motivations for ID’s own opposition of evolutionary biology.
Theistic evolutionists and the mainstream of the scientific community disagree with
these claims and argue that the acceptance of evolutionary theory is the most reasonable
response to a broad variety of scientific evidence. However, even if the problematic nature of
evolutionary theory is granted, these four reasons lead to me to think that the evidential
argument should also not be a sufficient reason to reject discussion of theistic evolutionism.
898 Richards 2010, 302.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
234
The Implicit Importance of Theology for ID
There is a further tension in the ID movement’s evidential argument. As I have shown in
chapter 3.5, the Intelligent Design theorists are not opposed to the idea that the designer of
life could have worked through natural laws and mechanisms. They emphasize that God as
a free agent could have used any means to create the species, including Darwinian evolution.
Taken consistently, this should lead to the acceptance of the possibility that God has in fact
used Darwinian evolution.
However, despite this emphasis, the ID theorists often portray design and Darwinism
as opposed viewpoints. As they understand it, the very point of Darwinian explanations is to
attempt to explain away the apparent purposiveness of nature. For example, Dembski’s
argument that the Intelligent Design theorists are not motivated by their theology comes
after several pages discussing theological problems with the harmonisation of theism and
Darwinism. Thus while Dembski does not argue that Darwinism entails atheism, he does
believe that there are substantial problems in reconciling Darwinism and theism.899 Phillip
Johnson has also argued extensively that there is a conflict between what he terms the “blind
watchmaker” thesis of evolution and theism.900 Johnson argues that the Darwinian way of
thought rules out an evidentially based belief in creation, but still leaves room for religion
which is chosen for subjective reasons.901 Stephen Meyer, too, has criticized theistic evolution
as being indistinguishable from materialism.902 Behe admits the possibility of theistic
evolutionism in principle and even calls theistic evolutionist John Haught a believer in
intelligent design.903 However, elsewhere Behe too writes that the followers of theistic
evolution “are kidding themselves if they think it is compatible with Darwinism” as  it  is
understood by the mainstream scientific community.904 Behe also argues that intelligent
design provides important confirming evidence for faith. Behe admits that theistic
evolutionists may have other evidence to corroborate their faith, and that their position is not
self-contradictory, but nevertheless finds Intelligent Design more satisfying even
theologically.905
The impression these accounts give is that for the ID theorists, a combination of
Darwinism and theistic belief is possible, but this leaves theistic belief much weaker. The
argument is that is a tendency to slide from theistic evolutionism to the more consistent
positions of materialism or Intelligent Design. Even if the ID theorists don’t argue that
Darwinian evolution logically entails atheism, they at least argue that atheism logically
requires something like Darwinism to escape the evidence for creation. The impression one
899 Dembski 1998, 112.
900 Johnson 2001.
901 Johnson 1993, 155-157.
902 Meyer 2010.
903 Behe 1999a.
904 Behe 2007a, 229.
905 Behe 1998a; 1999b, 2005b.
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gets is that while God may have used any method for creation, for the ID theorists it would
be theologically desirable that he did not choose a Darwinian mechanism. Thus their ideal of
openness to many different accounts of natural history does not mean that they have no
theological or moral preferences for what sort of method God should have used.
The ID movement’s idea that empirical evidence should define what we believe about
God’s interventions in natural history seems appealing. As I discussed in chapter 7, it seems
difficult to form a convincing theological argument for totally ruling out the possibility of
God’s interventions into natural history prior to the examination of the empirical data.
However, the ID theorists’ defence of this principle would be more credible if they did not at
the same time also argue that Darwinian evolutionary biology and belief in design are not
necessarily opposed. Currently it seems that they do have a strong metaphysical preference
favouring non-Darwinian accounts of the origin of life and the biological species.
To be fair, I want to note that the same tension is also present in some defences of
theistic evolution, as well. In chapter 7, I showed saw that many see ID’s design argument as
a theologically undesirable “God of the gaps”; in chapter 9, I will show see that ID’s design
argument is also sometimes thought to make responding to the problem of evil more
difficult for theists. Many theistic evolutionists thus have a strong theological preference for
the idea that God used evolutionary methods of creation. These thinkers typically hold both
that (1) acceptance of evolutionary theory is based on the evidence, not primarily theology,
and that (2) there are highly pressing theological reasons for preferring theistic evolutionism
to forms of creationism. These principles are in tension, just as the ID movement's principles
are in tension.
Robin Collins’ defence of theistic evolution provides a model that I would recommend
to defenders of theistic evolution. Collins argues that there is no good, well-developed and
convincing argument for rejecting an “interventionist” account of the laws of nature, where
God intervenes into natural history in addition to working through the laws of nature. Thus
the theistic evolutionist does not begin from a theological account which precludes God’s
interventions, but on the basis that of the “well-established theory that life on Earth arose through
the process of biological evolution, by which I mean the process of descent with modification from the
first cell.”906 Then, because of the acceptance of the theory of evolution, a theistic evolutionists
(of Collins’ mold) looks to understand the reasons God had in choosing to work in this way.
8.2. The Apparent Incompatibilities
Design and Darwinism as Explanations of the Same Data
The second line of argument the ID movement uses against theistic evolutionism is based on
the supposed incompatibility of Darwinian evolutionary explanations and design. In the
906 Collins 2009, 243.
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history of design arguments, natural causes and the effect of minds have not always been
opposed. Plato’s demiurge, for example, created by using matter’s existing properties, not
out of nothing or contrary to laws of nature. For the death of Socrates, Plato saw several
causes. While the poison drank by Socrates was the material cause of his death, it would
have been an error to see only this side of the issue. Instead, the political situation of Athens
and the plans and purposes of both Socrates and his opponents were also important to note.
For Plato, material and teleological explanation were thus complementary levels of
explanation. On this model, a design argument is not necessarily in conflict with material
explanations.907
The possibility of combining divine design and natural processes is also evident within
the Christian tradition. The distinction made in Thomistic philosophical theology between
primary and secondary causes remains useful and defensible. Divine action in the world
does not require gaps in the web of natural processes, since God can also be conceived to act
in the world through secondary causes. A common example of the combination of divine
purpose and natural causes is the conception of each individual human being. Christians
have traditionally believed both that each individual is created by God, and that this
happens through a natural process.908 As I pointed out in chapter 7.2, Christians have also
traditionally believed that sometimes God does bypass the regular order of nature to act
miraculously in the world. However, this does not need to be conceived as opposed to the
natural laws.909
The Intelligent Design theorists are not opposed to the idea that the designer of life
could have worked through natural laws and mechanisms. For them, design and natural
causes are both real. As Behe writes, the alternatives are not that of “a cartoon world, where
genies and fairies swirl about endlessly dispensing magic, or a world of relentless materialism where,
say, the charitable work of a Mother Teresa is explained only in terms of evolutionary selection
coefficients.”910 The ID theorists often argue that ID does not require interventions by God in
natural history. Behe, for example, argues that the process of evolution could be
programmed into the universe911, and Dembski argues that design could be inserted into the
universe in quantum events without violating the laws of nature.912 Dembski and Well
distinguish between several different meanings of the word “evolution”, most of which they
believe to be compatible with Intelligent Design. For example, evolution can mean simply
change over time or minor changes within existing organisms, or it can mean the idea of
common descent, or the power of the Darwinian mechanism of mutation and selection, or
907 Sedley 2007, chapter 4.
908 Hart 2014, chapter 1.
909 On this discussion, see Earman 2000 and Keener 2011, chapter 5.
910 Behe 1999a.
911 E.g. Behe 2007, chapter 10.
912 Dembski 2002a, 333-337.
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some other evolutionary mechanism such as described in the theories of endosymbiosis or
neutral theory.913
The central point of contention they see between design and evolution comes from the
special nature of the Darwinian mechanism. As Jonathan Wells argues, “it is not evolution in
general, but Darwinism’s exclusion of design, that ID proponents reject.”914 Using Plato’s
categories, while other natural explanations work on the level of material causes, Darwinism
also attempts to reduce teleology to material causes. It attempts to provide a wholly
naturalistic explanation of teleology, and to thus render references to purpose and direction
unnecessary. Plato criticized the Epicurean system, which argued that teleology is ultimately
reducible to material causes.915 Advocates of Intelligent Design contend that Darwinian
evolution and design are similarly opposed. This is the argument from the apparent
contradiction between Darwinism and design.
Because of the many different definitions of evolution, the ID theorists see it possible to
define “theistic evolution” in a way that is compatible with the design argument of the ID
movement.916 Theistic evolutionism in the sense of belief in evolution actively directed by
God is held to be a possible way of believing in creation.917 However, this form of directed
evolution is believed to be in contradiction with standard Darwinism.918 Undirectedness is
understood to be part of the very definition of the Darwinian process. According to Johnson,
“‘Evolution’, honestly understood, is not just a gradual process of development that a purposeful
Creator might have chosen to employ. It is, by Darwinist definition, a purposeless and undirected
process that produced mankind accidentally.”919 The Intelligent Design theorists thus understand
Darwinian evolutionary theory to include the denial of purpose and direction to evolution.
The Intelligent Design theorists thus share Richard Dawkins’ understanding of the aims of
Darwinism. Dawkins’ definition of evolution as the “blind watchmaker” is quoted over and
over again in the ID literature, and is understood to be mainstream Darwinism.920
The contrast the ID theorists make is then between the origin of the species as
purposeful and directed in the theistic story and evolution as purposeless and undirected in
the naturalistic story of origins.921 Despite this seeming contradiction, many theistic
evolutionists have attempted to harmonize belief in design and Darwinian evolution. It is
this synthesis which many ID theorists criticize.922 According to Dembski, “Theistic evolution
takes the Darwinian picture of the biological world and baptizes it, identifying this picture with the
way God created life. When boiled down to its scientific content, however, theistic evolution is no
913 Dembski & Wells 2007.
914 Wells 2010, 119. Similarly Meyer 2010, Dembski 1998, Johnson 1993.
915 Sedley 2007, chapters 4 and 5.
916 Meyer 2010, 147.
917 Johnson 1993, 4n1.
918 Meyer 2010.
919 Johnson 2001, 436.
920 E.g. Johnson 2001, 436; Meyer 2010, 148. See Loesberg 2007 for some further examples.
921 Richards 2010, 7-25.
922 I have noted Behe’s somewhat different take on the issue above in chapter 8.1.
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different from atheistic evolution, treating only undirected natural processes in the origin and
development of life.”923 Dembski argues that by Occam’s razor, consistent theistic evolutionists
should either argue that evolution is directed, in opposition to Darwinism, or give up the
label “theism” as superfluous to their understanding of evolution.924 The idea here is that
design and Darwinism are different explanations of the same facts of apparent design in
biological organisms. They occupy the same scientific explanatory space. If one believes in
Darwinism, design becomes unnecessary, and vice versa. To phrase it in Plato’s categories,
the ID theorists see Darwinism as an attempt to reduce the teleology of organisms to material
causes.
Two Examples of Theistic Evolutionism
The ID movement’s critique of theistic evolutionism will become easier to understand and
criticize when contrasted with concrete examples of how the integration of Darwinian
evolutionary theory and belief  in God is  defended. I  will  now look at  two cases where the
Intelligent Design movement has interacted with these views directly: Stephen Meyer’s
critique of Dennis Lamoureux’ evolutionary creationism925 and William Dembski’s critique of
Simon Conway-Morris’ view that the phenomenon of convergence allows us to see a
direction in evolution.926 Many other ways of defending theistic evolutionism also exist, but
here I focus on ways that the ID movement has interacted with.927
According to Lamoureux, “the Creator established and maintains the laws of nature,
including the mechanisms of a purpose-driven teleological evolution.”928 Lamoureux argues that we
can see design in nature at a level deeper than biology. Like a brilliant billiard player, who
can sink all the balls of the billiard table with one shot, God has made the evolution of
humans possible already with his initial act of creation. For Lamoureux, the process of the
evolution of life is also comparable to the development of an embryo into an adult, directed
by natural laws. Lamoureux argues that in fact, designing a universe to create the living
species takes more divine wisdom than creating an unfinished universe and then creating
species miraculously. In our universe, while no references to design are necessary on the
level of proximate biological explanations, ultimately all of the workings of nature reveal the
existence of its Creator, and cannot be properly understood without reference to him.
Lamoureux affirms the value of the design argument, and even calls his own view a form of
923 Dembski 1998, 110.
924 Dembski  1998,  111-112.  While  Dembski  presents  these  as  the  ideas  of  mainstream  biologists,  he  does  not
critique their logic.
925 Meyer 2010b.
926 Dembski 2004c.
927 See Peters & Hewlett 2003 for an excellent discussion of varieties of theistic evolutionism. See also chapter 2.1.
of the present study for a brief synopsis of varieties of theistic evolutionism.
928 Meyer 2010, 149.
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intelligent design. However, he critiques the Intelligent Design movement for opposing
Darwinian evolutionary theory and design arguments.929
Meyer is not satisfied with Lamoureux’s harmonization of theism and evolutionary
biology. His central argument is that Lamoureux’s account of the evolution of life does not
differ sufficiently from materialistic stories, and thus does not really explain by reference to
design. As an example, Meyer uses the origin of life’s biological information. Meyer sees two
main coherent possibilities for explaining its origin. Either the information which makes life
possible comes directly from the mind of the designer, or it is mediated by deterministic
natural laws. However, Meyer argues that self-organizational models have failed to explain
the origin of life’s information. However, suppose that Lamoureux wants to base his theory
of life’s origins on contingent, accidental chemical events, which natural selection then works
on. According to Meyer, in this case the contingent processes of chemical accidents do most
of the work of creation instead of a personal Creator.
Meyer’s conclusion in critiquing Lamoureux is that “it is difficult to see how Lamoureux’s
theory – – differs in substance from conventional materialistic theories of evolution that rely on
undirected contingency and deny any intelligent guidance or direction in the history of life.”930
Meyer’s idea here is that the deity does not have a much greater role in this sort of theistic
evolutionism than in standard materialist theories of life’s origins. Thus belief in the deity’s
direction in evolution is explanatorily unnecessary. Meyer acknowledges that Lamoureux
believes the Creator designed natural laws which allow for the interplay of natural laws and
natural events to create living organisms. However, for Meyer such a role is too small for the
Creator. He wants the evidence to reveal the Creator’s active involvement in the creation of
life beyond the laws of nature.931
Dembski makes many of the same points in his critique of Simon Conway-Morris’
defence of theistic evolution. Paleontologist Conway-Morris develops his argument in his
book Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe (2003). Conway-Morris’s argument
is based on the phenomenon of convergence. Evolutionary convergence means that similar
features have evolved several times apparently independently during the course of
evolution. Conway-Morris believes that convergences show that the course of evolution is to
at least some extent determined by the natural laws and conditions of our universe.
Extrapolating from this, it could be that even the emergence of human-like organisms is
ultimately determined by the natural laws. Thus it could be that God directs the course of
Darwinian evolution through such natural constraints. Conway-Morris argues that the
evidence from convergences supports the possibility of a theistic view of evolution, where
the direction of evolution is built in by the Creator into the natural laws.
Dembski’s critique of Conway-Morris position is that the biological evidence from
convergence only shows that evolution is “limited to fixed paths, not that it has goals.” Dembski
929 See e.g. Lamoureux’s contribution in Johnson & Lamoureux 1999.
930 Meyer 2010, 162.
931 Meyer 2010, 163.
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acknowledges that Conway-Morris has given some evidence for the teleological nature of
evolutionary processes. However, Dembski does does not see this as being strong enough
evidence. Design remains merely a metaphysical possibility, not a necessary component of
explanation. According to Dembski, Occam’s razor also cuts against these sorts of design
arguments: since design is not necessary, we can be content by simply believing that the
process of evolution was natural, and that contingent processes inside nature are responsible
for the direction. Both Dembski and Meyer emphasize the need for evidence to determine the
question of evolution’s purposiveness. To discover whether evolution was directed, they
argue that we should look at the details of the process itself, ask where the limits of the
natural processes are, and whether design is required to explain that which lies beyond those
limits. Dembski’s assumption here is that we need evidence of design, and further that this
evidence should be strong and scientific in nature.932
As I argued in chapter seven, the ID theorists have denied that their argument is
reducible to a fallacious argument from ignorance or a God of the gaps. After all, they also
try to present positive evidence of design, and believe that it is possible for God to work
through nature. However, in these critiques of theistic evolutionism they give the impression
that gaps in the abilities of natural processes are required for a robust defence of the design
argument. Meyer and Dembski want to discover evidence of intelligent design on the level of
biology, teleology which cannot be explained other than by reference to the purposes of a
designing mind. Because of this, they do not appreciate Lamoureux’s and Conway-Morris’
arguments which aim to discover evidence of design not on the level of biological theory but
on the underlying explanatory level in the fine-tuning of natural laws.
However, it should be asked whether Meyer and Dembski do justice to theistic
evolutionism in their critiques. While Meyer is correct in pointing out that Lamoureux’s
explanation does not differ from materialist Darwinists on the level of biological details, it
does not seem to follow that Lamoureux’s evolutionary creation -view contains no
“substantial” differences from atheistic views on any level, as Meyer claimed. After all,
Lamoureux agrees with the proponents of Intelligent Design, and against materialism, that
(1) the ultimate basis of reality is personal, (2) there is evidence of design in nature, and (3)
atheistic interpretations of nature can be opposed with rational arguments. Lamoureux is not
an atheist, but believes in a God who is active in the world, even performing miracles. So,
Lamoureux agrees with many of the Intelligent Design movement’s core ideas. It seems that
their critique of theistic evolutionism carries the ID theorists from their basic “big tent”
strategy, which was an attempt to unify those who believe in design and oppose scientific
atheism.
Suppose that theistic evolutionists’ account of chemical and biological evolution does
not differ on the level of biological science from those of atheistic evolutionists, as Meyer and
Dembski argue. It doesn’t seem to necessarily follow from this that design could not be
perceived even in biology when taking a wider perspective. Even if there is no design
932 Dembski 2004c.
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required on the level of proximate biological explanations, it does not follow that there is no
design required on any underlying explanatory level. Lamoureux’s argument is that the very
possibility of Darwinian evolution depends on the existence of natural laws and conditions
which biology takes for granted. If natural laws are designed, then the possibility of
Darwinian evolution requires design. If that is the case, then the apparently purposeful
complexity in biological organisms depends on design, and cannot be said to be produced
without design. Although design is not a proximate cause of evolution, it can be the ultimate
explanation for its possibility. As Del Ratzch has argued, “design is not a causal irrelevance”
in explaining biological complexity, if the natural laws were designed.933
Dembski argues that Conway-Morris does not present sufficient evidence for the
teleology of evolution. Conway-Morris’ point was arguably not to present undeniable
evidence that evolution was directed, but rather to argue that theistic evolution is a coherent
and rational possibility. Conway-Morris shows that it is an error to think of mutation and
selection as the only factors in evolution. Rather, the different biological forms can be seen as
built into the laws of nature. Conway-Morris’ argument shows one way in which God could
direct evolution, even though the mutations seem accidental from a scientific point of view.
It could simply be that all of the possible natural events will tend to lead evolution along
certain paths which are predetermined by the characteristics of the universe. In this way,
God could make even accidental evolutionary events work towards his purposes in creation.
If the intelligent designer of biological life were thought to be like a human engineer
working within the possibilities afforded by the laws of nature, the opposition between
random chance and design would be more convincing. For such limited designers, it would
be more difficult to utilize chance and natural processes as part of engineering.934 However,
considered from the point of view of a classical theology of creation, the contrast between
random contingency and design which the Intelligent Design theorists make is dubious. If
there are contingent events in the world, then these can only be events which are made
possible by the structure of the world which God has created and which are allowed and
foreseen by God. Divine foreknowledge could also enable God to create life through a
“random” process, since God would know beforehand what results the random process
would produce. Thus teleology could be built into the Darwinian process without a logical
contradiction.935
933 Ratsch 2001, 130.
934 Even within human engineering the use of chance as part of the design process is not unheard of, as the use of
evolutionary computer algorithms in engineering demonstrates. I will come to this in more detail later in chapter
8.2.
935 See further McGrath 2009, chapter 7. Another possible theistic option of dealing with randomness would be to
adopt scientific antirealism. The randomness of mutations could be argued to be the best scientific description of
mutations,  while  simultaneously  arguing  that  arguments  outside  science  should  lead  us  to  doubt  that  this  is
ultimately the correct picture of the world, and that in fact evolution has been directed by God. Parallels to this
sort  of  anti-realism  exist  elsewhere:  for  example,  in  the  early  part  of  the  20th  centure,  antirealism  was  the
mainstream position of scientists on the existence of non-observable molecules. For discussion of scientific realism
and anti-realism in  relation  to  theology,  see  McGrath  2001.  For  more  on  varieties  of  theistic  evolution,  see  my
chapter 2.1.
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Dembski dismisses Conway-Morris’ argument as nonscientific, and as not giving
enough evidence for belief in purpose. What is enough evidence is subjective – Dembski
admits that Conway-Morris has given at least weak evidence. However, Dembski’s critique
is interesting, since the ID movement itself has recognized that its design argument cannot
prove the existence of a Creator. There is a gap between belief in an “intelligent designer”
and belief in the Creator God. Thus the ID movement has argued that its design argument
only provides “epistemic support” for belief in creation. But isn’t this the same sort of
evidence that Conway-Morris presents? Dembski seems to want scientific evidence for a
Creator, but couldn’t belief in the Creator rest more on extra-scientific reasons? Meyer and
Dembski think that theistic evolutionism should differ from atheistic evolutionism on the
level of the natural sciences in order to be properly theistic. But this overlooks the fact that
most theistic evolutionists think the theological interpretation of evolutionary biology is a
matter that is outside the competence of the natural sciences to address. I will look at this
issue more below while dealing with the ID movement’s fourth line of argument against
theistic evolutionism.
The Compatibility of Evolution and Design Arguments
The common understanding is that Darwinian evolution undermines biological design
arguments, but is perhaps compatible with cosmic design arguments. So, in arguing that
biological design arguments and Darwinian evolution are incompatible, the thinkers of the
ID movement are in good company.936 But  it  may  also  be  possible  to  combine  belief  in
biological design with acceptance of Darwinian evolution, and the discussion on ID already
contains the seeds of this kind of approach.
Del Ratzsch has presented several interesting thought experiments to argue that design
could be evident even without gaps in natural processes. Consider the possibility of an
automated VCR (Video Cassette Recorder) factory. In this case one could give a “complete
causal account of the production and physical properties of VCRs from the initial factory state. But
we’d still feel that something was missing – that there was something about the factory itself, perhaps
implicit in the “givens” that demanded special explanation.”937 According to Ratzsch, this would
be true even if the explanation for some order like this could be traced back to the Big Bang.
Explaining the VCR’s production in terms of the properties of the factory would leave
Rarely, members of the ID movement also point out the relevance of the creator's foreknowledge for combining
chance and design. Behe (2007a, 231-232) writes that “an über-physicist” with sufficiently advanced technology to
create a new cosmos and to be able to predict the events of that cosmos could create a cosmos where life evolved
through a chance-driven process without the designer’s intervention. The ID movement's major criticism of these
types of scenarios is that in them the process of evolution appears undesigned from the human standpoint, thus
leaving humans with too little evidence of the creator. I will analyse this line of argument in chapter 8.4.
936 Even Alister McGrath (2009b) presents Darwinian evolution as refuting at least Paley’s biological design
arguments, while arguing that Darwinism does leave room for a wider teleology.
937 Ratzsch 2001, 130-131.
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something unexplained that we would still have to explain through design. If the properties
of the factory itself are designed, then this designedness “is not a simple causal irrelevance,
given that without that factory’s designedness the VCRs would fail both to exist and to have key
physical properties they in fact have.”938
In  Ratzch’s  model  of  design  detection,  mind  correlativity  and  mind  affinity  –  the
correspondence of patterns in nature with patterns in our minds – are clear signs of design in
the context of human artefactuality. But even if we find these designs outside this context,
these properties constitute at least some evidence for design. For example, suppose that the
text “John 3:16” was clearly carved into the surface of the Moon by meteor strikes. Even if we
could trace the causal history of this text back to the big bang, and there was thus no context
of artefactuality, it would be clearly designed.939
The point of these thought experiments is to make the strategy of “level-shifting”
analysed in chapter 5.3 also applicable to biological design arguments. Supposing that
biology also has this sort of properties that are evidence of design in the presence of gaps, the
argument is that they could in principle be some sort of evidence of design even if their order
can be traced back to the initial state of the Big Bang with no gaps in the natural processes
that could be filled by supposing the intervening activity of a designer. An omnipotent
designer who could design even the laws of nature would not in principle have need of any
such gaps, since he could create any outcome he wanted without interventions.
In this type of view the possibility of cosmic design arguments makes it possible to also
argue that the biological organisms created by evolution are designed, since their order also
depends on the natural laws. But for some other thinkers, the train of thought runs in the
other direction. If the order of VCR’s can be explained without design in the case of the
automated factory, then it can be argued that the automated factory can also probably be
explained without design. In effect, this is the strategy taken up by Richard Dawkins in his
God Delusion. According to Dawkins, Darwinian evolution functions as a “consciousness-
raiser” which shows that teleology can be reduced to material processes. According to
Dawkins, “a deep understanding of Darwinism teaches us to be wary of the easy assumption that
design is the only alternative to chance, and teaches us to seek out graded ramps of slowly increasing
complexity. – – After Darwin, we should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of the very idea of
design.”940 Dawkins argues that since Darwinism shows that reductionistic explanations for
teleology are possible, it provides grounds for the reduction of all teleology to non-
intentional material causes. This is one point where ID theorist Johnson agrees with Dawkins
– according to Johnson, Darwinism lends credence to such reductionism, and thus includes a
way of thought which is contradictory with cosmic design arguments as well.941
938 Ratzsch 2001, 130-131.
939 Ratzsch 2001, 63. With his thought experiment, Ratzsch goes on to argue that in cases of divine design, natural
law  and  evidence  of  design  need  not  be  opposed,  since  God  can  also  work  through  natural  laws,  not  just  in
counterflow to them.
940 Dawkins 2006a, 139.
941 Johnson 2010, chapter 4.
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But Dawkins’ argument seems to assume what he is trying to prove. Dawkins argues
that because Darwinian evolution produces what appears to be purposeful complexity
without teleology, it is possible to reduce all teleology in just this way. However, how does
Dawkins  know  that  Darwinian  evolution  requires  no  purposeful  design?  Following  the
analogy of the factory, it is possible to believe that while no teleology is required on the level
of proximate biological explanations, Darwinism itself ultimately depends on teleology built
into the universe. If this is true, then the Darwinian process does not work without teleology
– the designedness of the universe is not irrelevant to the production of organisms. To prove
his first premise – that Darwinian evolution does not require design – Dawkins therefore also
has to assume his conclusion, that there is no design on the cosmic level.
In my view, the combination of Darwinian evolutionary biology and design in the way
envisaged by Ratzsch is an interesting possibility which deserved more study. Perhaps the
order of organisms could still provide at least weak evidence of design, even in the presence
of natural explanations. Surprisingly, ID literature itself contains ingredients which I believe
could be used to develop this argument more rigorously. As we saw in chapter four, the ID
theorists Benjamin Wiker and Jonathan Witt also argue that we can appreciate the beauty of
biological organisms better when we realize how much fine-tuning is required for this
beauty to be possible. The converse could also be true: we can appreciate the fine-tuning
required for life better when we look at the remarkable complexity and “designedness”
visible in organism. In a way, one could argue that on the evolutionary view, the fine-tuning
and rationality of the whole cosmos becomes clearly visibly in the order of biological
organisms. Even someone who is not well versed in physics could see the evidence of design
by looking at the organisms which make the fine-tuning of the cosmos visible.942 Based on
these ideas, perhaps an argument could be developed to the effect that the order of biological
organisms can still testify of a Creator, even if the proximate explanation for this order is
Darwinian evolution.943
The extent to which the possibility of Darwinian evolution depends on the fine-tuning
of the laws of nature affects the strength of this argument. Here Conway-Morris’ argument is
helpful, since it seems to show that the forms of biological life follow certain fixed patterns
which could be determined by the natural laws. Further, as I argued in chapter 6.4, many of
ID’s arguments for the improbability of Darwinian evolution (such as Behe’s argument from
irreducible complexity) could be reformulated as arguments for the amount of fine-tuning
required by evolution. In order for the evolution of irreducibly complex structures to be
possible, evolutionary routes that make this possible must exist. In this way, it could be
942 Perhaps  a  comparison  to  icons  as  used  in  Eastern  Orthodoxy  will  help  further  explain  this  view  for  some.
Organisms  are  like  icons  in  that  the  rationality  of  the  whole  cosmos  is  both  seen  through particular  organisms
and also present in each of them.
943 Ratzsch  (2001, 59) similarly argues that ”if  something would constitute evidence of design in the context of
some  presumed  gap  in  nature,  then  it  will  also  constitute  evidence  of  design  even  if  the  gap  in  question  gets
closed naturally”. Thus Darwinism does not, according to Ratzsch, necessarily threaten the biological design
argument.
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argued that as Darwinian evolution weakens all gaps-based biological design arguments, it
boosts design arguments based on cosmic fine-tuning correspondingly.
Intriguingly, Dembski himself has proposed a similar reconciliation of design and
evolution. The argument is based on Dembski’s “law of conservation of information”, the
claim that any random search capable of generating information can only do so because it is
directed by information. The idea is already presented partially in Dembski’s No Free Lunch
(2002), but more clearly in a later article.944 Dembski and Robert Marks argue that applying
the law of conservation to information creates the result that “when natural systems exhibit
intelligence by producing information, they have in fact not created it from scratch but merely shuffled
around existing information."945 While evolutionary computer algorithms are often used to
demonstrate the power of the Darwinian mechanism of mutation and selection to generate
order, Dembski and Marks argue that such algorithms also show the limits of the
mechanism. They argue that information can only be generated by evolution when it is built
into the process. This is also shown by the fact that it is possible to generate algorithms
which rely on mutations and selection and which do not generate any interesting results.
Their point is that engineers have to carefully construct these simulations so as to make
the Darwinian mechanism do what it needs to do. To make a successful search algorithm,
“active information” generated by a mind is required. After arguing this in a highly technical
manner, they are ready to make an analogy: “In these models, careful tailoring of fitness functions
that assist in locating targets is always present and clearly teleological. If these models adequately
represent biological evolution, then this teleological feature of fitness ought to be preserved in nature,
implying that Darwinian evolution is itself teleological.”946 The evaluation of their argument here
is beyond the purposes of this study, but it is interesting to note that with their model of
teleological Darwinism Dembski and Marks come rather close to theistic evolutionism. In
their article, Dembski and Marks themselves do not mean to say that their model of
teleological Darwinism is close to theistic evolutionism. Rather, they argue that theistic
evolutionism means by defition belief in the teleology of evolution without any evidence.947
However, this seems like a semantic quibble, since Dembski and Marks agree here with
theistic evolutionists that the Darwinian process can be designed by God. There is a tension
between their arguments for the possibility of teleological evolution and the claim that belief
in Darwinian evolution is in tension with believing in design.948
944 Dembski 2002a, chapters 3 and 4.
945 Dembski & Marks 2009.
946 Dembski & Marks 2009, 31. This argument could perhaps be supplemented by using the ID theorists’ critique
of the Darwinian mechanism. For example, as we saw in chapter two, Behe argues that nature contains
“irreducibly complex” systems whose evolution through natural selection would require extremely circuitous
and improbable pathways. If Behe is correct, then an evolutionary algorithm which can produce these structures
would indeed be difficult to construct.
947 Dembski & Marks 2009, 6.
948 Together with Dembski’s treatment of theistic evolution in his The End of Christianity (2009), it might even be
argued  that  Dembski  is  moving  towards  a  more  inclusive  and  open  approach  to  the  issue  of  evolution  and
design.
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Though a general opposition between natural processes and divine action is a mistake,
this does not mean that some ideas of divine action could not require rejecting natural
explanations. All gaps-arguments such as those analysed in chapter 7 are made in opposition
to natural causes, and it seems to be in principle possible that there are gaps in the abilities of
natural processes. Also, historically miracles like the bodily resurrection of Jesus have been
thought to be in conflict with naturalistic explanations. For example, it would be strange to
argue that the disciples actually stole the body of Jesus from the tomb and buried him in an
unmarked grave, but that this was merely God’s way of accomplishing the resurrection of
Jesus. In chapter 5.3, I argued that some examples of “level-shifting” are not plausible. This
will have to be decided on a case by case basis. But the arguments that Darwinian
evolutionary biology and design are necessarily conflicting explanations do not yet seem
convincing.
8.3. Darwinism as a Worldview
The Darwinian Episteme
Intelligent Design’s third line of argument against the reconciliation of Darwinism and
theism comes from the way that Darwinian evolution is often presented as a whole
worldview and a way of thought, not just a scientific theory. As Johnson puts it, Darwinism
is  an  “episteme, a way of thinking about things in general.”949 Johnson agrees that the new
atheists Dawkins and Dennett have presented the philosophical implications of evolutionary
biology correctly – it is an universal acid that dissolves everything else “into shifting sand by
the acid of reductionism”.950 Thus evolution, when correctly understood, is not just a biological
theory, but the starting point for understanding all of reality. Because of this, while a theistic
evolutionist might have completely “orthodox biology”, he or she will still be “missing the point
of the theory” if he ignores the episteme. This type of separation between evolution as a
worldview  and  evolution  as  a  scientific  theory  is “barely possible”, but it is a continual
struggle and a source of cognitive dissonance for the theistic evolutionist.951 According to
Johnson, combining the Darwinian way of thought and the naturalistic way of thought “has a
fatal logical weakness that stems from the fact that it attempts to reconcile two fundamentally
inconsistent ways of thinking. Theism asserts that God rules everything; naturalism asserts that
nature proceeds on its own, without supernatural influence.”952
Initially, this seems like a challenging argument to make. Many scientists, theologians
and philosophers have distinguished between Darwinian evolutionary theory and
materialistic thought. Shouldn’t it be possible to accept Darwinian evolution as a probable
949 Johnson 2010, 49.
950 Johnson 2010, 55.
951 Johnson 2010, 53.
952 Johnson 2001, 447.
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biological theory and yet not accept the Darwinian episteme? It seems that some positive
philosophical arguments should be given before we are justified in selecting a particular
scientific theory as our starting point for interpreting all other areas of life. Could we not
rather interpret evolutionary biology’s meaning for our life based on what we know through
other means, such as through our everyday experience, our philosophy, and our religion? It
seems difficult to base any whole way of thought on just scientific discoveries. This would
require scientism, which is itself a highly questionable philosophical idea that theistic
evolutionists can criticize with full justification. As Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett argue,
theistic evolutionists believe that it is possible to separate the gold of evolutionary science
from the dross of ideological wrappings.953 Johnson's argument ignores this possibility.
In the previous chapters, I have showed that many defenders of naturalistic
evolutionism indeed base their position on philosophical reasons, not just the scientific
evidence. As John Haught has also noted, Johnson is correct that for many Darwinians, the
theory is more like a worldview than just a scientific theory. It is possible to quote many
important evolutionary biologists who draw very far-reaching consequences from the
theory. Johnson is right in calling attention to the importance of critiquing this highly
influential worldview.954 However, as Haught also notes, there are also well qualified
biologists and philosophers who do not believe that the ramifications of Darwinian
evolutionary theory are this far-reaching. Of course, it could be that those who make a
theistic interpretation of Darwinian theory are simply mistaken. However, it could also be
that the differences could simply lie in the different worldviews through which theists and
materialists interpret evolutionary theory.955 It seems difficult to settle the disagreements
about the implications of evolutionary theory simply by polling evolutionary biologists and
asking them whether Darwinism has metaphysical implications, as Johnson's references to
famous evolutionary biologists seem to assume. The question of implications is a
philosophical one, and the arguments for and against any such understanding of
evolutionary theory must be evaluated.
Separating Evolutionary Biology and Darwinistic Philosophy
In response to Johnson, many have differentiated between methodological scientific naturalism
and metaphysical naturalism.956 Metaphysical naturalism is the belief that natural mechanisms
and forces are all that exists. According to this understanding, there is no God or higher
power and there is no design or purpose in the universe. Methodological naturalism, by
contrast, simply means restricting natural science to the study of natural causes. I have gone
over varieties of methodological naturalism previously in chapters 3.4. and 3.5. What matters
953 Peters & Hewlett 2003, 22.
954 Haught 2003.
955 Stenmark 2001.
956 Pennock 1999, Murphy 1993.
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here is that even under strong methodological naturalism, one could still present reasons for
belief in God outside of science. As long as one doesn’t accept scientism, such reasons could
in principle be seen as compelling.
Johnson’s response to the distinction between methodological and metaphysical
naturalism has been twofold. First, he has insisted that the main targets of his criticism are
those who accept both scientism and methodological naturalism. It would indeed be more
rational to understand science as a limited enterprise which cannot prove or disprove the
existence of a transcendent Creator. “To a scientific naturalist, however, ‘outside of science’ means
outside of reality.” Thus the main point of this materialistic scientism is that if there is “no room
for God in science, then there is no room for God in reality.”957
Second, Johnson admits that methodologically naturalistic science can be useful, but
denies that this is the only possible way of doing science. Here he comes back to the
arguments against strong methodological naturalism. If one does not assume metaphysical
naturalism, then it is in principle possible that there are gaps in the capabilities of natural
processes, and sometimes the activity of God could conceivably be the best explanation for
some pattern in nature. Johnson advocates for a methodological pluralism in science, and
seeks to create a new kind of science that could in principle recognize gaps and evidence of
design in nature.
I have looked at Johnson’s view of science in more detail in chapter 3.5. In that chapter,
I argued also that even a theistic scientist could in principle accept evolution as the best
explanation of biological data. Theistic scientists, as long as they remain scientists, will not be
satisfied by explaining every phenomenon by saying simply that “God did it.” Rather, they
would want to make their explanations as elaborate and satisfying as possible, and would
try to find explanations which best fit the evidence.958 Because of this, if there is great
evidence for the hypothesis of common descent and great evidence of the creative
capabilities of the Darwinian mechanism, a theistic scientist would tend to conclude that
God used the mechanism of Darwinian evolution to create life, just like the methodological
naturalist.
So in the end, Johnson’s argument for linking between Darwinian evolutionary theory
and the Darwinian episteme comes down to evidential questions. Johnson’s argument is that
if we do not restrict our inquiry because of methodological naturalism, then the evidence for
the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism does not appear at all plausible. Given strong
methodological naturalism, even an extremely weak and problematic naturalistic
explanation could be the best scientific explanation. According to Johnson, strong
methodological naturalism is supporting Darwinian evolutionary biology in just this way. If
the assumption of strong methodological naturalism were jettisoned, then scientists would
quickly recognize design as the best explanation. Thus if theists have no reason to accept
strong methodological naturalism, then theists also have no reason to accept Darwinian
957 Johnson & Reynolds 2010, 51.
958 Bradley Monton (2009, 62) makes this point well.
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evolutionary biology. So, because the empirical evidence is lacking, the main reason a theist
would accept Darwinian evolutionary biology is if the theist had unwittingly adopted
elements from naturalistic philosophies which are in tension with theism.959
The presence of many theistic and apparently honest scientists who believe there is
good evidence for Darwinian evolution is a problem for Johnson’s argument. For many, it
seems that the perception that there is evidence for evolution is the most important reason
for believing in evolution than materialistic philosophy. Johnson seems to be correct that for
many, acceptance of Darwinian evolution is indeed strongly influenced by philosophical and
theological reasons. However, the importance of philosophy does not imply that one could
not in principle have overwhelming evidence for Darwinian evolution even if the
“Darwinian episteme” were abandoned.960 Anyone who accepts the theory because of the
evidence and not because of philosophical naturalism can avoid Johnson’s argument, since
for any such person the naturalistic worldview is not a necessary part of evolutionary
theory.961
8.4. Theistic Evolutionism and Evidence
The Insufficiency of Theistic Evolutionism?
As noted, the ID theorists emphasize the importance of scientific evidence to defend theism
against naturalism. This is the foundation of their critique of theistic evolutionism. Earlier, I
showed that the ID theorists recognize the possibility that God could have directed the
process of evolution, but in a way that is undetectable by the natural sciences and
unnecessary for biological theories. This is the type of theistic evolutionism championed by
Robert J. Russell, for example.962 However, this is seen as unsatisfactory for theists, because it
removes evidence that a designer was required to produce life. The ID theorists recognize
that is logically possible to separate Darwinism as a way of thought from Darwinism as a
scientific theory. However, they believe that this is in practice difficult, because in this
situation the theist lacks the necessary evidence to properly defend belief in creation.963
Phillip Johnson argues that the Darwinian way of thought rules out an evidence-based
belief in creation, but still leaves room for religion which is chosen for subjective reasons.964
Similarly, Dembski writes that “within theistic evolution, God is a master of stealth who constantly
959 Johnson 1993, chapter 9.
960 Ratzsch (2002, 3) makes this point well.
961 Johnson himself thinks that the evidence is weak: “Darwinism achieved its present dominance not by experimental
confirmation but by confident assertion. There is a fatal flaw not just in the outer districts of the Darwinian metropolis but at
the very center, with the mechanism that is relied on to perform all the naturalistic miracles.” (Johnson and Reynolds
2010, 59.)
962 Russell 2008, chapters 4-6.
963 Wiker 2002; West 2007, chapter 10.
964 Johnson 1993, 155–7
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eludes our best efforts to detect him empirically. Yes, the theistic evolutionist believes that the universe
is designed. Yet insofar as there is design in the universe, it is design we recognize strictly through the
eyes of faith. Accordingly the physical world in itself provides no evidence that life is designed. For all
we can tell, our appearance on planet Earth is an accident.”965 In this quote, Dembski places a
great emphasis on the importance of scientific evidence for design instead of philosophical
and religious evidence. This implies that if we accept the Darwinian view, there are no good
reasons to believe in the designedness of life’s evolution or the universe at large: “for all we
can tell, our appearance on planet Earth is an accident.”
Dembski also argues that ID is theologically valuable, because it provides evidence
against a theory which is indispensable for atheists. For him, claiming that evolution implies
atheism is “logically unsound,” but it is not unsound to claim that “atheism implies evolution.”
According to Dembski, atheists require some sort of natural explanation for the design-like
complexity of the biological world in order to be “intellectually satisfied atheists.” Without
evolution, atheists would have to deal with a problematic amount of evidence for the
existence of an intelligent designer, giving support to belief in God. Without evolution,
atheists would also lack the possibility of justifying their Darwinian metaphysics in a
scientific-sounding way. By accepting Darwinian evolutionary theory, theistic evolutionists
are thus not using a potent weapon against Darwinism. For Dembski, evolution is a weapon
which atheists are using to attack believers. He argues that ID breaks the weapon, while
theistic evolutionism provides an ineffectual defence, because it leaves the weapon intact.966
Phillip Johnson similarly opposes the “blind watchmaker” of  Darwinism  and  divine
design. According to Johnson, evolution does leave room for a faraway first cause, a deistic
God. However, it doesn’t leave room for a God who makes a difference in the natural world
and whose existence can be seen from his works: “If God stayed in that realm beyond the reach of
scientific investigation, and allowed an apparently blind materialistic evolutionary process to do all
the work of creation, then it would have to be said that God furnished us with a world of excuses for
unbelief and idolatry.”967 According to Johnson, the Biblical passages on natural revelation
(such as Romans 1:20) show that in the Christian view, nature must point “directly and
unmistakably” toward the necessity of a Creator. Accepting Darwinian evolutionary theory
would mean that natural revelation in biology can no longer be said to be “direct and
unmistakable”. Biologically created things can no longer be said to reveal a Creator, and a
crucial piece of evidence for ID has been lost. For Johnson, this makes Darwinian evolution
theologically problematic.968
965 Dembski 1999, 110.
966 Dembski and Witt 2008; Dembski 2010; influenced by Dawkins 1991.
967 Johnson 2001, 443.
968 Johnson 2001.
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Intelligent Design and the Seduction of Scientism
This insistence on the extremely high importance of scientific evidence in support of theism
is in tension with the ID movement’s broader thought, however. Because this insistence is
the foundation of the ID theorists’ critique of theistic evolutionism, tensions at this point are
significant. I will now proceed to consider two aspects of this tension: the tension with the ID
movement’s own reliance on nonscientific reasons and the tension with the ID movement’s
desire to critique scientism and defend religious rationality.
The first tension springs from the fact that the ID theorists recognize the existence of
many other reasons for believing in God besides biological design arguments. But if such
broad reasons are available to the ID theorists themselves, they should also be available to
theistic evolutionists. As I pointed out in chapter 3.1, the ID theorists themselves do not
believe that their own arguments prove the existence of God or the Christian doctrine on
creation. As David Bentley Hart has argued, God as “being, consciousness and bliss” is far
more than just an intelligent designer, and the doctrine of creation is also about the radical
metaphysical dependence on all that exists on God as the “ground of being” or “being itself”,
not just about God as a the orderer of nature.969 Since the ID theorists nevertheless believe (on
theological and philosophical grounds) that the designer is God and believe in the doctrine
of creation, this means that they must acknowledge the validity on nonscientific reasons for
belief despite their insistence on the necessity of scientific evidence.
The ID movement should even acknowledge the rationality of purely intuitive and
philosophical belief in a designer of the cosmos. As I argued in chapter 4.1, the ID movement
sees the design argument as a defence of an ancient design intuition. However, if humans
have found out the truth intuitively or even through philosophical design arguments before
the advent of modern science, then this implies that true beliefs in the existence of the
designer can arise without science. Since it would be incredible for these beliefs to be correct
if they had been formed randomly, ID must also recognize these non-scientific methods and
cognitive mechanisms to be reliable.  It could of course be that this natural perception of
design requires a further elaboration and defence to remain credible in our modern culture.
However, it requires further arguments from the ID theorists to show that this defence has to
be scientific rather than philosophical. Because of the great theological depth of the doctrine
of creation, which I pointed out in chapter 2.5, it seems more credible to think that
philosophical and theological defenses of this idea are more important than scientific ones.
As seen in chapter 5, the ID theorists also recognize the possibility of cosmic design
arguments, and it is difficult to see why just a naturalistic theory of biological origins would
make these impossible in principle. On the ID theorists’ understanding it is possible to see
that the removal of the biological design argument would weaken the case for design, since it
removes one level of design arguments. It also makes it difficult to argue that gaps in the
abilities of known natural processes increase the plausibility of the biological design
969 Hart 2013, 36-41.
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inference. However, it could be argued that more cosmic fine-tuning is required for
Darwinian evolution than no Darwinian evolution, and thus the fine-tuning argument
arguably becomes stronger as the gaps-based arguments diminish in power. Thus it seems
that the wholesale rejection of evidence for design requires more than just a naturalistic
theory of biological origins can provide.
Sometimes this is recognized in the ID literature. For example, Benjamin Wiker and
Jonathan Witt argue that the cosmic evidence of design is “Darwin-proof”, meaning that a
theory of biological evolution cannot refute it.970 Even Johnson, who believes that the logic
behind Darwinian evolutionary theory also leads to the rejection of cosmic design
arguments, sees broad reasons for opposing naturalism:  “reality is simply too rational and
beautiful ever to be forced into the narrow categories that materialism can comprehend.971 The
rationality and beauty of reality in its harmonious natural laws, the possibility of science, the
fine-tuning of the universe, the complexity of biological organisms and even the glimpses of
something greater in the arts and religious experience all speak of the reality of the
“intelligent designer” for the ID theorists.972
It seems that the idea of natural revelation as spelled out in Romans 1:20 is a far
broader matter than analysed by Johnson. While Johnson relates the passage to the biological
design argument, it is noteworthy that the text itself is actually quite ambiguous about the
precise way God’s power and wisdom are manifested. Biological and cosmic design
arguments are not mentioned.The text is most closely related to the apocryphal Book of
Wisdom 13:1–9, which is quite different from modern design arguments. For example,
consider the very general nature of verses 1–3:
But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good
things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works
have  acknowledged  who  was  the  workman:  But  have  imagined  either  the  fire,  or  the
wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the Sun and Moon, to
be the gods that rule the world. With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to
be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the
first author of beauty made all those things.
While biological design does speak of the Creator for many religious thinkers, many also see
the immense power and greatness of God in things like the vastness and beauty of the wide
blue sky. Psalm 19 says that the heavens testify of God’s greatness, but it does not present a
design argument. And many feel that the success of science in understanding the physical
processes of creation only increase their amazement at God’s wisdom, rather than
diminishing it.973 As I have argued, there are reasons even within ID thought to move
towards this type of a deeper conception of creation.
970 Wiker and Witt 2006, 238.
971 Johnson 2000, 152.
972 See Moreland, ed. (1994), as well as Dembski & Licona, ed. (2010) for such discussion.
973 Roberts 2003.
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The second tension is between the ID movement's emphasis of the importance of
scientific evidence and its goal of defending religious rationality and critiquing scientism.
Conor Cunningham has argued that ID’s project presupposes scientism just as the new
atheism does.974 However, I find that insofar as ID comes close to scientism in its critique of
theistic evolutionism, this is actually in tension with its broader ideas. The ultimate
theological purpose of the ID movement is to refute materialistic scientism, not to affirm it.
Thus Dembski identifies scientific evidence for ID as the “bridge between science and
theology,”975 presupposing that Christian theology is a rational enterprise. Johnson has termed
the ID movement a “wedge” which can destroy the pretensions of scientific materialism and
open up room for a broader conception of rationality which includes religion and theology.976
Johnson’s opposition to scientism is sometimes so clear that Robert Pennock actually
identifies his views with the postmodernistic critique of science.977 Johnson’s idea is that if
room is made for a designer within science, then the possibility of rationality outside of
science also becomes credible. But if there is rationality outside of science, then why the
insistence that belief in creation absolutely must have scientific support? These premises that
(1) the case for design is broader than biology, and (2) it can be rational to believe something
even with nonscientific reasons, would seem to lend themselves also to the justification of a
theistic view of evolution.
The ID theorists themselves insist that ID is not scientism. Thus William Dembski978
and Jay Richards explain the emphasis on scientific reasons as partly a strategic choice:
science has immense cultural authority and far greater public credibility than religion or
philosophy.979 It is the “only universally valid form of knowledge in our culture”.980 And so to be
universally appealing, the ID theorists oppose the atheistic use of science by scientific
arguments, rather than philosophy or religion. In challenging the scientific theory of
Darwinian evolution, they want to say that their alternative is also scientific so as to present
it as a rational and objective, rather than a pseudoscientific view. Their insistence on the
necessity of science in influencing popular culture does not mean that they themselves accept
science as the only habitat of rationality.
It seems clear to me that the ID theorists do accept the existence of rationality outside
of science. However, in the ID theorists’ critique of theistic evolutionism this emphasis on the
necessity of scientific reasons does not appear merely a strategic choice but takes on larger
significance. As I have showed throughout chapter 8, the ID theorists generally argue that
theistic evolutionism differs only superficially from naturalistic evolutionism. The
philosophical and theological reasons theistic evolutionists present in defence of their
974 Cunningham 2010, 278.
975 Dembski 1999a.
976 Johnson 2000.
977 Pennock 2010.
978 Dembski 1998c, 26-27.
979 Richards 2010, 260-270.
980 Dembski 1998, 26– 27.
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position are dismissed as unconvincing and unimportant. This is the case even in the ID
theorists’ evaluations of theistic evolutionists like Denis Lamoureux, who insist that there is
much evidence to support theism, though this evidence is not part of the natural sciences.
Rather, the ID theorists emphasize that a theistic interpretation of evolution must differ from
atheistic evolutionism on the level of the science. At this point, the ID movement’s critique
indeed gives the impression the movement itself values scientific reasons far above religious
and philosophical ones just as our broader culture does. Here the fears of critics like
Cunningham seem to be confirmed.
There is a danger in this insistence on primarily scientific reasons in defence of
religious belief. From a Christian perspective, the supposition that religious and
philosophical reasons for belief have little value is surely a large problem in our culture to be
confronted, rather than a reality that needs to be accepted for strategic reasons. Because of
the implicit devaluing of philosophical and religious reasons in the critique of theistic
evolutionism, the ID movement does seem to be flirting with scientism in this critique. But
making science the primary arbiter of religious truths is theologically problematic, because
(1) most Christian doctrines cannot be demonstrated within the narrow confines of what
scientism counts as rational, (2) religious rationality is in actual practice based on much
broader grounds, and (3) the doctrines of God and creation are about much more than just
design, as the ID movement itself acknowledges. Thus accepting scientism as the criterion of
rationality would make typical Christian religious beliefs irrational. Because the ID
movement wants to defend traditional Christianity, it should emphasize the existence of
good philosophical and religious reasons for belief in design and creation, rather than
insisting that theistic evolutionists must provide scientific evidence before their views can be
substantially different from those of atheistic evolutionists.
Dembski’s argument that ID is required to counter the atheists’ use of evolutionary
science as an argument against religious belief is problematic for related reasons. Both the ID
theorists and theistic evolutionists recognize that the “Darwinism” used as a weapon is not
just a scientific theory, but also a metaphysical worldview. But if this is true, then the
weapon also has a philosophical component, and is not composed just of science. It follows
that philosophical arguments can and must be used to dismantle the weapon. Again,
powerful philosophical arguments against materialistic scientism indeed exist, so it is
difficult to see why the ID theorists seem in many comments to see ID as the only durable
answer to this use of Darwinism.
Though ID’s critique of theistic evolutionism is highly problematic, this is not a fatal
problem for the ID movement. The ID movement could abandon its critique of theistic
evolutionism in general and turn away from the seduction of scientism without abandoning
any part of the design arguments that are at the core of the movement’s thought. The
movement could also continue to insist that scientific evidence in support of belief in
creation is valuable, and simultaneously acknowledge that belief in creation does not depend
on the failure of Darwinism or the existence of scientific arguments in its favour. Giving up
the critiques of TE analysed in this chapter also will not mean that the ID theorists will have
to give up all of their critique of individual arguments for theistic evolutionism, or that the
movement could not fall back on traditionalistic biblical critiques of evolutionary theory,
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such as the insistence on the importance of a historical Adam and a historical Fall.981 They
could also continue to insist that theistic evolution is not theologically required by a proper
understanding of the doctrine of creation or for answering the problem of natural evil, which
I will analyse in the next chapter.
The acceptance of the in principle possibility of theistic evolutionism would be more in
line with ID’s “big tent” strategy and its emphasis on the importance of an open evaluation
of scientific evidence. This would create a theologically sounder base for ID and would also
help eliminate the suspicion of many critics that religious and moral concerns about
evolution influence the ID theorists’ evaluation of the empirical evidence too much. It would
also be in line with the ID theorists’ own theological emphasis on the freedom of the Creator,
as seen in chapter 3.5.
981 The  historicity  of  Adam  is  currently  a  much-discussed  topic,  with  some  theologians  insisting  that  any
theologically acceptable evolutionary view must allow for the historicity of Adam, and others arguing that a fully
non-historical reading of the paradise narratives is sufficient for theology. If successful, the arguments for the
necessity  of  a  historical  Adam  do  not  aim  to  refute  all  evolutionary  views  theologically,  just  a  subset  of
evolutionary views. For discussion, see Caneday, Barrett & Gundry (ed) 2013.
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9. DESIGN ARGUMENTS AND NATURAL EVIL
The problem of naturalistic evil has been used in both naturalistic and theistic critiques of the
ID movement’s design arguments. It is argued that the existence of natural evil and the
problem of bad design are difficult to explain on ID’s understanding of the designer. Rather,
a model of naturalistic or theistic evolutionism can account for the existence of natural evil
much better. This chapter will situate the problem in the broader context of natural theology
and analyse the responses of the ID movement. Often, the problem of natural evil is
discussed in the ID discussion without taking into account the broader philosophical and
theological context. To avoid this problem, I will begin with some basic formulations of the
problem and common responses to it in chapter 9.1. I will then go on to analyse the ID
movement’s responses to the problem in chapter 9.2. Chapter 9.3 presents theological
discussion of the problem in relation to ID.
9.1. The Basics of the Problem of Natural Evil
Understanding the Problem
In Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the problem of natural evil is one of the core
objections against all forms of natural theology, including design arguments:
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and
organized,  sensible  and  active!  You  admire  this  prodigious  variety  and  fecundity.  But
inspect  a  little  more  narrowly  these  living  existences,  the  only  beings  worth  regarding.
How  hostile  and  destructive  to  each  other!  How  insufficient  all  of  them  for  their  own
happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but
the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth
from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children.982
The Dialogues presents four types of natural evil: (1) the capacity of organisms for pain, not
just pleasure; (2) the governance of the world through regularities and natural laws, rather
than through divine action that could prevent any evil; (3) the insufficient natural capabilities
granted to living beings for taking care of themselves and finding happiness; and (4) the
insufficient fine-tuning of the natural laws, which do allow for life, but also for natural
disasters. The universe is compared to a poorly built house where the tenants live in
suffering. The Dialogues then goes on to argue that this presents a problem for belief in God,
982 Dialogues, part XI. (Hume 1999, 113.)
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
258
because we would not expect to find this type of evil in a world created by an omnipotent,
morally perfect Creator.983
In the philosophy of religion, there has been much discussion over how the problem of
natural evil should be formulated. It is customary to differentiate the logical and the
evidential forms of the problem of evil.984 The logical problem can be formulated succintly as
follows:
1. If God exists, then evil cannot exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.985
The logical problem of evil asserts that there is a logical incompatibility between the
existence of an omnipotent, morally perfect Creator and the existence of evil. However, this
is not the form of the problem that is used in the Dialogues, for the reason that because of the
limits of human knowledge, it is always possible to argue that a morally perfect Creator may
have some unknown reason for allowing evil in his world. Since the publication of Alvin
Plantinga’s God,  Freedom and  Evil (1974), most philosophers of religion have come to agree
that the existence of evil is logically compatible with the existence of God.986 However,
Hume’s argument does not stop here:
I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness
in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these
concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure,
unmixed and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena,
and from these alone.987
In the Dialogues, the problem of natural evil is not used so much to disprove the existence of
the Creator as to argue against the possibility of proving the Creator’s goodness. On this
understanding, the imperfection of creation is in contradiction with the perfection of God,
and so it cannot function as evidence for God’s perfect goodness. This evidential argument
from evil is based on a comparison of hypotheses: does an indifferent and impersonal
mother nature “impregnated with a great vivifying principle”  that works “without discernment or
parental care” provide a better explanation of the facts than the hypothesis of a morally
perfect, omnipotent Creator? Proponents of the evidential problem argue that the evidence
983 Dialogues, part XI. (Hume 1999)
984 Murray 2011, chapter 1; Tooley 2013.
985 Draper 2009, 334.
986 Plantinga 1977 [1974]; for some discussion on the impact of the argument and a dissenting opinion, see Oppy
2006, 262-263. Trent Dougherty (2014, chapter 2) argues that the distinction between the logical and evidentia
problem collapses in light of how deductive arguments actually work. Deductive arguments also don´t assume
that we have full certainty of their premises before they can lend some credibility to the conclusion. Rather, to the
degree that we have confidence in the premises, we should also have confidence in the conclusion.
987 Dialogues, part XI. (Hume 1999)
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of natural evil is better explained by the hypothesis that we are produced without divine
design, than the hypothesis of design.
The evidential problem argues that though the existence of a morally perfect,
omnipotent God is logically compatible with the existence of evil in the world, evil is
nevertheless evidence against the existence of such a God. It is simply implausible that a
good God would create a world like ours, it is argued. Given the hypothesis that such a God
exists, then according to the argument we would not expect to see the level of evil in the
world that we do see. This refers to both the quality and the quantity of evil: horrendous and
gratuitous evils of types that it is difficult to conceive any good purpose for, great quantities
of  evil  when  only  a  small  amount  might  be  expected  and  so  on.  On  this  view,  then,  the
existence of evil in our world provides counterevidence against the hypothesis that God
exists.988
In the modern discussion, this evidential argument has been championed by Paul
Draper, and applied to the discussion on design arguments by Jan Narveson and Gregory
Dawes among others. The argument is that theistic arguments get any explanatory power
they have from their appeal to the goodness of God, which allows us to make some
hypotheses about what God would act. We can assume, for example, that a good God would
create a rational cosmos, that he would care about the existence of intelligent life and so on.
However, if God is so unknowable that we cannot suppose that he would act to minimize
suffering in the world (and eliminate any evil) then we also cannot suppose that he would
create rational laws, and so the theistic arguments lose their explanatory power.989
A Variety of Responses to the Problem
To better situate the answers given by the ID movement, I will first briefly describe eleven
typical strategies for answering the problem of natural evil in the literature.990 The first four
strategies (1-4) follow the idea of questioning our ability to evaluate the goodness of the
world and to judge that God should have eliminated all evil, or at least claim that the
amount of evil in the world may be less than we think. The following four (5-8) present
different possible reasons that may justify allowing the existence of evil. The next two
strategies (9-10) are based on re-evaluating the evidence, and arguing that the evidence for
God's existence outweights the evidence against it. The final strategy (11) involves giving up
988 Howard-Snyder (ed.) 1996; see also Draper & Dougherty 2014 for further discussion.
989 Narveson 2003, Dawes 2009.
990 Following Plantinga´s (1974) terminology, attempts to show that the existence of evil and the existence of God
are logically compatible are commonly termed defences,  while attempts to show that the God actually has good
reasons  to  permit  evil  (and that  hence  the  existence  of  evil  is  not  improbable  on  theism)  are  commonly  called
theodicies. See also Murray 2009b, 353. Dougherty (2014, 51-53) criticizes the usefulness of this distinction.
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some of the traditional divine attributes, such as omnipotence. Different strategies are also
often combined in order to provide a more robust response to the problem.991
First (1), it is possible to argue that we cannot reliably predict that God would not
create a world like ours, since we cannot be confident in our ability to judge such lofty things
as the character and motives of God. Because of this, we cannot assert with any confidence
that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God. The basic intuition behind
this strategy finds support in the tradition of negative theology, as well as the Biblical book
of Job. However, if God is asserted to be fully unknowable, this includes very high costs for
the rest of Christian theology. It also becomes difficult to speak of God´s love for humanity,
since we will have no basis of saying what such love means.992
However, perhaps God could be unknowable in some weaker sense of the term.
Perhaps there is some way appealing to the complexity of reality and the limits of human
knowledge that strikes just the right balance between allowing for knowledge of God on the
one hand, but nevertheless being skeptical of our ability to criticize God. Actually, perhaps it
is precisely in knowing God that we also realize that he is beyond our ability to criticize. As I
pointed out in chapter 2.5, traditionally theological language indeed includes both the
cataphatic and the apophatic element. Assertions of the unknowability of God must
paradoxically always be based on some knowledge of what God is like before they can be
meaningful.993
Second (2), it is possible to direct our skeptical to our knowledge of the world, instead
of at our knowledge of God´s nature. Modal skepticism means the argument that we cannot
make informed judgments about how the world should be. The mystery of evil is not so
much in God’s character as in the complexity of the world which makes it difficult for us to
argue that the world is not optimally designed. We cannot argue that God should have made
the world in some other way, because making such a judgment requires far more knowledge
than we are capable of acquiring.994
One problem with this strategy is that a strong modal skepticism seems to lead to
skeptical theism. If we cannot know anything about the possibilities available to a divine
agent or judge whether the world is good or not, we also cannot know what sort of actions a
good God would make, and thus his goodness becomes completely unknowable to us.995
However, a weaker form of modal skepticism may still be useful in conjunction with some
other strategies. For example, Gregory Boyd uses it to argue that though we can explain the
existence of evil in general, the explanation of particular evils is difficult: “the problem of
991 Murray 2011, chapter 7.
992 For much discussion of skeptical theism, see Dougherty & McBrayer 2014.
993 John DePoe (2014) has recently defended just this type of formulation of skeptical theism.There are other ways
of  arguing  for  the  simultaneous  knowability  and unknowability  of  God.  For  example,  Luther's  theology  of  the
cross  asserts  that  God  appears  in  his  opposite,  as  when  Christ  suffering  on  the  Cross  is  actually  the  ultimate
expression of God's love. There have been some attempts to apply the ideas of the theology of the cross to natural
history, as well. (E.g. Murphy 2008). See also McGrath 2003, 204-210.
994 Van Invagen 1998.
995 Dawes 2009, 94-96.
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explaining why a particular  “natural  evil” occurred is  in actuality no different  than the problem of
explaining  why  any  particular  thing  occurs.  –  –  [the  explanation  of  particular  instances  of  evil  is]
simply the mystery of creation’s complexity.”996
Both skeptical theism and modal skepticism have one major problem in common: they
only provide an answer to the logical formulation of evil, not the evidential formulation.
They can at most make it possible to argue that we do not have grounds to expect that God
would eliminate all evil from the world. This means that it remains possible to argue that the
amount and type of evil in the world nevertheless fits better with the atheistic understanding
of the world. If one thinks (based on one´s own theological approach) that engaging in
natural theology is important, further arguments are required.997 The next three strategies
argue that we can actually know at least good reasons that justify allowing the existence in
the world, and so reduce the improbability of evil on the theistic understanding. A milder
form of skepticism is to deny simply the validity of examples of natural evil.
The third (3) strategy is to deny the existence of the “best possible world.” This
argument denies the possibility of creating a world that is truly optimal in sense that it is the
best of all possible worlds. For example, it could be that some good things rule each other
out, so that all good things cannot be realized in the same world. It also seems to be the case
that we can always image that the world would be a little bit better: simply add more happy
and virtuous person. The impossibility of the best possible world can then be used to argue
that we should not expect God to create a world that is as good as we can imagine in all
ways. Rather, God could be expected to create just a very good world.998 It seems to me that
this defence can be successfully used to show that some purported instances of natural evil
are not really evil. This includes things like the scarcity of habitable planets in the solar
system. One could always ask for more. However, the strategy is not applicable to all
examples. Unless we also embrace modal skepticism, it seems possible to argue that the
world indeed could be a better world in some respect without losing some other good.999
Fourth (4), other examples of natural evil can also be argued to be actually useful or
morally neutral on closer examination. For example, some neo-cartesians argue that animal
experience of suffering is either nonexistent or very different from our own, and thus cannot
be considered as evil as our own suffering. This strategy is problematic, since common sense
and the consensus of scientists both agree that animal pain is analogous to ours, despite
differences in neuroanatomy. It is plausible that higher animals do suffer in some way.
Nevertheless, perhaps this strategy can be used to argue that at least some examples of
natural evil are not as evil as one might initially think.1000 In chapter 9.2, I will show how the
996 Boyd 2001, 309. Furthermore, some grounds to hesitate before evaluating God based merely on our current
understanding of the world seems to be implied by Christian eschatology: we have not yet seen what the world
will be like at the end of history, and it has been promised that God will make all things right. (Hart 2005, chapter
2).
997 Dougherty 2014, chapter 2.
998 Morris 1993.
999 Dawes 2009, 92-94.
1000 See Murray 2011, chapter two and Dougherty 2014, chapters 4 and 5.
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ID theorists also argue that some examples of natural evil and bad design cannot actually be
demonstrated as evil or bad. I move now to strategies which attempt to show why God could
be justified in allowing evil.
Fifth (5), it has been argued that allowing the suffering we see is justified, because it
will lead to greater good. These theodicies assert that features though to be evil are in
actuality not evil, but part of a good plan that we can at least partly understand. Soul-making
theodicies are an important example of this idea. It is argued that the world is created as an
arena of growing and exercising virtues, and that this would be impossible without the
suffering caused by natural evil.1001 One  problem  with  this  view  is  that  suffering  does  not
always seem to lead to the growth of character. Related to greater good theodicies in general,
we can also ask whether some instances of suffering are too horrible to be justified by any
such good purpose. It sometimes seems implausible than an omnipotent God could not have
found any better way for fulfilling his purposes. Nevertheless, the idea that suffering will
ultimately be redeemed is an important part of the Christian tradition.1002
Sixth (6), it is often argued that the possibility of suffering is a consequence of allowing
the great good of free will. It is claimed that the existence of true creaturely freedom is such a
great good that its existence justifies allowing the existence of evil resulting from free choices
by the creatures.1003 Typically free will defences have been used to explain the existence of
evil in human societies after the “fall” of humanity. Since the discovery that suffering existed
before humans, this has become more difficult, though some still argue that God created
nature to be a fitting place for sinful humans, since he had foreknowledge that humans
would sin.1004 However, free will defences have also been used to explain the existence of
natural evil by reference to the pre-human cosmic fall of angels.1005 This  introduces  more
complexity to theistic natural theology in order to account for the data of evil, and its
credibility is dependent on our metaphysics and view of free will.1006
Seventh (7), nomic regularity-defences and free process defences argue that the
existence of regularity in the world is a great good. This defence is typically related to the
free will defence: in order for the free-willed creatures to be able to interact with each other,
the order of nature must be comprehensible and reliable. But if God intervenes every time
something evil is about to happen, then the creatures will no longer be really free.
Furthermore,  disturbing  the  regularity  of  the  cosmos  with  too  many  miraculous
interventions would also lead to the demise of creaturely responsibility. So, the law of
gravity must typically remain in force, even if it results in accidental deaths by falling from
tall places.1007 Free process defences further argue that any order of nature that allows for free
1001 E.g. Hick 1978; similarly Peterson 1982, 113, Stump 2010. See Dougherty 2014 for an application of the soul-
making theodicy to animals.
1002 Hart 2005.
1003 Plantinga 1977.
1004 E.g. Dembski 2009.
1005Boyd 2001, chapters 8-10.
1006 Murray 2011, chapter 3.
1007 Swinburne 1998; van Inwagen 1991; 2008.
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interaction must also allow for natural processes to degenerate into chaos and violence,
because only then can these processes be manipulated for novel ends by free agents.1008
Eighth, (8) Chaos to order-defences are closely related to the nomic regularity defence.
The argument in these defences (sometimes also known as evolutionary theodicies) is that
employing a free process of evolution in the work of creation is a good thing, even if this
process also leads to the evolution of natural evil and suffering. For example, it has been
argued that this type of free process is required in order for the creation to be truly
independent of its Creator and that a nature possessing such creative capacities is in some
way more beautiful or better than a nature without such capacities. Like free will defences,
these defences seek to absolve God of the responsibility for evil in nature. Here the culpable
party is a natural unconscious and blind process rather than an intelligent moral being,
however. I will analyse these defenses in more detail in chapter 9.3.1009
One problem with the nomic regularity defence and the chaos to order-defence is that it
seems to be possible to imagine a regular, evolving world that allows for free interaction
between agents, but does not contain quite as much evil. For example, it seems that the
world could contain less hurricanes and earthquakes, yet remain highly regular.
Furthermore, some amount of divine intervention to minimize chaos would surely be
possible without endangering the freedom of creatures. So, one can continue to ask why God
has not created a better world. If massive irregularity is considered to be a fault in a world,
this defence does help understand why God would create a regular world and not intervene
to prevent all evil. The type and amount of evil may still remain unexplained, however.1010
The following two strategies attempt to situate the problem of natural evil in a broader
context of theistic arguments, and to re-evaluate the extent of natural evil in the world. As
noted, natural theology does not seek to merely demonstrate the logical compatibility of
theism and evil, but claims that the evidence is on the whole in favour of belief in God.
The ninth strategy (9) is the evidentialist response to the problem of natural evil.  Even
granting that natural evil provides some evidence against the existence of a good God, it may
nevertheless not provide enough counterevidence to override the power of the positive
arguments for the existence of God. The approach of Richard Swinburne, for example, is to
minimize the power of the argument from evil by using theodicies and then to argue that the
overall evidence is sufficient to render theism more probable than not.1011 William Paley’s
response to Hume’s argument in his Natural Theology was similar: Paley argued that there is
much more good than evil in the world, and that we can often identify a good reason for the
existence of purported natural evils.1012 In this approach it may be admitted that at least some
1008 Meister 2013.
1009 Van Till 2001.
1010 Murray 2011, chapter 5.
1011 Swinburne 2004a, chapter 11.
1012 Natural Theology, chapter XXVI. (Paley 2006, 237-276). Hume anticipated this type of response in the Dialogues
and argued that the majority of religious thinkers have also emphasized the miseries of life prior to the discussion
about the problem of evil. (Dialogues, part XI, Hume 1999).
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natural evils are evidence against theism, but these are seen as anomalies in the broader
pattern of evidence which supports theism. However, as in the natural sciences, anomalies
do not always lead automatically to the rejection of an otherwise good theory.1013 The
credibility of this approach depends on how strong we think the grounds of theistic belief
are in contrast with the problem of evil.1014
The tenth strategy (10) is closely related to the evidentialist argument, but taking the
case even further. It is argued that the existence of natural and moral evil is actually evidence
in favour of the existence of God, rather than against it. The argument is that naturalism
implies that good and evil are merely human inventions, whereas theism implies that there
is an objective standard of moral good and evil. Evil is understood as parasitic on good. Thus
God as the highest good must also exist if evil exists. This approach has also been endorsed
by prominent thinkers within the ID movement, notably William Dembski1015, Benjamin
Wiker1016 and Cornelius Hunter.1017 Dembski puts this  point as follows: “The line I  find most
convincing is that evil always parasitizes good. Indeed, all our words for evil presuppose a good that
has been perverted. Impurity presupposes purity, unrighteousness presupposes righteousness,
deviation presupposes a way (i.e., a via) from which we’ve departed, sin (the Greek hamartia)
presupposes a target that was missed, etc. Boethius put it this way in his Consolation of Philosophy:
‘If God exists whence evil; but whence good if God does not exist?’”1018 This moral argument for
theism based on natural evil argument is related to the controversial moral argument for
God’s  existence;  there  is  much  discussion  and  the  objections  to  both  arguments  will  be
similar.1019
The eleventh strategy (11) involves moving away from the traditional understanding of
the divine nature. Even if evil were logically inconsistent with the existence of God, the
problem could be averted by adopting some form of belief in God which denies classical
conception of the omnipotence of God. In the modern discussion, process theology is a major
conception of this kind.  It is argued that God does not actually create the world from
nothing, and acts in the cosmos only through loving persuasion. This means that God does
not actually have the power to eliminate all evil, though his loving persuasion will ultimately
lead the cosmos towards goodness.1020
Because the problem of natural evil is an important naturalistic counter-argument to
both cosmic and biological design arguments, one might think that different opinions about
1013 For  a  defense  of  thinking  of  evil  as  an  anomaly  for  theism  akin  to  the  anomalies  of  scientific  theories,  see
Dougherty & Pruss 2014.
1014 See also Murray 2011, chapter 4 for some more refined criticisms of approaches arguing that the good
outweights the bad in our world. When considered in the context of specifically Christian theology, religious
experience  can  also  be  argued to  create  a  trust  in  God’s  love.  However,  this  response  relies  on  knowing about
God's love through faith, not through natural theology.
1015 Dembski 2000a.
1016 Wiker 2009.
1017 Hunter 2010.
1018 Dembski 2000a, quoting Boethius 1973, 153.
1019 For example, see the excellent discussion in King & Garcia (ed.) 2009.
1020 For different perspectives on process theology, see Cobb & Griffin 1976 and Nash (ed.) 1987.
Design Arguments and Natural Evil
265
design are influenced by whether one chooses to focus on natural good or natural evil.
Theists could then be understood as optimists who see natural good as the more important
evidence, and naturalists as pessimists who focus on natural evil. However, I think that this
interpretation would be mistaken. Naturalists, too, typically emphasize the beauty of the
natural order and the goodness of life. For example, Richard Dawkins’ writings on evolution
are full of wonder at the order of nature, even while arguing that nature contains bad
design.1021 The same contrast is already present in Darwin’s though. On the one hand,
Darwin felt that there was “grandeur” in his view of life and obviously felt love, rather than
disgust, for the natural world.1022 On the other hand, he thought that natural evil was a
problem for theism, writing that “I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God
would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within
the living bodies of caterpillars or that a cat should play with mice.”1023 It seems that the central
difference between proponents and critics of design arguments is not in their degree of
pessimism but in the significance they attribute to natural good and natural evil, as well as in
the theological conclusions they make.
In the discussion on Intelligent Design, the problem of natural evil has been used in
two main ways. First, it has been used in largely the same way as Hume used the problem:
as a philosophical problem for any attempt to argue that biological nature is designed, rather
than produced by a natural process that is “without discernment or parental care.”1024 This
type of critique typically involves empirical evidence about non-optimal (stupidly designed,
rather than intelligently designed) structures in nature or even evil designs in nature.1025
Second, the problem of natural evil has also been presented as a theological argument
against ID. It is argued that ID makes it difficult to use an evolutionary chaos to order-
defence in response to the problem of natural evil. Because of this, it is argued that ID makes
Creator responsible for all the natural evil in world and is therefore a theologically
dangerous or even blasphemous idea, which should be rejected in favour of theistic
evolutionism.
Thinkers within the ID movement have endorsed a variety of the ten responses listed
above. However, the primary response of the ID movement to the problem of natural evil is
something quite different. Rather than engage in a theological and philosophical response to
the problem of natural evil, the ID movement insists that the problem is theological in
nature, and is not actually relevant for assessing its scientific design arguments.
1021 See e.g. Dawkins 1991 & Dawkins 2009.
1022 Darwin 2009 [1859], 360.
1023 Darwin 2012 [1860]. Desmond and Moore (1991, 622-637) argue Darwin evolved in his religious views from a
theist into an agnostic. Even as an agnostic he wavered between belief and unbelief.
1024 Dialogues, part XI. (Hume 1999, 113).
1025 Sometimes the problem is called the problem of bad design rather than natural evil. However, in my view,
bad design is a subset of the problem of natural evil, and the logic of the arguments is the same, so my usage of
the term “problem of natural evil” covers the problem of bad design.
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9.2. Intelligent Design and Bad Design
Bypassing the Problem?
In chapters 3 and 4, I showed that the ID movement’s design argument does not identify the
designer as God. Rather, its design arguments are based on the idea that certain types of
order in nature are best explained as the creation of an intelligent designer. Because of these
characteristics of their design arguments, the ID theorists argue that their design argument
bypasses the philosophical and theological discussion of the problem of natural evil. Thus
Dembski, for example, argues that:
Critics  who  invoke  the  problem  of  evil  against  design  have  left  science  behind  and
entered  the  waters  of  philosophy  and  theology.  A  torture  chamber  replete  with
implements of torture is designed, and the evil of its designer does nothing to undercut
the torture chamber’s design. The existence of design is distinct from the morality,
aesthetics,  goodness,  optimality,  or  perfection  of  design.  Moreover,  there  are  reliable
indicators  of  design  that  work  irrespective  of  whether  design  includes  these  additional
features.1026
So, generally the ID movement argues that its design hypothesis does not say anything about
the moral characteristics of the designer. Behe similarly claims that “we can determine that  a
system was designed by examining the system itself, and we can hold the conviction of design much
more strongly than a conviction about the identity of the designer.”1027 So, the design argument
cannot say “whether the designer of life was a dope, a demon or a deity”, and we need not deny the
conclusion of design simply because the design appears evil to us.1028 Behe himself  is  quite
consistent on this point, even arguing that malaria was intentionally designed. Because of the
parasite’s molecular machinery is an “exquisitely purposeful arrangement of parts”, it is not, for
Behe, credible to believe that it evolved without the direction of some intelligent designer.1029
It is quite easy to argue based on our common human experience that we can indeed
recognize something as designed, even if we can ourselves come up with ways to improve
on the design. For example, Windows 95 was in fact designed, even though it has been
possible to improve on the operating system in following editions. The torture chamber
described by Dembski can similarly be recognized as designed, even though designing such
a chamber is an evil act.1030 In chapter 4, I argued that the ID movement´s design arguments
don´t primarily depend on assessments of the designer´s morality and motives. Rather, they
depend on the perceived link between some types of order and intelligent design as a cause.
Based on this, the ID movement´s response to the problem of natural evil does have some
1026 Dembski 2000a.
1027 Behe 2006a, 196.
1028 Behe 2007, 238-239.
1029 Behe 2007, 237.
1030 Similarly Collins 2005, 186-187.
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initial plausibility. As long as design hypothesis is highly minimalistic, the consideration of
the moral nature of the design does not factor into the main argument.
But does the ID theorists’ response indeed succeed in bypassing the problem of natural
evil? I see four reasons for thinking that the problem of natural evil is relevant for the
discussion of ID’s design argument.
First (1), in previous chapters, I have shown that the ID theorists sometimes move
between a minimalistic and a more robust version of the design hypothesis. Sometimes they
do also refer to the beauty, optimality and goodness of nature as additional reasons to
believe in the existence of a designer. In cosmology, at least some ID theorists refer to the
beauty, goodness and rationality of the cosmos as evidence that fits better with the
hypothesis of intelligent design than with any naturalistic explanation. In biology, the ID
theorists’ writings similarly show awe in the face of the designed elegance of biological
systems. Dembski himself argued already in 1998 that “on an evolutionary view we expect a lot
of useless DNA. If, on the other hand, organisms are designed, we expect DNA, as much as possible,
to exhibit function.”1031 With the ENCODE project and other recent research now discovering
at least some functions in junk DNA, proponents of ID argue that this validates Dembski’s
prediction.1032 However, a prediction like this requires a more robust design hypothesis, one
in which the designer is highly intelligent.
So, in practice, the ID theorists do seem to use more robust versions of the design
hypothesis when they feel that it fits the evidence. However, it seems inconsistent to use a
more  robust  design  hypothesis  when  it  fits  the  evidence,  but  then  retreat  back  to  a
minimalistic design hypothesis when faced with criticism.
Second (2), proponents of ID must face the problem of natural evil because it is
presented merely as evidence against design, but also as evidence that is predicted by
naturalism. In the context of biological design arguments and naturalistic evolution, Jerry
Coyne puts the point as follows:
Insofar as intelligent-design theory can be tested scientifically, it has been falsified.
Organisms simply do not look as if they had been intelligently designed. Would an
intelligent designer create millions of species and then make them go extinct, only to
replace  them with other  species,  repeating this  process  over  and over  again? Would an
intelligent designer produce animals having a mixture of mammalian and reptilian traits,
at exactly the time when reptiles are thought to have been evolving into mammals? Why
did the designer  give tiny,  non-functional  wings to  kiwi  birds?  Or useless  eyes  to  cave
animals?  Or  a  transitory  coat  of  hair  to  a  human  fetus?  Or  an  appendix,  an  injurious
organ  that  just  happens  to  resemble  a  vestigial  version  of  a  digestive  pouch  in  related
organisms? Why would the designer give us a pathway for making vitamin C, but then
destroy  it  by  disabling  one  of  its  enzymes?  –  –  There  are  only  two  answers  to  these
1031 Demski 1998d, 26; quoted in Meyer 2013, 401.
1032 Meyer 2013, 400-402. See also Wells 2011 for the ID movement’s most thorough case against the concept of
“junk DNA”. The main study referenced by Meyer on the demise of the idea of junk DNA is ENCODE Project
Consortium 2012. For an argument that the ENCODE Project has interpreted its results erraneously and that it is
still reasonable to say that most of the human genome is filled with nonfunctional junk DNA, see Doolittle 2013.
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questions: either life resulted not from intelligent design, but from evolution; or the
intelligent  designer  is  a  cosmic  prankster  who  designed  everything  to  make  it  look  as
though it had evolved. Few people, religious or otherwise, will find the second
alternative palatable. It is the modern version of the old argument that God put fossils in
the rocks to test our faith.1033
Other writers promoting similar arguments are not difficult to find. A classic statement is
provided by  Stephen Jay  Gould,  who argues  in  his  book The Panda’s Thumb (1980) that “if
God had designed a beautiful machine to reflect his wisdom and power, surely he would not have used
a collection of parts generally fashioned for other purposes.... Odd arrangements and funny solutions
are the proof of evolution--paths that a sensible God would never tread but that a natural process,
constrained by history, follows perforce.”1034
Here the argument for evolution clearly has its theological and philosophical part, as
some in the ID movement have argued.1035 These writers have some expectations about what
we could reasonable expect an intelligent designer to do. But the argument is not just that
these features are evidence against intelligent design. Rather, they are also presented as
positive evidence in favour of naturalism. If we have reason to expect these types of findings
on the hypothesis of naturalistic evolution, but no reason to expect them or their absence on
the hypothesis of intelligent design, then the evidence of bad design favours naturalistic
evolution over intelligent design.
Evolutionary biologists have identified four reasons for expecting that Darwinian
evolution would not create perfect creatures. First, selection can act only on existing
variations. If a mutation making some trait possible does not occur, then it won’t evolve.
Second, evolution is limited by historical constraints. Adaptation to new situations must
begin from the body plan that already exists, rather than designing a new one from scratch.
Third, adaptations are often compromises. For example, it may be difficult to simultaneously
create a high amount of offspring and care for them all. Fourth, chance, natural selection and
the environment interact. An adaptation that is good for one environment may not be as
optimal when the environment changes.1036
As I have shown in chapter 6, ID does in principle allow for combining belief in design
and  parts  of  evolutionary  theory.  The  designer  can  also  work  through  a  historically
constrained process, leading to the same limitations in designs. The combination of ID and
evolution can also lead ID theorists to expect life to be imperfect in the way described by
Coyne and Gould. This possibility to combine ID and evolution is another way to bypass the
evidence for bad design as irrelevant for ID´s design arguments. On this understanding, bad
designs will simply be evidence for an evolutionary understanding of design, rather than
against all design arguments. However, this strategy for bypassing part of the problem will
1033 Coyne 2005, part VI.
1034 Gould 1980, 20-21.
1035 For example, see Hunter 2001 and Nelson 1996.
1036 Campbell & Reece 2007, 484.
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only work for that minority of ID theorists who accept common descent. Others need to find
further responses.
The nature of adaptations as compromises and the difficulty of creating adaptations
that are good in all environments can also be transformed into defenses of the design
argument. Dembski argues that design can also “conditioned by the needs of a situation and
therefore always falls short of some idealized global optimum."1037 Chris Doran has argued that this
requires a strong analogy between human designers and the intelligent designer of life, and
goes against the doctrine of the omnipotence of God. Presumably God, creating out of
nothing, could in principle create organisms that are in all respects perfect.1038 However, I
think Dembski´s strategy can in principle fit under the strategy of denying the possibility of
the best possible world which I described in chapter 9.1. Under this understanding, even
God would not be expected to create organisms that are ideally fit in all ways.
But another point to note about these strategies is that they are actually attempts to
tackle the problem of natural evil, rather than bypass it. So, the necessity of explanatory
comparison between naturalism and design does make the problem of natural evil relevant
for ID.
My third argument (3) for the relevance of the problem of natural evil to ID is based on
the importance of worldviews for the debate. Even if our Western culture  is sometimes
characterized as “post-Christian"1039, the monotheistic God of the Judaism, Christianity and
Islam remains the most credible candidate for a designer for most people, including the ID
theorists themselves, as I noted in chapter 3.1. This cultural situation seems to make it
reasonable to evaluate the design argument as part of this broader context of reasons to
believe or disbelieve in the existence of God. Culturally the most credible alternatives are
currently naturalism and some form of theism. So, either a designer is perfect, or there is no
designer at all. In this cultural context, the hypothesis that there is a designer, but that he is
unable to create good design may be less credible than a wholly naturalistic scenario for
many people.1040 Because the ID theorists wish to impact our broader culture, engaging in
such broader discussion should also be desirable for them.
It may indeed be true that the culturally reasonable opposition between naturalism and
theism does not capture all the options adequately.  As I pointed out in chapter 9.1, one way
of showing that the problem of natural evil does not lead to atheism would be to argue that
the problem should lead us to modify our conception of God, rather than to abandon belief
alltogether. It is conceivable that belief in the God described by modern process theology
could for many people be more credible than believing in a fully naturalistic account of
evolution, even with the problem of natural evil. But as noted, most of the ID theorists
1037 Dembski 2000a.
1038 Doran 2010, 226-227, 231.
1039 Hart 2010.
1040 It may be that the opposition is not credible even on traditional Christian premises – perhaps some features of
life could have been made by angels or corrupted after their creation, for example. This would be a form of the
free will defense, and I will come back to this idea shortly in the main text.
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themselves are very traditional theists, so this does not seem like a strategy they would
endorse.1041
My fourth argument (4) for the relevance of the problem of natural evil to ID is based
on the ID theorists´ own understanding of ID as a bridge between theology and science. In
chapter three, I showed that many ID theorists think their argument provides evidence that
is more consistent with belief in God than with atheism. ID has broad cultural aims beyond
just promoting the design argument. As I showed in chapter 2.2, the ID movement also
understands itself as a defense of the traditional theistic moral vision of the cosmos and
humanity. ID´s arguments are thought to provide a better framework for understanding the
meaningfulness and value of life than those of the atheistic Darwinism.1042 In order for ID’s
design argument to be useful for this broader purpose, it must be related somehow to this
broader theistic vision. This requires more knowledge of the nature of the designer and thus
also requires dealing with the problem of natural evil.1043
While it may in principle be possible to construct a design argument without
interacting in great detail with the problem of natural evil, the broader context of the
argument does not allow bypassing the problem this quickly. Fortunately, the ID movement
has also attempted to tackle the problem more directly. Some of these more direct responses
to the problem of natural evil have already been foreshadowed in the discussion so far. First
(1), the ID movement argues that some proposed examples of natural evil are not actually
evil, or that at least we are not in the position to evaluate how optimal they are. Dembski´s
arguments about junk DNA are one example of this. Second (2), the ID movement supplants
its design hypothesis with auxiliary hypotheses to explain bad design. For example, as
already noted, ID can be combined with parts of evolutionary theory, or it can be argued that
the designer has some other reason for allowing bad designs and natural evil. Both types of
answers follow strategies described in chapter 6.1.
1041 There are also some philosophical reasons for discounting any hypothesis of incompetent design. As Joseph
Corabi (2009, 23-24) has argued, “presumably less powerful or knowledgeable designers would be less likely to produce
optimal and efficient mechanisms than God, but the knowledge and power required to design optimal and efficient
biochemical systems might not be very great on a cosmic scale.” Any being capable of manipulating the laws of nature
and creating something as complex as life should also be capable to doing it  optimally,  it  could be argued. But
would such a being want to, and what would optimality look like? Once we start moving away from the theistic
concept of God, predicting what this God would see as optimal becomes more difficult.
1042 E.g. Meyer 2013, chapter 20; Wiker & Witt 2006;  West 2006, Wiker 2002.
1043 Niall Shanks has similarly argued that the separation between the designer and God is “technically correct but
irrelevant.” (Shanks 2004, 256). Because Dembski himself believe that the designer is God, he must face the
problem of evil. While Shanks’ general point about the importance of the problem of evil is correct, I do not think
his characterization of Dembski’s argument is quite fair: Shanks agrees with Dembski that the design argument
cannot  prove  the  existence  of  God,  but  still  assumes  that  Dembski  makes  the  leap  to  God  on  the  basis  of  his
design argument. “The problem lies in Dembski’s unwarranted leap to the conclusion of supernatural design using his
methods for the mere detection of design.” (Shanks 2004, 257.) Dembski does not do this, however. Dembski’s reasons
for  believing  that  God  is  the  designer  originate  outside  the  design  argument  itself.  Ratzsch   (2005)  makes  this
point forcefully in his review of Shanks’ book.
Design Arguments and Natural Evil
271
Does Bad Design Exist in Nature?
While proponents of ID do concede that some natural evils are real, they also claim that
some other examples of natural evil or bad design are unconvincing. There are two primary
ways of doing this. First, it can be argued that examples of bad design are actually examples
of good design, when they are evaluated more precisely. Jerry Coyne argues that the
wayward route taken by the human recurrent laryngeal nerve is evidence that it was not
constructed by an engineer working to create the most efficient solution, but a historical
process.  It  is “one of nature’s worst designs.”1044 In response, ID proponents have argued that
research actually shows this to be a functionally better solution than the straight route. In
addition, if it were not optimal, the mutation to create a shorted nerve path is not very
difficult and so evolutionary theory also should not expect the nerve to take a wayward
route.1045 Proponents of ID can similarly point to research highlighting the functional nature
of vestigial organs like the human appendix, for example.1046
In the case of cosmology, some examples of the hostility of the universe for life also
seem to be poor. For example, the vastness of the cosmos is sometimes thought to be an
argument against seeing the cosmos as life-friendly. However, John D. Barrow and Frank
Tipler argue that under the current physical laws, the vast size of the cosmos is actually a
requirement for the emergence of life. Under Big Bang cosmology, a universe which is 10
billion years old (and thus has had enough time for the synthesis of the heavier elements
such as carbon inside stars) will also have had 10 billions years of time to expand. Thus the
size of the cosmos is not a problem for the fine-tuning argument, but part of the fine-
tuning.1047 This does not demonstrate that God could not have created a universe with other
kinds of natural laws that would not require for it to be large, but it is in any case unclear
why the size of the cosmos is problematic for a God that does not have any difficulty making
the cosmos as big as he likes. If there are no other planets capable of supporting life in this
vast universe, the use of space is perhaps inefficient for a designer who is concerned with
creating the maximum amount of life-forms per cubic meter of the universe. But why should
we base our evaluation of the designer’s goodness on this criteria?1048
Proponents of design arguments can also well argue that some evaluations of bad
design are based on incomplete criteria. Thus Jonathan Witt argues that Gould’s evaluation
of the panda’s thumb is flawed because it overemphasizes engineering efficiency:
1044 Coyne 2009, 87.
1045 Luskin 2010.
1046 Luskin 2012.
1047 Barrow & Tipler 1986.
1048 Some examples of bad design depend greatly on our metaphysical assumptions.  For example,  some authors
have argued that our finiteness itself implies lack of good and thus evil. This would seem to imply that the only
way that our existence could be free of evil would be if we were, like God, omnipotent and self-sufficient. Others
have argued that all finite existence is necessarily violent and there is no way to avoid the domination and use of
others. But these premises are controversial. See David Bentley Hart’s analysis of the ontological claims
underlying these and Hart’s theological response to it in his The Beauty of the Infinite (2003).
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Must  the  cosmic  designer’s  primary  concern  for  pandas  be  that  they  are  the  most
dexterous bears divinely imaginable? From a purely practical standpoint, might
opposable-thumbed über-pandas wreak havoc on their ecosystem? From a purely
aesthetic  standpoint,  might  not  those  charming  pandas  up  in  their  bamboo  trees  with
their  unopposing  but  quite  workable  thumbs  be  just  the  sort  of  humorous  supporting
character this great cosmic drama needs to lighten things up a bit? If Shakespeare could
do it in his tragedies, why not God?1049
Witt argues that we should not evaluate designs purely on criteria of tidiness and the
efficiency of engineering. Rather, we should also consider the organism’s role in the broader
ecosystem, the beauty of the plurality of forms created and the possibility that the Creator
might wish to commune with his creation before evaluating the goodness of the designs of
nature. This seems reasonable from a theological perspective, but again requires a broader
approach than just focusing on the minimalistic design argument.
This first type of responses to examples of bad design assumes that we can evaluate the
goodness of the designs in nature. While skeptical of some criteria used to evaluate
biological and cosmic order, the possibility of evaluation is not itself denied. However, ID´s
second response to the problem of bad design is based on a deeper type of skepticism about
our evaluations. It argues that we cannot evaluate the optimality of the designs we see in
nature, and so cannot judge them to be suboptimal. Behe makes the argument as follows:
The most basic problem is that the argument demands perfection at all. Clearly, designers
who have the ability to make better designs do not necessarily do so. I do not give my
children  the  best,  fanciest  toys  because  I  don’t  want  to  spoil  them,  and  because  I  want
them  to  learn  the  value  of  a  dollar.  The  argument  from  imperfection  overlooks  the
possibility that the designer might have multiple motives, with engineering excellence
oftentimes  relegated  to  a  secondary  role.  Another  problem  with  the  argument  from
imperfection is that it critically depends on a psychoanalysis of the unidentified designer.
Yet the reasons that a designer would or would not do anything are virtually impossible
to know unless the designer tells you specifically what those reasons are.1050
For Behe, the ultimate criterion of “optimality” is thus correspondence to the purposes of the
designer. However, supposing that these are unknowable without revelation from the
designer, we cannot criticize a design as suboptimal. Robert Pennock, commenting on this,
concludes that Behe has “successfully insulated the design argument against the imperfection
argument.”1051 I agree that a minimal design hypothesis can be formulated even if the designs
observed are inefficient. However, on the question of optimality, I think that Behe’s response
1049 Witt 2004.
1050 Behe 2006a, 223. I am quoting the same text as Pennock 1999, 248.
1051 Pennock 1999, 249. The argument that the problem of natural evil is absolutely incompatible with the
biological design argument is thus no more logically sound than the claim that the existence of evil is absolutely
incompatible with the existence of the Christian God (see e.g. Plantinga 2000).
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is problematic. As I showed in chapter 6.1, Behe argues that we can reliably understand what
a system’s immanent functions are, even though the designer’s ultimate purposes are
unknown to us. But if we can understand the system’s immanent functions, we might also in
principle be able to understand how efficiently the system is fulfilling these functions. As
literature in the philosophy of biology shows, medical science depends on being able to
diagnose when a system is not working properly – for example, when a heart is not able to
pump as much blood as the organism needs. It seems that at least in some cases, we can be
confident that some organ is not functioning as well as it could or should be. Therefore, we
can and do evaluate design.1052
Behe’s argument does show that the hypothesis of minimal design is compatible with
this discovery. It also shows that it is in principle possible for any design to be optimal
related to the designer’s purposes. On the minimalistic design argument, it could even be
that the designer’s purpose to create health problems for human beings. However, as I have
pointed out, many ID arguments make use of a more robust concept of the designer. If the
evaluation of optimality is indeed impossible, then creating such a robust design hypothesis
also becomes impossible.
As I argued in chapter 9.1, to make the skeptical response work, one must balance a
fine line where the Creator is both knowable and unknowable at the same time. The skeptical
defense of design arguments must be humble in the face of reality’s complexity without
abandoning hope for knowledge about it. As with skeptical theism more generally, it may be
that balancing this line is possible. Behe’s argument that we can often detect design before
we can identify the designer is experientially true. A similar experientially true claim is that
we can often detect design much before we can judge ourselves to be in the position to make
claims about the optimality of the design. For example, it is possible to understand that a
computer´s hard drive is designed before one can understand its structure so well that one
can come up with good ideas to improve its functionality.
It can be argued that the situation is similar with the cosmos and life. Suppose that we
can recognize that the cosmos and life are designed by looking at their intricate complexity
and rationality which far exceeds anything that human beings have created. If some
intelligence was able to create such order, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the
intelligence was far more intelligent than we are, to such a degree that we should think it
likely that we will not be able to outsmart this intelligence. So as we come to know the
Creator of life and understand his intelligence by analogy with human intelligence, we
simultaneously realize that he is much greater than we can comprehend and thus above our
ability  to  criticize.  Just  as  in  Christian  negative  theology,  in  coming  to  know  God  we
simultaenously also come to know that he is a mystery.
This line has of argument has actually been taken up in the ID movement. Referring to
Kant’s argument of this type and the biblical story of Job, Dembski has argued that
intelligent design actually helps answer the problem of natural evil, because it helps us
1052 See e.g. Melander 1997.
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understand that the designer of life is greater than we are, and thus it is reasonable to be
skeptical of our ability to criticize him.1053 This is an attempt to balance on the fine line
between knowledge and skepticism. This view does not lead to a similar doubt regarding
our capability to recognize that some design is very good. Rather, it is just because we
recognize that the designs are generally very good that we become skeptical of our own
negative evaluations. As in the evidential strategy, evil is treated as an anomaly in the
broader evidence which points to the wisdom of the Creator.
These types of responses to the problem of natural evil are also open to theistic
evolutionists, and can in some cases help alleviate the problem. However, they do not solve
the problem completely. Though we can understand some cases of natural evil to be
misunderstandings and see that in some other cases we cannot be confident of our ability to
judge that the design is truly of poor quality, in other cases the degree of imperfection or evil
seems to be so great that such solutions are implausible. If we are to be at all confident in our
ability to evaluate nature (even to recognize the wisdom of its Creator), it seems difficult to
believe that we cannot at the same time recognize the imperfection and evil in these cases.
The ID proponents themselves recognize this and propose other solutions.
Supplementing Design Arguments
As Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine noted, it is rarely possible to falsify a
complete scientific picture of the world with just one experiment. Rather than being isolated
hypotheses that can be tested in this way, scientific theories often form a complex web of
mutually reinforcing beliefs and hypotheses. Thus it is is often possible to save a hypothesis
from falsification by modifying the system at some point and introducing other explaining
factors.1054 Sometimes this is the reasonable and correct thing to do. For example, in the
beginning of the 19th Century it became apparent that the orbit of Uranus did not confirm
with the predictions of Newtonian mechanics. In this case, it was more reasonable to posit
the existence of a new planet (Neptune) than give up the whole model.1055 Proponents of ID
can argue similarly that it is possible to supplement the design argument with auxialiry
hypotheses in order to avoid falsification through bad design.
On example of clear natural evil that is difficult to explain away is provided by Behe,
who argues that the molecular machinery of the malarial parasite is an “exquisitely purposeful
1053 Dembski  2003a.  The  unreliability  of  our  judgments  that  some feature  of  nature  is  nonoptimal  could  also  be
defended with an inductive argument, though I have not found this in the ID literature. If previous examples of
bad design have been discovered to be well designed after all, then we have reason to believe that we will also
find a function for some features of nature which we do not know a function for at the present.  However,  this
type  of  inductive  argument  does  not  guarantee  its  conclusion.  Some  examples  of  bad  design  could  be  so
compelling that it would be unreasonable to expect any good function to be found.
1054 Quine 1953. Interpretation from Murray 2010, 97-98.
1055 O´Connor & Robertson 1996.
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arrangement of parts” and cannot be plausibly explained by naturalistic mechanisms.1056 By
Behe´s own logic, the malarial parasite is clearly designed. But a problem arises, because the
parasite´s design is producing a great deal of suffering, and so the intelligent design we
observe seems to be clearly morally evil. Behe admits that this is a hard question
theologically, but not one that affects the minimal design argument: “we can determine that a
system was designed by examining the system itself, and we can hold the conviction of design much
more strongly than a conviction about the identity of the designer.”1057 So, the design argument
cannot say “whether the designer of life was a dope, a demon or a deity”. 1058 So Behe admits that
some designs in nature are evil, but argues further that we cannot deny the conclusion of
design simply because of this fact.1059
Previously in this chapter, I pointed to Witt´s argument that we should evaluate the
beauty of nature, not just its efficiency. The example of parasites is one where nature seems
ugly, though efficient. Parasite wasps are highly useful for human farmers because they kill
of many pests. Sometimes humans have thus even helped parasite wasps spread so that they
would protect human farms.1060 Nevertheless, there is something deeply ugly and unsettling
about the whole phenomenon of parasitism. I have already quoted Darwin´s assessment: “I
cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the
Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars or
that a cat should play with mice.”1061 The problem of natural evil is somewhat diminished once
we realize that caterpillars have vastly different emotional lives than humans.1062 This does
not remove the ugliness of the phenomenon, however. And there are also parasitical worms
which live in human intestines and thus cause suffering for humans, so parasitism is not just
a problem of animal suffering.
In cosmological design arguments about fine-tuning, some proposed answers to the
problem of natural evil are also not convincing. Consider earthquakes. Defending the design
argument, Michael Denton argues that earthquakes are a consequence of the activity of the
Earth’s geology, which is necessary to circulate heavier elements from the Earth’s depths to
its surface, where life can make use of them.1063 This response seeks to show that
earthquakes, too, have a purpose for life: that even in this instance, nature is fine-tuned to
benefit life. To be fair, this is not just Denton’s response, but a common feature of the nomic
regularity defences described in chapter 9.1.1064 However, here Hume’s question about the
insufficient fine-tuning of natural laws seems pertinent. On a theistic view, one can ask
whether it is really plausible that geological activity could not be so optimized by an
1056 Behe 2007, 237.
1057 Behe 2006a, 196.
1058 Behe 2007, 238-239.
1059 Similarly Richards 2007.
1060 See Elizabeth Pennisi's article “The Little Wasp That Could” (2010) for more details.
1061 Darwin 2012 [1860].
1062 See answer #5 in chapter 9.1.
1063 Denton 1998.
1064 Murray 2011, chapter 5.
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omnipotent deity creating the world ex nihilo as to recycle the elements without causing
earthquakes. 1065
So, how is ID to get out of this problem? Did God indeed design the malarial parasite,
earthquakes and other ugly features of nature? This would seem to be contrary to God´s
good nature, unless we accept a strong form of skeptical theism with all its problems. The ID
movementś possible responses to the issue follow strategies 5-8 listed in chapter 9.1. The
movement can argue that these evils are created for enabling some greater good, such as the
development of character, or allowing free will and nomic regularity.
Many ID theorists who comment on the problem of natural evil argue that the origin
designs of the Creator may have been corrupted over time. Dembski argues that “the good
that God initially intended is no longer fully in evidence. Much has been perverted. Dysteleology, the
perversion of design in nature, is a reality. It is evident all around us.”1066 Dembski argues that this
kind of corruption is not unknown even in the case of human design: “Objects invented for
good purposes are regularly co-opted and used for evil purposes. Drugs that were meant to alleviate
pain become sources of addiction. Knives that were meant to cut bread become implements for killing
people. Political powers that were meant to maintain law and order become the means for enslaving
citizens.”1067 Jay Richards similarly argues that “By  looking  carefully,  we  might  be  able  to
distinguish the original design behind its degraded condition. For instance, some design theorists have
suggested that  many bacteria  that  kill  us  or  make us sick might have gotten that  way by mutation.
They might have been harmless or helpful to humans in their original form. Or maybe we have become
more susceptible to them.”1068
However, these texts are ambiguous about just what has acted to corrupt nature
against the good purposes of God, and why God allows such corruption to take place. The
possibility of this response to the problem of natural evil from the ID point of view depends
not just on our theology, but also on what the ID proponent believes about the capabilities of
the evolutionary process. Some of the examples of natural evil, such as Behe´s example of
malaria, require highly complex molecular machines. Because ID proponents do not
generally accept the capacity of the evolutionary process to explain such complex structures,
it is difficult to view these simply as consequences of a regular evolutionary cosmos.
One  option  is  to  bite  the  bullet  and  accept  that  God  himself  is  responsible  for  the
corruption of nature. Dembski argues that dysteleology is the result of a divine curse on
creation because of human sin. In the modern discussion, this explanation is typically
1065 On Denton’s own view this is not a problem, however, because Denton does not believe that God created ex
nihilo. Rather, Denton believes that the Creator worked on pre-existing matter and created the best world that this
matter allowed for.
I do not mean to argue that there are no better answers to the question of natural evil; just that the strategy of
showing that natural evil  is  actually not evil  does not seem to answer every difficulty.  The question was posed
eloquently by Voltaire after the Lisbon earthquake in 1775: can the suffering of small children caused by
earthquakes really be a necessary feature of the “best possible world”? On this discussion see Hart 2005.
1066 Dembski 2000a.
1067 Dembski 2000a.
1068 Richards 2007.
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rejected for the simple reason that because the cosmos began billions of years before humans,
dysteleology predates human sin. However, Dembski argues that the foreknowledge of God
can solve this problem. The cosmos was created to be a fitting place for sinful humans, since
God  knew  that  humans  would  sin.  Since  God  is  not  unjust  and  did  not  want  to  punish
humans before they actually committed sin, God created the Garden which protected the
first human couple from the effects of sin before their transgression. After the fall, God
banished humans from the Garden to suffer the pre-prepared consequences of their actions.
Dembski argues that suffering also has a redemptive purpose, however, in that it teaches
humans to avoid evil.1069 So, Dembski is combining the free will theodicy (strategy 6) and the
soul-making theodicy (strategy 5) that I described in chapter 9.1
Another option that avoids reference to divine foreknowledge is to explain the
corruption of creation by reference to the fall of angels and the subsequent actions of these
fallen angels. This solution is indirectly hinted at by Behe´s wording that a “a demon or a
dope” may be responsible for the evil designs in nature. Neither Behe nor any other ID
writer has committed himself to this demonic theodicy, and Dembski has directly criticized
it. Dembski argues that though it could be that God allows free creatures such as humans
and  fallen  angels  to  produce  evil  in  the  world,  this  would  not  entirely  eliminate  God’s
responsibility for this evil. Rather, Dembski argues that Christians must accept that God
bears the ultimate responsibility for evil, even if he merely allows it, and that no view can
absolve God of this responsibility.1070
Missiologist Ralph Winter reports that he once asked Phillip Johnson whether
biological viruses should be explained as the creation of evil intelligent design:
His answer, essentially, was, “Ralph, in my writings and public appearances I can’t even
mention God much less Satan. I have a very specific battle to fight, namely, to take apart
the logic of unaided evolution. That is all I am trying to do.”1071
Here Johnson´s response is not to deny the demonic explanation of natural evil, but to avoid
it for strategic reasons.
Though no ID theorist has defended the idea, it seems to me that belief in the existence
of both good and evil designers would be quite a natural conclusion from the logic of ID’s
design argument. If we can make estimates of the wisdom and intelligence of the designer
using human analogies, what is to stop us from also making estimates of the designer’s
morality? The central problem of the demonic hypothesis is indeed the low prior credibility
of the existence of demons in our cultural situation. Furthermore, Dembski´s question is also
valid: it can be asked why God allows the free will of created beings to corrupt his creation
1069 Dembski 2009 is an extended defense of this theodicy.
1070 Dembski 2009, 150.
1071 Winter 2013.
Intelligent Design: A Theological and Philosophical Analysis
278
as much as this theodicy requires. However, similar questions can be asked of any
theodicy.1072
One problem with adding auxiliary hypotheses to explain natural evil is that
explanatory simplicity and testability have traditionally been regarded as a virtue of good
explanations. So if naturalistic evolutionary theory could explain all the features of life with
just naturalistic mechanisms of evolution and the hypothesis of common descent, this would
seem to be preferable to a hypothesis that also included intelligent design as an additional
explaining factor. A vague hypothesis including several designs is also difficult to test
against the goodness and evil in nature: anything good in nature can be explained by the
actions of the good designer, while anything evil can be explained by referring to the evil
designer. A design hypothesis like this may still be falsifiable in other ways, however. And a
more specific hypothesis of design that states that the evil designer is much weaker and can
only corrupt what the good designer has created could perhaps be more easily falsifiable. For
example, if we found out that more evil than good exists in nature (as Paley and many other
natural theologians claim), this would seem to count against this idea.
Although simplicity would lead us to prefer explaining everything with just one
hypothesis, it could in principle be that biological reality is too complex to be explained by
just one hypothesis. As I pointed out in chapter 6, proponents of ID argue that the Darwinian
mechanism of natural selection and mutation does not have sufficient causal powers to
explain the origins of most of life’s complexity. If this were correct, then the Darwinian
mechanism would be a bad explanation for most of life, even if the designs exhibited by that
life are less than optimal. As Joseph Corabi has argued, the problem of natural evil is not by
itself a sufficient argument against ID, since it could well be that the probability that a
naturalistic process could produce life at all could still be much lower than the probability
that an incompetent cosmic designer exists, or the probability that a good God would create
suboptimal designs. 1073
However, some have argued that there is a tension between ID and the theodicies
based on the value of nomic regularity in the universe, free process defence and the chaos-to-
order defence.  This is argued to be a large problem for ID theologically, even if it is not an
insurmountable problem for the design argument if the argument is otherwise sound.
9.3. Theodicy as a Problem for ID?
The Necessity of an Evolutionary Theodicy
Several prominent writers in the debate on Intelligent Design have argued that the problem
of natural evil makes ID theologically heretical, or at least close to heresy. This very strong
1072 See Boyd 2001, chapters 8-10 for an extended defense of the demonic theodicy and Murray 2011, chapter 3 for
some mild critiques of this approach.
1073 Corabi 2009.
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claim has been advanced even by such an esteemed figure as Francisco Ayala. According to
Ayala, “the natural world abounds in catastrophes, disasters, imperfections, dysfunctions, suffering,
and cruelty”1074 and he shudders "in terror at the thought that some people of faith would implicitly
attribute the calamity to the Creator’s faulty design.”1075 Ayala even goes on to state
that“attributing these to specific agency by the Creator amounts to blasphemy” 1076 “Darwin’s gift”
to religion is the possibility to absolve God of the responsibility for any such natural evils.
The same argument is also made by several other prominent writes in the discussion,
including Biologos writers Karl Giberson1077 and  Darrel  Falk1078 as  well  as  philosopher  of
biology Michael Ruse.1079 Their argument utilizes the nomic regularity, free process and
chaos-to-order defences described in chapter 9.1. The basic idea of this Darwinian theodicy is
the following. Supposing that God wanted to create life through a natural process that was
free to evolve in any direction, then any interventions by God into the development of life
would constrain this freedom and constitute breaks in the nomic regularity of nature. In this
theodicy, the absolute autonomy of the creation from its Creator and the absolute continuity
of the nomic regularity are believed to be so valuable that preserving them justify also
allowing the evolution of natural evil. Michael Ruse explains the importance of Darwinian
evolution for this theodicy clearly:
But supposing that God did (and had to) create through law, then Richard Dawkins of all
people  offers  a  piece  of  candy  to  the  Christian.  Dawkins  argues  that  the  only  physical
way  to  get  organic  adaptation  --  the  design-like  nature  of  living  beings  --  is  through
natural selection, that very painful mechanism that worried Darwin! Other mechanisms
are  either  false  (such  as  Lamarckism,  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics)  or
inadequate (such as saltationism, change by sudden jumps). In other words, although
Darwinism does not speak to all cases of physical evil -- the earthquakes -- it does speak
to the physical evil that it itself is supposed to bring on. It is Darwinism with suffering, or
nothing.1080
The argument is that if God wanted to create through an evolutionary process, then he had
to create through the Darwinian process and the existence of suffering was inevitable. Life is
so valuable that producing it justifies using these means, so God is absolved of blame. Or so
the argument goes.
However, many questions remain. Why would God choose to create through an
evolutionary process if this process inevitably includes suffering? In the discussion, three
1074 Ayala 2007, x.
1075 Ayala 2007, xi.
1076 Ayala 2007, 160. See also Ayala 2006 and the discussion in Ayala 2008 and Doran 2009.
1077 Giberson 2009.
1078 Falk 2009.
1079 Ruse 2011, for more details see Ruse 2003, chapter 15 and 2001, chapter 6.
1080 Ruse 2011.
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basic reasons for this divine choice have been presented.1081 First (1), it is arguably an
intrinsic good for the universe to exhibit progress; such a method of creation is thought to be
more beautiful than creating through miracles. For example, Howard van Till has argued
that a universe with the capability to evolve is “fully gifted” whereas a universe without
such a capability is  lacking a good thing.  Creating through a process can also be argued to
require more skill from the Creator, thus providing a more adequate demonstration of his
power and wisdom.1082 Three main critical questions about this approach are (A) whether we
think this good truly outweighs or justifies the value of suffering caused in the evolutionary
process, (B) whether the universe could also exhibit progress even with a shorter history
involving no suffering at all, and (C) whether there might be some additional value also in
creating through miracles. For example, many church fathers also believed that God created
life through a process, but did not describe this process as one involving suffering and did
not believe that it took such a long time.1083
Second (2), some have argued that a universe possessing autonomy must be
evolutionary. For example, theologian John Haught has argued that in order for the universe
to be truly distinct from God, it must be capable of evolving in any direction freely.1084 Karl
Giberson similarly argues that “unless God micromanages nature so as to destroy its autonomy,
[natural evils] occur. Likewise, unless God coercively micromanages human decision making, we will
often abuse our freedom.”1085 Though there is much more depth to this approach than I can do
justice here, some hard questions remain. The conception of autonomy in particular needs
more work. In what sense would it destroy nature’s autonomy if God were to create directly,
rather than through an evolutionary process? Haught argues that in this case, the universe
would be merely an appendage of the deity. But as Michael J. Murray argues, it is hard to see
why. In creating a painting, for example, a human artist does not merely create an
appendage of himself; why should God be unable to create something distinct from himself?
Furthermore, if creating directly merely creates an appendage of the deity, then it is difficult
to see how evolution solves the problem. If we believe in the creation of the world out of
nothing, then God has created the initial state that evolution begins from. If this initial state
is merely a “part” of God (because it was directly created by God), why should we assume
that further evolution will make the part distinct from God?1086
1081 Murray 2011, chapter 6. I am modifying Murray’s account somewhat, since he writes four different responses:
(1) the value of progress, (2) enabling narrative structure, (3) divine hiddenness and (4) the value of a chaos-to-
order process. Here I have combined his first and fourth response (the value of progress and the value of a
process bringing order from chaos) because a process bringing order from chaos sounds very much like progress
to me. So arguing that a chaos-to-order process has intrinsic value is the same as saying that progress has intrinsic
value, and a chaos-to-order process was chosen because it exhibits progress.
1082 Van Till 2000 & 2001.
1083 See e.g. Murray & Wilkinson 2010. I also pointed analysed the apologetic questions on miracles in chapter 7.2.
1084 Haught 2003.
1085 Giberson 2009.
1086 Murray 2011, 170-175; 2009b, 365-367. It seems to me that a better model of autonomy than the one criticized
would be to argue, following David Bentley Hart (2003, 18-19), that the distance between creation and Creator is
formed when the Creator looks at what he has created and pronounces it beautiful.
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Third (3), it has been argued that God chose to use the evolutionary process in order to
keep himself hidden. For example, biologist Kenneth Miller has argued in his work Finding
Darwin’s God that if God were to create through a non-Darwinian process, then his existence
would be so evident in the biological marvels of life that it would make human free choice
impossible.1087 The  presence  of  a  policeman will  make  it  very  difficult  for  people  to  choose
without pressure whether to obey the law or to disobey it. Similarly such pressing
knowledge of God’s existence would, it is argued, make it difficult for people to make a free
moral choice between loving God and rejecting him. So in order to make human morality
possible, God must maintain a certain epistemic distance between himself and humanity.
There is much to be said for the general argument from divine hiddenness, but the
conclusion that God therefore had to use a Darwinian process is questionable. Murray makes
the point well: “Would the presence of a creator who evidently creates a fully-formed universe within
the last ten thousand years improperly overwhelm creaturely freedom? It is hard to make this
argument plausible when we take note of the fact that vast numbers of people over the last two
millennia have believed in just such arguments. That is, prior to 1859, many if not most in the West
fully accepted that the data –theological, philosophical and empirical – resoundingly implied the
existence of just such a being. As a result, for this claim to be plausible we would have to believe that
the free and effective choice of all of those who accepted such arguments during this period was
disabled. Needless to say, this is unbelievable.”1088
The three main theistic reasons for the necessity of an evolutionary process all remain
somewhat unconvincing. It may be that a more coherent case for the necessity of evolution
could be made from the perspective of process theism, which already includes the process-
like nature of creation in its basic philosophical background. But perhaps the evolutionary
theodicy could nevertheless provide the best response to the problem of natural evil, even if
it is not required for other theological reasons? The theological argument against ID is that if
the best or only way of solving the problem of natural evil requires accepting Darwinian
evolutionary theory, then models which question Darwinian evolution are theologically
problematic. The problem of evil then becomes a powerful a theological reason for rejecting
ID and accepting Darwinism. Rather than providing one possible way of building a bridge
between science and theology, ID’s success would actually provide evidence against the
existence of the Christian God.
The Unnecessity of an Evolutionary Theodicy
I see two large problems in the theological critique of ID based on the evolutionary theodicy.
First, even if the Darwinian theodicy is a good one, this does not by itself show that there are
no  other  ways  of  answering  to  the  problem  of  natural  evil.  In  order  for  the  lack  of  a
1087 Miller 2002, 290.
1088 Murray 2011, 180.
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Darwinian theodicy to be problematic for ID, those defending this theological argument
would have to show that none of the other answers to the problem of natural evil are at all
satisfactory. As Murray notes in his Nature Red in Tooth and Claw (2011), it seems possible to
build several different types of combinations from the various answers to the problem of
natural evil, and not all emphasize the importance of the nomic regularity, free process and
chaos-to-order defences in the same way.
In practice, Ayala and the other defenders of this theological critique of ID have not
produced any deep analysis of the other possible answers to the problem of natural evil. The
closest  I  have  found  to  this  is  Darrel  Falk’s  brief  critique  against  theodicies  based  on  the
cosmic  effects  of  the  angelic  fall.1089 However, even if the free will theodicy in the case of
natural evil were refuted (which still requires further demonstration), this would still not
mean that there is no other way of trying to respond to the problem of natural evil besides
the Darwinian theodicy. It would also have to be shown that none of the other theodicies and
defences presented in chapter 9.1. are usable for ID proponents.
So, the first problem in this theological critique of ID is that the necessity of the
Darwinian theodicy has not been demonstrated. The second problem in this critique is the
inherent weakness of the Darwinian theodicy. Robert J. Russell, no friend of ID, thus argues
that the Darwinian theodicy is “Theodicy Lite.” As noted, a major underlying assumption of
the Darwinian theodicy is that if God wanted to create life through natural laws, he had no
choice  but  to  rely  on  Darwinian  evolution,  and  no  choice  but  to  allow  the  evolution  of
natural evil. However, as Russell argues, this assumption is strange if we believe in an
omnipotent God who creates out of nothing:
1089 According to Falk, it is not credible for the ID theorists to claim that sickness-inducing bacteria are products of
unguided  evolution,  since  they  do  not  believe  that  naturalistic  evolution  has  the  capability  to  produce  the
molecular machinery necessary for this. If this is correct, then attributing these designs to the actions of the devil
is the only remaining credible alternative. But this, according to Falk, is theologically problematic: “Who is the new
creator? Does Satan have power to create? Surely not the Satan of Christian theology–that Satan functions to destroy, not
create. The whole story of intelligent design starts getting absurd, and it doesn’t fit with any orthodox Christian theology.”
(Falk 2009)
There may be something to this critique. It may be that explaining natural evil requires attributing creative
powers to demons to an extent that is theologically problematic; in the Bible even many features of nature which
humans see as fearful are sometimes presented as evidence of the glory of God. Christ himself is compared not
just to a lamb, but also to a lion. However, showing that there is a theological problem here would require a more
thorough analysis. It also has some in-depth defences (e.g. Boyd 2001; Murray 2011, chapter 3)
The meaning of the words “create” and “destroy” is central. ID theorists who adopt the demonic theodicy
could argue that though the devil cannot create from nothing, one way he destroys is by corrupting what God has
created.  So  all  evil  designs  must  be  corruptions  of  structures  of  what  God  has  created,  rather  than  something
made out  of  nothing.  Also,  it  seems strange  to  think  that  it  is  blasphemous  to  think  that  an  angelic  intelligent
being could have sufficient power to manipulate life if one simultaneously believes that the laws of nature have
the  powers  to  do  much more  autonomously  from God.  Why should  believing  that  one  part  of  nature  (angelic
beings) have creative powers be more heretical than believing that another part of nature (matter and energy in
free process) have these same creative powers? It seems to me that the more central problem for the demonic
theodicy is the difficulty of believing in the existence of demons, not any heretical nature of this belief.
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Admittedly if God were to create life without intervening in the nature and if the laws of
physics which govern these processes are taken for granted, then God may have had “no
choice” other than Darwinian evolution. But if we push it one step further, the question
returns at  a  more fundamental  level  in  what  I  will  call  “cosmic  theodicy.”  The point  is
that God created our universe ex nihilo with the specific laws of physics and constants of
nature which make Darwinian evolution possible. Why then did God choose to create
this universe with these laws and constants knowing that they would as a consequence
make  the  full  sweep  of  natural  evil  inevitable?  In  effect,  the  Ruse/  Dawkins  argument
does not rescue God from blame, but merely places blame at a foundational level, leading
to the Leibnizian challenge: is this the best of all possible universes?1090
So, Russell argues that the Darwinian theodicy does not succeed in absolving God of the
blame, because an omnipotent God could plausibly have created different laws of nature and
nature constants, creating life through another kind of process that did not result in any
suffering or at least not as much suffering. In classical Christian theology, God is not thought
to be constrained by the natural laws in choosing the way he creates. Rather, the natural laws
themselves are a free creation of God. If we think that God must have created through a
naturalistic process, then the modern theory of evolution does seem to be the most
scientifically credible attempt to describe this process. However, despite some arguments to
the contrary, this does not show that God must have created these particular natural laws. It
seems that any possibility for an evolutionary process must have been created by God
himself. Much more work has to be done to show that a world with Darwinian evolution is
indeed the sort of world that we would expect God to necessarily create.1091
The  problem  of  divine  freedom  for  any  account  which  supposes  that  God  must  of
necessity do something was already noted in chapter 5.2. There I also noted that this
nevertheless need not stop us from trying to find out reasons for some divine action, just as
the idea of human freedom does not stop us from finding reasons for human action. Collins
builds his own theology of evolution in just this way. According to Collins, finding a
rationale for God’s use of evolution can only happen after we have already become
convinced by the empirical evidence that God did indeed use evolution.1092 After this, it
becomes plausible to argue that evolution indeed was the best way, or at least a very good
way of creating. However, this more defensible way of building a theology of evolution does
not justify theological criticism of ID, since this theological view does not include any
necessary theological rationale for evolution that is independent of our acceptance of
evolution based on the empirical evidence.
1090 Russell 2013, 179; see also Russell 2008, chapters 7 & 8.
1091 DeWeese 2013 provides some interesting further speculation in this vein – he argues that we should expect
God to create a world that works through free chaotic processes, because such processes are important for the
ability  of  free  agents  to  create  truly  novel  things.  Some  problems  and  benefits  of  explaining  natural  evil  by
reference to free will were noted earlier in chapter 9.1; see also Murray 2011, chapter 3. Southgate (2011, 387-388)
also argues that evolution as we know it “was indeed the only way, or the best way, God could give rise to creaturely
selves.”
1092 Collins 2009.
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Intelligent Design’s Response to the Theological Critique
In its own response to the theological criticism based on the problem of natural evil, the ID
movement has also highlighted the same two problems: (1) that the Darwinian theodicy does
not seem to absolve God of the responsibility for natural evil, and (2) that there are other
ways of responding to the problem of natural evil. Like Russell, Behe and Dembski have also
argued that the Darwinian theodicy does not absolve God of responsibility, because God will
nevertheless be responsible for the sort of processes and possibilities he creates.1093 They do
not accept the analogy between the freedom of the moral agents and the freedom of natural
processes, because they understand these natural processes as inevitably controlled and
planned by God in some way, whereas the choices of moral agents are planned by
humans.1094 Giberson, in contrast, argues that there is a good analogy between the freedom of
human moral agents and the freedom of the creation, but does not defend this analogy in
any depth against the charge that it is just an anthropomorphism: an attribution of qualities
that are valuable in personal agents to something that cannot have them.1095
In response to Ayala, Behe argues that defenders of the design argument can also
appeal to the role of “natural evil” in making possible some greater good, and that God has
granted nature a great deal of autonomy, even if his direction is important in crucial parts of
the history of nature. Behe argues that not just any laws of nature will allow for the
emergence of complex human life and creaturely freedom, so even those who believe that
life has emerged through natural processes will have to believe that God has somehow
directed the course of evolution.1096 There is empirical support for this premise: as I argued in
chapters 6.4 and 8.2, the possibility of evolution appears to require fine-tuning and is
constrained by natural laws. The arguments of Simon Conway-Morris are also again
relevant: it seems that the course of the evolutionary process may be at least partly written
into the laws of nature.1097 If so, then even a Darwinian view will indeed not imply the total
freedom of the creation to evolve anything at all. If this sort of control of evolution by God
does not destroy the creation’s autonomy, then it needs to be clarified what makes the sort of
control envisaged by the ID movement different.
Both theistic evolution and ID typically assume that God has in some way directed or
controlled the evolutionary process, but that God has left enough freedom in the world to
allow for the evolution of natural evil. So, both approaches must similarly assume that God
has chosen the right balance between direction and freedom: enough direction to make the
1093 Behe 2007c,
1094 Behe 2007c; Dembski 2009; 2013.
1095 Giberson 2009; see also Giberson & Collins 2013. For a critique of this defence as anthropomorphism, see
Murray 2008, 174-175.
1096 Behe 2007c.
1097 Conway-Morris 2005.
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existence of intelligent life possible, but so much freedom that this explains the existence of
natural evil. Though explanations for how natural evil came about are often different within
ID and theistic evolutionism, there is much common ground in the underlying logic. Most of
the theological critiques of ID come from theistic evolutionists who believe that God acts in
the world. These are not typically deists who believe that God merely set up the system in
the beginning 1098
Perhaps the difference is in the amount of control God exercises over the evolutionary
process. As Giberson puts it, Intelligent Design implies that God micromanages nature down
to its fine biochemical details, designing the biochemical machinery of living cells.1099
Perhaps theistic evolutionism can allow the creation relatively more autonomy than ID’s
view, where the creation has much smaller power to evolve. The theological problem for ID
can then be restated as a general problem of divine action theory: if God acts in the world at
all, why does he not act even more?1100 As Corabi argues, if one accepts Intelligent Design,
then one cannot argue that God has chosen to create a world completely without any nomic
irregularity. In that case, Corabi argues, it becomes more difficult to claim that God should
not have intervened in nature even more.1101 If God has already micromanaged nature up to
its  fine  biochemical  details  in  millions  of  cases,  then  we  can  ask  why  God  has  not
micromanaged nature even more so as to prevent the evolution of the malarial parasite, for
example.1102
Corabi also provides what he thinks is the most plausible answer to this question. Let's
suppose that designing life requires a relatively small amount of interventions into the
natural order. For example, maybe it requires thousands of miracles in the history of life in
order to build the most important "irreducibly complex" systems. Related to the lenght of
history and the enormity of the world, it can be argued that these do not yet create “massive
irregularity” in nature.1103
Since theists already typically believe that God acts in the world, it is difficult to limit
precisely how much God can act before this becomes problematic for the regularity of
creation and the possibility of creaturely freedom. If the one act of raising Jesus from the
dead does not yet create massive irregularity in the world, why should directing the
evolution of the bacterial flagellum create massive irregularity? It is difficult to evaluate such
1098 Darrel Falk, for example, writes that “in Scripture we have this mysterious interplay between the ongoing assurance
of God’s Spirit and a life lived in freedom including, even, the harmful by-products that freedom brings with it.” (Falk 2009)
1099 Giberson 2009.
1100 Murray 2008, 148-149; 2009, 369. The arguments for the necessity of nomic regularity are typically based on the
bad consequences that massive irregularity would create for the world. Humans could no longer study and trust
in the fundamental rationality of the world and could not reliably interact with each other or make moral choices.
However, it is not clear why a small amount of irregularity would jeopardize these aims, so critics of this defence
can always already ask why God does not do more to minimize suffering. The question that ID raises about the
amount  of  divine  intervention  in  the  world  seems  to  be  quite  relevant  even  without  ID,  then.  The  nomic
regularity defence does not seem to be sufficient in itself.
1101 Corabi 2009, 23-28.
1102 Ruse 2003, chapter 15 & 2001, chapter 6.
1103 Corabi 2009, 30-31.
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things. However, it seems that if the defence based on nomic regularity is to be valuable at
all from the viewpoint of traditional Christian belief, then this nomic regularility must not
rule out all divine intervention in the world. The Creator must be able to interact with his
creation without jeopardizing its autonomy and regularity. Much further work must be done
before it is possible to argue confidently that the amount and type of miracles required by ID
(if it indeed requires miracles at all) is enough to make nomic regularity defence
impossible.1104
Some Conclusions from the Discussion
In this chapter I have spent much time describing results from the discussion of the problem
of natural evil that has been happening in the past decades. I have felt it necessary to go into
this discussion in such depth, because the discussion has typically been conducted without
situating it in this broader context. Nevertheless, the broader discussion contains many
insights that are useful for the discussion on Intelligent Design.
Based on the analysis presented in this chapter, the problem of natural evil does not
settle the discussion on Intelligent Design in the way that is sometimes presented.
Proponents of ID would do well to discuss the problem more, since it is indeed relevant in
the broader context of their argument. However, the problem of natural evil does not in itself
provide a sufficient philosophical or theological critique of ID.
The problem of natural evil is worthy of continued attention in the discussion because
it reveals the philosophical and theological assumptions of all sides of the debate so clearly.
It is clear that the acceptance and rejection of design arguments is often based on theological
considerations. Though the ID movement sometimes seeks to bypass theological concerns, it
seems that the theological side of the discussion also needs to be engaged if the ID
movement, since it inevitably influences perceptions of ID.
In this chapter, I have been arguing that in addition to many thinkers of the ID
movement, many of the movement´s critics are also influenced by philosophical and
theological considerations. The problem of natural evil is seen as a highly pressing reason to
1104 The nomic regularity defence, though valuable, seems insufficient in itself. William Alston (1994), 55-56 argues
that even rejecting the possibility of divine interventions entirely would only move the problem back: “The point is
that the problem of evil is so severe anyway, even if there is no divine intervention, that the accretion due to the distribution
of divine intervention is hardly significant. Even if God’s activity vis-à-vis creation is confined to initially setting things up
in the way he does, there are more than enough questions as to why he has done it this way. – – Thus, quite apart from
problems concerning divine intervention, we are faced with unanswered questions, perhaps unanswerable by us in this life,
questions as to why God has devised His creation as He has. Hence, if a theistic position is tenable at all, it is tenable in the
face of an inability to answer such questions, and so our inability to answer such questions concerning divine intervention
can hardly be a conclusive reason for rejecting it. If our inability to answer such questions is a conclusive negative reason,
then theism goes down the drain whether we accept divine intervention or not. And if it is not a conclusive negative reason,
it leaves the belief in divine intervention standing.” See also Murray 2008, 5.
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reject ID. Clearly, the theological and philosophical side of the debate is important and
should be discussed openly.
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10. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters have been an analysis of the debate on Intelligent Design with the
aim of answering two questions. First (1), what is the structure of the Intelligent Design
movement’s design argument and what are its central concepts and presuppositions? Second (2),
How does Intelligent Design relate to theistic evolutionism and naturalistic evolutionism on the
question of design? In addition, I have attempted to advance the discussion on the central
philosophical and theological questions of the debate. It is now time to summarize my
answers to the research questions, and to recap some of my ideas about the debate.
10.1. The Design Argument
The Structure of the Design Argument
The ID movement’s design argument is an attempt to defend the idea that the order of
nature has marks of intelligent design. Research in the cognitive sciences of religion supports
the idea that humans indeed have a tendency to interpret nature teleologically, and believe
in a Creator. The ID movement also sees its arguments as supporting the reliability of this
intuitive interpration of nature´s order. Contrary to some critiques, such strong
commonsense intuitions do seem to provide at least some prima facie reason to believe in a
designer. However, as with other commonsense beliefs, this does not mean that such
evidence could not be overturned or supported by further arguments. So, exploring
arguments for and against the reliability of this intuitive conclusion still seems highly
desirable. Appeals to common sense or its failure are not themselves sufficient to settle the
discussion.
ID indeed does not rely on just our intuitive reasoning, but attempts to develop
rigorous philosophical, even scientific design arguments. Proponents of ID have defended
several different formulations of the design argument. I analysed formulations of the design
argument as an analogy, an induction, an inference to the best explantion and an inference to
the only explanation. Though design arguments have often been understood as analogies, I
argued that ID´s version of the argument is better understood as an inference to the best
explanation or to the only explanation. These inferences work by positing that design best
explains certain features of the cosmos and the biological world, such as fine-tuning and
irreducible complexity. The critique of alternative explanations is crucial for these argument
types, but a positive connection between intelligent design as a cause and the properties
explained is needed.
I argued that the ID movement’s design argument gains its explanatory power from
the perceived connection between teleological properties and design as a teleological
process. This connection is argued based on inductive observation, subjective experience of
the nature of intelligence, and rational intuitions. Many thinkers in the ID movement prefer
using technical terms like “specified complexity” instead of teleology when describing the
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complexity of nature. However, they typically move back to the language of teleology when
it comes time to explain the explanatory power of the argument. It is argued that the
appearance of teleology in nature is best explained by a teleological cause: intelligent design.
My analysis of the logic of the design argument and thought experiments supports the
possibility that this type of inference could indeed in principle work. Whether the actual
world contains evidence that can be identified in this way is another matter. Many critics of
design arguments also acknowledge that there are features of nature which are congenial to
the design-based explanation. When design-based explanations are rejected, it should be
done after first considering the details of the arguments, and the evidence presented.
To reject ID´s design arguments, one should also argue that it is more reasonable to
accept some other explanation than design, or at least that it is more reasonable to wait for
such an alternative explanation, than to accept the conclusion of design. ID´s design
arguments require that such alternative explanations can be shown much less improbable
than design. Just how improbable the natural explanations have to be shown depends on
conceptions about the prior credibility of the design hypothesis. ID assumes an
interpretation of the philosophy of mind in which intentionality can really be the true
explanation of human behaviour, and even an unembodied designer could have sufficiently
analogous properties for the argument to work. Furthermore, in order for the argument to
work, the existence of this kind of nonhuman designer must be accepted as a possibility that
could in principle be supported by the evidence.
Cosmic and Biological Design Arguments
The ID movement sees a positive connection between cosmic and biological design
arguments. Cosmic design arguments are based on the idea that the fine-tuning of the
natural laws and the rationality of the cosmos are best explained by postulating a designer,
usually seen as the God of theism. The ID movement argues that the cosmic and biological
arguments provide two mutually reinforcing lines of evidence. Theistic natural theologians
have long argued that the rationality of the cosmos provides evidence that resonates with
belief in a Creator. The ID movement argues that admitting the existence of such a cosmic
designer opens up further questions. It is argued that a designer has also acted within
natural history to ensure the existence of higher forms of life, rather than merely designing
the natural laws. This use of several different arguments to support the same conclusion
finds significant analogies in theistic natural theology.
However, there are also tensions between the cosmic and biological design arguments.
Cosmic design arguments clearly move outside the realm of natural science, whereas the ID
movement’s biological design arguments include critiques of Darwinian evolutionary theory
and naturalistic origin of life-scenarios. Though both arguments are derided as “God of the
gaps”-arguments, this charge seems to have more relevance in the case of biological design
arguments. This is because natural history has generally been thought of as the domain of
methodologically naturalistic science, whereas explaining the cosmic order is traditionally
the domain of philosophy and theology.
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Both types of arguments depend on the possibility of finding limits to natural
explanations, since both claim to explain phenomena where naturalistic explanations fail.
The difference is only that it is more credible that these limits are real in the case of the order
of the laws of nature. This is shown by the strategy of “level-shifting”: in many cases,
naturalistic explanations do not seem to eliminate the rationality of nature that design
arguments seek to explain, but merely push this rationality back to the level of more ultimate
natural laws. However, it seems in principle possible that the evidence could also warrant
belief in the existence of some naturalistically unexplainable gaps in natural history. The
quality of the empirical evidence is the crucial thing to be evaluated, and the philosophical
and theological arguments against the “God of the gaps” do not allow us to bypass this
evaluation. So, the philosophical and theological critique of the God of the gaps is not as
nearly strong as critiques of ID as is often assumed in the discussion.
The design arguments of natural theology have typically been theistic, concluding that
there is evidence for the existence of a good God. In contrast, the ID movement argues
merely for the existence of an unidentified “intelligent designer”. Nevertheless, for most
participants of the debate, theism remains the most credible idea about the identity of the
designer. Furthermore, many of the ideas of ID´s design arguments make much more sense
in a theistic context. In ID´s cosmic design arguments, the beauty and the goodness of the
natural order also play a part of the argument, which implies that the designer also must be
good. ID´s biological design arguments, too, seem to assume at least an extremely wise
designer. Because of the perceived theistic implications, it is reasonable to link ID´s design
arguments to the traditional discussion of natural theology, even though the ID movement
itself emphasizes the minimalistic nature of its argument.
The ID movement emphasizes the scientific nature of its argument and its difference
from the arguments of natural theology, and it does indeed formulate its argument without
the traditional religious context. However, it is not difficult to imagine that if the ID theorists
did not see strategic benefits in this distinction, they would rather emphasize the continuity
between ID’s designer and God, and openly make use of broader theistic arguments. It is
clear, after all, that background beliefs about the philosophy of mind and the plausibility of
theism greatly affect evalutions of design arguments.
ID´s Design Arguments in Relation to Creationism and the Natural Sciences
There are different narratives about Intelligent Design. Many critics present ID as a
repackaged form of creationism, while the movement presents itself as a scientific research
programme. I have argued that analysing the merit of ID’s arguments is of more interest
than whether it should be classified as creationism or science. These definitions are semantic
questions, and cannot settle the ontological questions that are the core issues of the debate.
However, the results of my analysis do also shed light on questions of definitions. On a
very broad definition of creationism, ID is creationism, but on a sufficiently narrow
definition, it is not. There is both substantial continuity and discontinuity between ID and
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different forms of creationism. In any case, both empirical, philosophical, theological and
moral arguments play a large role in the discussion on ID´s design arguments.
The ID theorists principally defend a minimalistic design argument, in which the
designer of biological and cosmic order is not identified. In the logical structure of the
argument as it is presented by the movement, the separation between identifying the action
of an unknown intelligent designer and identifying the designer does make sense.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the same cognitive apparatus is in play both in
recognizing human design and the designedness of nature. It seems ID´s minimalistic design
argument has analogies to the detection of the work of finite designers. This line of argument
provides  some  grounds  for  claiming  that  ID  is  somehow  analoguous  to  sciences  such  as
archeology,  which  also  study  evidence  of  design.  The  best  objections  to  this  argument  are
based on the differences between design-based explanations and the law-based explanations
that are most commonly used in the natural sciences. The problem of defining the precise
boundary between science and pseudoscience is a difficult one. Often, it is far easier to argue
that a bad argument is bad science, than it is to argue that there is nothing scientific about it
at all.
Because of the ID movement´s emphasis on the scientific nature of its design argument,
and because of the political importance of the definition of science, much energy has been
used to debate whether ID indeed fits under the definition of science. The most common
objections to ID as science are based on versions of methodological naturalism. I
differentiated between strong methodological naturalism, which excludes any designers and
supernatural entities from the natural sciences a priori, and weak methodological naturalism,
which excludes such entities only based on an a posteriori evaluation of their scientific
success.
ID´s principal objection to strong methodological naturalism is that a priori
methodological restrictions may not reflect the actual structure of reality. Before the
examination of the empirical evidence, it is conceivable that an intelligent designer´s activity
beyond the laws of nature was required for the origin and evolution of life. If a designer´s
activity truly has been a crucial factor in natural history, then a science guided by strong
methodological naturalism will never reach the true explanation of the origin of biological
complexity.
The ID theorists express the same point theologically by emphasizing God´s freedom in
creation. Since God could have created in any way, it is up to empirical science to find out
how he did it. God could have created the various living species through a process of
evolution,  or  worked  through  miracles,  for  example.  This  principle  of  openness  to  the
evidence is not restricted to the ID movement, but is part of the historical theological
motivations of natural science, and a commonly used argument also in the theology and
science community. The ID theorists apply the principle against strong methodological
naturalism: God may not respect the boundaries of the sciences that have been set by
humans. God may even have intruded into the territory of the natural sciences by directing
the origin of life, for example. It is then argued that the natural sciences should be open to
finding evidence of such a design act.
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I have argued that this objection deserves to be taken seriously into account when
defending methodological naturalism. However, methodological naturalism can be
formulated in a non-dogmatic way which avoids ID´s objections. The simplest way to
respond is to restrict the domain of the natural sciences. On this understanding, the natural
sciences do not have a monopoly on truth and rational beliefs. Rather, some questions are
better characterized as part of other disciplines, such as history, psychology, philosophy and
theology. In the theology and science community, it is commonly accepted that there is a
hierarchy of scientific disciplines, and the natural sciences are not expected to answer all
questions about the world. If the origin and evolution of life were indeed designed events,
then a humble methodological naturalist can argue that the origin of life would no longer be
part of the domain of the natural sciences. So, the boundaries of methodologically
naturalistic science can be based on the evidence, rather than assumed dogmatically on a
priori grounds.
Another way to respond to ID´s objection is to defend merely weak methodological
naturalism, and argue that ID is rejected based on the evidence, not a priori considerations.
In the discussion on ID, several critics of ID have moved away from strong methodological
naturalism, and have argued that something like ID could in principle be a part of the
natural sciences. In this understanding, ID is critiqued based on the merits of its arguments,
and the search for natural explanations is defended based on its historical scientific
fruitfulness.
However, both of these credible ways of defending methodological naturalism concede
the principal point that an evaluation of the arguments for and against ID cannot be evaded.
It seems that it is possible to imagine a world in which it would be reasonable to believe in
ID; it is just a matter of what sort of evidence we actually have. So, the crucial matter to be
evaluated is the quality of the arguments, rather than which discipline they fall under. The
question of whether ID qualifies as science or not is a side-issue.
The answer to the question of ID´s scientific status is again likely to be more complex
than a simple yes or no. Parts of ID´s research programme (such as the evaluation of the
plausibility of evolutionary mechanisms) clearly fall under even the strictest definitions of
natural science, but others (such as the design argument) may be better construed as part of
philosophy. If we accept the analogy between ID´s design argument and the detection of
human design, ID could also be called an integration of methods from the humanities and
the natural sciences.
ID has sometimes been formulated as a theistic science, which eschews the ideal of
scientific neutrality and seeks to understand nature starting from the assumption that God
created the world. However, the ID movement´s mainstream attempts to formulate ID as a
methodologically neutral science, in which neither the existence nor non-existence of
supernatural designers is assumed a priori. But perhaps it is even better to see ID as an
attempt to integrate methods and ideas from various disciplines. If we go by the traditionally
defined boundaries of disciplines, it becomes apparent that ID´s project has both empirical,
philosophical and theological parts.
In the course of this study, it has become clear that the ID movement’s design
argument has been formulated in dialogue and debate with opposing views.  The nature of
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ID’s design argument will thus become clearer as I turn to my second research question: the
relationship of ID to naturalistic evolutionism and theistic evolutionism.
10.2. ID and Naturalistic Evolutionism
Intelligent Design’s Conflict with Naturalism
ID´s approach in dialoguing with naturalism is to challenge naturalism on the level of the
natural sciences, rather than on the level of philosophy and metaphysics, which the theology
and science community has traditionally regarded as the better way to approach the issue. In
the beginning of this study, I defined two forms of naturalistic evolutionism as (1) evolution
without God and the supernatural, and (2) evolution which is seen as being in tension with
important religious beliefs, or even evidence against the existence of God. ID is motivated in
part by the desire to oppose this naturalistic understanding of evolution. The ID theorists
argue that an intelligent designer explains the emergence of life, biological information and
irreducible complexity better than naturalism, and that intelligent design is also the best
explanation for many features of the cosmos. Furthermore, evidence of design is thought to
support a theistic vision of the cosmos over an atheistic one.
The ID movement’s design arguments have been formulated and refined in dialogue
and debate with naturalism. In ID´s argumentation, design and naturalistic explanations are
thought to work at least to some extent on the same explanatory level. In both cosmic and
biological design arguments, design is often opposed with naturalistic explanations.
Naturalistic explanations for fine-tuning include both the multiverse hypothesis and
references to hypothetical ultimate physical explanation for everything. These have been
critiqued with several arguments, including (1) the alleged ad hoc nature of the multiverse
hypothesis, (2) the consequences of the multiverse hypothesis in undermining our
confidence in reason, (3) the greater explanatory power of the design hypothesis, because it
also explains the intelligibility of the cosmos, (4) the consonance of the design hypothesis
with further theistic arguments, and (5) “level-shifting”, arguing that proposed naturalistic
explanations do not actually solve the problem. The ID movement has used primarily the
first three strategies, whereas theistic philosophers have used all five.
The ID movement’s biological design arguments are based on the appearance of
purposeful complexity or teleology in biology, which proponents of ID believe is particularly
well exemplified by “irreducibly complex” systems. Irreducible complexity and the origin of
life are thought to be the central problems for naturalistic explanations of all of biological
complexity. I also detailed several other problems that have been used in the discussion, and
revealed the interdependency of the arguments. My analysis of the problem of irreducible
complexity (IC) revealed that much of the critical discussion has missed a crucial part of the
argument. Biological homologies and the possibility of co-option are rightly reference as a
possible answer to the problem of IC. Unfortunately typical discussions of the biological side
of the debate ignore the fact that the IC-argument has also been formulated in a way that is
meant to pose problems for the co-option -argument. These further arguments should be
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taken more seriously in future discussions of ID. The importance of philosophical arguments
for deciding how we should approach scientific mysteries cannot be bypassed.
Based on my analysis of the debate, it is clear that philosophical and theological
arguments play a role in the strength of beliefs in both naturalistic explanations and design.
This is partly because the scientific evidence is incomplete and many scientific mysteries
remain, and partly because many of the questions of the debate are more philosophical and
theological than scientific in nature.
On the naturalistic side, important arguments include (1) the critique of the
“God/designer of the gaps” and the explanatory power of design, (2) defence of the
superiority of naturalistic explanations over design-based ones, and (3) the problem of
natural evil. All of these criticisms are repeated in the cases of both cosmic and biological
design arguments, showcasing the similarity of the arguments, at least from a naturalistic
perspective. This shows a link between the two types of design arguments. Particularly in
the case of a priori -critiques, solving the problems in the case of one argument will often
help answer critiques in the case of the other argument. However, the different evidential
basis of each argument and the greater credibility of natural explanations in the case of
biology also create important disanalogies between the arguments.
I have argued that the most plausible defences of naturalism against design arguments
should begin by admitting that there can be no in-principle ban on design-based
explanations. Methodological naturalism should be formulated in a self-critical and
undogmatic way that allows for the in principle possibility of evidence for design. The
preference for natural explanations should be justified based on their historical scientific
fruitfulness, rather than a priori principles. At the same time, naturalists should
acknowledge that the success of natural science also depends on the possibility of intentional
explanations, and there is knowledge outside science. This leaves the door open for
discussion of theistic arguments and dialogue between the various parties.
I have argued that it is reasonable to think that we could in principle have evidence of
an intelligent designer of the cosmos. Eliminative naturalism is one way to reject this
conclusion,  but  it  is  a  highly  problematic  position  that  is  not  usually  advocated  by  the
naturalists in the ID discussion. So, rather than basing their arguments on principles which
exclude any conceivable evidence of design a priori, naturalists should rather argue that our
actual world only contains weak evidence of design, rather than strong evidence as the ID
theorists claim. Furthermore, naturalists need to argue that design inferences are much
stronger when we have background knowledge about the designer, and we lack such
knowledge in the case of cosmic and biological design. Design arguments need to be shown
to depend to a large degree on the broader theistic arguments. If the naturalist rejects all of
these other arguments, she can then go on to argue that the evidence of design is also not
convincing enough in the case of the natural order.
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The Problem of Good and the Problem of Evil
Cosmic design arguments and biological design arguments are based (very broadly
understood) on the phenomenon of natural good: the useful arrangements, rational ordering
and beauty of the cosmos and living organisms. The rationality and the fine-tuning of nature
in particular does seem to remain problematic for naturalism. In the final analysis, most of
the naturalistic answers to cosmic design arguments seem to end up claiming simply that
some of these puzzling features of nature cannot and need not be explained. Here theists are
in a good position to argue that God may provide a better stopping point for the search of
explanations.
However, naturalists can also appeal to the problem of natural evil as counterevidence
to  all  theistic  arguments.  This  is  a  more  powerful  response.  The  problem  of  natural  evil
points to the apparently useless and chaotic arrangements, bad design and the ugliness of
the world as evidence against design. While proponents of cosmic design arguments argue
that the cosmos is fine-tuned for life and rational, the problem of natural evil can be used to
argue that our cosmos appears to be largely indifferent to the suffering of living beings.
Rather than being the good world that one would expect based on a theistic design
hypothesis, our world is argued to be mediocre at best. Against biological design arguments,
it is argued that living things are in many places poorly designed and not the sort that one
would expect from a wise and powerful designer, but are rather better explained by a
haphazard, tinkering process of evolution.
Defenders of design arguments have responded to these criticisms in several ways – I
provided a list of eleven different ways to answer the problem. However, there is a
difference between theistic design arguments and the ID movement’s design arguments
which do not identify the designer. Theistic defences of the design argument are committed
to the claim that the designer is good, whereas the ID movement’s non-theistic design
arguments do not identify the designer as God. Thus the ID theorists attempt to bypass
discussion of the problem of natural evil on the grounds that it is not relevant to their
argument. However, I have argued that the broader context of ID´s design arguments should
lead the ID theorists to also engage with the problem of natural evil in a deeper way. The
credibility of ID´s minimalistic design argument also depends partly on broader
philosophical and theological issues, so the movement should engage these issues.
Based on the prominence of the problem of natural evil in critiques of the design
arguments presented by proponents of ID and natural theologians, one might think that
naturalists and believers in design are separated here by their degrees of optimism and
pessimism. However, when they are not engaged in critiques of theistic arguments, the
naturalists in the discussion also typically emphasize their awe at the marvellous designs
and beauty they see in nature.
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10.3. ID and Theistic Evolutionism
The Conflict Between ID and Theistic Evolutionism
Because a central aim of Intelligent Design is to oppose a naturalistic understanding of the
world, ID would initially seem to have much in common with theistic evolutionism, since a
theistic understanding of evolution is also opposed to naturalism. However, there is much
tension between ID and theistic evolution. Whereas ID questions the veracity and sufficiency
of Darwinian evolutionary theory as an explanation for all of life’s complexity, theistic
evolutionism attempts to harmonize the traditional Christian understanding of creation with
mainstream naturalistic scientific theory.
Theistic evolutionists also use some of the same philosophical arguments against ID as
naturalists. For example, ID is argued to introduce the concept of design improperly to the
study of biological organisms, which should rather be studied by a methodologically
naturalistic science. Theistic evolutionists’ primary motivation for accepting Darwinian
evolutionary theory comes from its status as a broadly accepted scientific theory. However,
many theological arguments for preferring theistic evolutionists to an interventionistic
understanding of divine action within natural history have also been presented. Three major
arguments for this theological preference are first (1) that a theory of divine action
harmonized with Darwinism makes explaining the existence of natural evil easier, second (2)
that interventionism leads to an erroneous “God of the gaps”-theology where God is made
into an explanation on the level of scientific theory, and third (3) that ID’s picture of God as a
designer is an anthropomorphic account which misrepresents the doctrine of creation and
the doctrine of God. Sometimes it is even argued that ID comes close heresy.
These arguments are interesting, but inconclusive. Claims that ID is heretical overstate
the case against ID, and would require that if ID´s arguments were found to be correct, they
would actually constitute evidence against the existence of the Christian God. In response to
the first argument, the success of the Darwinian theodicy can be contested, and ID theorists
can arguably also use a broad variety of strategies in responding to the problem of natural
evil. In response to the second argument, it is difficult to present a good theological
argument which totally rules out the possibility that God could have intervened in natural
history. The abhorrence of God’s miraculous interventions in the world often rests on the
picture of God as a perfect watchmaker, but there are also other metaphors of God (such as
the maker of a musical instrument) which are more congenial to even miraculous divine
interaction with the world. It seems possible to formulate a theology which includes both the
idea that God has created and upholds the order of nature, and that God works within
nature in a way that goes beyond the laws of nature. In response to the third argument, the
understanding of creation as the ordering of nature is arguably also a central part of the
traditional doctrine of creation. There is thus a basis for speaking of God as a designer
analogously. The critique of ID as idolatry comes close to the critique of all natural theology
as idolatry, and proponents of ID could well utilise many of the responses that can be made
on behalf of natural theology more generally.
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It seems possible to conceive a world in which questions like the origin of life are
indeed the proper limit of natural explanations, just as theistic evolutionists conceive of the
explanation of cosmic fine-tuning and the rationality of the cosmos as a properly beyond the
capacity of the natural sciences to explain. God could have created the world in a way that
does not respect the traditional division of tasks between theology and the natural sciences.
In the theology and science community, it is broadly accepted that God´s creative acts are
free and we need empirical research to find out what sort of world God did create. Applying
this thinking to the question of ID means that theistic evolutionists should primarily also use
the empirical evidence against ID, rather than depending too heavily on theological
arguments.  Of  course,  theological  arguments  can  continue  to  be  used  to  show  why
theological explanations are more at home in the level of metaphysics, rather than the
natural sciences. Theological arguments can also continue to be used to show the
compatibility of evolution and creation, and to point out tensions in ID´s theological
argumentation.
Problems in ID´s Critique of Theistic Evolutionism
Classical Christian theology admits the possibility that God could have intervened into
history beyond the laws of nature. This makes it theologically difficult to rule out the
possibility of divine interventions into history a priori, without looking at the evidence.
However, the classical doctrine of creation is indeed more about the ultimate basis of reality
rather than being a theory in competition with some scientific theory. Thus the ID theorists
can be argued to err by emphasizing the comparison between design and evolutionary
theory as explanations. So, the theological critique of God of the gaps does provide an
important warning against too heavy an emphasis on God’s direct activity in natural history
beyond the secondary causes of nature. The theological critique of idolatry also contains a
useful warning. Talk of God as a designer must also admit that God is more than a designer,
and the doctrine of creation should be understood to be about far more than design. The ID
theorists emphasize only the aspect of God as a designer, and sometimes create the
impression that God’s activity could not be detected without gaps in natural processes. This
is puzzling, since the ID theorists also believe that the laws of nature are designed.
The ID theorists’ critique of theistic evolutionism is problematic and in tension with the
movement´s broader ideas. While the ID movement admits the possibility that God could
have created life through some sort of evolutionary process, it also understands Darwinian
evolution as a worldview that is by definition atheistic. It seems to me that the ID theorists
do not adequately respond to the arguments for separating between Darwinian evolutionary
biology as a scientific discipline and Darwinism as a worldview. Here the views of the ID
theorists even come close to scientism, because they argue that theistic evolutionism should
differ from the Darwinian worldview on the level of science, before it can differ in any
meaningful way. The ID theorists would do well to admit the value of philosophical and
theological arguments in this discussion more clearly, as they do elsewhere. Furthermore, as
implied by their argument from divine freedom, God could have used the process of
Conclusions
299
Darwinian  evolution  in  creating  life,  and  it  is  up  to  empirical  science  to  find  out  what
happened. The admission of the possibility of theistic evolutionism would help create a
theologically more secure basis for ID and help quell the suspicion that ID is strongly driven
by theological motivations.
In the course of my analysis of ID’s biological design arguments, I have provided some
novel thoughts towards the reconciliation of biological design arguments and Darwinian
evolutionary biology. Surprisingly, I have found some inspiration for this line of argument
from the ID theorists’ writings, despite the ID movement’s own dismissal of the combination
of Darwinism and design. Critiques of Darwinism can be turned into illustrations of the
amount of fine-tuning which Darwinian evolution requires to work, and arguments on the
necessity of design for the functioning of simulations of evolution show how the possibility
of evolution depends on the existence of proper conditions. Furthermore, I have argued that
biological organisms could function as icons through which the fine-tuning of nature
becomes most clearly manifest, and so by extension the designedness of the universe can be
perceived through organisms, even in a evolutionary cosmos. These arguments require
much further work, but my opinion is that they point towards the possibility for movement
from ID to a theistic evolutionistic view without sacrificing belief in biological design.
10.4. Towards Better Discussion of Evolution and Creation
I began this study be referring to the wide-spread intuition that the order of nature somehow
testifies of the existence, power and wisdom of a Creator. The useful arrangements, rational
ordering and beauty of nature can be understood as a “problem of natural good” for
naturalistic atheism. If there is no Creator, then why is there so much good in the world? The
discussion on design arguments shows the complexity of this question, but also its potential.
Though the focus of this study has been on understanding rather than on evaluating the
design argument, it does seem that the argument can be formulated in a way that bypasses
many common objections. In my analysis, I have pointed out responses to many
philosophical and theological critiques of design arguments.
However, the ID movement’s arguments also have problems. In particular, ID´s way of
opposing design and Darwinism and its unwillingness to openly connect its argument with
its broader philosophical and theological context are problematic. On many points, the ID
theorists’ argument is weaker than it could be because of the movement’s lack of
engagement with a more robust Christian theism and classical theology of creation. My
analysis reveals that major positions in the ID debate are based not just on scientific
evidence, but also on philosophy and theology. For maximal academic and cultural benefits,
the debate should be openly conducted on all of these levels.
In my analysis of the cognitive terrain of the discussion on Intelligent Design, I have
gone through a large amount of material and identified much that is crucial for
understanding the ID movement’s design argument and the relationship of ID to naturalism
and theistic evolutionism. But there also remains much that can be studied further. First (1),
based on this mapping of the cognitive terrain of the debate, a full evaluation of the ID
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movement’s research programme could be conducted. This would require a much more in-
depth analysis of the scientific evidence, as well as the nature of science and evidence.
Bayesian analysis could be used to provide much better estimates of what, exactly, is the
impact of different background beliefs on the credibility of design arguments. Second (2), the
theological and moral argumentation of the ID theorists and their critics that are not directly
related to the design argument could be further analysed. The moral, psychological, social
and political aspects of the debate are highly intriguing, and could serve as an interesting
case study of human nature and the ethics of living in a world of such fundamental
disagreements. Third (3), I would like to be able to formulate a theological understanding of
nature incorporating the idea of design in nature and “the problem of natural good” into a
proper theology of nature, taking into account the theological and philosophical problems
identified in this study. This type of a theology of nature would argue that the order of
nature has properties that help make talk of a Creator intelligible, just as the question “Why
is there something rather than nothing?” is often conceived to do.
This has been a study of the Intelligent Design movement’s design argument and its
theology as it relates to the design argument. Looking back on this study, I am amazed at the
multitude of connections between the design argument and other long-standing issues in the
philosophy of science, the philosophy of religion and theology. My analysis of Intelligent
Design has touched on problems like the relationship of faith, reason and science, the
problem of natural evil, the nature of reality and the nature of God. For me, this revelation of
the breadth of the factors behind the debate on design arguments has been the one of the
greatest rewards of this study.
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